China’s Role in Resolving the Korean Nuclear Issue and Some Suggestions

By Wang Fan

I. China’s Special Role in and Position on Resolving the Korean Nuclear Issue

China’s endeavor with regard to resolving the Korean nuclear issue involves: Striving for a peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue; preserving stability of the peninsula situation; actively promoting the Six-Party Talk mechanism on the Korean nuclear issue it has proposed. Meanwhile, China has two major concerns over the Korean Peninsula issue: First, upheaval or drastic changes may occur in the Korean Peninsula, which will not only bring the northeastern region of China to face the impact of refugee influx, but possibly give rise to a local war. Second, certain foreign countries may manipulate or capitalize on the crisis between China and the DPRK, as in the case China pursues a tough policy toward the DPRK, while other countries take the opportunity to make a dramatic peace with the DPRK. China is also concerned that other countries may transfer or outsource crisis to China, while taking no actions whatsoever, thus resulting in rising contradiction between China and the DPRK, and much reducing China’s ability to exert special influence on the DPRK as it used to.

As a result, China’s position on the Korean nuclear issue is clear and definite:

First, it is better for the doer to undo what he has done. Contradictions, confrontation and mutual-distrust between the US and the DPRK pose the biggest obstacle to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. So, it is only when the US and the DPRK normalize their relations and put an end to their military hostility, that the way is clear for the final denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Second, China has strategic limits on the Korean nuclear issue. As China is unable to well resolve the Korean nuclear issue alone, it has to work with other relevant parties to reach the final goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. It is naive and unrealistic to believe the Korean nuclear issue could be resolved when China steps up pressure on and suspends its assistance to the DPRK. Such a belief will only endanger the final resolution of the Korean nuclear issue.

Third, joint efforts should be made by China and the US to further strengthen their strategic coordination on the Korean nuclear issue. China and the US enjoy a high degree of consensus in opposing DPRK’s possession of nuclear capability and nuclear proliferation, while sharing a common stand on maintaining regional stability. However, they differ from each other on the way of resolving the Korean nuclear issue. China opposes the efforts made by the US to strengthen its alliance system and deploy missile defense systems in the region by taking advantage of the Korean Peninsula issue, believing such acts would only intensify the situation in the peninsula. China opposes the US policy of hostility and negligence toward the DPRK, standing for the US taking active actions under the Six-Party Talk framework, and supporting direct dialog between the US and the DPRK. China also opposes intentions and policies of any state to subvert the government of another country, upholding the respect for other countries’ sovereignty as well as equal and coordinated dialog. The US is concerned that when the peninsula is unified in the future, there will be a tendency to exclude the US from the peninsula, thus affecting its military presence in the peninsula, while China’s concern involves the unified Korean Peninsula would align with the US, hence enabling the US to advance its troops to the bank of the Yalu River. China will continue to give a full play to its geostrategic and geo-economic advantages in actively promoting economic reforms in the DPRK, so as to bring the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the direction of soft-landing.

Fourth, all the parties concerned should make joint and concerted efforts, as it is the only way to resolve the issue. In other words, China still pins hopes on resolving the Korean nuclear issue through the Six-Party Talk mechanism. China is only to undertake its share of responsibility, in that China wishes to play its role in a multilateral framework. Since the beginning of the new century, China’s cooperation with the ROK on the Korean Peninsula issue is obvious to all, while its strategic coordination with the US on the Korean nuclear issue is the highlight in their bilateral cooperation. However, these cooperation efforts have only been confined to stabilizing the regional situation. So, more innovative cooperation efforts should be made in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

Fifth, what is China’s red-line on the Korean nuclear issue? This author holds that China’s red-line involves the DPRK should not further develop its nuclear weapons, and should freeze all its nuclear development programs until they are eliminated in the end. Therefore, the core effort of China on the Korean nuclear issue is to keep the DPRK from further developing its nuclear weapons as well as from proliferating nuclear weapons and using nuclear weapons first. At the same time, China, of course, opposes other countries to conduct a nuclear threat or make preemptive use of nuclear weapons against North Korea.

China concentrates on preventing the occurrence of two situations in addressing the Korean Peninsula issue, namely war and chaos. In a broad sense, China is more concerned with the geostrategic environment, which involves its policy toward the peninsula. China’s policy toward the DPRK will not change drastically, nor will it fluctuate wildly, in that China’s position on the Korean Peninsula issue is firm and explicit, as well as its role is positive, constructive and responsible. The implementation of the “dual-suspension” scheme proposed by China has ushered in the relaxation of the US-DPRK relations and summit meetings between the two countries. Nonetheless, “parallel progress” recommended by China is yet to be fully implemented, which is the key to whether the resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue will make further progress in the next phase. Although China could have played a more active role, it has to do whatever within its ability and continue to play a coordinating role, as the issue between the US and the DPRK cannot be turned into one between China and the DPRK.

II. The Resolution of the Korean Nuclear Issue Calls for a Comprehensive Approach

In the thinking of resolving the Korean nuclear issue, scholars from the US and the ROK still emphasize such a view that if choice to be made between security, stability and denuclearization, priority should be given to denuclearization. However, China believes ensuring security and stability is a prerequisite and denuclearization should be achieved through peace talks under such a premise. If chaos arises in the region, none of the parties concerned can bear the cost of losing security, letting alone the denuclearization of the peninsula. For the DPRK, ensuring national security is the most fundamental element. With the process of resolving the Korean nuclear issue going deep, disagreements between the US and the DPRK over the issue of denuclearization will be further exposed and enlarged. In addition, the two sides have to face such difficult problems as related to nuclear inspection and cost-sharing. How to link up the phased denuclearization plan with the final denuclearization plan and ensure their consistency also pose a challenge. Therefore, resolution of the Korean nuclear issue has to go through a long and arduous course.

First, as the Korean nuclear issue has already formed a complicated and interwoven cause-effect chain, a key breakthrough point has to be found for its resolution. Such a breakthrough point lies in promoting denuclearization through encouraging economic reforms in the DPRK. To address the Korean nuclear issue, a single policy or a combination of two opposing policies would be ineffective. There should be a comprehensive policy in its true sense, in that a policy of neutrality without hostility may be more effective. So, economy should be given a priority, and then relevant measures should follow for achieving the goal of denuclearization when economic reforms are irreversible.

Second, we should learn more about the DPRK through meticulous and comprehensive studies of the country, give more attention to its security concerns, and provide it with a multilateral security assurance under the framework of the Six-Party Talk so as to correct the deeds of bullying the weak. As history has proven, although acts like holding military exercises or deploying the THAAD systems may be of some significance to the US and the ROK in deterring the DPRK, they hardly have any positive influence on promoting the DPRK to abandon its nuclear programs, but exerting negative impacts instead. The respect for the DPRK should be, first of all, reflected in politics and security, namely respecting the sense of equality, independence and dignity of the DPRK as a sovereign and independent state. Secondly, patience has to be there in order to have a fuller and more objective understanding of the state of underdevelopment and the development stage the DPRK is in, and notice the progressiveness of its development. Since the core of the Korean nuclear issue is security, denuclearization should be linked with security rather than energy and food assistance. Moreover, denuclearization is impossible to achieve simply through contacts or engagement. As a result, concrete and feasible steps should be taken in providing security, as the DPRK will not give up its nuclear capabilities without having security ensured.

Third, major countries and powers around the DPRK should particularly have corresponding mentality as major countries or powers on the Korean nuclear issue. The DPRK has no capital to charge exorbitant prices, as relevant major countries and powers around the DPRK are in possession of larger strategic space and far more strategic means than the DPRK, and have enough restraint to control and regulate its actions, keeping it from repeating its mistakes and raising the cost for it to commit more mistakes, so as to force it to comply to the agreements reached in the end. There can be many operable institutional designs to keep the DPRK from reaching out for a yard after taking an inch. So, relevant parties should have the wisdom and courage to make bigger moves strategically rather than dwelling on tactical affairs, as there is a space for exchange of interests and negotiation on the matter of the DPRK’s denuclearization.

Fourth, emphasis should be given to policy interaction. The present state of the Korean nuclear issue is the result of multilateral interaction rather than bilateral ones. Therefore, it makes no difference to the matter to put blames on any single party. We should have not only to keep an eye on the DPRK’s foreign policy change, but also to strengthen position and policy coordination among the five parties on the Korean nuclear issue so as to overcome the shortcoming of taking separate approaches in the past. The Six-Party Talk should address the issues relating to not only multilateral coordination within the mechanism, but also the DPRK’s economic development and the multilateral security arrangement in particular. The Six-Party Talk mechanism should be revitalized and upgraded.

III. The Future of the Six-Party Talk Mechanism

The Korean nuclear issue is closely associated with security. This author believes, to resolve the issue fundamentally, we have to go back to the Six-Party Talk mechanism, as it had already played its role in the past. So, an upgraded Six-Party Talk mechanism is bound to have greater influence in the future.

Since the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talk in 2009, negative comments on the mechanism have multiplied. People believed the Six-Party Talk mechanism has failed or got into an impasse, and lost its value of existence, as it has been reduced to a deliberative institution without any binding force. However, we have to evaluate the Six-Party Talk mechanism from a historical point of view. First of all, the emergence of such mechanism was the result of the consensus reached by relevant parties then; and the Six-Party Talk had its mission demanded by history, as the bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral talks had all failed, thus giving rise to the Six-Party Talk, which achieved more progress than any other form of talks had done.

Although the original Six-Party Talk mechanism has been in deep waters, its role and functions are irreplaceable, with the key lying in innovation. For instance, in terms of providing security assurance to the DPRK, the Six-Party Talk can still play a constructive role, as the DPRK is now disbelieving such a commitment made by any single country. As a result, the most effective way to influence the DPRK is multilateral rather than bilateral, as the latter’s influence is more limited. Therefore, only a mutually-binding commitment in a multilateral form works effectively, as the security assurance has to be irreversible first before the process of denuclearization is made irreversible. Irreversibility of the security assurance is impossible without multilaterally binding forces.

The five parties under the Six-Party Talk mechanism, apart from the DPRK, can not only make a difference in security coordination over the Korean nuclear issue, but also reach more strategic consensuses in pacifying and exhorting the DPRK as well as promoting economic reforms in the DPRK. In doing so, more patience is called for on the part of the five parties, and they must show more tolerance and provide more conveniences.

For the next step of reform, efforts should be made to strengthen the function of the Six-Party Talk mechanism in providing security assurance as a multilateral platform, and boost its function in promoting denuclearization through assisting economic development of the DPRK.

The Six-Party Talk mechanism calls for reform and adjustment. Otherwise, it will fall once again into a vicious circle. We should not seek arrangement only in form. The working groups of the Six-Party Talk may be retained, but have to remain domain to domain and function to function, with functional cooperation to be strengthened.

The Six-Party Talk mechanism calls for an upgraded version. The focus of the Six-Party Talk reform should be on re-establishing its authority to make it an oversight mechanism with unchallenged authority, in addition to promoting the combination of rights and responsibilities, re-defining the rights and obligations of member states, striving to strike a balance between responsibility and benefits, between rights and obligation, and between mutual-restraint and self-restraint to give the mechanism more binding force and the approach of security before denuclearization a try.

The Six-Party Talk mechanism calls for innovation and breakthrough. In terms of institutional building, the rights and obligations of member states should be further defined, and more institutional arrangements should be made to promote coordination among member states. As a member state of the Six-Party Talk, each member state not only is entitled to security assurance, but also has obligations to ensure security to other member states. So, they have both rights and obligations as a member state of the Six-Party Talk. For instance, as a member state of the Six-Party Talk, the six countries should have a shared responsibility to preserve regional peace and stability. The six member states are equal, and should respect each other’s sovereignty mutually. Normal state-to-state relationship should be established among member states involved in the Six-Party Talk. The US and the DPRK should conclude a peace agreement of some kind first; neither side shall pursue a provocative policy unilaterally to undermine regional stability; and as for security assurance among member states, the six parties should sign a mutual non-aggression agreement among them. The DPRK should suspend or stop its nuclear development programs, while other parties should halt their threat of nuclear strikes. The DPRK should enjoy nuclear protection under the framework of the Six-Party Talk. Meanwhile, consideration should be given to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by the DPRK. For example, other countries, including countries involved in the Six-Party Talk other than the DPRK, provide nuclear energy to the DPRK. Promoting economic development in the DPRK should also be a focus of the upgraded Six-Party Talk mechanism, such as establishing an economic cooperation body among the six countries, in which member states enjoy preferential trade and tariffs. Only by doing so, can the DPRK be finally made aware that as a member of the Six-Party Talk, the benefits it gets by continuing with its nuclear tests are decreasing, while the benefits of denuclearization are increasing greatly.

In sum, as a member of the Six-Party Talk, countries will not only get security assurance like mutual non-aggression, but also economic benefits, such as reciprocal economic policies and tariff reduction, which will show to the DPRK the multiple benefits for joining in the mechanism, and make it stay resolutely in the framework. Carrying out economic reforms should be made a threshold for the DPRK to join in the new Six-Party Talk mechanism. In the new mechanism, member states will have both benefits and responsibilities, and there are more attractions and restraints, so as to realize effective management.

In addition, the new Six-Party Talk mechanism should have a longterm arrangement for building a regional security regime in Northeast Asia. Currently, a Cold-War security structure is still lingering in Northeast Asia, which is closely associated with the nuclear issue. Given the history and current state of the region, the six-party security mechanism may coexist for a long time with the US-ROK alliance. From the perspective of the North and South Koreas, the multilateral security regime under the Six-Party Talk mechanism should be synchronized with the improvement of the North-South relations.