The Substance–Effort Paradox in Yangming Learning andthe Lesson It Teaches

Wang Miquan

Abstract： Wang Yangming once said， “That which accords with original substance is effort， and only when one makes effort can one realize original substance.” However， this remark contains a substance–effort paradox： if people do not accord with original substance， they cannot exert effort， but if they do not exert effort， they can never realize and accord with original substance. This paradox is an important thread that runs through the learning of Yangmings later followers. Wang Ji and Nie Bao adhered to the first half of the statement， but their discussions of “according with original substance” are not without problems. Qian Dehong was more focused on the second half of the statement， yet it is difficult， if not impossible， to determine whether or not one realizes original substance. The crux of this problem lies in the conception of original substance （benti）： it cannot be too near to experience， or it loses its ontological meaning; nor can it be too distant from experience， or the concept becomes purely abstruse. Later Yangming Learning was caught in this dilemma. Huang Zongxi asserted that “the mind has no substance， and its original substance is simply that which is attained through effort.” In fact， the ontological understanding of the mind and human nature does not prove effective in either explanation or argumentation， and in fact tends to result in dogmatism， mystification， and hubris. Therefore， we should understand the substance of the mind and human nature through the effort and practice of empirical human nature and the human mind.

Keywords： original substance， effort， substance of human nature， substance of the mind， empirical

The relationship between original substance （benti 本體） and effort （gongfu 工夫） is a basic issue in Song–Ming Neo-Confucianism. It played a central role in Yangming Learning （Yangmingxue 陽明學(xué)） and constituted an important thread in its development. Although this issue has been studied exhaustively， scholars seem to have overlooked the paradoxical relationship between original substance and effort. On the one hand， original substance is both the precondition and the final result of effort; without realizing original substance， ones effort is all in vain， wastes time and energy， or even goes astray. On the other hand， one can never arrive at original substance without effort. This forms an infinite regress， and both how to confirm ones accordance with original substance and how to begin with effort thus become problematic. This paradox was already latent in Wang Yangmings 王陽明 （1472–1528， a.k.a. Wang Shouren 王守仁） demonstration of the dao 道 on Tianquan Bridge and exerted a profound influence on the development of Yangming Learning. To some degree， later scholars of Yangming Learning sought to address this issue in various ways; unfortunately， they did not settle the issue but merely arrived at different approaches that contradicted one another. This paper examines typical examples of this paradox in Yangming Learning， analyzes its root cause， discusses the conception of original substance and the ontological status of xin 心 （mind） and xing 性 （human nature）， and draws methodological lessons by reflecting upon this ontological approach.

The Substance–Effort Paradox [Refer to page 83 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]

Wang Yangmings view on original substance and effort is summarized in his famous statement： “That which accords with original substance is effort， and only when one makes effort can one realize original substance.” This remark seems to give a comprehensive and satisfactory account of original substance and effort， yet it contains within itself a paradox. Specifically， how does one confirm such “accordance with original substance”？ One who has not yet realized original substance is certainly unable to judge this; only one who has realized original substance can do so. However， for one who judges that he accords with original substance， what allows him to confirm this？ Here， those who claim to realize original substance seem to become a closed group who confirm themselves through circular argument. Moreover， how can those who are less talented confirm that the direction of their effort is “in accord with original substance”？ For those who are already “in accord with original substance，” they do not need further effort， since effort is merely the aroused function of original substance. For the mediocre to whom “original substance is obscured，” they cannot possibly begin in their effort， for no sooner do they start than they go astray.

Given that “that which accords with original substance is effort，” the effort of one who does not accord with original substance would seem to be simply futile. Notably， there was a tendency among the followers of Yangming Learning to regard the most fundamental effort as， above all else， the endeavor to accord with original substance. According to Wang Ji 王畿 （1498–1583， a.k.a. Wang Longxi 王龍溪）， just as an unfertilized egg does not hatch， exerting effort without according with original substance is a waste of time and effort. Wang Ji thus advocated “l(fā)earning that preserves the a priori integrity of the mind.” Wang Ji thought it made effort complicated and difficult to exert effort on ones intentions （yi 意）， constantly check and restrain ones feelings and desires， and strive to avoid making mistakes. Exerting effort on ones intentions is not the most fundamental effort. Rather， one should “base oneself on the a priori substance of the mind”; that is， one should first lay the solid foundation of intuitive knowledge （liangzhi 良知）， so as to free oneself from the shackles of emotions and desires without the need for precaution or scrutiny. This is also what Wang Yangming meant when he said， “[one] has accomplished his task as soon as he has apprehended original substance.”

Wang Jis purpose is easy to understand; however， this interpretation of effort faces a tricky problem when it comes to practice. Although a distinction can theoretically be made between the substance of the original mind and the function of aroused intentions， it is impossible to distinguish between the two in concrete mental activities. Intuitive knowledge， in the final analysis， can be viewed as a kind of mental activity based on human experience; the contents of intuitive knowledge can be grasped concretely through mental experience， yet its ontological meaning cannot be comprehended in this way. In fact， how to establish this ontological status of intuitive knowledge is itself a problem. When scholars aim to preserve the “a priori integrity of the mind，” it would seem that they still in fact revert to concrete mental activities， expressed in the form of aroused “intentions，” without any way to maintain their “a priori” （xiantian 先天） status.

Wang Jis solution to the problem was in line with the thought that “substance and function have a single source.” On the one hand， Wang Ji distinguished between the a priori and a posteriori， and highlighted the more direct and fundamental effort of “basing oneself on the a priori substance of the mind.” On the other hand， Wang Ji also acknowledged that “the a priori does not exist independent of the a posteriori.” However， following this line of thinking， Wang Jis theory falters on two accounts. With regard to its emphasis on substance， since preserving the a priori integrity of the mind cannot be entirely separated from mental activity in practice， the theory has been accused of confusing intuitive knowledge， which is ontological， with ordinary acts of perception， thus undermining its ontological strength. With regard its emphasis on effort， Wang Jis theory aimed to attain function by directly establishing substance， and hence left no room for the practical learning of making ones intentions sincere.

A common feature of the followers of Yangming Learning was their pursuit of a kind of fundamental effort of “according with original substance.” In this respect， the school of “returning to quietude” （guiji 歸寂）， of which Nie Bao 聶豹 （1487–1563， a.k.a. Nie Shuangjiang 聶雙江） was the leading exponent， was a development of Wang Jis thought.

If Wang Ji did not give a fully ontological account of substance， with substance still unavoidably entangled with empirical mental activities， Nie Bao took a more ontological stance toward the substance of the mind. Nie said， “To say that the mind has no stable substance fails to grasp the truth of the substance of the mind. This substance shines brightly within the mind. Silent and still， it serves as the foundation for the myriad transformations. It is the stable substance.” This “stable substance” was kept clearly apart from empirical mental activities. Nie said，

Intuitive knowledge is originally quiet， and only when it responds to external things is there knowledge. Hence one must not equate the knowledge thus aroused with intuitive knowledge， and forget from whence this aroused knowledge comes. The mind resides inside， and in responding to external things， it casts its shadows outside. One must not equate the shadows outside with the mind inside， and search for the mind externally. Therefore， a scholar in pursuit of the Way seeks the quiet mind that resides internally， and preserves its quietude in constant stability.

Nie drew a clear distinction between the “arousal” （fa 發(fā)） of knowledge and “the site from which arousal comes，” that is， between empirical mental activities and the substance of the mind. The substance of the mind is quiet （ji 寂）， so the fundamental effort is to return to this substance which is quiet and resides internally. Nie believed the extension of intuitive knowledge consisted in returning to this quiet substance. Once this quiet substance is established， responses to the outside naturally become interconnected. In general， compared with Wang Jis monism of the unified source of substance and function， Nie Baos thought had strong dualistic tendencies， drawing clear lines of demarcation between original substance and aroused function， the state before arousal and the already aroused， quietude and responsiveness， and the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things. In this way， Nie not only highlighted the status of original substance， but also clarified the distinctive form of effort revolving around original substance （embracing stillness and returning to quietude）.

Nie Baos theory of embracing stillness and returning to quietude can be traced back to the Daonan School in the Song dynasty （960–1279）， which was marked by the tradition of “realizing in stillness the state of the great substance prior to arousal.” However， Nies theory was still heavily imbued with the characteristics of the Learning of the Mind in the Ming dynasty （1368–1644）， with a clear awareness of the “substance of the mind.” While the Daonan School was more focused on the experience of the unity of the myriad things， owing to its adherence to the theory of Heavenly principle， Ming dynasty Learning of the Mind was more focused on the centrality of the self， largely owing to its awareness of the “substance of the mind.” A feature shared by both of them is a certain quality of mysticism. Regardless of whether original substance was regarded as principle or mind， the way to recognize original substance was always a tricky problem. Indeed， mysticism was a logical direction to take， since original substance cannot be too close to human experience， or else it tends to become entangled with human experience to the detriment of the status proper to ontology. Mysticism set substance apart from the experiential and mundane， and brought into sharp relief the intuitive apprehension of substance. Compared with Wang Ji， Nie Bao gave more emphasis to the substance of the mind， even to the point of risking slipping into a substance–function dualism. For this and for the tendency toward empty quietude in his theory of effort， Nie was criticized by other scholars of Yangming Learning.

Qian Dehong 錢德洪 （1496–1574， courtesy name Xushan 緒山）， another brilliant disciple of Wang Yangming， was critical of both Wang Ji and Nie Bao， charging them with “overemphasizing original substance.” Qian held the notion of “making ones intentions sincere” in high regard， and advocated “exerting strenuous effort in inspecting and restraining oneself，” that is， self-cultivation in daily experience where “ones likes and dislikes become manifest after being aroused by external things.” Judging by Wang Yangmings remark that “That which accords with original substance is effort， and only when one makes effort can one realize original substance，” the first part of the remark depicts the theories of Wang Ji and Nie Bao， and the second half that of Qian Dehong. For Qian， one can only exert effort on concrete mental activities， rather than directly on the substance of the mind. As long as “the effort made in making ones intentions sincere is supreme，” then “the substance is spontaneously quiet， and ones responses spontaneously appropriate.”

Evidently， Qian was not as concerned as Wang Ji and Nie Bao with the “substance of the mind”; he put more emphasis on effort in the empirical world. According to Zhang Xuezhi 張學(xué)智， some of Qians theories were a “precursor to Huang Zongxis thought that the mind has no substance， and its original substance is simply that which is attained through effort.” As convincing as Qians argument seems， it was criticized by those who emphasized substance as blurring the boundary between substance and function， with the consequence that one loses sight of the essential by being burdened and confused in addressing the trivial and complicated task of inspecting and restraining oneself. In practical effort， such questions as how to determine whether effort has reached its “l(fā)imit，” whether is it able to perceive “substance，” and whether this process is as “spontaneous” as Qian believed， all remain doubtful.

In summary， Wang Ji， Nie Bao， and Qian Dehong dealt with substance and effort through different approaches， and brought into sharp focus the substance–effort paradox discussed at the beginning of this paper.

For Wang Ji and Nie Bao， original substance was of prime importance and was a precondition for effort， yet how can one determine that one has “realized original substance”？ Wang Ji stuck to the monistic view that substance and function are one， and hence the substance of the mind became entangled with concrete mental activities. As a consequence， Wang Ji did not succeed in developing the theory he envisioned， that of directing effort straight to substance. Nie Bao risked dividing substance and effort into two by establishing “quietude” as the characteristic of the substance of the mind; eventually， he could not help but take a mystical approach to explain the realization of substance， making it impossible to assess. Although Yangming stated that “that which accords with original substance is effort，” the problems with Wang Ji and Nie Bao demonstrate that it is impossible to determine， in absolutely rational terms， the state of being “in accord with original substance.” In contrast， Qian Dehong took the opposite approach， going from effort to substance; however， the problem persists as to how one knows that one does not go astray or that “the state attained through effort is substance” without realizing substance in the first place.

Therefore， it seems that effort is either simply unnecessary （for those who are already “in accord with original substance，” yet this state of according with substance is impossible to determine）， or simply impossible （for those who are not yet “in accord with substance”）. Hence， although Wang Yangmings statement seems comprehensive and satisfactory， careful reflection upon it reveals the seemingly insoluble conflict between substance and effort in such a framework. It was indeed precisely their problematic relationship that also set later scholars of Yangming Learning， such as Wang Ji， Nie Bao， and Qian Dehong， in disagreement with each other.

Reflections on the Substance of Human Nature and the Mind [88]

How did the above substance–effort paradox come into being， and in what way can it be resolved？ In this pair of concepts， there is little doubt about effort， and it is “substance” that is questionable.

Since this paradox presupposes a transcendent original substance， on the one hand， the goodness of human nature and the possibility of effort are grounded， so “that which accords with original substance is effort”; on the other hand， worldly effort seems to obtain a transcendent goal and destination， so “only when one makes effort can one realize original substance.” However， one is faced with a dilemma as soon as one seeks to understand this transcendent substance： it cannot be too near to experience or it may reduce the transcendence of the substance; neither can it be too distant from experience or it will become speculative or mystical， doing no good or even harm to practice. This dilemma is the cause of the Yangming substance–effort paradox， and the source of the disagreement among Wang Ji， Nie Bao， Qian Dehong， and other scholars. With the development of the Learning of the Mind， Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 （1610–1695） advanced the opinion that “the mind has no substance， and its original substance is simply that which is attained through effort.” In Huangs interpretation， original substance plays a rather nominal role， and effort becomes essential， the aspect one that must attend to assiduously. In fact， insistence on the transcendent nature of original substance makes it impossible to resolve the substance–effort paradox; the paradox can only be resolved by setting aside the transcendent original substance and turning to Huangs theory that “the mind has no original substance.” The substance–effort paradox reminds us to further examine the ontological interpretation of the mind and human nature.

To understand the substance of the mind and human nature， one has to understand how they relate to the mind and human nature in quotidian experience， or rather， how the substance of the mind and human nature reconcile with their functions in everyday experience. Generally， there are two ways to understand this relationship： one is bottom-up and the other is top-down. The bottom-up approach focuses on empirical content and effort on a daily basis in order to realize the substance of the mind and human nature， while the top-down approach focuses on the substance of the mind and human nature to grasp their empirical content and approach for effort.

Cheng–Zhu Learning of Principle claimed that “human nature is principle” and， in this way， sought to prove the notion of human innate goodness. Since this approach begins with the substance of human nature， it is a top-down approach. However， judging by the actual development of the school， the top-down approach gradually gave way to the bottom-up approach. Zhu Xi 朱熹 （1130–1200） for example did not， as might be expected， develop an idea of pure principle–nature， or a substance of human nature; instead， he admitted that principle–nature still relies on qi–nature to be manifested. Thus， the dualism of principle–nature and qi–nature turns into a monism of qi–nature， with principle–nature being one of the elements of qi–nature. Chen Chun 陳淳 （1159–1223）， a disciple of Zhu Xi， said， “In fact， the nature of Heaven and Earth is not separate from or outside of qi–nature; the point of singling out the former from the latter is to prevent the confusing of the two.” So-called principle–nature is singled out from qi–nature， but it does not exist independent of qi–nature. Apparently， after the Cheng–Zhu school， the principle–qi dualism and the concomitant dualism of principle–nature and qi–nature fell into decline， and there gradually appeared a monism based on qi and qi–nature. For example， Wang Yangming did not oppose Gaozis 告子 view that “what is inborn is called nature”; moreover， Wang stated explicitly： “Qi is human nature， and human nature is qi.”

Cheng–Zhu Learning of Principle sought to defend the notion of innate human goodness metaphysically through the claim that “human nature is principle”; however， this claim is open to question. It is actually not because “human nature is principle” that human nature is inherently good， but rather precisely the opposite， that because human nature is supposed to be inherently good， so it was thought to have principle as its very substance. Consequently， innate human goodness does not presuppose that human nature is principle; on the contrary， the latter claim was deduced from innate human goodness. A convincing defense of innate human goodness must ultimately probe into human nature and the mind， so to prove that “human nature is principle，” one should first prove that “mind is principle.” This explains why Zhu Xi talked about “the mind uniting human nature and feelings” in his discussion of “human nature as principle.” In particular， Zhu proposed a new interpretation of Menciuss Four Beginnings in terms of their interrelationships： the feeling of commiseration is the single thread running through all moral feelings， and ren 仁 （humanity） is the source from which all other virtues like righteousness， propriety， and wisdom are derived. That the Cheng–Zhu school employed the view that human nature is principle to account for innate human goodness was probably due to the difficulty in making the argument from a psychological perspective， for as is obvious， apart from human goodness， there is certainly also an evil side to the human mind. However， it can be argued that goodness and evil are not mutually exclusive but related to each other in structural terms. For example， the feeling of commiseration is not only good but also preventive， inhibiting the development of evil in the mind. Therefore， evil also exists in the mind， but it is inhibited or suppressed in the system of human nature， and hence taken as a whole， human nature is good.

Zhu Xis theory that the feeling of commiseration runs through the Four Beginnings and that humanity incorporates the four virtues can be seen as an attempt to buttress the notion of innate human goodness through a structural analysis （not merely an analysis of the components） of human nature. Wang Yangming proposed another structural analysis that differed from Zhus. Wang regarded intuitive knowledge as the foundation of the mind， and the feeling of right and wrong as the substance of intuitive knowledge. Where Zhu started from the idea that human nature is principle， and inevitably reached the conclusion that the mind is principle， Wang took a bottom-up approach， going from the human experience of enlightenment of human nature and mind to the opinion that the mind is principle. Both Zhu and Wang affirm the ontological meaning of human nature and mind. These views were by no means arbitrary： they were based on their understandings of the experience of human nature and mind as well as the concrete life experience of cultivation through effort.

It is noteworthy that in religion there are two paths to the knowledge of God， the rational path of understanding the order of the world that is granted by none other than God himself， and the non-rational path of intuiting through divine revelation. The same is true when it comes to understanding the ontological meaning of human nature and mind. Not all took the bottom-up rational path， going from knowledge of the empirical contents of human nature and mind to knowledge of the substance of human nature and mind， and a few with fervent faith in the substance of the mind may have understood it through something very like a religious experience， and received guidance in thought and action the same way a religious person receives divine revelation. In its later development， the Learning of the Mind turned to the more non-rational approach， widening the gap between the substance of the mind and the basis of intuitive knowledge and practice， and the substance of the mind became a purely speculative and mystical concept that served like a first principle issuing instructions from above.

To sum up， the problem with the top-down approach is obvious. The approach， at best， may encourage practice， but it does not prove effective in theoretical explanations or debates. For example， Cheng–Zhu Learning attempted to prove innate human goodness by proposing that human nature is principle， but this top-down path does not lead anywhere; moreover， it may lead to arbitrariness or even mysticism， like how the followers of Yangming Learning sought a way to directly intuit original substance through effort， such as Nie Baos advocation of returning to quietude. The top-down approach did not last long， and quite naturally underwent a shift to the rational bottom-up approach. This explains why Zhu Xis theory of principle–nature finally developed into a qi–nature one， with some empirical analysis of the internal structure of human nature and mind， and why Yangming Learning finally espoused Huang Zongxis view that “original substance is simply that which is attained through effort.” Both Zhus acknowledgement of qi–nature as more fundamental and Huangs predilection toward effort show a firm adherence to human experience and to the bottom-up approach.

Conclusion [89]

The substance–effort paradox in Yangming Learning teaches us a lesson that we should pass through ontological notions of human nature and the mind， and return to human nature and human mind in the life-world. In other words， we should restore the proper relationship between the experience and practice of human nature and mind and ontological theories of human nature and mind. The former serves as the foundation upon which the latter are built， and it follows that the latter must be understood through the former. Deprived of the foundation of experience， ontological theories lose their strength and rigor in explanation or argumentation， and provide no guarantee of innate human goodness or the practice of moral cultivation. If an ontological theory does not involve sensible self-inspection of the mind and human nature， or earnest effort made in self-cultivation， it is likely to make humans arrogant. In todays Confucian studies， we should see clearly and emphasize that experience is crucial to the notions of human nature and the mind. We should， in our research， be cautious about the meaning and function of ontological concepts such as the substance of the mind and the substance of human nature， and avoid sticking merely to the ontological， sacrificing what is real for what is immaterial.

Bibliography of Cited Translations

Chan， Wing-tsit， trans. Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming. New York and London： Columbia University Press， 1963.

Translated by Hou Jian