女性主義理論和普通語言哲學(xué)：托里爾?莫依教授訪談錄（英文）

許慶紅　托里爾?莫依

Abstract： Toril Moi initiated ordinary language philosophy in the tradition of Wittgenstein， Cavell and Austin into feminist theory and womens writing， opening up the intersections of literature， philosophy and aesthetics. Her feminist ideas are primarily manifested in three books： Sexual/Textual Politics： Feminist Literary Theory， Simone de Beauvoir： The Making of an Intellectual Woman， and Sex， Gender and the Body. She argues that the feminist writing like that of Beauvoirs， through the attention to ordinary everyday experience， builds up the connection between the personal and the philosophical， as suggested in Stanley Cavells ordinary language philosophy. Moi has also tried to work out the relationship between theory and politics in ordinary， everyday terms instead of the empty terms of metaphysics. This interview mainly focuses on Mois discussion on the connection between feminist theory and ordinary language philosophy， such as her understanding of Beauvoirs existentialist feminism in The Second Sex， the revolution that transformed “l(fā)iterary theory” into “theory” in her Sexual/Textual Politics， her third-way （neither essentialist nor constructionist） understanding of “what is a woman”， and her reference to poststructuralist theory as “theoretical straitjacket”. Moi also advocates that women writers and feminist critics in China should show concern for womens experiences， thus appealing to the value of justice， equality and freedom.

Key words： feminist theory; ordinary language philosophy; existentialism; theoretical straitjacket

Authors： Xu Qinghong，Ph. D.， Professor of English and American literature at Anhui University （Hefei 230601， China）， visiting scholar at Duke University （2008-2009） and Fulbright Research Scholar at The City College of New York （2016-2017）. Toril Moi， Distinguished Professor of Literature， of English， and Theater Studies at Duke University， the Director of the Center for Philosophy， Arts， and Literature at Duke， an adjunct Research Professor at Norways National Library since 2017.

內(nèi)容摘要：托里爾·莫依教授將維特根斯坦、卡維爾和奧斯汀傳統(tǒng)中的普通語言哲學(xué)引入女性主義理論和婦女創(chuàng)作，打通文學(xué)、哲學(xué)和美學(xué)的學(xué)科交叉。其女性主義思想主要體現(xiàn)在三本書中：《性/文本政治：女性主義文學(xué)理論》、《西蒙娜·德·波伏娃：知識女性的形成》、《性、性別與身體》。她認(rèn)為，波伏娃的女性主義創(chuàng)作通過對日常生活經(jīng)驗的關(guān)注實踐了“由個人的通達(dá)哲學(xué)的”這一普通語言哲學(xué)觀。莫依還試圖用普通的日常用語，而非空洞的形而上學(xué)用語來解釋理論和政治之間的關(guān)系。本次訪談主要聚焦于莫依關(guān)于女性主義理論與普通語言哲學(xué)之間聯(lián)系的一些相關(guān)討論，比如波伏娃《第二性》中的存在主義女性主義、莫依之《性/文本政治：女性主義文學(xué)理論》中的“文學(xué)理論”向“理論”的轉(zhuǎn)換、其既非本質(zhì)主義又非建構(gòu)主義層面上的“何謂女人”以及后結(jié)構(gòu)主義之“理論緊身衣”等。莫依還提倡中國當(dāng)下的女性創(chuàng)作和女性主義批評應(yīng)更多關(guān)注女性經(jīng)驗，追求正義、平等、自由的價值。

關(guān)鍵詞：女性主義理論;普通語言哲學(xué);存在主義;理論的緊身衣

基金項目：安徽省哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)規(guī)劃重點項目“十九世紀(jì)美國女性文學(xué)中的女性共同體研究”【項目編號（AHSKZ2019D015）】的階段性成果。

作者簡介：許慶紅，博士，安徽大學(xué)教授，杜克大學(xué)訪問學(xué)者（2008-2009），紐約城市學(xué)院富布賴特研究學(xué)者（2016-2017）。這篇訪談是托里爾·莫依授權(quán)的訪談版本，其中文版本發(fā)表于《文藝?yán)碚撗芯俊罚?009年第3期），并被人大復(fù)印報刊資料《外國文學(xué)研究》（2009年第10期）全文轉(zhuǎn)載。托里爾·莫依，美國杜克大學(xué)文學(xué)、英語和戲劇研究杰出教授，著名的女性主義理論家，哲學(xué)、藝術(shù)和文學(xué)跨學(xué)科研究者，2017年起擔(dān)任挪威國家圖書館的兼職研究教授。

Xu Qinghong （Xu for short hereafter）： Simone de Beauvoir is one of the foremost feminist theorists in the West. Now you are a widely-acknowledged expert on Beauvoir and your Simone de Beauvoir： The Making of an Intellectual Woman is the only work that makes a genealogical study on Beauvoir both as an intellectual and as a woman. And your works are profoundly influenced by Beauvoirs thought. So， we would like to know what initially drew you to study Beauvoir？ What in Beauvoirs life and works fascinated you？ Except for Beauvoir and Sartre， are there any other philosophers and theorists that inspired and influenced your academic work？

Toril Moi （Moi for short hereafter）： I started working on Simone de Beauvoir because she is the greatest feminist thinker of the twentieth century. If you want to be a feminist intellectual， you have to study Simone de Beauvoir. I was very shocked that in the late 1980s， very few people were interested in her. For me， the whole of Beauvoirs life was fascinating. In my book Simone de Beauvoir： The Making of an Intellectual Woman I began by saying that she was “the emblematic intellectual woman of our [the twentieth] century” （Moi 1）， that she pioneered a life that became common only a generation later， that is， she made her way through the normal institutions of education in the same way that men did. She belonged to the first generation of women who did this in a fairly routine way. Virginia Woolf didnt go to university， but Beauvoir did. Beauvoir was born in 1908 and Virginia Woolf was born 1882. The generation of women born between 1900 and 1910 got access to higher education in the same way that men did， which produced a new kind of intellectual women， who had gone through the same institutions as men. Since this is now the norm for most women， Beauvoir is particularly interesting for us. We can learn from her problems and her experiences. We can learn a lot about the conflicts and difficulties of an intellectual woman in the sexist society by looking at her work and life. Another interesting fact is that， like many young women today， Simone de Beauvoir， when she was a young student， thought she was equal. She didnt think she lived in a sexist society. She only discovered the extent to which she had been shaped by a sexist society later when she looked back. A lot of young women students today， I think， are in the same situation. Maybe when they start working and deal with real life， they will realize that there is still something unequal. As for other philosophers and theorists in whom I find intellectual inspiration， I would say above all Ludwig Wittgenstein， Stanley Cavell， and J. L. Austin. I have always been very interested in Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I have worked much on psychoanalysis， particularly Sigmund Freud and Julia Kristeva and other psychoanalysts， too， including Jacques Lacan. In philosophy， the major ones are French phenomenology， existentialism and ordinary language philosophy， I suppose.

Xu： You mentioned in your essay “What Is a Woman” that “[n]o feminist has produced a better theory of the embodied， sexually different human being than Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex.” （Moi， What Is a Woman？ and Other Essays 5）. What， from your perspective， are the crucially important things in The Second Sex？ What are the intellectual resources you see in the existentialist feminism of Beauvoir which have stimulated your insights in feminist theory？

Moi： I think some of the crucially important things in The Second Sex are： the writing style， its method， the way that is once personal and philosophical， and attentive to ordinary everyday experience; and also the way it uses womens novels， diaries， memoirs. The first sentence of the book uses a very personal “I”： “For a long time I have hesitated to write a book on woman. The subject is irritating， especially to women; and it is not new” （De Beauvoir， The Second Sex 13）. The whole tone and the way that it was written is a model for us because it is not pretentious， not abstract and yet it is philosophically deep.

Xu： So Beauvoir builds up the connection between the personal and the philosophical， as later suggested in Stanley Cavells ordinary language philosophy？

Moi： Yes， you could say that. This is the subject of my essay “I Am a Woman”， the second essay in Sex， Gender and Body. We have not exhausted the idea of freedom， and the analysis of what prevents women from behaving as free subjects. Beauvoirs utopian ideal is the reciprocity and comradeship between men and women. She did not think that women are the mere victims of sexist circumstances. The epigram to The Second Sex is： half accomplices， half victims like everyone else. She is a subtle thinker about the difficulties of freedom and about the difficulties that stand in the way of friendship between the sexes. I think we have a long way to go before we can finish with Beauvoir.

Xu： Your first book Sexual/Textual Politics： Feminist Literary Theory is a great success since its publication in 1985. It was reprinted， as I remember， 15 times before its second edition in 2002， and translated into eleven languages in different countries and regions. So how do you look back on the book twenty years later？

Moi： Readers continue to find Sexual/Textual Politics useful. I suppose this means that it raises questions that have remained relevant to feminist theory， either because they still preoccupy us， or because they are now considered necessary starting points for understanding later developments in feminist theory. The change in cultural context of feminism has had an impact on the way the book is read. Feminist theory was a marginal and somewhat suspect intellectual activity in the eyes of many academics， now it is （at least in many Western countries） an established part of academia. Similarly， Sexual/Textual Politics has changed from being a controversial， cutting-edge intervention in a subversive field in 1985 to a textbook in 2002. The first half of the book， entitled “Anglo-American Feminist Criticism”， traces the relationship between traditional literary theory and feminist politics. In the second half， entitled “French feminist theory”， the meaning of “theory” starts to shift from literary to philosophical and psychological questions， from “l(fā)iterary theory” to “theory”. Sexual/Textual Politics was my first book; it taught me that it is possible for anyone — me， for example — to speak up， to have a say， to participate in the feminist project. Today feminism still needs new visions and new voices. I know that this book has inspired feminist students to speak up， to express their passionate disagreement or agreement. In translation the book has mattered and continues to matter to readers all over the world. If Sexual/Textual Politics continues to inspire discussion for some years to come， it will still be a useful book.

Xu： Sexual/Textual Politics is about feminist theory and criticism. As for the topic of theory and politics， you are persistent in the idea that we shouldnt be excessively optimistic about the political power of theory or that there is no absolute political value of intellectual work. Could you please expand it a little bit on your thinking of the relationship between theory and politics？

Moi： Sexual/Textual Politics participated in the revolution that transformed “l(fā)iterary theory” into “theory”. It was written at a time and in a place when to be doing theory， particularly feminist theory， was perceived by both theorists and anti-theorists to be subversive of the academic institution. At that time， the phrase the “politics of theory” appeared to make obvious and automatic sense. Now that “theory” has ensconced itself as the dominant academic doxa. It is no longer possible to believe that theory simply is political， or to continue the search for the perfect theory， the theory that “is defined by its practical effects， as what changes peoples views， makes them think differently about their objects of study and their activities of studying them，” （Culler， Literary Theory 4） to quote Jonathan Culler. Now it is time to take a new look at the relationship between theory and politics. The question about “politics of theory” has in fact mostly been raised by post-structuralists， whose theories have to do with language， discourse and subjectivity. But to speak of the “politics of theory” is to speak in far too general terms. There are all kinds of theories， used by all kinds of people in all kinds of contexts. A theory of truth and discourse does not have the same relationship to politics as a theory of global capitalism or womens oppression. In the same way， the word “politics” means different things at different times， in different situations. In the 1930s a political play was likely to be about class， or fascism. Now a political play may be about AIDS， or race or gender or sexuality. To the question “Is theory political？”， I think all one can reply is “It depends”. To me， what we cannot do is to provide a guarantee or to “impose a demand for absoluteness […] upon a concept”（Cavell， “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy”. Must We Mean What We Say？ 88）， to quote Stanley Cavell. I do not want something metaphysical， something melodramatic as the idea of a guarantee or absoluteness. To ask about the “politics of theory” is not the only way to think about the political value of intellectual work. Nor is the demand for absoluteness confined to contemporary literary theorists. The poststructuralists have excessive faith in the power of theory to put everything politically right， as if every kind of oppression would vanish if only we could elaborate the right theory of subjectivity， or discourse， or truth. I dont agree with that. I agree with Beauvoirs “I take words and the truth to be of value” （Moi， Sexual/Textual Politics： Feminist Literary Theory 183）which enables us to discuss the relationship between theory and politics in ordinary， everyday terms， and not in the empty terms of metaphysics. So I think it is part of the life of intellectuals working in the humanities to ask not simply what intellectuals in general can do， but what we can do that people from other disciplines cant do better， and under what circumstances we can do them. I also think we shouldnt give up the thought that words and writing can have political significance. It is part of intellectual or theorist life constantly to ask about what the political， ethical and existential value of ones work is. What I am trying to say is that that there doesnt have to be one answer to that， let alone one answer to be given once and for all， on behalf of all intellectuals. And to justify our speaking about theory， to make our theory politically committed， all we can do is to say what we have to say， and take responsibility for our words. In short， we have to mean what we say. My passionate advocacy for feminist anti-essentialism was at once intellectual and political， and actually did change some peoples minds.

Xu： You also emphasized the obvious political duty of feminism in Sexual/Textual Politics： Feminist Literary Theory. How do you think of feminism as a political project？

Moi： Feminism is the struggle for freedom， justice and equality for women. If you call your work feminist theory or feminist criticism， surely you have some version of that political project. If， on the other hand， you think the current situation is just wonderful and that we have freedom now， and so on， then you dont need feminism and you shouldnt call yourself a feminist. Thats the difference between simply working on women and working on a feminist project. If you think everything is fine for women， you dont need to be a feminist. Feminism is about changing things for the better.

Xu： You once said， the word “woman” has been causing trouble for some feminist theorists， so that many academic feminists truly feel that it is difficult to speak of “women” except in inverted commas to avoid essentialism and other theoretical sins. Your famous essay “Feminism of Freedom： Simone de Beauvoir” aims to liberate the word “woman” from the binary “straitjacket” in which contemporary sex and gender theory imprisons it， so as to recuperate it for feminist use. （Moi， What Is a Woman？ and Other Essays 34）Could you please give us some explanations？ And we are wondering in what way your definition of “woman” is different from that of other theorists such as Judith Butler？

Moi： I think that we shouldnt try to police the use of the word “woman”！ The meaning of the word depends on who is speaking， to whom they are speaking， what we are talking about. You are responsible for your words （and I for mine）. I believe it is not a good idea for feminists to lay down requirement for how other people should speak. I would just rather ask you to speak the way you want to speak and take responsibility for your words. If I dont agree with you， I will tell you. Maybe our discussion can be illuminating for both of us. The reference to a “theoretical straitjacket” refers to the way a certain poststructuralist theory limits your freedom， forces you to follow the requirements of the theory， rather than your own perception of reality. Theory should help us understand the world， its task is not to lay down requirements for how we should think and speak. If it does， it becomes a kind of tyranny. There are all kinds of contexts in which there is nothing wrong with the word ‘woman， and there are all kinds of situations in which people will say sexist things about women. Our task as feminists is to point to sexism， criticize it， explain why we object. You cant tell people not to say “woman”， as if the very word is intrinsically bad. For me there the problem isnt the word ‘woman， but theories of femininity. Section five of the essay called ‘What Is a Woman is about femininity which is usually defined as some set of qualities that pertain to women. I think thats where the trouble starts. According to Simone de Beauvoir， there is no femininity common to all women. It is known as a “mysterious and threatened reality” or “femininity is in danger” in Beauvoirs words （Beauvoir， The Second Sex 13）. On this point， Judith Butler， Beauvoir， and I are in total agreement. There is no quarrel there. Although I am very much in favor of psychoanalytical theories， I object to psychoanalytical femininity theories， which usually become very traditionalist in the end. Butlers theories presuppose the conservative clichés she wants to undermine. The “norm” is taken to consist of the conservative， clichéd notion that when people say women， they must mean traditional， feminine， heterosexual， submissive and so on. Sexist and heterosexist attitudes make up the norm， which feminists， queer activists and other radicals then must work to undermine. I dont think the world looks like that. Butlers theory lacks space， there is only the norm and the subversion of the norm. What about all the exceptions， the people who never conform to the traditional femininity norm and arent really subversive either？ We need a more multiple and free understanding of what women can be like. However， Butler and I have the same utopian aim， to free people to be women or men or transgender in whatever way is meaningful to them. In the “Afterword to Sexual/Textual Politics” （2002） I wrote that “any theory that sets out to define womens essence or womens nature is detrimental to the goal of feminism： to obtain freedom and equality for women.” （Moi， Sexual/Textual Politics 175） Feminism needs to acknowledge womens obvious and striking differences. These differences comprise but are not reducible to differences of race and sexual orientation. To me， as to Simone de Beauvoir and most other people， a woman is a human being with the usual biological and anatomical sexual characteristics. The point of arguing strongly against essentialism is to stop sexist generalizations about women. It is not to deny that women exist. To avoid essentialism and biological determinism all we need to do is to deny that biological facts justify social norms.

Xu： It is insightful that you compare “the Poststructuralist Theory of Language” to a “l(fā)inguistic straitjacket”. Does this idea show your turn from post-structuralism？

Moi： Yes. To recapitulate， I think poststructuralist theories of language leave no space for human agency. Thats why they are a straitjacket. There just is not enough room to move in these theories， that they are giving far too much power to the abstract notion of language and discourse. I have reached these conclusions because I have been reading Wittgenstein and Cavell for fifteen years.

Xu： Not long ago， I read your essay “‘I Am Not a Woman Writer： About Women， Literature and Feminist Theory Today”. You also spoke about it in Nanjing University and Beijing University in China. What are you trying to tell the Chinese audience by such a catching claim？ In what way is it different from Beauvoirs somewhat both personal and scholarly statement “I am a woman”？

Moi： I wanted to show that there are good reasons why some women want to say something like that. From feminist point of view， you might react by saying how horrible， why does she deny that she is a woman？ What I am trying to show is that there are provocations that can force you into an unpalatable dilemma， a choice between having either to assert or deny that you are a woman. Either way you end up sounding idiotic. The whole dilemma is a symptom of sexism. The paper tries to develop these insights into a diagnosis of how sexism works. I am also trying to say that the feminist theory needs to take a new look at the question of the woman writer， to rethink the whole question of what it means to be a woman writer. Feminist theory has often insisted that women writers must identify themselves as women writers. I am trying to show that the question is more complex.

Xu： If a woman writer says that “I am a woman writer”， it is also a response to a provocation？

Moi： Yes， because normally you dont have to declare your sex， except in passports and on drivers license and so on. A woman writer always writes as the woman she is， not just as “a woman”， in some generic and general sense. Women are put in a position where they have to choose between calling themselves a woman and a writer， a man never has to choose between calling himself a man and calling himself as a writer.

Xu： Sex/Gender differences is a controversial issue of modern （feminist） scholarship. To some， defining woman will fall into the snare of essentialism. Through the essays in Sex， Gender and the Body， you provided a new way of thinking about questions concerning the body and language， and worked through the impasse between the biological definition of sex and the cultural definition of gender. Could you please explain briefly on your thinking of the conflicts between ontology and constructionism？ How can we find a way out of it？

Moi： For a long time the idea was that we have to choose between essentialism and constructionism. In my essay “What is a Woman”， I try to show that there is a third way. The problem is badly formulated， we dont have to choose either essence or construction. And regardless of what we think about bodies， biology cannot justify social norms. We cant prove to someone that they should treat women as equals by saying that “woman” is a social construction. We have to appeal to other values — justice， equality， freedom — to do that. My point in the new essay is that once you are taken to be a specific sex or gender， no theory of becoming or construction solves the question of what we do next.

Xu： Helene Cixous， Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva are the three leading figures of contemporary French feminists. To which of these three do you feel closest？

Moi： Any one who has read Sexual / Textual Politics knows that I preferred Kristeva， because she was refusing all kinds of femininity theory. Unlike Cixous and Irigaray who， while they dont want to be essentialists，do embrace a certain kind of femininity theory that I find highly problematic. They do say femininity can be found in men， too， but their definition of femininity is still quite dubious. The work all three of them did in the 1970s and 1980s remains foundational for anyone who wants to study the subject.

Xu： The feminist literature and criticism in Chinas mainland and Taiwan has developed vigorously over the past 20 years. Many young women writers， influenced by Cixouss theory of “?criture féminine”， have had feminine writings on the issues of body， language and desire. But these writings are also criticized as a kind of self-indulgent writings. They express the feminist protest on the one hand， but cater to the patriarchal culture and commercial economy on the other. We are wondering how you perceive “?criture féminine” and the consequent problems？ What are your suggestions and expectations for these contemporary Chinese women writers？

Moi： Cixous theories fall into the trap of thinking that there is just one way of being a woman writer. There is a strong stereotyping of womens writing there， and a lot of overlapping with quite traditional notions of femininity： the woman as bodily， fluid， sensitive， nervous， the eroticism of the body and the writing. Thats not very different from what patriarchy always says about women. I dont know about the Chinese version， so I certainly cant give them any advice. But in Western versions of this kind of writing， I always feel that I am drowning in a flood of traditional femininity. I would like women writers to talk honestly about their experiences， and not worry so much about whether those experiences are feminine or not.

Xu： The problem lies in some works undisguised description of eroticism that is against the sex taboo in conventional Chinese culture.

Moi： Of course， it is difficult. On the one hand， you want to give women the right to express sexuality freely; on the other hand， it is also true， at least in the Western patriarchal sexist tradition， that woman is taken to be the sex and man is not， i.e. the female body is sexualized in a way that the mans is not. There is a dilemma here， for what is the option for these women writers？ What choices do they have？ Should they pretend not to be women？ If they want to write about their bodily experiences， my opinion is that they should do so， but we should also remember thats not all it means to be a woman writer. Some women writers want to write about their mental experiences， or their work in the world， thats just as good. You shouldnt have to give up writing about your femininity if that interests you; but on the other hand you shouldnt suggest that this is something that ought to interest all women， or that all women have in common. We always get to the same dilemma， feminine or human.

Xu： We would also like to know about your attitude towards contemporary radical lesbian feminist writing and criticism？ Do you think that this has gone too far？

Moi： It is impossible to say anything sensible about all lesbian literature in general. Also， I dont actually know contemporary lesbian writing very well. A book I used in my classes， and really loved is Stone Butch Blues， a novel by Leslie Feinberg. It is a story about a woman who grows up looking very masculine， very butch. The novel shows how her subjectivity is shaped by the discrimination and violence she experiences in a homophobic society， and by the love she finds among lesbians. It is an existential book about how she becomes she is because of the kind of body she inhabits. There is no such thing as a lesbian novel or the lesbian novel. I think there are many different types， some are good， some not.

Xu： You are very interested in the study of theory and always concerned with the interdisciplinary thoughts， and particularly the intersection between the study in literature and philosophy. But， as suggested by Paul H. Fry when he reviews the publication of Theorys Empire： An Anthology of Dissent， not many people are interested in literary theory and some scholars even attack theory as completely hostile to literary study. Howard Jennifer has also proposed the concept of fragmentation in The Fragmentation of Literary Theory. How do you respond to these criticisms？

Moi： I havent read what Fry and Jennifer have said. I have read Theorys Empire， though， which is a very conservative anthology， although it has one or two good papers in it. Basically you have to begin by asking what people mean by theory. On the whole they mean poststructuralism. To me， poststructuralism was a powerful theoretical formation that produced lots of creative works for many years， but that appears no longer to do so. I dont think you can find much original work that is truly post-structuralist any more. If， on the other hand， theory means thinking theoretically or thinking philosophically， I cant see how anyone can be against that. That would be like being against reflection and thoughtfulness. There is no such thing as one monolithic theory that we are either for or against. The people who question “theory” as such， will have to tell me what theory they want to get rid of and which ones they want to keep. In my essay “What is a Woman”， I criticized what I called “theoreticism”， the idea that if you just get your theory right， then you will automatically get your politics right. I think thats a mistake， at least when it comes to theories dealing with meaning and interpretation. Thats having too much faith in what a general theory of language or discourse can do for you.

Xu： Wendy Brown mourned over the loss of the revolutionary spirit of feminism in her 2003 essay “Feminism Unbound： Revolution. Mourning， Politics”. Do you think feminist theory is over？

Moi： Feminist theory still needs theoretical reflection. In my book on Beauvoir， first published in 1993， but now republished in a 2nd edition， with a long new introduction， there is a chapter called “Beauvoirs Utopia”. Every revolution has its utopian vision， a vision of the kind of society you want to achieve. Without that， you dont have a political movement. When theory becomes highly internal to academic discourse， it runs the risk of losing sight of the problems it is supposed to solve. Feminist theory wont be over until sexism is over.

Xu： There has been a decline of interest in literature study in both American and Chinese universities in the past decade or more， especially for undergraduate students who tend to like media， film and drama better. What do you think is the reason behind this phenomenon？ In view of the importance of literature in humanity study， could you please suggest a way out of this situation？

Moi： Here in the United States， many undergraduate students also turn away from literature. They want to study new media， film， or theory in general， rather than literary theory. And literature is just one art form. Why should we care about the arts like painting， film， literature？ Thats a question each generation has to justify afresh. One problem we have had over the past twenty years or so is that intellectuals inspired by theory have produced readings of literature that essentially consist in finding in literature the same things they have already found in the theory. Then we shouldnt be surprised when students ask： Why do we need to study literature at all？ Cant we just read the theory without the literature？ Unless you believe that literature or other arts truly can tell you something different， something new， something you cant find in the theory， there is no point in reading it.

Xu： So writers are now also faced with much more challenges than ever before？

Moi： Yes， a good writer interprets the world to us just as a good philosopher does. Thats why I say that we need to treat literature as if it had something original and important to tell us. If we dont believe that， then why read it？

Xu： Could you please tell us whether you think some social conditioning and institutional shaping of intellectual women still exist in Europe and US today？

Moi： Of course！ Sexism hasnt disappeared. Just look at the statistics. Only 18% to 20% of all full professors at Duke are women. At Harvard it is around 16%. How many women are presidents of universities？ Maybe 5%？ On the other hand， progress has been made. 25 years ago I could never have dreamt of getting the kind of job I have now. Some women have made it to the top in most professions. Old-fashioned sexism is no longer acceptable in most institutions in the West.

Xu： Finally we would like to know about your current projects. Are you conceiving different books， since you have a wide range of vision and always keep working on different writers， thinkers or theorists？

Moi： I dont like doing the same thing over again. Now I hope to work on three projects： the first， one will be about the vision of language in ordinary language philosophy compared with poststructuralism; the second is a short book about feminist theory and women writers; and the third one is a much bigger project that builds on the work I did in my book on Ibsen， Henrik Ibsen and the Birth of Modernism （2006） （which， by the way， also contains much discussion of women in European literary history）. That project is called “The Emergence of European Modernism 1870-1914”. It is about how modernism came about， about the difficulty of discovering the new and the significant when it happened， and about how we cant think without literary period concepts， although they are always created well after the fact. So right now I have three projects： one philosophical project， one which is more or less about feminist theory， and one that is really about literary history.

Xu： Thank you very much for squeezing the time out of your busy schedule to accept my interview. I believe this interview will enlighten a large number of Chinese learners and researchers concerned with the study of literature， feminist theory and literary theory. Thank you very much.

Works Cited

Cavell， Stanley. “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy.” Must We Mean What We Say？ Cambridge： Cambridge UP， 1969.

Culler， Jonathan. Literary Theory： A Very Short Introduction. Oxford and New York： Oxford UP， 1997.

De Beauvoir， Simon. The Second Sex. Trans. & ed. H. M. Parshley. London： Jonathan Cape， 1953.

Moi， Toril. “Simone de Beauvoir： The Making of an Intellectual Woman.” The Yale Journal of Criticism 4.1 （1990）： 1-23.

---. What Is a Woman？ and Other Essays. Oxford and New York： Oxford UP， 2001.

---. Sexual/Textual Politics： Feminist Literary Theory. London and New York： Routledge， 2002.

---. Sex， Gender and the Body. Oxford and New York： Oxford UP， 2005.

---. “‘I Am Not a Woman Writer： About Women， Literature and Feminist Theory Today.” Feminist Theory 9.3 （2008）： 259-71.

---. Simone de Beauvoir： The Making of an Intellectual Woman. Oxford and New York： Oxford UP， 2008.

責(zé)任編輯：宮桂