The Possibility and Method of Implanting Aesthetic Autonomy into Confucian Aesthetics: The Case of Helian Bobo

Liu Xuguang

Abstract： Chinese Confucian aesthetics takes aesthetic moralism as its priority， and yet it also presupposes aesthetic autonomy. The ancients applied a double standard to evaluate the tyrant Helian Bobo， from both the aesthetic and moral perspectives， revealing a possibility that aesthetic pleasure is independent of moral feeling. Modern Chinese scholars have been theoretically aware of aesthetic autonomy but they refuse to accept it in practice. This paper attempts to start from the “music of the rain altar” and the “realm of refreshing breeze and the bright moon” to implant aesthetic autonomy into Confucian aesthetics in order to gain independence and dignity of aesthetic perception and arts in Chinese culture and therefore be free from the traditions of aesthetic moralism and artistic utilitarianism.

Keywords： Helian Bobo， Confucian aesthetics， aesthetic autonomy

Helian Bobo 赫連勃勃 （r. 407–425） “was more than six feet tall， with a girdle of ten finger spans， talented in debate and beautiful in demeanor.” The ancient Chinese historian had such a rare description of the tyrant with an aesthetic attitude. In this account， aesthetics seems to break away from obscuration by politics and morality and show its independence. In ancient China， did aesthetics have its own independence？ The case of Helian Bobo shows that it did， but it was concealed behind aesthetic moralism.

The issue of aesthetic independence can also be expressed as that of aesthetic autonomy in theory. Since Kant formulated the conception of aesthetic autonomy， it has spread all over the world in two hundred years， which constitutes the basic understanding of aesthetics by modern people. What kind of theoretical response then should be made to the aesthetic thoughts of those nations that do not have aesthetic autonomy？ There are only three possible responses： the first is to refuse and insist on making aesthetic activity and perception the means to achieve a goal; the second is to embrace， excavate， and enlarge the factors related to aesthetic autonomy in traditional aesthetics; the third is confrontation， adhering to their own position and forming a dialectical relationship of mutual negation and mutual regulation in the confrontation， so as to praise each others characteristics and seek compromise. The relationship between Confucian aesthetics and Western aesthetic autonomy falls into the third category.

The Issue of Aesthetic Autonomy in Confucian Aesthetics

[Refer to page 41 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]

The history of Chinese aesthetics often uses “aesthetic moralism” to summarize the value pursuit of traditional Confucian aesthetics. That is， Confucianism always unifies aesthetics with moral judgment， moral emotion with aesthetic delight， and aesthetics with the system of ritual and music and the spirit of benevolence （ren 仁） and righteousness （yi 義）. This theoretical generalization is derived from four groups of assertions in the Analects.

Group one：

The Master said of Shao music that it was perfectly beautiful and also perfectly good. He said of the Wu music that it was perfectly beautiful but not perfectly good. （Analects 3：25）

In this sentence， beauty （mei 美） and goodness （shan 善） are understood as things that can be joined or separated. Here then beauty and goodness are not one but rather are separate， although they should be one.

Zixia 子夏 （b. 507 BCE） asked， saying， “What is the meaning of the passage—‘The pretty dimples of her artful smile！ The well-defined black and white of her eye！ The plain ground for the colors？” The Master said， “The business of laying on the colors follows the preparation of the plain ground.” “Rites then are subsequent thing？” The Master said， “It is Zixia who can bring out my meaning. Now I can begin to talk about the Book of Songs with him.” （3：8）

This statement places “colors” after “plain ground” and the aesthetic effect after “rites.” It shows that the aesthetic effect belongs after actual function， but does that mean that aesthetics still exists independently of actual function？

Group two：

The Master said， “With coarse rice to eat， with water to drink， and my bended arm for a pillow; I have still joy in the midst of these things. Riches and honors acquired by unrighteousness， are to me as a floating cloud.” （7：16）

The Master said， “Admirable indeed was the virtue of Yan Hui 顏回 （521–490 BCE）！ With a single bamboo dish of rice， a single gourd dish of drink， and living in his mean narrow lane， while others could not have endured the distress， he did not allow his joy to be affected by it. Admirable indeed was the virtue of Hui！” （6：11）

This group refers to a kind of moral delight that transcends utilitarian satisfaction and is truly worth pursuing. The delight of Yan Hui has something in common with aesthetic delight. They are both non-utilitarian. However， from the expression that “the business of laying on the colors follows the preparation of the plain ground，” Confucius also knows that formal beauty and moral and emotional pleasure are different. They are separate， but they should be combined.

Group three：

Zilu 子路 （542–480 BCE） asked what constituted a complete man. The Master said， “Suppose a man with the knowledge of Zang Wuzhong 臧武仲， the freedom from covetousness of Meng Gongchuo 孟公綽， the bravery of Zhuangzi of Bian， and the varied talents of Ran Qiu 冉求 （b. 522 BCE）; add to these the accomplishments of the rules of rites and music;—such a one might be reckoned a complete man.” （14：12）

The Master said， “If a man be without the virtues proper to benevolence， what has he to do with the rites of propriety？ If a man be without the virtues proper to benevolence， what has he to do with music？” （3：3）

The Master said， “‘It is according to the rules of propriety， they say. ‘It is according to the rules of propriety， they say. Are gems and silk all that is meant by propriety？ ‘It is music， they say. ‘It is music， they say. Are bells and drums all that is meant by music？” （17：11）

This statement requires that people be educated with rites and music， and that rites and music be guided by benevolence. Rites and music are first of all used with jade， silk， bells， and drums， but they should also be attached to benevolence.

Group four：

“What harm is there in that？” said the Master. “Let each of you speak out your wishes.” Zeng Dian 曾點(diǎn) （b. 546 BCE） then said， “In this， the last month of spring， with the dress of the season all complete， along with five or six young men who have assumed the cap， and six or seven boys， I would wash in the Yi River， enjoy the breeze among the rain altars， and return home singing.” The Master heaved a sigh and said， “I give my approval to Dian.” （11：26）

This dialogue encompasses a kind of amoral and non-utilitarian pleasure， which is called the delight of the “music of the rain altar” by later generations. It looks very much like the non-utilitarian， amoral， and non-conceptual spiritual delight that is the aesthetic feeling as understood by the Western theory of aesthetic autonomy.

Beauty and goodness should coincide， aesthetic delight and moral delight should coincide， benevolence and rites and music should coincide. These constitute the three basic demands of Confucian aesthetics， but this “should” also shows that this consistency has not occurred， which means that there is a confrontation between beauty and goodness. This confrontation implies a latent presupposition that aesthetics is independent and autonomous.

No explicit expression of this conclusion is found in the Confucian classical texts， but it can be speculated that though beauty and goodness are mentioned together， they are two distinct things. Moreover， from its pragmatic effect in the history of the Chinese language， the word mei were mainly used by the ancients to refer to what is good or fine （hao 好） and the meaning of hao overlaps with mei. Therefore， hao and shan are usually not used together in Chinese expressions to avoid redundancy. However， in the phrase jin shan jin mei 盡善盡美 （perfectly good and beautiful）， mei （beautiful） and shan （good） are put together， showing that the two are semantically parallel rather than absolute synonyms， This means that calling something beautiful does not necessarily mean calling it good. At least in the Analects， the word mei has its own independence. However， later Confucian scholars adhered to aesthetic moralism in the Analects and believed that mei and shan are the same thing. For example， Xu Shen 許慎 （ca. 58–ca.147）， author of The Etymological Dictionary of Characters [說文解字]， first had the concept of integrating beauty and goodness and then tried to unify them in philology. Taking yang 羊 （sheep） as the bridge， he speculated that since sheep are for eating， the word mei 美， which seems like a derivative of yang， should be related to food. He then directly asserted that mei is synonymous with shan 善 （譱）， both being derived from yang. As yang has the meaning of “auspiciousness，” it is inferred that shan is synonymous with yi 義 （義） and mei in meaning.

Xu Shens literal interpretation is only the result of his theory of the synonymy of beauty and goodness， but later generations would take it as evidence for that theory. This synonymy cancels the theoretical possibility of aesthetic autonomy， but the problem is that in the Analects there exists no theory that beauty and goodness must always travel together， so the independence of beauty remains a possibility.

In the third passage Confucius seems to treat benevolence and righteousness as the preconditions of rites and music， but do there exist any rites and music that are not consistent with benevolence and righteousness？ Although Confucius does not agree with music that is not benevolent， non-benevolent rites and music do already exist！ Does this mean that rites and music can be affirmed just for their beauty or refinement， regardless of moral considerations？

The above-mentioned Confucian aesthetic reflects a theoretical contradiction. Beauty and goodness， the aesthetic value of art and its moral value， are semantically distinct， but when it comes to appraising specific cases they can be used interchangeably， which is a contradiction. This contradiction may not seem so problematic because it seldom arises in particular cases. However， there is such a particular case in Chinese history that can amplify this contradiction， such as Helian Bobo.

Helian Bobo： A Confrontation between Aesthetic Moralism?and Aesthetic Autonomy [42]

Theory must deal with real events. The History of the Jin Dynasty [晉書]， in its “Account， the Thirtieth” [載記第三十] chapter， records the deeds of a Xiongnu descendant named Helian Bobo who established the Xia state during the Sixteen Kingdoms period （304–439）. The historians who compiled the history， supervised by Fang Xuanling 房玄齡 （579–648）， Chu Suiliang 褚遂良 （596–ca. 658）， and Xu Jingzong 許敬宗 （592–672） in the Tang dynasty， encountered a difficult problem： the confrontation between beauty， art， and benevolence.

“Helian Bobo was more than six feet tall， with a girdle of ten finger spans， talented in debate and beautiful in demeanor.” The introduction of the character begins with this aesthetic evaluation， which is distinctive and rare in history books. When Helian Bobo established his regime， he built and ruled numerous towns and cities， and demanded absolute refinement of craftsmanship. The account continues：

Bobo claimed， “Now I have conquered the world， ruling all states， and thus we can name the capital city Tongwan.” Ali was particularly gifted for craftsmanship and yet he was extremely cruel and tyrannical. He had the walls built by the lime-clay injection method. He would kill the builder and bury him in the wall if ever the wall was weak enough as to allow the awl to enter an inch. For his loyalty， Bobo entrusted him with the task of construction and maintenance. Then he was commissioned to make extremely fine and sharp weaponry. Upon completion， some craftsmen would be executed： If an arrow could not pierce armor， the bow maker would be killed， and if it did pierce armor， the armor maker would be killed. Then he set to making finely tempered swords， namely black phoenix swords， called the “great Xia black phoenix swords.” . . . And he also made all kinds of mythological figures of copper and gold and displayed them in front of the palace. He killed thousands of craftsmen to ensure that his products were exquisite and beautiful.

Killing thousands of craftsmen！ This is the reason why the artifacts were exquisite， beautiful， and among the best in the world. This kind of beauty is not justified in the eyes of orthodox Confucianism. On the one hand， the text describes the ferocity and killing of Helian Bobo; on the other， it makes the following aesthetic evaluation in the final “historians comment”： “Yet he had high taste and unique character， intoxicating Emperor Wenhuan of Later Qin and moving Emperor Taizu of Song.”

The person of Helian Bobo and the objects and buildings he supervised had high aesthetic value， but morally they deserved criticism. However， Fang Xuanling and others did not deny the former because of the latter. Their description of the image of the tyrant and the beauty of his citys artifacts is impressive. This is caused by the ambiguous attitude of Confucianism in aesthetic moralism and aesthetic autonomy. Where then is the contradiction between the two？

First of all， aesthetic delight and moral feeling can be distinguished in experience， but they somehow overlap. Confuciuss sigh at watching pines and cypresses and the joy of listening to Shao music contain moral feeling， but they are indeed triggered by the specific objects of sensibility. Does this then mean that the “sigh of pine and cypress” and the “joy of Shao music” are aesthetic delights， or are they a moral feeling caused by the moral concept symbolized by the trees and spiritual delight aroused by the spiritual ideal contained in Shao music？ In this regard， the Confucians have some insight but they do not analyze it. Instead they combine the two through analogy to virtue and philology （such as Xu Shen）， enlarge them， and interpret aesthetic delight as the strengthening or guidance of moral delight， a position of aesthetic moralism. The problem is that the aesthetic value of Helian Bobo and the things he supervised is intuitive， which leads to the difficulty of aesthetic moralism： the beauty thus seen is an undeniable fact， yet it cannot be willingly affirmed.

Second， the aesthetic judgment and moral judgment are different in essence， a fact of which Confucianism also has a clear consciousness. Aesthetic judgment is the judgment of an objects form and formal language. It is related to the delight of feeling. It may only have perceptual directness without the intervention of values. In Kants view， aesthetic judgment is aimless and non-conceptual， which is the direct judgment of the subjects inner state upon the object. Confucianism pays more attention to another phenomenon， namely that the emergence and acceptance of artistic beauty and even natural beauty are influenced by the penetration of morality into all things in human life in various ways. Therefore， in fact， aesthetic experience and appreciation judgment are more complex than Kants pure judgment of taste. In the aesthetic judgment involving moral judgment， the perceptual representation of the object not only combines with the pleasant inner state but also combines a certain value purpose. Confucian aesthetics is always the product of the combination of pure appreciation and moral connotation. In the tradition of analogy to virtue， Confucianism gives up the analysis of and emphasis on the difference between aesthetics and moral judgment， instead stressing the cooperative relationship between them. But once there is no cooperative relationship between the two， or even opposition， as for example in the case of Helian Bobo， then should we accept the independent aesthetic value of the object？

There is another phenomenon in the judgment of taste： artistic taste may only focus on the formal language of artistic works and suspend the content of the works and moral evaluation of the artist （or not willingly conduct that moral evaluation）， so as to form a conflict between artistic appreciation and moral evaluation. This conflict will lead to the moralization of artistic style and aesthetic experience， such as the evaluation of Zhao Mengfu 趙孟 （1254–1322）， of whom it was written that his “calligraphy is gentle and elegant. It has inherited the genuine characteristic of Wang Xizhi 王羲之 （303–361） from afar， but its defects are delicateness and softness， lacking strong will.” “Gentleness and elegance” is an aesthetic evaluation， while “l(fā)acking strong will” is a moral evaluation. When moralism wants to deny Zhaos independent value in art， it comes up with the expression—“delicateness and softness，” which is essentially moral negation but disguised as aesthetic negation. Yet this negation is farfetched， because “gentle and elegant” is still applicable to Zhaos style！ This is a paradox： “gentle and elegant” and “delicateness and softness，” which refer to almost opposite attitudes， now nevertheless refer to the same object.

Finally， the judgment of taste has an undeniable directness and independence. It is like an unfounded intuition， without the guidance of ideas and previous norms of appreciation. Aesthetes can experience the delight given by objects themselves. This is a disaster for aesthetic moralists， because moral judgment always needs the education of moral ideas and the cultivation of moral feeling， but the directness of the experience of formal beauty does not need the intervention of ideas， which forces aesthetic moralists to fight against peoples direct experience and common sense： a tree is not beautiful， but because it has the symbolism of moral ideas， people must say that it is; or people must deny the beauty of a beautiful woman because of her bad character—this is not convincing！ In the case of Helian Bobo， it is surprising that Fang Xuanling and others actually accepted the aesthetic appeal of Helian Bobo and did not deny it on account of his moral defects.

To sum up the three points above， the conflict between aesthetic moralism and the theory of aesthetic autonomy is that aesthetic moralism does not deny the independence of aesthetic delight， but although it does also see its relationship with moral feeling， it still chooses to emphasize the connection and ignore the independence， thus causing an opposition between aesthetic delight and moral feeling in extreme cases. This conflict is magnified in the case of Helian Bobo. Historians ambivalently affirm him aesthetically but deny him morally. However， as Confucius said， “If a man be without the virtues proper to benevolence， what has he to do with the rites of propriety？ If a man be without the virtues proper to benevolence， what has he to do with music？” （Analects 3：3） Orthodox Confucian scholars will not make this compromise.

The Beauty of Weeds： The Experiential Basis for?Aesthetic Autonomy [45]

The last sentence in the “Interpreting Rhyme-Prose” [詮賦] of Dragon-Carving and the Literary Mind [文心雕龍] reads： “In style， its ultimate achievement is beauty without excess， in diction， redundant words are shorn like weeds.” Weeds are useless， so they have to be cut off. This attitude has pervaded Chinese culture. The “Discourse on Music” [樂論] of the Xunzi declares， “Therefore， musical performances are the means of guiding enjoyment. The instruments of metal， stone， silk， and bamboo are the means to guide music， for whenever music is performed， the people sit facing it.” The “Record of Music” [樂記] in the Book of Rites clearly points out： “Virtue is the strong stem of [mans] nature， and music is the blossoming of virtue.” In the ancient Chinese tradition of musical education， morality was the purpose of music. Only when music becomes a moral sound can it obtain its own legitimacy. Aesthetic autonomy does not have sufficient legitimacy in this conceptual system. However， as shown above， the potential recognition of aesthetic autonomy and the independence of aesthetic delight make a gap between the conceptual aesthetic moralism and actual aesthetic behavior. In other words， aesthetic moralism covers up the theory of aesthetic autonomy， but the light of the latter can still pass through the former. Is there a foothold of aesthetic autonomy in Confucianism？ Is it possible for weeds to be independently recognized because of their beauty？

This does happen in practice. First of all， under aesthetic moralism， the artistic style itself has an independence of its own. For example， for ancient Chinese painters， bamboo is an object of virtue. Bamboo is hollow， jointed， bent but not broken， and has noble ambition. It is a symbol of the virtue of a gentleman. However， Zheng Xie 鄭燮 （style name Banqiao 板橋， 1693–1766） said， “When you look at bamboo in the morning in the autumn， the smoke， light， sun， shadow， and air float between sparse branches and dense leaves. My heart is full of vitality with the aspiration for painting.” It is the beauty of bamboo that triggers the painters creative impulse. The reason why he paints bamboo is not a moral motivation but an aesthetic reason. Su Shi 蘇軾 （1037–1101） once commented on Wu Daozis 吳道子 （ca. 680–ca. 758） paintings：

When Daozi paints figures， he seems to take shadows with light， go backwards and forwards， show side-by-side， oblique， and straight lines， and multiply and divide each phase to get the natural number with perfect precision， creating new images within the rules， sending wonderful notions beyond the bold and unrestrained. He may be the only person from ancient to modern times who has sufficient capacity to create new trends.

What is revealed is obviously a pure appreciative judgment independent of aesthetic moralism and only related to the language of form. Therefore， the concept of aesthetic moralism did not prevent the ancients from experiencing pure appreciation and judgment of art and natural objects. This indicates a possibility that the object appreciated by an aesthetic moralist will cast off moral judgment and be independent.

Another interesting case is that of the Chinese literati playing with calamus. Acorus calamus （changpu 菖蒲） is a kind of wild grass growing on the wetland by the river. Compared with weeds， it has no particular aesthetic distinctiveness or advantages. But the literati have aestheticized it for two reasons. First， because chang 菖 is homophonic with chang 昌 （goodness）， appreciating the acorus calamus has become a moral behavior. A second reason is that acorus calamus is seen to symbolize leisure in the wild and so has been used by hermits as a self-metaphor. This reason too also belongs to the category of analogy to virtue. Jiang Kui 姜夔 （Jiang Baishi 姜白石， ca. 1155–1209） said in his poem “Calamus”：

Calamus resides by Yuelu streams with grace，

and Xiang River flows like jade with fragrance.

The seedlings stand strong and upright，

retaining propriety with fragrance.

Who says the flower bowl is too small，

he forgets the odor lasts long.

The mountain is small like a fist and the pond like a spoon，

and yet its hard to fathom their depth.

The first two lines end with grace and fragrance， which are aesthetic qualities. The second two lines contain upright and propriety， which are terms of virtue. This shows that aesthetic and virtue terms occur in parallel. Only those calami that can achieve some aesthetic effect can become scholars playthings， and each calamus can become an object analogized to virtue. Therefore， in the aesthetics of each specific object， aesthetic moralism is actually used as the grounding or background. In other words， in specific aesthetic activities， the aesthetics of the object can precede the moral evaluation of the object， and even shake free of moral evaluation. When people like a specific and pleasing experience in addition to analogy to virtue， it shows aesthetic autonomy.

When talking about the creation of landscape paintings， Guo Xi 郭熙 （1023–1085）， a painter in the Northern Song dynasty， followed the tradition of analogizing mountains and rivers to virtue. However， when presenting specific mountain scenes he wrote， “The spring mountains are calm as if smiling， the summer mountains are green as if dripping， the autumn mountains are bright and clean as if made up， and the winter mountains are bleak as if sleeping.” This is obviously an empathic aesthetic judgment based on emotional experience and does not depend on analogy to virtue. This independent aesthetic state shows that ancient peoples aesthetics did include autonomy and independence in specific aesthetic experience. The expression of weeds itself shows the relative independence of beauty. Aesthetics and aesthetic moralism are parallel， but it is a complex issue to accept this parallel in theory， or indirectly recognize aesthetic autonomy.

Why Was Aesthetic Autonomy Not Accepted by?Modern Chinese Aesthetics？ [46]

Generally speaking， ancient Chinese critics were unwilling to admit aesthetic autonomy. If the appreciation of art and beauty is not conducive to self-cultivation and has nothing to do with merit， they reduced it to “entertainment” or “play.” This utilitarian moralism is the basic principle for the evaluation of things by Confucian-influenced scholar-officials. When this principle is specific to aesthetics， it is transformed into the fundamental issue of “the significance of aesthetics to life.” The theoretical path of Western aesthetic modernity answers the question of “cultivating a free personality.” When Kant analyzed “teleological judgment” in The Critique of Judgment， he gave such a “purpose” for aesthetic and artistic activities：

And such must have been the age， and such the nation， that first discovered the art of reciprocal communication of ideas between the more cultured and ruder sections of the community， and how to bridge the difference between the profundity and refinement of the former and the natural simplicity and originality of the latter-in this way hitting upon that mean between higher culture and the modest worth of nature， that forms for taste also， as a sense common to all mankind， that true standard which no universal rules can supply.

In Kants view， the ultimate purpose of aesthetic and artistic activities is to combine the ruder human nature with the cultured， and to coordinate profundity and refinement with natural simplicity and originality. The reason why aesthetic and artistic activities can achieve this goal is that they cancel the role of “concepts” in appreciative judgment. In fact， they dispel all kinds of external purposiveness for aesthetics. The subject regards “free play of the powers of representation” as the internal purposiveness of aesthetics and takes “free delight” as the essence of the sense of beauty. This kind of free play and free delight coordinates peoples profundity and refinement with their natural simplicity and originality. In Kants view， “the freedom of the imagination” in aesthetic experience is the feeling of freedom obtained after liberation from the rules imposed by knowledge. The experience of beauty is a kind of experience of freedom， and perhaps our only experience of? freedom （since Kant mentioned in his works on morality that we do not have any direct experience of “free will”）， so it can be said that aesthetic experience provides an empirical confirmation of our freedom. This confirmation of freedom actually plays an intermediary role， making an analogy between the “freedom of the imagination” in aesthetic experience and the free will in moral motivation and moral action， although the two kinds of freedom are different in category. However， Kant believes that the experience of freedom in aesthetics helps us to feel and pursue free will in morality. Aesthetics has become the preparatory stage of moral non-utilitarianism because of its non-utilitarianism and non-existence. From this， he came to a conclusion that made traditional Chinese intellectuals at home and welcome： “Beauty is the symbol of morality.”

The basis of this conclusion is the analogy and mutual promotion between aesthetic freedom and moral freedom. Will this conclusion itself discard aesthetic autonomy？ It should not. After all， the pursuit of freedom and delight is the fundamental purpose of aesthetics. Whether it is conducive to the experience of free will and morality is only its incidental result rather than the ultimate purpose. Preparing for morality is one of the aesthetic meanings， but it is not the essence of aesthetics！ However， the proposition that “beauty is the symbol of morality” will indeed bring conceptual conflict. It will drive people to doubt aesthetic autonomy and move toward aesthetic moralism， especially in Chinese culture with a strong tradition of aesthetic moralism.

The acceptance of Western aesthetics in modern China began from “aesthetic education，” which is the territory of aesthetic moralism and which determines the construction of aesthetic ideas in modern Chinese aesthetics to avoid or even oppose aesthetic autonomy. For example， Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 （1868–1940） made a concise and accurate summary of Kants aesthetics. He could accept Kants concept of pure beauty or free beauty but still turned to aesthetic moralism， writing：

Beauty has both universality to break the barriers between my view and others views and detachment to reveal the relationship of interests. Therefore， at an important juncture exists this spirit： “Neither riches nor honors can corrupt him; neither poverty nor lowly condition can make him swerve from principle; neither threats nor force can bend him.” There is even the courage to “die to achieve benevolence” rather than to “seek survival at the cost of harming benevolence.” This kind of thing does not come about from quibbling over knowledge but from the cultivation of feelings. That is， it comes not from intellectual education but from aesthetic education.

He seems to think that aesthetics can cultivate independent personality， and independent personality can follow moral self-discipline！

Kant bridges between aesthetics and morality through free will， making aesthetics the preparation of morality， while Cai Yuanpei bridges between aesthetics and morality through independence of personality， making aesthetics the means of cultivating moral personality. Although both are theoretically dry， what they have in common is that they are not willing to linger upon aesthetic autonomy， hoping instead that aesthetics can guide the more valuable part of human spirit.

More noteworthy as a theoretical reference is Mou Zongsans 牟宗三 （1909–1995） understanding of and attitude toward aesthetic autonomy. As a translator of Kants aesthetics， Mou believes that aesthetic autonomy is about the “differentiation” among aesthetics， morality， and cognition， or truth， goodness， and beauty：

Analytically speaking， the “beauty” is the “l(fā)eisure principle” of life and the free and easy freedom of life. When people are free and easy， life begins to live， to be relaxed and free without any fear， to soar freely. But this is the leisure of subtle wisdom and meditation， which will show “abiding.” If one thus abides to the end， and there is no sense of alarm that can arise， one can fall and even indulge oneself.

The freedom of life is indeed the fundamental purpose of aesthetic autonomy， but it cannot become the ultimate goal; otherwise it will fall into indulgence， lose wisdom， and fall into perceptual passion. In this regard， Mou Zongsan once again displays his controlling ability as the moral metaphysician and puts forward a “realm” of “truth， beauty， and goodness，” which transcends the three and reaches an unimpeded realm of their integration. Of course， this can also be understood as dissatisfaction with and abandonment of the theory of aesthetic autonomy.

Cai Yuanpei and Mou Zongsans responses to aesthetic autonomy are representative in the history of modern Chinese aesthetics; that is， they acknowledge it in theory but do not accept it in aesthetic practice. The absence of aesthetic autonomy makes positions aesthetics as leisure and elegance， and art is thus regarded as a tool of entertainment and propaganda， which is a situation that all people who love aesthetics and art are unwilling to accept！ Is it possible to implant aesthetic autonomy into China？

Implanting Aesthetic Autonomy [50]

The word “implant” has two connotations. One is that something that did not originally exist is created through the introduction of foreign objects; the second is that it is possible to accept foreign objects and make them survive. Just like transplanting a tree， it is not difficult to plant it. The problem is how to make it adapt to the new environment and survive. This requires appropriate conditions and appropriate implantation sites. The point at which to implant aesthetic autonomy into Chinese aesthetics lies in the “music of the rain altar” and the “realm of refreshing breeze and bright moon.”

“I would wash in the Yi River， enjoy the breeze among the rain altars， and return home singing.” This is the ideal life as given by Zeng Dian. There is a kind of non-utilitarian spiritual delight very similar to aesthetic delight. Zeng Dians ideal of life can also be understood as a kind of “poetic existence.” In essence， this ideal of life is to pursue a non-utilitarian life and realize unity with nature. Zhu Xi 朱熹 （1130–1200） explained Zeng Dians joy as follows：

From Zeng Dians learning， one may see the end of human desire. Heavenly principles are prevalent， filling up everything with nothing missing. Therefore when he is moving or standing still， he is most calm. And his ambition is nothing other than to inhabit where he is， to enjoy his daily life， with no intention of sacrificing himself for others at the beginning. And his mind is leisurely， straight up and down with all things in heaven and earth， and each has its own wonder， which is only revealed beyond words.

That is to say， in daily sensory life， we can obtain a kind of non-utilitarian and transcendental spiritual delight， which is consistent with Kants aesthetic concept of modernity. As long as this delight comes from the appreciation of nature and art， it is not inconsistent to say that it is aesthetic delight. The non-utilitarian， aimless， and non-conceptual music of the rain altar determines that it is autonomous， so it can be used as the site for implanting aesthetic autonomy.

In Zhu Xis eyes， the music of the rain altar is the same as all the things in heaven and earth， each possessing its own wonder. This is the result of subtle wisdom and subtle awakening. Therefore， obtaining the music of the rain altar is not an elegant expression or play of leisure. This “music” has independent value， which can coexist with truth and goodness. In addition， Cheng Yi 程頤 （1033–1107） also affirmed the music of the rain altar. Confucius comforted old， trusted friends and cared for the young with the heart of benevolence， so that all things could follow their nature. In Cheng Yis view， this is the essence of the music of the rain altar and the atmosphere of Yao and Shun. Transcending secular utilitarianism and making contributions to all things is the embodiment of “benevolent love，” which Kant regards as the essential characteristic of the aesthetic.

There is also a third view：

Thus the three Masters writing concerns rites and the will of the people. Zeng Dians ambition is expressed through drum and harp， wind and dance. The music coincides with the voice of the people. Music comes from within and rites are made without， so Confucius alone had affinity with Zeng Dian. Only music cannot be made fake， so Zeng Dian staked his ambition there.

This is to attribute the music of the rain altar to musical education teaching—music comes within and rites are made without. In fact， it affirms the independence of music， that is， the independence of art.

However， the “music of the rain altar” is also full of controversy in Confucianism. The moralist tradition is wary of this non-utilitarian spiritual delight. However， Zhu and Chengs interpretations are still the mainstream， and the essence of the music of the rain altar can still be interpreted as a non-utilitarian spiritual delight with metaphysical value. The affirmation of this delight can be transferred to the affirmation of aesthetics.

In addition， as the spiritual ideal of the ancient Chinese， the “realm of refreshing breeze and bright moon” is also an implantation point of aesthetic autonomy. This spiritual realm comes from Su Shi. Boating at the Red Cliff and enjoying the moon with friends， Su Shi gained a sense of freedom as if becoming an immortal on the river and under the bright moon：

Moreover， all things under heaven have their separate owners. If a thing does not belong to me， not a mite of it should be taken as mine. Only the refreshing breeze on the river and the bright moon over the hills， which generate in our ears a pleasant sound and in our eyes a dreamy color， are inexhaustible and can be freely enjoyed. They are an immeasurable treasure granted to us by our Creator for our common happiness.

Its delight comes from the state of non-utilitarian freedom in the face of all things. The refreshing breeze and bright moon are publicly owned by the world. They can be taken and used at any time， freely and without obstacle. It is this sense of freedom and independence that gives people spiritual delight. This is the natural aesthetic experience of Sus own ears and eyes， and his delight is the result of perceptual intuition. This kind of pure delight with self-discipline cannot be explained by aesthetic moralism. When explaining the realm of life， Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 （1895–1990） put forward the following：

Here is the highest human attainment in the realm of heaven and earth： One feels himself not only as part of the whole but also united with the whole. . . . The whole is the togetherness of all things， and “I” am united with the whole， so “all things are possessed by me.” This realm is called being united with heaven.

This state of unity with heaven is similar to Su Shis line about being “as if forsaking the world and becoming winged deities， ascending to the land of immortals.” This state of everything being possessed by me reflects the transcendence of life. Aesthetics can reach the same state in the realm of refreshing breeze and bright moon， so as to surpass morality and cognition and reach the highest state of life.

According to the influence and actual connotation of the music of the rain altar and the realm of the refreshing breeze and bright moon in the history of Chinese culture， we can infer that the understanding of aesthetics in Chinese culture itself contains the possibility of aesthetic autonomy. Among them， it encompasses the highest spiritual hopes of the West for aesthetics， as well as the basic connotation of aesthetic autonomy： a kind of universal spiritual delight without utilitarianism， conceptualization， and purpose， which is obtained through artistic activities and aesthetics—this is Chinas theory of aesthetic autonomy.

Why must we implant this theory of aesthetic autonomy？ Because without autonomy， there is no independence， and without independence， there is no dignity. In Chinese culture， with its strong tradition of moralism and utilitarianism， without the support of aesthetic autonomy and artistic autonomy， art and aesthetics lack independent value. Although they may be endowed with many social functions， they have no dignity！ Only by recognizing the autonomy of aesthetics and art can we recognize the transcendence of aesthetics and the creativity of art. Recognizing aesthetic autonomy means freeing ourselves from the Helian dilemma. Even if there are evil， unworthy， and worthless parts in the subject， aesthetics should not be canceled. Aesthetics has its own autonomy and has nothing to do with good and evil.

Bibliography of Cited Translations

Knoblock， John， trans. Xunzi [荀子] （Chinese–English version）. 2 vols. Library of Chinese Classics [大中華文庫]. Changsha： Hunan Peoples Publishing House; Beijing： Foreign Languages Press， 1999.

Legge， James， trans. Confucian Analects. Vol. 1， The Chinese Classics. Taipei： SMC Publishing Inc.， 1991.

———. Liji. https：//ctext.org/liji/ens， accessed August 22， 2021.

Xie， Baikui 謝百魁， trans. A Collection of Chinese Ancient Prose Writings [中國歷代散文譯萃]. 2 vols. Beijing： China Translation & Publishing Corporation， 2014.

Yang， Guobin 楊國斌， trans. Dragon-Carving and the Literary Mind [文心雕龍] （Chinese–English version）. 2 vols. Library of Chinese Classics. Beijing： Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press， 2003.

Translated by Zhu Yuan