Myths About Political Speechwriting 政治演說(shuō)寫手之迷思

Speechwriters are rarely figures of public note. The job is more often than not a quiet grind. Americans are predisposed to distrust the words that leave the lips of politicians， and the opacity of the speechwriting process can heighten those suspicions. Here are some misconceptions about our role.

MYTH NO. 1 Politicians are puppets.

Richard Nixon—who was out-orated and ultimately defeated by John F. Kennedy in 1960—dismissed JFK as a “puppet who echoed his speechmaker，” the great Ted Sorensen. The charge didnt stick; Kennedys natural eloquence and wit were apparent in every ad-lib.

“Are some public officials simply mouthpieces？” wonders Kathleen Hall Jamieson， who teaches political communications at the University of Pennsylvania. Its not unreasonable to assume that if someone isnt writing for himself， hes not thinking for himself.

Yes， something consequential was lost when political leaders abandoned the practice of working out their thoughts on paper， as Abraham Lincoln did. Writing， for him， was how he clarified his beliefs and determined a course of action. Still， its wrong to assume that todays politicians are mere puppets or parrots. Speechwriting， for the most part， is intensely collaborative： Writers and speakers trade outlines and drafts， reconsider the flow or the focus of an argument， refine （and sometimes ruin） a good line.

MYTH NO. 2 Speechwriters are stenographers.

When speechwriters arent portrayed as puppet-masters， theyre seen as note-takers—transcribers—who record and then polish what the speaker provides. At a White House party on the evening of the 1997 State of the Union address， Clinton threw his arm around Michael Waldman， his chief speechwriter， and introduced him to a guest as one of “the guys who typed my speech.” The verb was not incidental. Many politicians have ambivalent relationships with their speechwriters—relying on them while resenting that fact. “I used to write my own speeches， you know，” Ronald Reagan once reminded Peggy Noonan.

However， smart speakers demand more than a stenographer. Elected officials have policy and political advisers， and the most effective speechwriters conduct themselves as speech advisers—making recommendations about the form， content， purpose and intended audience of remarks. Sam Rosenman， who wrote speeches for Franklin Roosevelt， said that FDR “expected us to criticize and argue with him， and to suggest changes in language and ideas.” Any writer who didnt， Rosenman added， was “useless to” Roosevelt and “might as well go home.”

MYTH NO. 3 “Off the cuff” means “from the heart.”

One of the weirdest obsessions of the Republican Party—is a piece of technology more than 60 years old： the teleprompter. The GOP is opposed to it. True， many Republicans use one， but the partys semi-official position was articulated by Fred Davis， a media strategist， in 2011： A teleprompter， he said， is “a sign of inauthenticity. Its a sign that you cant speak on your own two feet.”

Anti-teleprompterism is not purely cynical; it reflects a widespread frustration with contrivance in politics. We have come to equate “off the cuff” with “from the heart，” as a former White House colleague of mine has put it. Which is just silly. Much of what Donald Trump blurts out is demonstrably false， while a well-crafted speech can be deeply revealing. Consider Steve Jobss commencement speech at Stanford University in 2005， in which he spoke about “l(fā)ove and loss” and living with cancer. He read it from a sheet of paper—though it wouldnt have been any less genuine if hed read it from a screen.

MYTH NO. 4 We cant believe a word theyre saying.

Our collective skepticism—to put it politely—about the truth of what politicians have to say is well grounded in the betrayals of the past half-century， from the “l(fā)ight at the end of the tunnel” in Vietnam2 to the Watergate break-in and coverup， the Iran-contra3 scandal and the Lewinsky affair.

This kind of chicanery has become commonplace in politics. Yet observers might be surprised by the conscientiousness of most public servants， or by the scope and serious-mindedness of the fact-checking operation in the White House or a typical campaign. Data is checked and rechecked by the economic team; anecdotes are thoroughly vetted and scrapped if they seem suspect; grand claims are qualified in ways that result in accurate， if sometimes awkward， phrase-making. Clinton wanted to set a goal in his 2000 State of the Union address of making America the safest country in the world. He had to settle for “the safest big country in the world”; senior policy advisers warned that the United States was never going to top little Iceland or Denmark.? ? ? ? ? ? ?■

演說(shuō)寫手是鮮為公眾關(guān)注的群體，這項(xiàng)工作通常都是默默的苦差：本來(lái)，政客一開(kāi)口，美國(guó)人民就心生疑竇，加之撰稿的過(guò)程不透明，就更令人疑竇叢生了。這里說(shuō)說(shuō)人們對(duì)我們寫手作用的誤解。

迷思一：政治人物是線偶。

1960年，理查德·尼克松在辯論中輸給約翰·F.肯尼迪，后在選舉中敗北。他把肯尼迪貶為“演說(shuō)寫手的應(yīng)聲線偶”，這位寫手就是牛人泰德·索倫森。但尼克松的說(shuō)法站不住腳，每一次即興演說(shuō)中，肯尼迪天生的口才和機(jī)智顯而易見(jiàn)。

賓西法尼亞大學(xué)教授政治傳播課的凱瑟琳·霍爾·賈米森提出一個(gè)問(wèn)題，“有些官員是否僅為傳聲筒？”若說(shuō)一個(gè)人不親自捉筆，思想就不是他自己的，也不是沒(méi)有道理。

確實(shí)，政治領(lǐng)袖不再自己動(dòng)筆整理思想，是個(gè)重大缺憾。亞伯拉罕·林肯就不同，對(duì)他來(lái)說(shuō)，動(dòng)筆是闡明觀點(diǎn)和決定行動(dòng)方向的方法。但如果把當(dāng)今政治人物說(shuō)成提線木偶或?qū)W舌鸚鵡，那也不對(duì)?？傮w而言，寫演講稿是需要高度配合的工作：寫手與演說(shuō)人交流提綱和草稿，推敲論證邏輯或重點(diǎn)，打磨（有時(shí)是毀掉）金句。

迷思之二：演說(shuō)寫手是記錄員。

寫手不是被當(dāng)成木偶提線人，就是被看作記錄員，抄抄寫寫，記錄演說(shuō)者所言，然后再加以潤(rùn)飾。1997年國(guó)情咨文演說(shuō)后的白宮晚會(huì)上，克林頓攬住他的演說(shuō)主筆麥克爾·瓦爾德曼，向一位來(lái)賓介紹：“我的講話，是他們敲出來(lái)的?！庇谩扒谩弊植⒎桥既?，許多政治人物與演說(shuō)寫手的關(guān)系很矛盾——離不開(kāi)寫手，卻又耿耿于懷。羅納德·里根有一次提醒佩姬·努南，“要知道，以前的講話稿可是我自己寫的”。

但精明的演說(shuō)人要的可不僅僅是個(gè)記錄員。當(dāng)選官員手下都有政策和政治顧問(wèn)，那些演說(shuō)撰稿高手會(huì)把自己經(jīng)營(yíng)成演說(shuō)顧問(wèn)——從演說(shuō)的形式和內(nèi)容，到演說(shuō)目的和目標(biāo)受眾，他們都會(huì)給出建議。效力于富蘭克林·羅斯福的山姆·羅森曼說(shuō)，羅斯?！跋Ｍ覀儗?duì)他的觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行批評(píng)和爭(zhēng)論，對(duì)語(yǔ)言和觀點(diǎn)提出修改意見(jiàn)”。羅森曼還說(shuō)，如果不這么做，那么這個(gè)人對(duì)羅斯福就“百無(wú)一用”，“很可能得走人”。

迷思三：即席講話等于真心話。

一項(xiàng)已有60多年歷史的技術(shù)一直讓共和黨糾結(jié)不已，這就是提詞器。共和黨是反對(duì)用提詞器的。不錯(cuò)，許多共和黨人在用，但媒體謀士弗雷德·戴維斯在2011年闡述了該黨的半官方立場(chǎng)。他說(shuō)，提詞器“透著假，說(shuō)明你沒(méi)有脫稿講話的本事”。

反對(duì)提詞器倒不純屬吹毛求疵，只是反映出人們已普遍反感政治中的造作。我的一位前白宮同事說(shuō)，我們已經(jīng)開(kāi)始把“即席”與“真心”畫上了等號(hào)。這簡(jiǎn)直荒謬：特朗普張口就來(lái)，但顯然講的很多都不靠譜;而一篇精心寫就的演說(shuō)卻能發(fā)人深省。喬布斯2005年在斯坦福大學(xué)開(kāi)學(xué)典禮上的演講就是一例，他談到“愛(ài)與失”，講述了與癌癥共存的經(jīng)歷。演講時(shí)他拿的是紙稿，但若換成提詞屏，那種真誠(chéng)也絲毫不會(huì)減弱。

迷思四：政客的話，一個(gè)字也不能信。

對(duì)政客言辭真實(shí)性的集體懷疑（這是客氣的說(shuō)法）是有充分理由的。過(guò)去半個(gè)世紀(jì)，我們屢屢遭到背叛，從越戰(zhàn)中“隧道盡頭看到光亮”的承諾到水門事件中的入室竊聽(tīng)偷拍未遂和事后種種掩飾，從伊朗門事件到萊溫斯基性丑聞。

此類騙局在政界已成家常便飯。但如果了解大多數(shù)公務(wù)人員是有良知的人，了解白宮或正常競(jìng)選中核查事實(shí)時(shí)的投入和較真，那么觀察家們可能會(huì)感到意外。經(jīng)濟(jì)團(tuán)隊(duì)會(huì)反復(fù)核實(shí)數(shù)據(jù);各種軼聞會(huì)徹底查證，存疑者棄之不用;重要提法會(huì)進(jìn)行定性，以求造詞準(zhǔn)確，盡管有時(shí)讓人覺(jué)得別扭。2000年，克林頓在國(guó)情咨文中提出要把美國(guó)建成世界上最安全的國(guó)家，但資深幕僚們說(shuō)，這一方面美國(guó)永遠(yuǎn)也趕不上小小的冰島或丹麥，克林頓最后只好接受“世界上最安全的大國(guó)”這一措辭。? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?□

（譯者為“《英語(yǔ)世界》杯”翻譯大賽獲獎(jiǎng)?wù)撸?/p>

1杰夫·謝索爾曾任克林頓總統(tǒng)的演說(shuō)寫手。

2 1967年，隨著美軍傷亡日漸增多，美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)反戰(zhàn)聲浪越來(lái)越大，而約翰遜總統(tǒng)、白宮高官乃至美軍援越司令部指揮官卻都樂(lè)觀地宣稱，越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)正在到達(dá)一個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)，美國(guó)正在贏得戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)（“We are winning”）。1967年11月21日，威廉·威斯特摩蘭將軍（Gen. William Westmoreland）在演講中說(shuō)，已經(jīng)看到了“勝利的曙光”（light at the end of the tunnel）。1968年1月31日凌晨3時(shí)，北越發(fā)動(dòng)了規(guī)模空前的春節(jié)攻勢(shì)（Tet Offensive），對(duì)南越幾乎所有的大小城市發(fā)起進(jìn)攻，讓美國(guó)和南越軍隊(duì)猝不及防。對(duì)戰(zhàn)持續(xù)數(shù)月，導(dǎo)致美國(guó)人對(duì)越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)徹底喪失信心，威斯特摩蘭和約翰遜關(guān)于“勝利即將到來(lái)”的承諾便成了笑話。? 3“伊朗門”是指發(fā)生在美國(guó)80年代中期的政治丑聞。里根政府向伊朗秘密出售武器，將軍火交易得到的3000萬(wàn)美元轉(zhuǎn)移到尼加拉瓜反政府武裝（Contra）手中，此事被揭露后造成嚴(yán)重政治危機(jī)。因新聞界將其與尼克松水門事件相比，故此亦稱為伊朗門事件（Irangate）。