論美國的民主

編者按：1831年5月，年輕的托克維爾 （Alexis de Tocqueville） 第一次踏上美國國土。這是一場“自我放逐”之旅。他與波旁王朝的關系剪不斷、理還亂，在新共和國的政權下難免受到懷疑，于是，托克維爾和長他三歲的古斯塔夫 · 德 · 博蒙 （Gustavede Beaumont） 主動請命跑來新大陸研究刑事和監(jiān)獄制度。此后的9個月，他倆結伴走過了當時美國24個州中的17個，以及日后成為美國國土的3個地區(qū)（密歇根、威斯康星和西弗吉尼亞），同200多名來自各行各業(yè)的人會面。

托克維爾1832年3月返回法國，帶著海量的材料和糾結的想法。他花了8年時間把他的零散印象寫成一本書。

托克維爾認為，每個民族都有自己的出身來源，其特有的偏見、激情和習性都是這樣發(fā)展而來的。個體的人同樣如此。托克維爾是法國貴族出身。父母曾在熱月政變3個月后被抓進惡臭的監(jiān)獄里關了10個月，而后無罪釋放。這加深了他們對舊制度的眷戀，于是竭力確保兒子所受的教育是堅定地站在波旁王朝和羅馬天主教這邊的。然而，托克維爾讀到法國哲學家的作品后發(fā)生了信仰危機；但他終生未反對或貶低過宗教。他從美國寫來的信里說：“因為一些共同原則和千絲萬縷的家庭關系，我注定是個?；庶h人，我感到自己和一個幾乎總在放縱、屢屢做出不光彩行為的群體捆綁在一起。他們犯下的過錯，我很難不往心里去，即便我竭盡全力譴責他們。”

在美國的9個月里，托克維爾和博蒙從海關的不拘小節(jié)觀察到美國遠不如法國那樣官僚化；他們也從新港的四五家銀行瞥見美國蓬勃發(fā)展的商業(yè)文化。此外，他們還見識到了美國人因為發(fā)達的航運網絡而“對距離有令人難以置信的蔑視”，以及“條條大路都可通向財富”、“對致富的渴望解釋了他們?yōu)楹螌φ魏翢o興趣”，還有物質主義如何悖論式地與極端宗教狂熱同時存在等等。（編譯/黎文）

在美國，行政權象其所代表的國家主權一樣，是有限的和例外的——在法國，行政權象國家主權一樣，可以擴及一切事務——國王是立法者之一——總統(tǒng)只是法律的執(zhí)行者——兩種權力的任期產生的其他差異——總統(tǒng)被束縛在行政權的范圍內——國王在這方面是自由的——盡管有此種種不同，但法國更近似共和國，而美國更近似君主國——比較兩國依附于行政權的官員人數。

[1] 行政權對國家命運所起的作用甚大，所以我必須先在這里詳細討論一下它在美國占有什么地位。為了對美國總統(tǒng)的地位有個清晰明確的概念，最好拿美國總統(tǒng)的地位同歐洲的一個立憲君主國國王的地位作一比較。

在進行這種對比時，我不太重視權力的外在標志，因為這種標志容易轉移研究者的視線，對研究者很少有引導作用。

當一個君主國逐漸變?yōu)楣埠蛧臅r候，王權雖已實際上消失了很久，但行政權仍使國王保留著頭銜、榮譽、甚至財富。英國人斬了一位國王的首級，把另一位國王從寶座上攆走以后，依然習慣于跪著對這些君主的繼承人談話。

另一方面，當一些共和國落到一個獨夫控制之下時，這個獨裁者卻能依然生活簡樸，不尚虛榮，作風謙遜，好象自己并未處于萬人之上。當皇帝們大權在握，對其同胞的財產和生存進行專橫統(tǒng)治時，人民在談話中稱他們?yōu)閯P撒，而他們本人卻又能屈尊到朋友家里作客。

因此，應當揭開面紗，深入到內部。

[2] 在美國，主權由聯(lián)邦和各州分享；而在法國，主權是一個整體，不能分割。我認為，美國總統(tǒng)與法國國王的最大、最主要不同即由此而來。

在美國，行政權象其所代表的國家主權一樣，是有限的和例外的；而在法國，行政權象國家主權一樣，可以擴及一切事務。

美國人有一個聯(lián)邦政府，而法國人則有一個全國政府。

[3] 這就是由此自然產生的美國總統(tǒng)地位不如法國國王地位的第一個原因，但還不是唯一原因。第二個重要原因，是兩者所代表的主權內涵不同。確切地說，可以把主權定義為制定法律的權限。

在法國，國王實際上是主權的化身，因為法律不經他批準就不能生效。同時，他也是法律的執(zhí)行者。

美國總統(tǒng)雖然也是法律的執(zhí)行者，但他并不實際參加立法工作，因為他不同意并不妨礙法律的存在。因此，他決不是主權的化身，而只是主權的代理人。

在法國，國王不僅是主權的化身，而且也參加立法機構，從其中得到一份權力。他參加國會的一個議院的議員提名，并能以自己的意志終止另一個議院議員的任期。美國總統(tǒng)不參加立法機構的組建工作，也不能解散立法機構。

國王與國會分享法律的提案權。

總統(tǒng)卻沒有這樣的提案權。

國王在國會的兩院中各有其一定人數的代表，這些代表在國會中解釋他的觀點，支持他的意見，使他的施政綱領獲勝。

總統(tǒng)不能成為國會的議員，他的閣僚也同他一樣，均被排除在國會之外。他只能通過間接的辦法使自己的影響和意見進入國會這個大衙門。

因此，法國的國王與立法機構處于平等地位，立法機構沒有國王不能活動，而國王離開立法機構也不能活動。

而總統(tǒng)就象一個低級的和從屬的權力，被置于立法機構之外。

[4] 在所說的行政權上，總統(tǒng)的地位似乎與法國國王的地位很接近。但即使在行使這項權力的時候，總統(tǒng)也由于地位低下等重要原因而屈辱。

首先，法國國王的權力在任期上就優(yōu)越于美國總統(tǒng)的權力。要知道，任期是權力的一項重要因素。人們只對行將長期存在的東西表示愛戴和敬畏。

美國總統(tǒng)是一個選任四年的行政官，而法國國王則是一個世襲的君主。

[5] 美國總統(tǒng)在行使行政權時，自始至終受到一種忌妒性的監(jiān)督。他可以締結但不能批準條約，他可以提名但不能直接任命官員。

法國國王在行政權方面是絕對主人。

美國總統(tǒng)對自己的行動負責，法國法律規(guī)定國王的人身是不可侵犯的。

當然，不管是法國國王，還是美國總統(tǒng)，都要受到作為一種指導力量的輿論的影響。這個力量在法國不如在美國那樣明顯，未全被人公認，沒有正式寫在法律里面，但這種力量確實在法國發(fā)生著作用。這種力量，在美國通過選舉和法院判決發(fā)生作用，在法國通過革命發(fā)生作用。盡管兩國的憲法不同，但有一點在兩國是相同的，即輿論實際上都是具有統(tǒng)治作用的力量。因此，說到底，法律的原動力在兩國都是一樣的，盡管這個原動力在兩國的發(fā)展有過于自由和不夠自由之別，而發(fā)展的結果又總是有所不同。從本性來說，這個原動力實質上是共和主義的。所以我認為，擁有國王的法國之近似共和國，甚于擁有總統(tǒng)的美國之近似君主國。

[6] 在以上的敘述中，我只是著重指出了主要的不同點。如果我要深入到細節(jié)，則對比的結果還會更加驚人。但是，這已經說得過長了，而我本來還想往短說的。

[7] 我已經指出，美國總統(tǒng)的權力只限于在其擁有的那部分主權內行使，而法國國王的權力則在全部主權的范圍內行使。

我可以證明，盡管法國國王的統(tǒng)治權已經大得驚人，并通過無數渠道深入到管理私人利益，但他在行使這項權力時又超過了其自然極限。

除了國王統(tǒng)治權的這個影響之外，我還能指出任用大批公職人員所帶來的后果。這些公職人員，幾乎都是代替國王行使行政權的。現在，法國公職人員的總數已超過以往任何時期，高達138000人，應把其中的每個人都視為權力的分子。美國總統(tǒng)沒有任用公職人員的專權，而且任用的人數沒有超過12000人。

IN WHAT THE POSITION OF A PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DIFFERS FROM THAT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL KING OF FRANCE. Executive power in the United States as limited and exceptional as the sovereignty that it represents—Executive power in France， like the state's sovereignty， extends to everything—The King a branch of the legislature—The President the mere executor of the law—Other differences resulting from the duration of the two powers—The President checked in the exercise of executive authority—The King independent in its exercise-In spite of these differences， practice is more akin to a republic than the Union to a monarchy—Comparison of the number of public officers depending upon the executive power in the two countries.

[1] THE executive power has so important an influence on the destinies of nations that I wish to dwell for an instant on this portion of my subject in order more clearly to explain the part it sustains in America. In order to form a clear and precise idea of the position of the President of the United States it may be well to compare it with that of one of the constitutional kings of France. In this comparison I shall pay but little attention to the external signs of power， which are more apt to deceive the eye of the observer than to guide his researches. When a monarchy is being gradually transformed into a republic， the executive power retains the titles， the honors， the etiquette， and even the funds of royalty long after its real authority has disappeared. The English， after having cut off the head of one king， and expelled another from his throne， were still wont to address the successors of those princes only upon their knees. On the other hand， when a republic falls under the sway of a single man， the demeanor of the sovereign remains as simple and unpretending as if his authority was not yet paramount. When the emperors exercised an unlimited control over the fortunes and the lives of their fellow citizens， it was customary to call them C'sar in conversation； and they were in the habit of supping without formality at their friends' houses. It is therefore necessary to look below the surface.

[2] The sovereignty of the United States is shared between the Union and the states， while in France it is undivided and compact； hence arises the first and most notable difference that exists between the President of the United States and the King of France. In the United States the executive power is as limited and exceptional as the sovereignty in whose name it acts； in France it is as universal as the authority of the state. The Americans have a Federal and the French a national government.

[3] This cause of inferiority results from the nature of things， but it is not the only one； the second in importance is as follows. Sovereignty may be defined to be the right of making laws. In France， the King really exercises a portion of the sovereign power， since the laws have no weight if he refuses to sanction them； he is， moreover， the executor of all they ordain. The President is also the executor of the laws； but he does not really co-operate in making them， since the refusal of his assent does not prevent their passage. He is not， therefore， a part of the sovereign power， but only its agent. But not only does the King of France constitute a portion of the sovereign power； he also contributes to the nomination of the legislature， which is the other portion. He participates in it through appointing the members of one chamber and dissolving the other at his pleasure； whereas the President of the United States has no share in the formation of the legislative body and cannot dissolve it. The King has the same right of bringing forward measures as the chambers， a right which the President does not possess. The King is represented in each assembly by his ministers， who explain his intentions， support his opinions， and maintain the principles of the government. The President and his ministers are alike excluded from Congress， so that his influence and his opinions can only penetrate indirectly into that great body. The King of France is therefore on an equal footing with the legislature， which can no more act without him than he can without it. The President is placed beside the legislature like an inferior and dependent power.

[4] Even in the exercise of the executive power， properly so called， the point upon which his position seems to be most analogous to that of the King of France， the President labors under several causes of inferiority. The authority of the King in France has， in the first place， the advantage of duration over that of the President； and durability is one of the chief elements of strength nothing is either loved or feared but what is likely to endure. The President of the United States is a magistrate elected for four years. The King in France is a hereditary sovereign.

[5] In the exercise of the executive power the President of the United States is constantly subject to a jealous supervision. He may prepare， but he cannot conclude， a treaty； he may nominate but he cannot appoint， a public officer 15. The King of France is absolute within the sphere of executive power. The President of the United States is responsible for his actions； but the person of the King is declared inviolable by French law. Nevertheless， public opinion as a directing power is no less above the head of the one than of the other. This power is less definite， less evident， and less sanctioned by the laws in France than in America； but it really exists there. In America it acts by elections and decrees； in France it proceeds by revolutions. Thus， notwithstanding the different constitutions of these two countries， public opinion is the predominant authority in both of them. The principle of legislation， a principle essentially republican， is the same in both countries， although its developments may be more or less free and its consequences different. Thus I am led to conclude that France with its King is nearer akin to a republic than the Union with its President is to a monarchy.

[6] In all that precedes I have touched only upon the main points of distinction； if I could have entered into details， the contrast would have been still more striking.

[7] I have remarked that the authority of the President in the United States is only exercised within the limits of a partial sovereignty， while that of the King in France is undivided. I might have gone on to show that the power of the King's government in France exceeds its natural limits， however extensive these may be， and penetrates in a thousand different ways into the administration of private interests. Among the examples of this influence may be quoted that which results from the great number of public functionaries， who all derive their appointments from the executive government. This number now exceeds all previous limits； it amounts to 138，000 16 nominations， each of which may be considered as an element of power. The President of the United States has not the exclusive right of making any public appointments， and their whole number scarcely exceeds 12，000.