Cruelfictions of Psychoanalysis： from Freud to Kafka; from Derrida to Mignotte①

Jean-Michel Rabaté

Abstract： Derrida has asserted that the main problem encountered by psychoanalysis is the existence of cruelty， a question that has never been solved. Touria Mignotte has responded to these criticisms and queries in Cruelty， Sexuality， and the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis by deploying a concept of cruelty that is not simply cultural but psychoanalytical. Following Mignotte’s lead， I attempt to situate the investigation at a foundational level that looks at the body. Derrida’s argument about psychoanalysis is compared with Deleuze’s essay on sadism and masochism， after which I outline points of convergence in their approaches， which leads to discussions of texts by Freud， Nietzsche and Hegel. I conclude by tackling Kafka’s rethinking of cruelty via a short text on Prometheus.

Keywords： cruelty; sadism; blood; the void; Prometheus

In one of his most searching essays on psychoanalysis， Derrida asserts that the main problem psychoanalysis encounters as a discourse and a clinical praxis is the existence of cruelty.Indeed cruelty not only exists but it insists and resists， which presents numerous and unsurmountable problems. The term refers to a mixture of aggression and pleasure found in pain， a heady cocktail hard to conceptualize. It is such a problem that Touria Mignotte addresses in her book

Cruelty

，

Sexuality

，

and

the

Unconscious

in

Psychoanalysis

. The notion of cruelty that she deploys is not cultural but psychoanalytical， which sends us on the path of specific genealogies and different terminologies. “Cultural” cruelty would refer to the domain competently explored by Maggie Nelson in her 2011 bestseller，

The

Art

of

Cruelty.

There Nelson tackles the proliferating manifestations of cruelty and highlights wanton displays of violence in media， literature and art.Thus Sade’s

120

Days

of

Sodom

and Saló， the filmic equivalent produced by Pier Paolo Pasolini in 1975 keep their power to shock. They repulse and fascinate. A radical artist like Thomas Hirschhorn critiqued this perverse attitude in the “De-Pixelation” show at New York Gladstone Gallery (October 2017-January 2018). Huge billboards covered with a montage of images taken from recent conflicts show dead bodies. They are spliced with publicity images. This has a startling effect on viewers. Nelson and Hirschhorn force readers and viewers to adopt a critical position， to be aware of the ethical stakes facing the society of cruel spectacles in which we live.

Mignotte does not tackle these issues directly although she is aware of what has been invested in them. She situates her investigation at a foundational level and within the specific discourse of psychoanalysis. I will first sketch the theoretical context of her approach by comparing it with Derrida’s argument about psychoanalysis. I will then underline points of convergence in their approaches， which include readings of Freud， Nietzsche and Hegel. I will conclude with a discussion of cruelty in the myth of Prometheus revisited by Freud and Kafka.

1. Psychoanalysis， the death penalty， and cruelty.

In July 2000， Derrida gave the opening lecture for the Paris

Etats

g

é

n

é

raux

de

la

psychanalyse

. René Major， the main convener and a friend of Derrida， had asked psychoanalysts and intellectual from all parts of the world to assess the situation of psychoanalysis. They were required to offer predictions for the future， outline tasks and orientations. Speaking in the main amphitheater of the Sorbonne to some 1，200 psychoanalysts and academics， Derrida took stock of a particular political situation， and began by stating a personal complaint about his own pain and suffering. Major and his friends had planned this historical parallel by evoking the moment when the “estates-general” had been convoked by King Louis XVI. In June 1789， there was a split between the third estate made up of bourgeois and commoners and the representatives of the clergy and nobility. The third estate refused to associate with them and created a National Assembly. This was the beginning of the French revolution. However， no revolution came from the four days of discussions held from July 8 to July 11,2000. No common resolution led to a program for the new century. Division reigned， tensions cropped up between various groups， nationalities and specialties. In such a contentious context， Derrida had been right to focus on two terms he saw linked， sovereignty and cruelty.Twice Derrida alluded to the French revolution， as when he wondered who could be the king in such an assembly (Derrida，

Without

Alibi

246，248)， but he did not want to restrict the meaning of cruelty to an etymology connected with blood because he wanted to include psychic cruelty. He asked： “Would such cruelty， if there is any and if it is properly psychical， be one of the horizons most proper to psychoanalysis?” (Ibid. 239) Mignotte’s book responds to such a question， it expands it and reframes it within the concepts of psychoanalysis. Mignotte accomplishes this complex task in a non-partisan manner by moving between the theories of Freud， Lacan and Winnicott， the three interlocutors with whom she dialogues skillfully.

In his Paris lecture， Derrida began with the old Jewish joke explaining how one becomes a psychoanalyst： it is a Jewish surgeon who cannot stand the sight of blood (Ibid.). This issue recurs in the two volumes of the Seminar on the Death Penalty， both of which take their point of departure in American law， namely the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibiting the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” That sentence prevents the government from imposing penalties deemed either barbaric or too severe for the crimes committed. It has been operative in cases when the method used， like the electric chair， seemed to torture the sentenced person rather than kill efficiently. Derrida asks pointedly： have we avoided cruelty by choosing faster and more efficient ways of killing? He considers at some length the rhetoric of the quasi painless cutting of the neck that accompanied the invention and use of the guillotine.

At a theoretical level， Derrida noted that by shifting from the Latin

cruor

to Freud’s

Grausamkeit

， we move from bloody cruelty to bloodless cruelty， which generates an echolalic “

sans

sang

，” as Derrida puns in French. It is not by replacing the bloody decapitation of the guillotine by a jolt from the electric chair， a lethal injection or the gas chamber that we have abolished cruelty. As Derrida repeats in “Psychoanalysis Searches the States of Its Soul，” the end of bloody cruelty does not signal the end of cruelty： it merely corresponds to a social modification the codes and norms that affect the visibility of cruelty. But an invisible cruelty can be as ethically reprehensible. In German，

grausam

keeps no association with blood， its etymology being closer to that of “gruesome” in English， namely whatever can create horror， fear， shudder.Freud’s “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality”unfolds a theory of cruelty stated quite clearly： “the history of human civilization shows beyond any doubt that there is an intimate connection between cruelty (

Grausamkeit

) and the sexual drive (

Sexualtrieb

); but nothing has been done towards explaining the connection， apart from laying emphasis on the aggressive factor in the libido” (Freud， “Three Essays” 159， modified). Freud quotes authors who insist on relics of cannibalism in sexuality， others who stress the link between pain and pleasure： “every pain contains in itself the possibility of a feeling of pleasure” (Ibid.). In a footnote added in 1926， he explains that he reserves a special place to the couple of sadism and masochism， and decides to “place them outside the class of remaining perversions” (Ibid.， Note 3). Then Freud lists neurotic symptoms that include “the active and passive forms of the drive to cruelty (

Trieb

zur

Grausamkeit

) (Ibid. 166， modified)， adding that this would be the root of the transformation of love into hate that is so common in paranoia.Freud observes that cruelty appears early in children： “the cruel component of the sexual drive develops in childhood even more independently of the sexual activities that are attached to erotogenic zones. Cruelty in general comes easily to the childish nature， since the obstacles that bring the drive to mastery (

Bema

?

chtigungstrieb

) to a halt at another person’s pain — namely a capacity for pity — is developed rather late” (Ibid. 192-93). Freud links the drive to cruelty with a more intense erotogenic activity. He cautions educators against using corporal punishments that will be experienced as sources of perverse pleasure by the child. “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality”provided Freud’s foundation for his later insights， even if he introduced many nuances to his analyses. In

Beyond

the

Pleasure

Principle

， the main philosophical statement of his maturity， he still insists on the links between sadism and the death drive.Once and for all， Gilles Deleuze has deconstructed the idea that sadism and masochism should be considered as linked like the two sides of one single coin. Deleuze has questioned the reversibility posited by Freud between activity (sadism) and passivity (masochism) in the essay on “Coldness and Cruelty” that serves as a preface to Sacher-Masoch’s

Venus

in

Furs.

Deleuze reminds us of the key fact that for Freud， the main site of cruelty is not the drive but the super-ego. The main difference between Deleuze and Freud is that the former looks at the texts written by Sade and Sacher-Masoch， whereas the latter attempts to understand sadism and masochism as two forms of perversions. Hence， for Deleuze， there is no sado-masochism as an entity， although there is， of course， cruelty： it reigns half-way between the “apathy” that the Sadean libertines want to conquer through a multiplication of crimes， and the “coldness” that the Masochist hero will gain after his many humiliations.Like Deleuze， Mignotte appeals to principled monism， which is why she pushes the issue in the direction of a conceptual unity that she calls “destruction.” Thus， she quotes Freud’s treatment of the young man whom he called the “Ratman” because his main symptom was an obsession with a horrible torture of pushing a rat into a victim’s anus. Freud names the young man “the Ratman” because of his fascination for the punishment， which had already appeared at the end of Sade’s

120

Days

of

Sodom.

He had heard it explained by a “cruel” officer who “obviously took pleasure in cruelty.” (Freud， “Some Remarks” 134). Freud manages to make the young man disclose in words the torture that horrifies him. When Lanzer confesses that the torture entails rats boring their way into the victim’s insides via the anus， he almost faints. “At all the more significant moments of his narration a very strange compound expression is visible on his face， which I can only interpret as

horror

at

the

pleasure

he

does

not

even

know

he

feels

” (Ibid.). At this moment， Freud witnesses what Lacan later called “jouissance，” an excessive and unspeakable pleasure. It is so strong that it is almost painful， and of course totally unconscious， thus creating the paradox of a feeling one is not aware of feeling. Besides， there are other resources for a cruelty applied to oneself than in the rat torture. The real or metaphorical pain inflicted by the rat in the anus is less destructive than the cruelty of the super-ego. Here is why poor Lanzer must endlessly pay for a debt he already paid for.What Lanzer brought to Freud was a notion that exceeded the economic logic that he had been relying on. It is the curious logic of jouissance， an excess that suddenly shifts from the plus to the minus. As Lacan reminds us， it was only later that Freud understood this， in

Civilization

and

Its

Discontents

， when jouissance appeared in its dimension of negativity and evil， namely when it entails enjoying making others suffer， which ushers in the issue of cruelty： “those who like fairy stories turn a deaf ear to talk of man’s innate tendencies to ‘evil， aggression， destruction， and thus also to cruelty’” (Lacan 185). Lacan keeps quoting the famous passage from

Civilization

and

Its

Discontents

in which Freud mentions that humans need to humiliate， torture and kill other persons. Lacan quips that the sentences seem to come from Marquis de Sade’s writings. Jouissance is closer to evil than to good， which is why Lacan will go on by developing a well-known parallel between Kant and Sade. In the end， he shows how Sade’s Libertines become hostages of a fantasy of divine power， trying to emulate the terrifying exactions committed by a cruel and ferocious anti-God， that

Dio

boia

， or “hangman god” mentioned by Stephen Dedalus in

Ulysses

(Joyce，

Ulysses

175).

Cruelty would be the stumbling stone for all ethics， as Lacan proves when reading Sade and Kant side by side， for its very existence negates the belief in reciprocity which is the foundation of humanitarian rules of non-aggression. Having moved beyond the pleasure principle and the morality principle， we have to appeal to a more archaic and foundational substance. Let’s follow Mignotte’s injunction that we need to dig deeper and tackle the issue of substance and its containers. As Lacan repeated in the seventies， the only substance known to psychoanalysis is jouissance. Here， I would like to suggest that it has to confront itself to another physiological substance， namely blood. Hence we need to address the issue of blood.

2. Is there a future for blood?⑤

To confront the substance bequeathed to us by the etymology of the word “cruelty，” we need to examine the meaning of blood， which goes from representations of the friend and the enemy to images of racist discrimination. Latin was rather refined in that it distinguished between sanguis and

cruor.

Cruor

， closer to “gore，” signifies blood seen flowing from a wound， and thus one can distinguish the “crude” (the Latin

crudus

comes from

cr

ū

rus

in Indo-European， linked with

kruhr

ó

s

， from

krewth

， meaning“raw meat， fresh blood”) from the “raw” and the “cruel.” Freud understood the mechanism of psychical cruelty， the pleasure taken in making someone else or oneself suffer， or otherwise by watching suffering， as a pleasure born from our bodies and their cycles.In English as in French， the term of “cruel” keeps an etymological link with blood. How to make sense of blood? Let’s take a look at Hegel’s

Philosophy

of

Nature

，the most systematic attempt at providing a theory of blood. Hegel links elements of natural life to the concept and to the “Spirit.” He sees nature as a huge body in which dissolution is not negative but a regenerating. In his groundbreaking book on Hegel，Markus Semm observes that the deployment of the Spirit through Nature adopts a general rhythm by following the tempo of a vital pulse. Rhythmic exchanges are underpinned by a pulsation that runs through all phenomena. The pulsating beat enacting regenerative negativity finds a double exemplification in breathing and in the circuit of blood：This dissolution of this persistence is the pulmonary system， the true， ideal process with the outer world of inorganic Nature， with the element of air; it is the organism’s own self-movement which， as elasticity， draws air and expels it. The blood is the result， the organism which through its own interior process returns into itself， the living individuality which makes members (

Glieder

) into viscera. The blood as axially rotating， self-pursuing movement， this absolute interior vibration， is the individual life of the whole in which there is no distinction — animal time. (Hegel，

Philosophy

366)

Hegel describes the process by which blood is formed：

The blood elaborates itself from the air， the lymph， and the digestion， and is the transformation of these three moments. From the air， it takes pure dissolution， the light of the air， oxygen; from the lymph， the neutral fluid; from digestion， the moments of singularity， the substantial moment. And as thus the whole individuality， the blood opposes itself to itself afresh and generates shape. (Ibid. 367)

Blood combines dissolution， neutrality and singularity， all this tied together in a unique substance. We follow successive transformations by which this substance ends up characterizing the individuality of the living subject. It is marked by a pulsation obeying a universal law. Blood thus allegorizes the logical progression of the Concept or Notion (

Begriff

)： “The endless process of division and this suppression of division which leads to another division， all this is the immediate expression of the Notion which is， so to speak， here visible to the eye” (Ibid. 368). One factor accounts for the rhythm of these successive negations， it is the essential “irritability” evinced by blood：Blood in general， as the universal substance of every part， is the irritable (

irritable

) concentration of everything into the interior unity： it is heat， this transformation of cohesion and specific gravity — but not merely the dissolution produced by heat but the real， animal dissolution of everything. Just as all food is converted into blood， so， too， blood is dispensed as the source from which everything takes its nutriment. That is what pulsation (

Pulsieren

) is in complete reality. (Ibid.)The picture of blood drawn by Hegel is that of a life cycle repeating itself to constitute a

perpetuum

mobile

(Ibid. 369). Blood， not the heart， appears as the agent of the dynamic process. The heart is just a muscle that pumps， a material cause， whereas blood allegorizes the dynamism of life itself： “This is the blood， the subject， which no less than the will initiates a movement. As the whole movement， the blood is the ground and the movement itself” (Ibid). Hegel notes that if an invalid remains immobile too long， he develops ankylosis (Ibid)： this banal example leads to a discussion of the difference between arterial blood， redder because it contains more oxygen， and venous blood， bluish because it contains carbon. A section devoted to breathing discovers the rationale for the endless movement： it deploys the term that Hegel had found in Albrecht von Haller， this same “irritability.” Blood is “irritable” in itself， and there is no other cause for its dialectical mobility. Hegel rejects theories that reduced the workings of the heart to a mechanical force：But all these mechanical explanations of the physiologists are inadequate. From whence comes this elastic pressure of the walls and the heart? “From the irritation (

Reiz

) of the blood”, they reply. According to this， therefore， the heart moves the blood， and the movement of the blood is， in turn， what moves the heart. But this is a circle， a

perpetuum

mobile

， which would necessarily at once come to standstill because the forces are in equilibrium. But， on the contrary， this is precisely why the blood must be regarded as itself the principle of the movement; it is the “l(fā)eaping point” (

punctum

saliens

)， in virtue of which the contraction of the arteries coincides with the relaxation of the ventricles of the heart. (Ibid.)Indeed， in 1628 Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood in the body. Harvey described the heart of the embryo as a “

punctum

sanguinemsaliens

，” a tiny pulsating point， the first spot in which can one recognize that a heart begins beating. It is also a point of fire， a notion that will be important for Freud， an

ignis

scintillula.

Refusing to ascribe the cause of blood circulation to a reflex action， which would lead to an endless hen-and-egg exploration (the heart cannot beat without blood but blood needs the heart to circulate： here would be an argument

ad

infinitum

) (Ibid.)，Hegel concludes that the “self-movement of blood” is the cause of the organic life cycle， which makes blood literally turn into the “subject.” Blood has a will of its own， a will that initiates and regulates the movement of the whole (Ibid.).After Harvey， Francis Glisson had introduced the concept of “irritability” in 1650 when analyzing psychosomatic diseases. His

De

Natura

Substantiae

Energetica

(1672) describes a natural energy going through the body. This blind energy called “irritability” differentiates itself into sensations. “Irritable” reactions of organs like the intestines or the heart derive from their ability to be excited the cause of bodily actions. Glisson generalized this to include the whole living dynamism， in a “

biousia

，” which would explain why substance of bodies react to stimuli without requiring any mind， consciousness or sensation. This notion reappears in “irritable bowel syndromes，” or other manifestations of classical hysteria.One century later， the Swiss physician Albrecht von Haller took up the concept in his 1752 “Dissertation on the sensible and irritable parts of Animals.” Trying to refute the materialist suggestion that there might be something like a blind animating all living substances， Haller differentiated between sensation and irritability. Sensation belonged to nerves and irritability to muscles. Haller discussed the link between blood and the heart and restricted irritability to the muscle of the heart： for him， the heart was “irritated” by an influx of blood， and then it responded with systolic contractions. In

Philosophy

of

Nature

， Hegel criticizes Haller who would have fallen into the trap of an

ad

infinitum

causal reasoning. Irritability entails a

Reiz

but to evoke a “response.” Haller mentioned a

Reitzleitung

as the “conduction of impulses，” forgetting that

Reiz

suggested “appeal，” “charm，” “attraction，” “excitement” and “stimulation.” Thanks to the semantic series， we understand how irritability can generate a principle of subjectivity： it ushers in the endless negativity at work in blood. The negativity of a blood-fire turns into thirst， hunger and desire.This same principle applies to the process of breathing： “The respiratory process is a spontaneously interrupted continuity. Exhalation and inhalation are a volatization (

Verdunsten

) of the blood， a volatizing irritability (

verdunste

Irritabilit

?

t

)” (Ibid. 392). The general operation of the lungs resembles the spontaneous mechanism of the heart， and therefore one can link this movement with the way to blood circulates：Now why is the blood connected with this ideal assimilation of the abstract Element? The blood is this absolute thirst (

absolute

Durst

)， its unrest (

Unruhe

) within itself and against itself; the blood craves to be ignited (

hat

Hunger

nach

Befeurung

)， to be differentiated. More exactly， this assimilation is at the same time a mediated process with air， namely a conversion of air into carbon dioxide and venous (dark， carbonated) blood， and into arterial， oxygenated blood. (Ibid.)Like fire， blood is a living being perpetually consuming itself： “Air is in itself the fiery and negative element; the blood is the same thing， but as a developed unrest — the burning fire of the animal’s organism which not only consumes itself but also preserves itself as fluid and finds in air its

pabulum

vitae

” (Ibid. 392-93). At work here is the “restlessness of the negative” that Jean-Luc Nancy has identified as Hegel’s main conceptual discovery.Blood allegorizes subjective negativity in the most concrete terms. Therefore， blood is “cruel.” Its restless “cruelty” derives from the main law of all life： regeneration presupposes destruction， division， negation; then， even if there is a recombination， the cruelty will not have been evacuated.To these insights， Mignotte adds her main concept， that of the void： there is， she claims， a void preceding all division， a void which appears already in Plato’s concept of the

khora

launched in

Timaeus

taken over and developed by Derrida and Kristeva. For both，

khora

refers to a receptacle， an unnamable material substratum， a pure dehiscence ready to accept any “fulfilment，” an empty grail ready to capture bitter drippings of blood from the sacred wound. Mignotte sends us back to Freud’s unflinching analysis of the origins of human societies founded on collective murder. The murder was as soon forgotten as committed. It would return in the collective unconscious as guilt leading to the subsequent deification of the father killed by the sons. In “thoughts for the times on war and death，” Freud contends that not only is “the primaeval history of mankind filled with murder” but that “if we are to be judged by our unconscious wishful impulses， we ourselves are a gang of murderers” (Freud， “Thoughts” 292，298)， we can be comforted by recent Darwinian theory that this is not such a bad thing.The groundbreaking book of

The

Paradox

of

Goodness

by Richard Wrangham argues that Homo Sapiens evolved by a practice of social cooperation required for the preemptive killings of the dominant males of each group， a process by which the need for communication， planning and strategy would lead to the need for language， sociability and tools. The worst and the best would thus have been entangled since the origins of human culture， language， and religion. Even if Freud is not quoted in Wrangham’s solidly documented book， he would have approved this sweeping thesis about our constitutive “paradox.” Here is the paradox of cruelty： our most esteemed foundations， those archaic impulses slowly leading to useful inventions like the institutions of democracy and tolerance are founded on cunningly planned collective murder.

3. The cruel foundation myth： Prometheus.

Freud had found similar ideas in the works of Nietzsche， who more than any philosopher made “cruelty” a key value in his deconstruction of morality. Indeed， Maggie Nelson begins her book on cruelty with a quote by Nietzsche： “One should open one’s eyes and take a new look at cruelty” (Nelson 3). Nietzsche knew the classical myth displaying pure cruelty： it was the cruel punishment of a Titan like Prometheus; here was and a first step in the rebellion of humanity against the power of the gods. Nietzsche discussed Prometheus in one early fragment from 1874， when he imagines that the ancient struggle will be forgotten after the gods have died out：

Prometheus and his vulture were

forgotten

when the old world of the Olympians and their power were destroyed.

Prometheus expects his redemption to come from human beings.

He did not betray his secret to Zeus， Zeus perished because of his son. (Nietzsche，

Unpublished

Writings

387)

A paradoxical obsolescence derives from our modern lack of belief in the divinity of the gods or of God. Nietzsche suggests that Prometheus created more than the human race： he was the creator of the gods as well：

Did Prometheus have to

fancy

first that he had

stolen

the light and then pay for that — before he finally discovered that he had created the light

by

coveting

the

light

and that not only man but also the

god

was the work of his own hands and had been mere clay in his hands? All mere images of the maker — no less than the fancy， the theft， the Caucasus， the vulture， and the whole tragic

Prometheia

of all the seekers after knowledge? (Nietzsche，

The

Gay

Science

240-41)

Prometheus is thus a Titan who by moving forward begins the transformation of humanity into Overhumanity. For Prometheus is not helpless. As all the myths concerning him aver， he has a hidden weapon： he knows Zeus’s secret， the oracle announcing that Zeus will be dethroned or killed by a son， as he had done to his father. Prometheus is tortured so cruelly because he knows the secret of the gods： the gods are mortal too， or they can die of their own immortality.

Mignotte sees this clearly when she posits the need for an intermediary like Prometheus who is presented by Aeschylus as a true god who suffers for men when punished by Zeus. Aeschylus presents also a political drama： Zeus is excessively cruel and bent on making the Titan suffer because his rule has just begun. As he is being chained to the rock and pierced through with an iron stake， Prometheus gets this explanation from Hephaistos， who seems reluctant to accomplish his grim task：

These political or psychological considerations should be brought back to a more archaic substratum. As we saw， Mignotte called upon the myth of Prometheus as an intermediary between the humans and the gods because his mediation was predicated on the power of fire：

... in this external conflict between men and Zeus， Prometheus is the intermediary who closes the gaping hole of the devouring fire of the angry Zeus： he nourishes it with his own materialized fire by consuming his own body， reducing the latter to a substance of purified fire， the liver. I would say that Prometheus nourishes the gaping hole of Zeus with his own “deep blood” which passes through， without abolishing it， the gap that he has created and that he wants to maintain between the two parts of his being： the divine part and the human part. (Mignotte 78)

When Salomon Reinach discussed the “Resurrection of Gods and Heroes” he took Prometheus as a model. He argued that all Greeks stories of metamorphosis were in fact resurrection myths：

Reinach， an excellent Hellenist like Nietzsche， knew that the name “Prometheus” derives from “

prometheia

，” “foresight.” Prometheus sees the future of humanity and his own resurrection or unbinding， but here the theme of resurrection migrates from the bird to the hero’s liver：

A divine animal when sacrificed never died completely; for after a few days of mourning a successor was found， another animal of the same kind， which remained sacred and intangible for a year. This explains the resurrection of so many gods and heroes， the fact that their tombs were shown， that they were honoured in a ritual， and represented as living among the gods. (Ibid. 85)

These immortal birds can also offer an image prefiguring the immortality of machines with endlessly replaceable parts， in which the world of technology consists， and that， we cannot forget， is what we owe to Prometheus’s gift.

Eagles were rumored to test their offspring： if they were unable to withstand the glare of the sun， the little ones would be cast out of the net in a premonition of the medieval “ordeal，” as Freud writes. There cannot be a starker contrast than darkly pulsating viscera linked with divination and a paternal “truth” so blinding that almost nobody will be able to withstand it.

However， when Freud went back to the Prometheus myth in 1932 in his dense and strange paper on “The Acquisition and Control of the Fire，” he insists on one detail of the legend： Prometheus would have hidden the stolen fire in fennel stalks， in which one can recognize penis-like objects. This is sufficient to send Freud to the many legends about micturition used to quench fire and extinguish flames. The acquisition of fire calls up images of homosexual urination as the exact opposite of the generous theft by the Titan. What matters is that the act is at root criminal — the crime being directed at Zeus， the main god. Freud continues：

If the jealous and cruel gods allegorize the unleashing of the drives， the myth conveys clearly that the renunciation to the pleasures they enjoy， a renunciation demanded by culture， cannot but be painful. This is why the liver has to be chosen as the point of impact of the cruel punishment：

In ancient times the liver was regarded as the seat of all passions and desires; hence a punishment like that of Prometheus was the right one for a criminal driven by the drives， who had committed an offence at the prompting of evil desires. But the exact opposite is true of the Bringer of Fire： he had renounced a drive and had shown how beneficent， and at the same time how indispensable， such a renunciation was for the purposes of civilization. And why should the legend treat a deed that was thus a benefit to civilization as a crime deserving punishment? Well， if， through all its distortions， it barely allows us to get a glimpse of the fact that the acquisition of control over fire presupposes a renunciation to the drive， at least it makes no secret of the resentment which the culture-hero could not fail to arouse in men driven by their drives. (Ibid.)

What has been renounced in this case? Not just the fire of love， a “symbol of the libido” but also a more transgressive fire. Freud goes on：

When we ourselves speak of the “devouring fire” of love and of “l(fā)icking” flames — thus comparing the flame to a tongue — we have not moved so very far away from the mode of thinking of our primitive ancestors. One of the presuppositions on which we based our account of the myth of the acquisition of fire was， indeed， that to primal man the attempt to quench fire with his own water had the meaning of a pleasurable struggle with another phallus. (Ibid. 190)

He then needs a third element beyond the binary opposites：

In the antithesis between fire and water， which dominates the entire field of these myths， yet a third factor can be demonstrated in addition to the historical factor and the factor of symbolic phantasy. This is a physiological fact， which the poet Heine describes in the following lines： —

Was

dem

Menschen

dient

zum

Seichen

Damit

schafft

er

Seinesgleichen.

(With what serves a man for pissing，

He creates creatures in his image).

The sexual organ of the male has two functions; and there are those to whom this association is an annoyance. It serves for the evacuation of the bladder， and it carries out the act of love which sets the craving of the genital at rest. The child still believes that he can unite the two functions. According to a theory of his， babies are made by the man urinating into the woman’s body. But the adult knows that in reality the acts are mutually incompatible — as incompatible as fire and water. (Ibid. 192)

Heine rediscovers here what had amused Hegel when he saw how Nature combined the high and the low in an outrageous combination of fire and urine： “... the same conjunction of the high and the low which， in the living being， Nature na?vely expresses when it combines the organ of its highest fulfilment， the organ of generation， with the organ of generation” (Hegel，

The

Phenomenology

of

Spirit

210). In his turn， Freud offers us an almost grotesque image of drive-based enjoyment presented as the mindless interaction of mutually masturbating Titans who have not even discovered the difference between urination and ejaculation! Re-reading Freud’s interpretation of the legend with Winnicott as a guide， Mignotte counters this version with a feminist twist： for her， Prometheus’s liver is an equivalent of the placenta， “an interface between the matrix void and the void that is intrinsic to the egg” (Mignotte 79). But of course， even in the male version， this is not the end — as we know， Prometheus Unbound follows Prometheus Bound.

4. Kafka’s solution.

These considerations explain why the Prometheus myth kept such an appeal for Franz Kafka. As a seeker for autonomy who considered love a form of torture by other means (mostly epistolary， as we see in his notorious letters to Felice)， he found in the bound Greek Titan a model for his doomed struggle against a domineering and powerful father. More often than not， his Oedipal struggle would abort or be lost in perverted or sado-masochistic games similar to the twists he saw underpinning the master and slave dialectic. Some self-hate helps if one wants to achieve the freedom required to be a writer. This freedom will unmoor him from the ground of the family， and it is a freedom from the blood links reminding him of a disgusting proximity smacking of the parents’ abhorred sexuality， a thought almost unbearable for Kafka：

Sometimes this bond of blood (...) is the target of my hatred; the sight of the double bed at home， the used sheets， the nightshirts carefully laid out， can exasperate me to the point of nausea， can turn me inside out; it is as if I had not been definitively born (

als

w

?

re

ich

nicht

endg

ü

ltich

geboren

)， were continually born anew into the world out of the stale life in that stale room， had constantly to seek confirmation of myself there， were indissolubly joined with all that loathsomeness， in part even if not entirely， at least it still clogs my feet which want to run， they are still stuck fast in the original pulp. (Kafka，

Diaries

371)Like the good lawyer he is， Kafka attempts to argue that he has some ground to hate his family (

es

gibt

ü

bergenug

Grund

zu

zolchem

Ha

?) (Kafka，

Tageb

ü

cher

375). Hate is then accompanied by shame， the shame of not having been born once for all. This generates another torture， the torture of having to be born again and again.

Günther Anders， one of the best early commentators of Kafka， has described at some length the “Promethean shame” in an essay that praises Freud’s idea of the “birth trauma”：

Philosophically speaking， Sigmund Freud’s discovery of the “Trauma of Birth” cannot be rated highly enough： for what more incisive event could happen to life than being torn from the “ground?” The feelings Freud brought into view (“Oceanic Feeling;” “Death Drive”) are metaphysical in every respect， even if Freud’s language was masked by the scientific vocabulary of his century. This is equally true of the “Trauma of Birth” with which he described the shock of individuation， no matter how well he disguised it. In an analogy with our question “who is ashamed?” the question to ask in relation to this trauma is the following： “Who is actually shocked here?” (Qtd. in Müller 93， note 33)

The death drive refers to the individual’s wish to get rid of the “agony of being an individual” (Ibid.). For Anders， it underpins a deeper and hidden link between shame， birth and original trauma. The shock of individuation should be compared with “being torn from the ground.” Prometheus， who is responsible for the creation of tool-making humanity against the wishes of the higher gods like Zeus， can relinquish his individuality and merge with the ground， the rock he has been chained to. Kafka’s rewriting of Prometheus was originally without a title. It was not absurd for Max Brod to want to change the original order and turn the last paragraph into the first， because he thought that examples should conclude and not begin with a general law. Kafka had thought his parable somewhat differently. Here is my rather literal translation：

The legend tries to explain the inexplicable; as it comes out of the ground of truth (

Wahrheitsgrund

)， it has return to the inexplicable in the end.

There are four legends concerning Prometheus： According to the first he was clamped to a rock in the Caucasus for betraying the secrets of the gods to men， and the gods sent eagles to feed on his liver， which was perpetually renewed.

According to the second Prometheus， goaded by the pain of the tearing beaks， pressed himself deeper and deeper into the rock until he became one with it.

According to the third his treachery was forgotten in the course of thousands of years， forgotten by the gods， the eagles， forgotten by himself.

According to the fourth everyone grew tired of the groundless affair. The gods grew tired， the eagles grew tired， the wound closed tired.

Kafka planned to begin with a statement about the role of legends in general. Their function is to explain natural phenomena： as we know， any spring， tree， river， can be a pretext for a Greek myth， and account for a metamorphosis： Niobe wept and turned into stone， Io jumped and created the Ionian sea， etc. Kafka’s riddle posits a link between myth and nature on the one hand， myth and human suffering on the other. The story of Prometheus provides an example of a universal principle following a sequence of four moments and describing a process of gradual exhaustion. The hero turns into stone， all the participants have forgotten what has happened， including the hero. All have been affected by the exhaustion of the myth. If no reason can be given for the cruelty of the gods and the indifference of Nature， then what explanation can be valid?

What remains unshakeable for Kafka is a principle of truth， in which he finds an indisputable

Wahrheitsgrund.

The positive side is that some truth can be found; truth needs a secure grounding to be valid. In the end， it will be only found in the ground of the rocky mountain; this substratum does not need any explication， and it is just there. All the rest has been invented to make sense of the mountain. Kafka prevents us from believing in the possibility of grounding ourselves in the natural world， while suggesting that the mass of rock that we call a mountain can also function as a primordial void — which would send us back to Winnicott and Mignotte. She shows that the void leaves an organic remainder， whether it be called blood or liver， but a remainder that generates endless torture： life itself as eternal torture. If the liver survives， so as to allow for a torture predicated on Prometheus’ immortality， the immortality of an endless suffering， we understand better Kafka’s desire for a cessation of this living immortality： only by turning into stone and making one with the mountain will the absurd torture end. The liver has turned to stone but somehow lives on.Among the parts of the human body， the skin and the liver share a common feature： they heal by reconstituting their tissues. However， if the Greek

hepar

keeps a link with the seat of pleasure and affects， the Germanic

lifere

that gave

liver

is cognate with “l(fā)ife，” and also calls up “courage.” Another writer， James Joyce， also connected the courage to write with the ability to face a never-ending torture. He had a tendency to identify with “crying Jesus，” which is why he mentions the city of Trieste in which he spent many years writing

Ulysses

in connection with rampant alcoholism and a decaying liver： “And Trieste， ah Trieste ate I my liver!” (Joyce，

Finnegans

Wake

301) Such a partial autophagy seems to have been the precondition required for the monumental generation of

Finnegans

Wake

， a work written over seventeen years and that he would call his “cruelfiction，” to blend crucifixion， cruelty and fiction： “O， you were excruciated， in honour bound to the cross of your own cruelfiction!” (Ibid. 192)

Notes

① This essay expands and modifies the Preface I wrote for Mignotte， Touria.

Cruelty

，

Sexuality

，

and

the

Unconscious

in

Psychoanalysis

：

Freud

，

Lacan

，

Winnicott

，

and

The

Body

of

the

Void

.Trans. Andrew Weller. London： Routledge， 2020. xiii-xxii. It is forthcoming in Meera， Lee， ed.

Lacan

’

s

Cruelty

：

Perversion

beyond

Philosophy

，

Culture

and

the

Clinic.

New York： Palgrave Lacan Series， 2022.② See Derrida， Jacques. “Psychoanalysis Searches the States of Its Soul： The Impossible Beyond of a Sovereign Cruelty.”

Without

Alibi

. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Stanford： Stanford University Press， 2002. 238-80.③ See Nelson， Maggie.

The

Art

of

Cruelty

：

A

Reckoning

. New York： W.W. Norton， 2011.④ See Deleuze， Gilles.

Coldness

and

Cruelty

and von Sacher-Masoch， Leopold.

Venus

in

Furs

. Trans. Jean McNeil. New York： Zone Books， 1991.⑤ This is Derrida’s question. See

The

Death

Penalty

，

Volume

II

. Eds. Geoffrey Bennington and Marc Crépon. Chicago： University of Chicago Press， 2017.219.⑥ See Hegel， G.W.F.

Philosophy

of

Nature

. Trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford： Oxford University Press， 1970.⑦See Semm， Markus.

Der

springende

Punkt

in

Hegels

System

. München： Boer， 1994.⑧ See Semm’s chapter “Blut und Puls in der Naturphilosophie” in

Der

springende

Punkt

in

Hegels

System

， 17-47.⑨ Nancy， Jean-Luc.

Hegel

：

The

Restlessness

of

the

Negative

. Trans. Jason Smith and Steven Miller. Minneapolis： University of Minnesota Press， 2002.⑩ See Wrangham， Richard.

The

Goodness

Paradox

：

The

Strange

Relationship

Between

Virtue

and

Violence

in

Human

Evolution

. New York： Pantheon Books， 2019.

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