標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利許可費：定價方法、適用困境及完善建議

Abstract： In essence，the negotiationof license fees onstandard essential patent （SEP）belongs toa kindofmarketbehavior，and the pricing right should be given to the market subjects under the requirements of patent law.In recent years，the frequent disputes on SEP licensefees witnessed in the industrialand academic worlds，together with the lack of systematic supporting functions like FRAND，make SEP pricing excessively reliant on judicial judgment in practice. Fortunately，a varietyofpricing methods have been proposed bytheoreticalresearchand practiced in judicial cases， which provide possble solutions forthelicense fee pricing ofSEPfrom theoperational level.Inthis paper，byfocusing on the characteristics of the existing SEP pricing methods in the academic fields and judicial system，the dispute caused by license fes of SEP is clarifiedfirstly，then bycombining and interpreting twelve existing pricing methods of license fee of SEPwith academic literature and judicialcases，four categories of methods arecomposed basedon the application stagesand calculation logic.Thirdly，theapplicationbariers and dilemmascaused bythe inherent limitations of the fourcategories of methods are analyzed，andthe posible ways toputthese methods into practice are explored.Lastly，suggestions are presented fromthe aspects ofpreconditions for application，pricing stages，dispute resolution mechanisms，and comprehensive applications.The purpose of this paper is to provide enlightenment for geting back on track with the pricing right and further optimization of the pricing mechanism of license fees of SEP.

eywords：SEP; FRAND principle; license fee;pricing method; application dilemma

CLC：D923.42;G306 DC： A Article：2096-9783（2025）03-0134-15

Standard esential patent （SEP）refers to the patent that must be used for the implementation of a technical standard].Its formationand development isa phased processof\"technique patented，patent standardized，standard licensed\"， where various types of subjects participate and play diferent roles in each stage.

The Standard-Seting Organization （SSO） hascompleted the screening and identificationof the standard essential patents inthe process of patent standardization.Considering theposibilityof high pricingcosts or monopolyliabilityl2l，most standards-seting organizations do not want to participate in pricing license feesand have no intention of seting detailed licensing rules，only requiring the SEPowner to make a promise called \"fair，reasonable， and non-discriminatory\" （FRAND）3l.On this basis，the SEP license fee is completely determined by the SEP owner and implementer through their negotiation.Leaving royalty pricing to market negotiations reflects both market economy principlesand the foundational purpose of the patent system.However，diffrent from ordinary patent licensing，

SEP hasobvious public atributes，so its licensing activities should take into accountthe interests of SEP owners， the implementerand thepublic.It is thecore functionof theFRANDprinciple tobalance the interestsof both parties by restricting the SEP licensing behavior.However，in practice，the ambiguity and non-punitive nature of the FRAND principlemake it impossible to play a guiding and binding role effctively，and the absence of a system function leads to the growing litigation disputes between \"hold up\" and \"hold out' ^14] ，the core of this kind of case lies in the determination of the license fee.

In addition to the ambiguityofthe FRAND principle，the civil justiciabilityof theSEP licensefee willalso affectthe pricing process，leading tothedeviationof pricing rights.Specificall，SEP licensefee disputes incivil litigationare different fromordinary patent license fee amount disputes.The later do not belong tothe adjustmentof thecourt，completelybythe deal tonegotiate;only defaultor infringement may intervenebythecourt，butthe amount of the SEP license feeitself isaqualified groundl，Which alsoleads tothe fact that when SEPlicense fee disputes arise，both parties often choose to resort to legal proceedings.Theabove two reasons make the court often become the pricing subject of SEP license fee in practice.This deviation in pricing authority not only increases the temporalandfinancialcostsof standard implementation，butalsopartiallyundermines theestablished pricing mechanism for SEP licensing fees.In adition，the pricing activities of the license fee involve many factors such as the patent itself，related standards，technical information，and marketconditions.Obviously，the court is not the subject with the most understanding of such information，and the limited vision of the identity also makes the judge often in adilemmabl.Moreover，due to the limitationof the process of judicial judgment，judges are oftenaffcted bythe prejudice after the event，so the price of the license fee by the judgment may not be fair and reasonablel7l.

The determination of the pricing method is a key part of the pricing processof the SEP licensefee，and the optimization of thepricing methods is the most direct path to solving thecurent SEPpricing problems，both forthe two sidesof theenterprisesand for judicial pricing.A varietyof pricing methodsareput forwardby theoretical research and judicial precedents，which provide a proper way to solve the pricing disputes from the operational level. Amongthem，some methods have beenapplied and developed in judicial practice and have been afirmed by the administrative level.However，itisstilldificultto break through suchcomputational problemsas （1）theadjustment factors for the calculation of license fes，such as licensing rates for patents previously licensed to others，etc.; （2） the selection of calculation benchmarks，the smallest salable patent practicing unit or end product;and （3） the measurement of the degre of SEPcontribution，quantity，or quality.In addition to these，some other methods are alsofaced with applicable problems due to their complexapplicable conditionsand theirown inherent limitations， whichare stillinthestageof theoretical discussion.Itisnodoubtthattheserich methodologicalresourcesstillcontain enormous practical and research value waiting to be tapped and utilized.It makes sense to systematically sort outand summarize the existing licensing feecalculation methods to clarifythe methodological advantages and aplicable scenariosbrought aboutby their typological characteristicsandmay beable to provide ideas for selectingand improving the existing pricing methods to solvethe current pricing problems and optimize the pricing mechanism.

This article did this，and throughan in-depth analysisof the calculation logic，assumptions，and considerations of a lot of pricing methods，a surprising result was discovered： Numerous approaches fail to impose temporal limitationsrequiring applicationonly after disputes arise.In addition，thecourt is not theonly third party that can participate inthe license fee pricing process throughout the life cycle of SEP.It providesa new ideaand enlightenment fortheresearch of pricing methods for SEP licensing fees，whether theycanadopt or optimize pricing methods to properlyhandle disputes in front stages like standards seting or license negotiating，to make deals both sides agree on and ease the judicial stage of backlog？ In addition，the disputes over SEP license fees are intensifying around the world.Fromtheperspectiveofcost，efficiency，and practical possibility，itisamore likelyway torespond to the application dilemmas of existing methods.

Based on these，the paper focuses on the typed characteristics of the existing SEP pricing methods.After clarifying thecauses of the disputes over them，twelve pricing methods of SEP license fees are combined from the existingliterature and judicial cases，then four categories of methodsare composed basedon theapplicationstages and calculation logic： pre-backtracking，comparative reference，proportion allcation，and post-disputesetlement.The application barrersand dilemmas caused bythe inherent limitationsof the fourcategories of methods are analyzed， and the possible ways on how to put these methods into practice are explored，and the intention is to provide enlightenmentfor geting back on the track of the pricing right and furtheroptimization of the pricing mechanism of license fees of SEP from the method operational level.

The article is structured as follows： Part I discusses the dispute traceability of the SEP license fee.This part focuses on the causes of license disputes from the integration and conflict between standardsand patents，profitseeking behavior ofenterprises，and thelevel of institutional construction inorder to provide ideas for dispute resolution. In part ，twelve methods are classified into four categories： pre-backtracking， comparative reference， proportion allocation，and post-disputesetlement，which reveals the obvious typological characteristics of the methods. Part Il discuses the application dilemmas and reasons for the above four categories of methods.Building on the typological characteristicsand practical constraints of each methodology，Part IVofers targeted recommendations for enhancing the license fee dispute resolution system.Part V is a conclusion.

1 Dispute Traceability of Standard Essential PatentLicense Fees

1.1Integration and Conflict Between Standards and Patents

Technical standard refers to a technical specification that is formed inacertain fieldandneeds to be complied with and applied repeatedly8l.Technical standards have obvious atributes of public goods，and their essence lies inrealizing theunificationandsharingof technologylStandardsare the highest integration formthatthe technologypursues[ol，with the spreadof technical standards torealize theexpansionof technical advantage being the advanced formof the technologyrace.Patent right means theexclusive rightlegallyenjoyed bythepatentee with respectto his invention.Obtaining legal monopolyrights byapplying for patents has become the main form of technology protection.Asakindof privateright，patent right isexclusive; thatis，it has therighttorestricttheillegal utilizationor disposal of others，andatthesame time，asan intangiblepropertyright，itisareasonable appeal of the patentee toobtain benefits or compensation forthe exploitation of others.Itis the inevitable choice of SSO to include the superior technology into the standard，and the superior technology often seeks patent protection，so SEPs arise.Obviously，the \"public good\"atributeof standards willconflict with the private propertyof the patents.Some scholarsbelievethatthetransferofsome rights is the basisforthecoexistenceof them，butitwill alsolead to new conflictsof interestl.This irreversible trendof integrationandthe irreconcilable contradiction between standards and patents have become the root cause of various disputes in the field of SEPs，including licensing fee disputes.

This is an important reminder for license feecalculation from the perspective of SEPs‘ essence.SEPs have special value and rightsatributes，and thevalue orientationandfactors that need tobe considered in the calculationof license fees are diferent from those of ordinarypatents.Itis reflected in the pricing methods，paying attention tothe special scenario faced by licensing of aSEP，removing theaditionalvaluebrought bythestandard，clarifying the necessary contribution of the technology，and balancing the interests of public and private subjects.

1.2TheProfit-SeekingBehaviorofEnterprises

In theory，both the SEPowner and the implementer would benefit from patent standardization.For the owner， once his patent is icorporated intothe standard，the implementationof the standard willmakethe holder getalot of opportunities for licensing，although thesinglerate may belower than theordinary patent，buta large potential groupof implementerswill also make the owner profitable;the resulting market position will bring aditional benefits for thepatentee.For the implementer，the use of the patents covered in the standardcannot only reduce the Ramp;D burden and save time and cost but also obtain the channel to comprehend advanced technologies.

However，in practice，the license fee disputes between the SEP holder and the implementing partyare not reduced due to the existence of this win-win situation.Thereason is that enterprises，as profit-oriented economic entities，shouldconsider thecostand income intheir productionandoperationactivities，andthe priceof the SEP license fee is essentially acompetition forthe economic interests of both sides.The patentee strives to increase he license fee as much as possble based on the recovery of Ramp;D investment，patent application，entry criteria，and other cost，and the compensation expectation for the lossoffuture market share.However，the implementer believes thatthe excessve pricing of such mandatory technical standards will lead toa heavy burden on the production of downstream products，and even the productionand operation will be threatened.In practice，some owners wil \"holdup\"the implementer toobtain excess profits by refusing permision，threat ofban，etc.，anda numberof implementers will also use theFRANDprincipleto\"holdout\"the owners，with the intention ofreaching ultra-low license fee transaction or even usethe SEPs for free.Simply put，the license fee disputesof SEP are usualy reflectedinthattheowner thinksthe licensefee is toolow，whilethe implementer thinks itis too high.Such dierences in expectations of SEP license fees often deadlock negotiations，even when both parties abandon seeking unreasonable interests.

1.3Loosenessof the FRAND Principle

SEP holders are often in a dominant position in the license fee negotiation process because when the patent is included inthecompulsorystandard，itsbargainingpowerwillbegreatlyimproved.Andfortheimplementers，once thenegotiationfails，theymayfacea more difcult situation，suchasexiting fromtheindustry.Inordertoprevent the holders from abusingthe dominant position，to ensuretwo sides can negotiate fairly，and to guarantee the implementation efectof SEPsand to eliminate theadverse impacton the technology competition market，the SSOs usuallyrequire the holders to makea \"fair，reasonable，and non-discriminatory\"license commitment.When SSOscompletely withdraw from the negotiation process of SEP license fes，F(xiàn)RAND，as a vague，unpunitive，and lack of enforcementrule，is usually dificult to guide orrestrain the behaviorsof both parties in practicel2l.Although this loose regulationresolves theconflictof principle between thetwo parties inthe transaction，itcannot eliminate the substantiveconfrontation between the two partieson the specific licensing conditions3l.After the failureof the negotiation，both parties usually choose toresort tothe dispute in law.Although FRAND is stillthe guiding principle of judicial pricing，the principle isnotsemanticambiguity，and its legal atributesare stillcontroversial.At present，thereare stillmanyviews，suchascivil legalaction，compulsorycontracts，oferand invitation tooffer4lThe determinationof different legal attributes ofFRANDwillinevitablylead todifferent judgmentsand evenresult in diferent sentences in the same case.Therefore，the judicial pricing of SEP license fees is equally difcult.

These，the above enterprises'behaviors and SSOs'policies，also provide ideas for license fee calculation from the perspective of methods optimization paths.Expecting enterprises to make concessons or govermments and SSOs to implement newpolicies toresolve license disputes is relatively diffcult orlong to wait for.It isreflected inthe pricing methods-therole of neutral technologyshould be fullutilized;optimizing the existing methods or proposing some new methods could solve SEP pricing disputes at the operational level.

In summary，the essence of SEPs，the profit-seeking behavior of enterprises，and the looseness of rules have led to the frequent occurence of licensing disputes.Such disputesare inevitable，and instead of expecting enterprises to abandon their profit-seeking behavior or urging thegovernmentsor SSOs to immediately launch regulationsthatcan adjust licensing behavior，itis more effctiveand necessary topayattention tothe pricing methodsat the operational level.Therefore，theapplication scenarios and dilemmas，advantages，and limitations of various pricing methods are prerequisites for optimizing existing methods and aspects to be taken into account when proposing new methods.

2PricingMethodsofSEPLicense Fees

In chronological order，SEPs involving license fee disputes usually go through the following three main stages： standard seting stage，transaction negotiation stage，and dispute resolution stage.The leading subject in each stage is diferent.In the standard seting stage，SSOscomplete mostof the work，while the transaction negotiation stage is freelyconductedbytheowners and the implementers.In the final disputeresolutionstage，thecourt or arbitration institutionusuallyholds the leading power.This provides thepossbilityto explore anew license fee pricing mechanism，with more diversified leading subjects and more diversified pricing modes.This paper sorts outtwelve SEP license fee pricing methodsand divides them into four categories according to the pricing stage and calculation logic， mainly including pre-backtracking，comparative reference，proportion alocation，and post-dispute settlement①.

2.1Typel：Pre-backtracking

Shapiro and Varian believe that only the equilibrium price formed by the patentee under the condition of open competition is the license feeofFRAND5l.The pre-backtracking pricing methods are based on this view，in which the standard value broughtby \"technologylock-in\"and \"network efect\"isexcluded bybacktracking the technologyinformationand market situation before the formation of the standard，including the Incremental Value Approach， Ex-ante Auction Model， and Shapley Value Approach.

（1）Incremental Value Approach

The Incremental Value Approach originated from theprincipleof patent infringement damages in theUnited States and can be traced back to the judgment by the Supreme Court on \"Dowagiac Mfg.v.Minn.Moline Plow\" in 1915.Thecentral ideaof this method is that theowner only enjoys the benefit ofthe value that the SEPadds to the final product，and thisaddedvalueis the upper limitof the licensefeethat the implementeriswilling to paylThe Incremental Value Approach focuses onthe stage before the formationand implementationof the standard.The specific steps are as follows： ① Find other alternative patents that meet the standard; ② calculate the market value of the patent; ③ separate the own value of the patent involved; and ④ calculate the incremental value of therelative alternative patent of the patent involved.In 2O13，in the case of \" Microsoft Corp.v.Motorola Inc. \"，Microsoft proposed to use it forthecalculation of the SEP license fee involved，but thecourt heldthat the standard of the dispute patent was established tooearlyanddid nothave the posibilityand reference of backtracking， so it was not adopted.

（2）Ex-ante Auction Model

Ex-ante Auction Model was proposed by economists Swanson and Baumol in 2005^[17] .The model assumes that there are multiple alternative patents in the market that can beused to produce a certain product.The impact of these patentson productqualityis thesame，butthe production costis diffrent.SSO organizesan auction，and potentialimplementersvote for theoptimal technologythat needs thelowestcostand products the most profit，then include it into the standard.Specificaly，firstof all，each owner shall provide the patent license feequotationR to the potential implementers，which will not be lowerthan theauthorization cost T;otherwise，it willcause losses. Subsequently，the potential implementers to vote to make the product profitable （profit ≡ product price P-productioncost C-license fee quotation R）to maximizepatent technologyand incorporated into the standard;obviously， with productioncostadvantage technology，itismore likelytobetheoptimal technology.Thepremiseisthe technologylicense fee price isnottoo high to lose theadvantage.Finally，when thetechnologyforthe standard is determined，the license feeisalso determined.Itcan be proved thatthe license fee quotationof theoptimal technology mustbe equal to thesum of the diference between the licensing cost Tof the patented technologyand the optimal technology and the sub-optimal altermative technology （R=T + C -Csuboptimum）.

Ex-ante Auction Model makes the holder，the implementer，and SSO all participate in it，providing a new solution to the problem of SEPand license fee pricing. The clear and complete analytical logic also makes it one of the few economic methods recognized by theadministration and the judiciary.Clear support for this method is expressed in the US Policy Statement on Voluntary FRAND License Relieffor Standard Essential Patents[18l.

（3） Shapley Value

The concept of the Shapley value came from the field of cooperative games，and was proposed by Lloyd Shapleyin1953.It isa common indicatorthat can quantitatively asess the marginalcontribution of individuals.Becauseof itssuperiorcharacteristicssuch as fairness，individual rationalization，andadditivity，itwas introduced by Layne-Farrar and other scholars to solve the SEP license fee problem of complementarity standard ^[19] Thismethod regards the licensefeeof SEPas the totalcooperation incomeof theownerinthestandard，byintroducing the \"average marginal contribution\"inthe coperative game to measure thecontribution ofeach patent to the standard and calculatethebenefitsof eachholder for itspatent，which providesatheoretical solution for thefairandreasonable distribution of the license fee.

2.2Type2： Comparative Reference

The calculation logic of the reference pricing method is that the similar licenseagreement is selected as the reference，the license fee isusedas the pricing benchmark，andthe final pricing of the SEP licensefee is afteradjustment.Including Comparable License Approach，Sidak's Comparison Approach，Patent Poo，and Pseudo-Pl Approach，each method makes diffrent definitions of theselection criteria andadjustmentfactors of similarlicense agreements.

（1）Comparable License Approach

The Comparable License Approach refers to the similar license agreement in which the SEP owner and the implementer arereachedbytheparties onequal negotiation.Specifically，theapplicationof theComparableLicense Approach can be disassembled into three basic steps： ① Select the comparable license agreement in which the license fee meets the FRAND principle; ② Disassemble the comparable agreement according to the license time，subject， scope， etc.; ③ Adjust the patent license fee involved based on the disassembled license agreement[20l.

Easily operation and simple calculation logic make the Comparable License Approach widely used in judicial practice，especially when there are obviouslysimilar license transactions[21l In20l1，\"Huawei v.IDC\" was the first caseinvolving thecalculationof SEP license fees in China，and it was alsothe first applicationofthe Comparable License Approach in such cases.The subsequent cases \"Infinite Planet v.Huawei\" and \"TCL v.Ericssn\"made furtherdevelopmentandapplication of this method.Ithasalso been recognizedattheadministrative leveland is recommended in the Work Guidelineson the Trial of SEPs Dispute Cases（Trial） issued bythe Guangdong Higher People's Court of China.

（2）Sidak's Comparison Approach

Sidak proposed an economic method to calculate the SEP license fee from the perspective of economics in （204號 2013^|22| He used personal rational constraintsand joint producer surplus maximization theory to construct a FRAND principle of economic analysis framework.Determining the use in the framework of the license fee should considerfactors，including the patent incremental value，the total license feeunder standard，Ramp;D cost，patent strength，and similar license agreement factors.The above factors weighted later determine the reasonable scope of license thefee.Among them，increasing the weight of licensing fees ofa similar license agreement can solve the operability problem of the theoretical framework.

Compared with Comparable License Approach，Sidak enlarges the scope of the optional and similar license agreement，and specifies theadjustment factorsmoreclearly.Hebelieves that the license feedetermined by the two parties of course mets the FRAND principle and can be used as areasonable starting point for the license fee analysis.Then the folowing6factorsare investigated to determinethe weight of theagreement，and then the SEP license fee is calculated： ① the patent included in the license agreement; ② the time of authorization; ③ theuse of authorized technology; ④ other considerationsincludedin the agreement; ⑤ whether the agreement isthe resultof litigation or arbitration; ⑥ whether the license feeispaid ina lump sum or atavariable rate.

（3）Patent Pool and Pseudo-Pool Approach

Patent pool refers to \"a joint organization in which two or more SEP owners agree to cross-license each other or jointly license their patents toa third party\"[23l.Patent pollicense isan important license mode;its transparent pricing method and comprehensive patent coveragecan help the licensing parties to reduce the negotiation costs and improve the transaction efciency.Withtheadventof SEP，theholdersof dominant patents inthe standardoftenform patent pools to solve complex patent license problems.This method is to determine the licensefeeof the dispute SEP through the patent pool license information.In the case of Microsoft V .Motorola，the patent pool，namely the H.264 patent polandthe8O2.11 patent pol.The trial judge believedthat the patent involved didnot enter the patent pool，sohecould notdirectlyuse thesame licenserate，buthealsoafirmed thereference valueof the license rate in the pool.The Work Guidelines of Guangdong Province and the Guidelines on the license of SEPs in Japan also introduceandrecommendthismethod.Although theeffectof itiscontroversial inpractice，itisstillone of the ways to determine the license fee.

However，the time consuming and managementcostsof buildingapatent pool are huge，and notall SSOs will establish patent pools.Contreras believes that the standardof not successully establishing the patent pool can also learnfrom the advantageous characteristics of the patent pool to determine the license feeand proposed PseudoPool Approach in 2013^?24? .Specifically，the method includes the following contents： ① The patent holder completes virtual declaration to SSO and makes a FRAND commitment; ② SSO determines the total license fee after the completion of the standard; ③ conduct an SEP license transaction （no matter how many parties reach the license agreement）; ④ allocate the total license fee among the holders according to the quantity or value.

Patent Pooland Pseudo-Pool Approach both fullyabsorb the advantages of the patent pool licensing model.

First，theunified licensingofthe standards willreducethecostofconsultationbetweenbothsides，which isconducive to the implementationof the SEPs.Second，the total license feeis firstdeterminedand then allocatedaccording to the share ofeach holder，which can avoidthe stacking of license fees and avoid the patent hold-up when facingthe holder's standard monopoly advantage during a single negotiation.

2.3Type3：Proportion Allocation

This kind of method is used whendecomposing the total license fee.Itscalculation logic is to allocate the totallicensefeebasedonthe SEPs numberor valueof theholderas thecontribution.This includes the Top-down Approach，the Method of Setting a Ceiling，and the Numerical Proportionality Approach.

（1） Top-down Approach

The Top-down Approach provides an idea of dividing the total license fee from the whole to the part.Holderman，thejudge，startedtheapplicationand specific designofthis method in judicial practice inthe\"Inre Innovatio\" case. The specific idea of the method is as follows： ① Determine the total license fee of all SEPs constituting the standard; ② determine the share owned by each right holder; ③ allocate the total license fee to each right holderaccording to theshare，and the weight can beconsidered when alocating.Thebasic formulaof thismethod is given by Sidak： FRAND license fee ≡ （price of the smallest salable patent-practicing unitXaverage rate of profit）

（patent contribution / standard value）l2ol. In judicial practice，it is often adopted，but the court always adjust the allocation criteria according to the specific situation.For example，Chinese court adopted this method for the first time in Huawei V .Conversant，and the final calculation formula is： the Chinese premium rate ≡ the industry cumulative license rate in ChinaXthe contribution of single patent familyl25l.

（2） Method of Setting a Ceiling

The Method of Seting a Ceiling refers to that in the Japanese case \"Apple Japan V . Samsung\" the court proposed tocontrol the upper limitof the total licensing fee bypeaking thecontribution of the standards to the end product.The basic calculation formula of this method is FRAND license fee ≡ end product salesX （standard contribution/ product value × peak ratio） × （patent contribution / standard value）[26]. In the case of Apple V .Samsung， a certain pricing method cannot be adopted separately without the advantage of evidence，so the court chose to use the \"Top-down Approach\"whileseting the peak method to controlthe upper limit ofthe license rate.Therefore， Method of Setting a Ceiling is usually combined with a basic pricing method to play its role.

（3）Numerical Proportionality Approach

Numerical Proportionalityis measured by the contribution of the proportion of the number of SEPs owned by eachholder tothe total numberof allpatentscoveredbythestandard，andthetotallicensefeeisallcatedaccording to the proportional value.For example，if a standard covers atotal of 2OO patents，of which 2Oof them belong to A，A's contribution is 10% ，and 10% ofthe total license fee is the corresponding share.The Numerical ProportionalityApproachhasastrong assumptionthat thevalueof allpatents inthestandard is equal.Although this is almost imposible tomeet，themethod isoftenadopted in judicial practicedue to itssimplicityandoperability.For example，in the Japanese \"Apple Japan vs.Samsung，\"in thecase，the contribution of the patents involved to the UMTS standard was not high.In the absenceof other evidence，the court determined that the 529 SEPs had the same contribution to the standardl23l.

2.4Type4：Post-dispute Settlement

The \"post\"of post-dispute setlement means that the holder or the implementer has had a dispute over the licensing fee and decided to resortto thecourt orarbitration institution.Although thecurentcalculationof the SEP license fee isvery dependent on judicial judgment，in fact，onlya few methods of the pricing process can be carriedout with theparticipationof third parties.Such methods also refer to pricing methods that musthave the participation of third parties，including the Hypothetical Negotiation Approach and Base-Ball Arbitration.

（1）Hypothetical Negotiation Approach

Hypothetical NegotiationApproach is themainmethod of calculatingdamages in patent infringement litigation intheUnited Statesl2.Thismethodadvocates to simulate the situation when the bilateral agreement is conducted onthebasisof meeting theFRANDcommitment，assuming thatat the momentof the infringement，theSEP holder and the implementer comprehensively consider the current market demand and industry development.It usuall includes 3 basic steps： ① Determine the calculation basis of the license fee; ② determine the starting license rate; and ③ adjustthe license rate for certain factors.However，which factors are analyzed to simulate hypothetical bilateralnegotiations toobtain FRAND license fees has beencontroversial28l.In theadoptionof \"Georgia-Pacific，\"the US court identified15 elements to beconsidered in calculating the licensing fee，and this analysis was oftenadopted insubsequent trials.Therefore，some scholars callthe hypothesis consultation law\"Georgia-Pacific\" fifteen elements law29l. In the case of Microsoft V . Motorola in 2O13， Motorola proposed to apply this method to calculate the SEP license fee，but thecourtdid not fullyadopt it. Instead，it chose toadopt some elements according to the SEP characteristics and FRAND principles，thus forming a revised hypothesis negotiation method.

（2）Base-ball Arbitration

Lemley and Shapiro held that the SEPowner's FRAND commitment represented a waiver of the rightof action and therefore suggested thatthe licensing fee dispute should beresolved by binding arbitration and proposed Baseball Arbitration ^[30]（2） .Firstof all，SSO shall establish an arbitration institution with suffcient understanding of the technologyand market.Theownerand implementer shall promise inadvance thattheywill not filealawsuit in the eventof a dispute but shallseek arbitrationfrom the agency.Whenthe owner and implementer cannot agree on the licensefee，they should provideafinal quotation to thearbitration agency，bythearbitration agency tochoose a moreconforming totheFRANDprincipleas the final licensefee;both parties haveonlyonechance toofer，and thearbitration agency cannot modifythequotation or proposean additional license fee.Lemleyand Shapiro argued thatthisgameentices both sides to tellthetruth，so itis easier to getaconsistent ofer.Compared with litigation， this arbitration mode will cost less time and money for both sides ofthe dispute and also provide inspiration for the multiple dispute resolution mechanism of the license fee.

3 The Application Dilemmas of the Pricing Methods of SEP License Fees

3.1 Dilemma of Typel： Pre-backtracking--Determination of Ways and Factors for Back-calculation

This kind of method needs to be backtracking the situation before the formulation of the standard.This calculation logic meets the current basic requirements for the SEP license fee including technologywithout astandard， butat the same time，it also becomes the most difcult applicable condition.Asmentioned above，the Incremental Value Approach needs to determine the economic valueof the patent before the standard is formulated，Ex-ante AuctionModel requires thatthe licensefee bedetermined in the market competition before the standard is formulated，and the Shapley value needs to calculatethe valuegenerated byeach patent portfolio before the standard is formulated.Obviously，the backtrackingofthemarket situation，technologyinformationorthevalueof thepatentis verydifficult inboththe negotiation processand thecourt-led judicial pricing process，but thismethod does provide inspiration for the pre-pricing mechanism which is leaded by SSO.

The need to find alternative patentsand assess the value is another limitation of the Incremental Value Approach and Ex-ante Auction Model.The Incremental Value Approach determines the upper limit of the license fee bycalculating thevaluediferencebetweenthe technologyandalternativepatents.Itisunfair totheholderwhen the incrementof technologyandthe valueof SEPandalternative patentsare too fierce.Ex-ante Auction Model determines thereasonable licensefee by bidding between alternative patents，which requires thatthere are enough alternative patents inthe marketthat maybe included inthe standard.However，when thecompetition is too fierce so that the return of the holder is too low，it will directly reduce their wilingness to join the standard.

It is also important to note that，although the above applicable conditions are met，the Incremental Value Approach and Ex-ante Auction Modelcalculated the licensing fee，which stillmay not met the FRAND principle，becausethe two have similar inherent limitations：one is only focusedon the alternativepatent，ignoring the existence of complementary patents，and the other is isolated to determine the licensing feeof a singlepatent，making it easy to cause licensefee stacking.The Shapley Value Approach avoids the above problems to some extent，but it is dificult to apply in practice because of its complicated logic and large computation.

3.2Dilemma of Type2： Comparative Reference--Selection of Comparable Agreement and Adjustment Factors

The basic idea of this kindof pricing method is the same;that is，choose a similar license agreement first，and thenadjustthe license feeaccording tothecase situation.Accordingly，therestrictionsarealsoreflected inthese twoaspects：oneis thatitisdifficult tofindasuitablesimilarlicenseagreement，and theotheristhelackof specific methodsofquantitativeadjustment of the license fee based onqualitative factors.Thecourt chose similar agreements strictlywhen using the Comparable License Approach and has requirements on technical association，agreement time，additional terms，and whether to file litigation orarbitration，which leads tonot manyagreements that can me the conditions.Sidak's method limits similar licenseagreements loosely but makes the results more reasonable by adjusting some considerations.However，Sidak does not indicateexactly howand to what extent the adjustment should be made，which makes the application of this method in practice difficult.

Some scholars believe that this kind of method should be classified as Bottom-up Approach，because this single way oflicense fee determination has similar inherent limitations，and thecalculation results cannot avoid the problem oflicense fee stackingl3l.Although the patent pool solves this problem，only the two parties of the transaction can fullyjoin the same patent pol.Because the license fee in the patent pool is generally low compared to a separate license agreement，such the license fee does not meet the FRAND principle for those who do not enter the pool.It is assumed that the Patent Pol Approach expands the applicablesubjects but will make some SEP owners who are willing to granta freelicense \"have to\"share a partof the license fee，which increases the burden on the standard implementerl31l，and also faces amore complex problem，the determination of the total license fee.

3.3Dilemma of Type3：Proportion Allocation-Selection of Computational Basis and Allocated Proportion

This kindof method tends to quantitativelydescribe the license feealocation methodthrough the formula.But mostof themcannot actuallybe able tocomplete the SEP license fee，but givea form fromthe whole to the distribution method，determine thereasonable total license fee，andbecome the primary problemof this kindof method.It is alsoan important step to prevent the high license fee，end productvalue，and thesmalest salable patent practicig unit （SSPPU） from becoming the main alternative.In terms of judicial practice，in the case of \"In re

Innovatio\"，thecourt proposed the methodof SSPPU，which was adopted bySSO，butin Microsoftv.Motorola，the court decided that the price of the end product was used as the calculation benchmark.The academic community has shown the recognitionof SSPPUasa foundation，but the problemsof how to divide the SSPPUand how to determine itsvalue have not been properly solved.Method of Seting a Ceiling by limiting the maximum licenserate also provides anew ideaforcontrolling the problem of excessive license fees，but how to determine a peak ratio selection standard approved by both parties to the transaction isstill unknown.

The unreasonable alocation standard also makes many proportion distribution methods controversial.The assumptio that the Numerical Proportionality Approach is exactlythe same value for patents ignores thediference in patent valuecontribution，drives alarge numberof low-quality patents into standards，and misses theexistence of complementary patents.Some scholarshave proposed that all SEPholders inthe technical standard should participate in the litigation according to the Interpleader③，and prove thecontribution and value of their patented technologyasareference todetermine theoverallratel32l，butit willinevitablyextendthelitigationcycleand increase the cost of dispute settlement[15l。

3.4Dilemma of Type4：Post-DisputeSettlement-Findan Independent，Impartial and Professional Third Party

This kind of method promotes the implementation of FRAND commitment by introducing a third-party dispute resolution agency，but no clear calculation method is given.Among them，the revised Hypothetical Negotiation Approach fully takes into account the factors thatthe patent licensefee should be considered and the principles of satisfaction to adjust the license fee，butthe elements consideredare too many，overlapping，and evencontradictory， which makes thecourt confused.Moreover，since thecourtsare not involved in the standard-seting process and have little understanding of technologyand marketconditions，itis extremelydifficult to implement so-calld hypothetical bilateral negotiations separately without a preponderance of evidence.

In the Base-ball Arbitration，the premise of aconsistent ofer is thatall parties have thesame understanding of the valueof thepatent.Iftheyhavesubstantial diferences inthecognitionofthevalueof thepatent，itisdificult to givea similarandreasonableoferif theparties donot intend to seek unreasonable interests.Inaddition， thedeviationfrom theprofesionalismandneutralityofthearbitration institutionswillalsoaffctthefinalresult. Because the judgmentoflicenseraterequires afullunderstanding of technologyand the market，somescholars believe that although SSO gathers a large number of technical experts，theycannot complete the value evaluation of SEP ¹³³¹ ，and arbitrators are alsoat risk of being lobbied.In addition，at the present time，when the license fee dispute isresolved，it is not wise tocompletely excludetherightof action ofboth parties inthedispute.Therefore，in practicalaplication，Base-ballArbitration isdificult to ensure thatthe final license fe meets the FRAND principle.

4 Suggestions for Improving the Pricing Process of SEP License Fees

Although the above twelve methods have been questioned to varying degrees，and some are stillat the theoretical level，thetypeddiscussionstillprovidesimportantreferenceandusefulenlightenmentfortherational regressionof the SEPpricing right and the further improvementof the pricing mechanism.Therefore，itisafeasible way to actively respond to the typedapplicationdilemma of theexisting methods fromthe perspectiveof comprehensive applicationand improvement to solve thepricing problemof the current SEP license fee.Accordingly，thearticle makes the following suggestions：

（1）Establish a pre-pricing mechanism supported by SSO.

Compared with the court，SSO has a better understanding of the value of technical standards and the market conditions，but itonly formulatespre-licensing provisions such asFRAND commitment in the standard-setting stage but does not play its due regulatory and guiding role inthereal license fee negotiation stage.Obviously，Exante Auction Model is dificult touse aftertheoccurrenceof practicaldisputes，butitstillprovidesa good pre-pricing model; that is，under theguidance of theSSO，the owner and the potential implementer jointlyparticipate in the pricing process，and the licensefee is determined while identifying theessential patents of the standard.Onthe premiseof balancing the publicand private interests bythe SSO，the pricing right isreturned toboth parties of the transaction，whichnotonly providesanopportunityforthe twoparties to negotiateunder equal conditions but also reduces the fear of the SSO for monopolyresponsibility.Inaddition，the pricing method participated inby the SSO， onthe one hand，can guarantee thequalityof the patents included inthe standard;on the other hand，the expected benefitsobtained bythe SEPowner in this stateof competition willbereduced，andtheSSO isqualified tocontrol the price bottom line to prevent the SEP owner from withdrawing from the competition.

（2）Explore the multiple resolution mechanisms of SEP license fee disputes.

In addition toadministrative enforcement and judicial protection，arbitration is also an efective way to provide timely，effective，andconvenient intellectual propertyrights protection.Giving some disputesofSEP license fees to arbitration agenciescannot only share the judicial presure but also reduce the timeand moneycostsof both parties in he dispute.Although Base-Ball Arbitration may not guarantee thatthe final license fee meets the FRAND principle，its idea of dispute resolutioncanbeused forreference inthe design of intellctual propertyarbitration and mediation mechanisms.For example，the profesionalismand neutralityof arbitration institutions are the important guarantee for the reasonable pricing of SEP license fees.Effortsshould be made to improve the professional allocationof intellctual propertyarbitration institutionsand theprofessonal roleof SSO inthearbitration process.In addition，although this method hasobviousadvantages，theright to sue should notbe completely excluded before the mature standards of the arbitration system of the SEP license feeand the allocation of perfect arbitration institutions are completed.

（3）Flexible adoption or a combination of various methods to solve the current license fee pricing problem.

In judicial practice，various methods should be flexibly adopted or combined according to the specific situation and onthe basisof the guarantee ofthe operabilityof the methodsused.For example，inthe trialofcontract litigationorinfringement ltigation，thequantitative method can becalculated to determinethe specificvalue，and in the anti-monopolylawsuit，various qualitativemethodscanbeused to judge.Inaddition，itisnot dificulttosee from the typedanalysisoftheabove methods that each method has itsownadvantagesand limitations，and the application dilemma of acertain typeof method maybe madeup forbyanother kindof method，which also provides the enlightenment of using the combined complete set method or supplemented by the verification method to improve the accuracy of the calculation results.

（4） Ensure that the proposal or use of each pricing method can meet the special requirements of the SEP.

The dispute of SEP licensing fees is different from the pricing problem of ordinary patent licensing fees，which is theconflictbetween thepublicatributeof the standardand the privaterightof thepatent.Therefore，thespecial nature of SEPand itsrequirementsmust be fullyconsidered in the comprehensive application of the current method ortheFRAND pricing method.Through the analysis ofthe above pricing methods，judicial cases，and existing documents， the following methods should be met： ① The method will not cause patent hold-up，hold-out，and licensing fee stacking; ② the license fee calculated by the method should not include the value of the standard; ③ should note the problem of alternative patents and complementary patents.

5 Conclusion

The integration of standardsand patents is the inevitable result of the development of scienceand technology and the perfection of the patent system.While SEPs bring convenience to people，theyalso lead toa major change in the patern of interests of the industry.The license fee has become thecore of SEPdisputes.Systemconstruction and method regulation are important to guide the pricing of license fees to the balanceof public and private rights. Obviously，there is stillalong waytogo，whether therefinement of the FRANDprincipleor the improvementof relevant legal provisions，andthe specification of thepricing method is a more realisticway toresolvethe current license fee disputes.In thispaper，twelve pricing methods are sortedout from a typological perspective.From the considerationof theessentialatributes of SEPs，it proposes the special premisethat needs to be taken intoaccount in the calculation; from the funding ofthe pricing time stage，it explores thenew pricing mechanism guided by the third party;and from the typologyofthe existing pricing methods，itproposes to comprehensivelyutilize the various types of methods in order to makeup forthe shortcomingsof their individual use.In orderto provide ideas for the relief of disputes overthe pricing of the SEP license feeand the improvementof itspricing mechanism.However，it should be noted that technology changes，market entity relations，and policy embeddednessmay affect SEP licensing，and how to resolve license disputes in a morecomplex and dynamic real-world situation still needs more attention in the future.

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摘要：標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利（Standard Essential Patent，SEP）許可費磋商本質(zhì)上是一種市場行為，將定價權(quán)交給市場主體也是專利制度的應(yīng)有之義。近年來，SEP許可費糾紛頻發(fā)，F(xiàn)RAND原則等制度功能的缺位導(dǎo)致了許可費定價實踐過度依賴司法判決的情況出現(xiàn)。理論研究和司法判例中提出了多種定價方法，從操作層面上為SEP許可費定價難題的解決指明了應(yīng)然道路。文章聚焦現(xiàn)有SEP許可費定價方法體系的類型化特征，在厘清了SEP許可費糾紛的成因之后，結(jié)合既有文獻及司法判例對現(xiàn)有12種定價方法進行梳理和解讀，并按照定價階段和計算邏輯將其劃分為4種類型，綜合分析各類方法由適用條件和固有局限導(dǎo)致的適用困境，探索能夠在實踐中合理使用或優(yōu)化以上定價方法的可能路徑。從定價階段、解決機制、應(yīng)用方式及適用前提等角度提出相應(yīng)建議，以期為SEP許可費定價權(quán)的理性回歸以及定價機制的進一步優(yōu)化提供啟示。

關(guān)鍵詞：標(biāo)準(zhǔn)必要專利；FRAND原則；許可費；定價方法；適用困境