Lessons from Wartime Economics for the Coronavirus 戰(zhàn)時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)對新冠疫情的啟示

丹尼爾·薩斯堪德 陳曉霜

It is remarkable how the economic debate that has dominated political life over the past decade in Britain and much of Europe—how austere1 should we be？—is completely irrelevant to our current crisis， as if that argument sits in a parallel economic universe that we no longer inhabit.

過去十年間，在英國和歐洲大部分地區(qū)，主導(dǎo)政治生活的經(jīng)濟(jì)爭論是我們的財(cái)政該緊縮到什么程度，而此論題與當(dāng)前危機(jī)毫不相干，仿佛那是在我們已經(jīng)離開的平行經(jīng)濟(jì)宇宙中進(jìn)行的。這種現(xiàn)象不同尋常。

Instead of arguing about how swiftly governments should balance the books2 and lower their debt levels， leading economists are suddenly making the case for3 much more aggressive public spending. The U.K.s Office for Budget Responsibility， traditionally a guardian of fiscal prudence， now advises the British government to spend “what you need to spend to deal with this. In some ways its like a wartime situation.”

大牌經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家不再爭論政府應(yīng)以多快的速度平衡收支、減少債務(wù)，而是突然間倡導(dǎo)大幅增加公共支出。英國預(yù)算責(zé)任司傳統(tǒng)上是財(cái)政節(jié)流的衛(wèi)士，如今卻建議英國政府“為此該花多少錢就花多少。在某種程度上，目前形勢和戰(zhàn)時(shí)情況一樣”。

If this is right， what lessons might we learn from “wartime economics”—beyond a cautionary reminder that the standard economic tools available to us （cutting interest rates， carefully increasing government spending） are no match for the magnitude of the moment？

假如這種判斷是正確的，我們可以從“戰(zhàn)時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)”中得到什么啟發(fā)呢——除了告誡我們可用的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)經(jīng)濟(jì)手段（降低利率、謹(jǐn)慎增加政府開支）無法抵抗目前形勢的嚴(yán)重性之外？

First， we should acknowledge the peculiar paradox4 at the core of this crisis， that although we are confronting an economic calamity5， no actual economic weaknesses are to blame. The economy has not been leveled by bombs—we have simply turned it off. This creates a unique challenge： How do you support people during this moment of suspended animation6， and ensure that， when we switch the economy “back on，” it is able to propel itself into action， unscarred by this pause？ Some of the traditional lessons of war， thus， dont apply. Today， for example， a crucial economic challenge is that consumer demand has been decimated7 by the virus. In contrast， what troubled John Maynard Keynes， the British economist， at the start of the Second World War was the possibility of too much demand. That combined with a shortage of supplies due to the war effort， he feared， would lead to explosive inflation. His solution， a compulsory saving scheme， is precisely the opposite of what we need.

首先，我們要承認(rèn)，目前處于危機(jī)核心的特殊悖論是，盡管我們面對經(jīng)濟(jì)危難，卻無法將其歸咎于某些實(shí)際的經(jīng)濟(jì)疲軟。經(jīng)濟(jì)不是被炸彈摧毀的——是我們讓它停止了。這造成了一個(gè)獨(dú)特的挑戰(zhàn)：如何在經(jīng)濟(jì)停擺的這一時(shí)刻援助民眾，并且確保經(jīng)濟(jì)在重啟之時(shí)，自己會推進(jìn)盤活、不受停擺的影響？因此，一些傳統(tǒng)的戰(zhàn)時(shí)經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)不適用。比如說，現(xiàn)在，一個(gè)關(guān)鍵的經(jīng)濟(jì)挑戰(zhàn)是消費(fèi)需求因?yàn)椴《径蠓认陆?。相比之下，第二次世界大?zhàn)開始時(shí)，困擾英國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯的是需求過剩的可能性。再加上戰(zhàn)爭導(dǎo)致的供應(yīng)短缺，他擔(dān)心需求過剩將導(dǎo)致爆炸性的通貨膨脹。他的解決方案——強(qiáng)制性儲蓄計(jì)劃——恰恰與我們現(xiàn)在所需的措施相反。

One lesson that we have learned， more from necessity than historical reflection， is the need for effective “big government，” for competent top-down planners to take the place of chaotic bottom-up markets. We have seen the state step forward in many countries to offer huge amounts of support for workers—in the U.K.， for example， by underwriting8 almost the entire private sector through wage guarantees. And we have seen the state take a role in mobilizing and redirecting resources—medical staff， volunteers， equipment， and much else—toward the “war effort.”

我們已得到的一條教訓(xùn)是，我們需要高效的“大政府”，讓能干的自上而下的規(guī)劃者取代混亂的自下而上的市場，這個(gè)教訓(xùn)與其說是來自歷史反思，還不如說是源于現(xiàn)實(shí)必要性。我們已看到，在許多國家，政府采取措施為勞動者提供大量支持——例如，英國政府通過工資保障為幾乎整個(gè)私營部門提供擔(dān)保。而且我們還看到，國家在調(diào)動和重新分配資源方面發(fā)揮了作用，將醫(yī)療人員、志愿者、設(shè)備等眾多資源用于“抗疫戰(zhàn)爭”。

Yet， in practice， the most important lessons we can learn from wartime economics are likely not those that teach us what to do now but those that give us a glimpse of the challenges and debates we will face in the future， once the war is over.

然而，實(shí)際上，我們能從戰(zhàn)時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中得到的最重要的啟示可能不是教我們現(xiàn)在該做什么，而是讓我們初步領(lǐng)悟到一旦抗疫戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束將面臨的挑戰(zhàn)和爭論。

To begin with， few countries have been able to respond to this crisis alone. Almost none has had the domestic capacity to produce sufficient tests， masks， medication9， or ventilators10 when the moment required. The U.S.， for instance， relies on China for 90 percent of its antibiotics11. Just as Keynes found himself， in the interwar period， reflecting on the merits of economic self-sufficiency， we will soon likely find ourselves further ensnared12 in debates about “strategic protectionism，” about the merit of intentionally building and shielding particular nationally important parts of the economy， even if to do so runs counter to the basic economic principle of comparative advantage.

首先，鮮有國家能獨(dú)自應(yīng)對這場危機(jī)。幾乎沒有國家能在需要時(shí)生產(chǎn)足夠的檢測劑、口罩、藥物或呼吸機(jī)。例如，美國90%的抗生素產(chǎn)自中國。在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)間隔期，凱恩斯在反思經(jīng)濟(jì)自給自足的益處。和他一樣，我們可能很快會進(jìn)一步陷入有關(guān)“戰(zhàn)略保護(hù)主義”的辯論，爭辯有意構(gòu)建和保護(hù)本國特定重要經(jīng)濟(jì)部門有何好處，即便這種措施違背了比較優(yōu)勢的基本經(jīng)濟(jì)原則。

If the U.K. had done this， we might have avoided the ongoing scrambles13 to secure sufficient ventilators， tests， and protective equipment; we could have built up the domestic capability to produce far more ourselves. On testing， for instance， the U.K.s health secretary， Matt Hancock， noted in March that “we didnt go into this crisis with a huge diagnostics14 industry.” In preparing for the next pandemic， we may want to change that.

如果英國采取了這種措施，我們可能就不會陷入當(dāng)前為確保有足夠的呼吸機(jī)、檢測劑和防護(hù)設(shè)備而與人爭搶的困境;我們本來可以增強(qiáng)國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)力，自己制造更多的產(chǎn)品。例如，在檢測方面，英國衛(wèi)生大臣馬特·漢考克在3月份指出，“我們陷入這場危機(jī)之時(shí)，尚無龐大的診斷產(chǎn)業(yè)?！痹跒閼?yīng)對下一次流行病做準(zhǔn)備時(shí)，我們或許需要改變這種狀況。

We should see a transformation in the way we view certain types of work， as well. The Second World War catalyzed15 a shift in womens treatment in the labor market， and this crisis may similarly force us to address another working-world flaw： the gap between the great social value of so many jobs， and the comparatively small market value （in the form of a salary） that they receive. In Britain， for instance， labeling doctors， nurses， care workers， social workers， teachers， criminal lawyers， and others as “key workers” betrays a two-fold irony： Though these roles are key （and have been for some time）， that status is in many cases not reflected in their pay; and some of them are precisely the sorts of so-called low-skilled workers that post-Brexit immigration controls would keep out.

我們對某些類型工作的看法也應(yīng)改變。第二次世界大戰(zhàn)催生了勞動力市場中女性待遇的轉(zhuǎn)變，而這場危機(jī)可能同樣迫使我們解決另一個(gè)職場上的問題：有那么多工作，其社會價(jià)值巨大，所獲的市場價(jià)值（以工資的形式）相對很小。例如，在英國，醫(yī)生、護(hù)士、護(hù)理人員、社會工作者、教師、刑事律師和其他人被貼上“重要崗位工作人員”的標(biāo)簽，這暴露了一個(gè)雙重諷刺：雖然這些角色是至關(guān)重要的（并且長期以來一直如此），但在許多情況下，這種地位并沒有反映在他們的薪酬中;其中一些人恰恰是所謂的低技能工人，英國脫歐后的移民管制會將他們拒之門外。

A third lesson is to monitor market competition， or the lack of it. A common complaint in the first half of the 20th century was that war conditions were particularly favorable to monopolization16： Certain companies were either favored by the state or well placed to take advantage of the war effort， and many smaller firms struggled， eventually being bought out by larger ones with deeper pockets. We can see similar trends unfolding in this crisis： Companies such as Amazon， Netflix， Facebook， and Zoom17 find themselves providing the goods and services that are necessary at the moment， while others， typically smaller businesses without the financial wherewithal18 to stay afloat19， are in trouble through no fault of their own. During the First and Second World Wars， excess profit taxes， levied on profits above prewar levels， were used to make sure no company benefited disproportionately20 at a time of great national suffering. We shouldnt just consider using these taxes again， but， in time， we should also survey the general health of different sectors， checking that they are still characterized by healthy competition， rather than dominated by a lucky few who have managed to survive.

第三個(gè)啟示是要監(jiān)控市場競爭，或監(jiān)控缺乏市場競爭的情況。20世紀(jì)上半葉的一個(gè)通病是戰(zhàn)爭條件特別有利于壟斷：某些公司要么受到政府照顧，要么處于可以利用戰(zhàn)事的優(yōu)勢地位，而許多小公司苦苦掙扎，最終被財(cái)力雄厚的大公司收購。在這場危機(jī)中，我們可以看到類似的趨勢：亞馬遜、奈飛、臉書和Zoom等公司在提供目前必需的商品和服務(wù)，而其他公司（通常是沒有資金維持運(yùn)營的小型企業(yè)）卻陷入了非自身原因造成的困境。在第一次和第二次世界大戰(zhàn)期間，對高于戰(zhàn)前水平的利潤征收超額利潤稅，以確保在國家蒙難時(shí)沒有公司發(fā)國難財(cái)。我們不應(yīng)只是考慮重新啟用這種稅收措施，最終，我們還是應(yīng)該調(diào)查不同行業(yè)的總體狀況，檢查它們是否仍然具備良性競爭，而不是由少數(shù)存活下來的幸運(yùn)兒支配。

The final lesson from wartime economics—and the most significant—relates to the future of the state. Having stepped forward to deliver so much in the crisis， the state seems unlikely to simply retreat to its former shape and size once this is all over， given it has not done so in the past. Many of Europes strongest welfare states found their initial form in the postwar moments of the first half of the 20th century. The same， I imagine， will happen in our time. Much as wartime economics did not cease when the world wars ended， the consequences of this “war” will be felt for long after it concludes.

戰(zhàn)時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的最后一個(gè)啟示——也是最重要的啟示——與國家的未來有關(guān)。疫情危機(jī)期間，國家挺身而出，付出了那么多。危機(jī)結(jié)束后，國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)似乎不太可能一下子恢復(fù)到疫情之前的狀態(tài)和規(guī)模，因?yàn)檫@種情況過去沒有發(fā)生過。歐洲許多最強(qiáng)大的福利國家是在20世紀(jì)上半葉的戰(zhàn)后時(shí)期初步成形的。我想，同樣的情況也會發(fā)生在我們這個(gè)時(shí)代。正如二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后戰(zhàn)時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)并未停止，在疫情結(jié)束后相當(dāng)長一段時(shí)間內(nèi)，我們還會感受到這場“抗疫戰(zhàn)爭”的影響。