Tang Junyi’s Interpretation of Zhu Xi’s Theory of ‘Li Existingbefore Qi’ and His Refutation of Alternative Theories

Chen Yongbao

Abstract： Controversies exist over various interpretations of Zhu Xis theory that li exists before qi， owing to Zhu Xis theory itself as well as its development by later scholars. This issue has found its most vivid expression in interchange between Chinese and Western thoughts in modern times， demonstrating the conflict between the two philosophical traditions. Feng Youlan and Jin Yuelin， resorting to Western logic， define the precedence of li over qi in Zhu Xis theory as a “l(fā)ogical priority”; however， this definition is hardly satisfactory to Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. Tang refutes this “l(fā)ogical priority” and proposes a new path to interpreting Zhu Xis li–qi theory， contributing to a more complete understanding of Zhus Neo-Confucian philosophy.

Keywords： Zhu Xi， li existing before qi， metaphysics， logicIntroduction [Refer to page 72 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]

Tang Junyi 唐君毅 （1909–1978） rarely discusses Zhu Xis 朱熹 （1130–1200） philosophy specifically. According to Yang Cho-hon 楊祖漢， Tangs treatments of Zhu amount to roughly these five： “On Master Zhus Theory of ‘Li Existing before Qi： Master Zhus Path to Moral Metaphysics” [朱子理先氣后論疏釋——朱子道德形上學(xué)之進路] （1947）， “An In-Depth Study on the Differences and Similarities between Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan” [朱陸異同探源] （1965）， “Rethinking the Yangming School and the Differences and Similarities between Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan” [陽明學(xué)與朱陸異同重辯] （1969）， and the chapters “An Inquiry into the Supreme Ultimate” [原太極] and “An Inquiry into Human Nature” [原性篇] in his Inquiries into Chinese Philosophy [中國哲學(xué)原論]. Though short in length， Tangs discussions bring a new perspective and profound interpretation to the study of Zhu Xi which cannot be overlooked.

Most notably， Tang gives a relatively complete account of Zhus theory of “l(fā)i 理 （principle） existing before qi 氣 （material force）.” Tang says， “Zhu Xi says li exists before qi， by which he means that li exists metaphysically prior to qi， not that li exists before qi in time. Also， Zhu is not explicit about this logical priority of li over qi.” On these words， Yang Cho-hon comments that

The principle of nature， the principle of Heaven， and the principle of ceaseless creation discussed by Master Zhu and other Song–Ming Neo-Confucian thinkers are the principle that enables every being to exist and not， as Feng Youlan and Jin Yuelin believe， a universal category abstracted through Western logic.

Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 （1909–1995） borrows this view from Tang Junyi. In The Substance of the Mind and the Substance of Nature [心體與性體]， published after the passage from Tang above， Mou says， “There is no problem in saying li exists before qi. ‘Before here just means ‘fundamentally. What is fundamental ought to exist before other things. So li enjoys both logical and metaphysical priority over qi.” Mou also writes， “The principle of nature spoken of by the Confucian thinkers of the Song–Ming period is the principle of being or the principle of realization， not the principle of formation.” Obviously， Tang and Mou have taken a new approach to Zhu Xis theory of li existing before qi， thinking li takes metaphysical precedence over qi. It can also be seen that this issue had become a major concern of scholars at that time.

How the Issue Arose [73]

The Beginning [73]

Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 （1895–1990） in his New Learning of Principle [新理學(xué)] and Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 （1895–1984） in his On the Dao [論道] gave their explanations on Zhu Xis theory of li existing before qi. Tang Junyi also published two papers on this subject， “A Brief Discussion on the Spirit of Song–Ming Neo-Confucianism” [宋明理學(xué)之精神論略] （1946） and “Master Zhus Theory of ‘Li Existing before Qi： Master Zhus Path to Moral Metaphysics” （1947）. Since that time， debate on the issue has never ceased. “Zhang Dejun and Wang Enyang from the China Metaphysical Institute wrote articles to comment on and criticize” Tangs view. Tang responded， “In fact， I wrote the article to elaborate the thoughts of the ancients， not to express my own ideas.” However， it is obvious that Tangs reply conceals his real intention.

Tang Junyi disagrees with Feng and Jin on the grounds that they “interpret li in Song–Ming Confucianism as a universal category arrived at through logical analysis， interpreting qi as matter or energy， and interpreting the priority of li over qi as logical priority”; what Tang really aims at is the rectification of Fengs and Jins distorting effects on the studies of Zhu Xis philosophy. Tang admits， “The two articles are not flawless， but they do make some progress on this issue.” This is the point of departure for Tangs proposition that li has metaphysical priority over qi.

A brief discussion of Fengs and Jins theories is necessary for a better account of Tangs approval and criticism.

Feng Youlans Interpretation [74]

Feng Youlans interpretation of Zhu Xis theory of li existing before qi first appears in New Learning of Principle. In the second chapter of that book， Feng discusses Zhu Xis view on time and space and on the relationship between li and qi， his treatise exerting much influence on the thought of Tang Junyi. There are two points in Fengs theory which are worthy of attention.

First， Feng states， “In the old learning of principle， the precedence of li over qi does not deserve to be treated philosophically， or it is an issue of little importance.” Feng makes a basic judgment that the precedence of li over qi in time is a pseudo-problem，” whether the time referred to is time in the ordinary sense or “real time.” That is， it is unsound to approach Zhu Xis proposition from the perspective of time. Although Feng does not explicitly state the logical priority of li over qi， this idea is pronounced in another book of his， A History of Chinese Philosophy [中國哲學(xué)史]， where he writes that

According to Zhus system， there must be the li for any given thing before the concrete instance of that thing can exist. So without the li， the concrete instance of the thing does not exist. As to the question of the priority between li and qi （the latter regarded as a whole， rather than as differentiated to form separate objects）， this can be discussed from two angles. From a matter-of-fact point of view， it may be said that， as soon as there is li， there is also qi. This is the implication of the idea that “movement and quiescence have no starting point， and yin and yang have no beginning.” From a strictly logical point of view， however， “one is forced to admit that li has priority.”

Also， in A New History of Chinese Philosophy [中國哲學(xué)史新編]， Feng says that

According to Zhu Xi， “There are li and qi between heaven and earth.” Zhu Xis words not only illustrate the difference between li and qi as distinct categories but also show how he comes to grasp the distinction between them. To put it philosophically， Zhu first makes a logical analysis of things in general and then derives his understanding from such an analysis.

Fengs interpretation is intended to solve two problems. First， Feng makes it clear that the priority of li over qi in Zhu Xis thought is by no means temporal. Second， Feng seeks to construe the relationship between li and qi with recourse to Western philosophy. Admittedly， Fengs effort in this regard lays the foundation for understanding Zhu Xis li and qi in Western philosophical terms， but Fengs claim， in this framework， about the logical priority of li over qi， cannot gain Tang Junyis approval and provokes Tangs subsequent exploration on this issue.

Jin Yuelins Interpretation [75]

Jin Yuelins book On the Dao concerns logic， reflecting on his early reading of Western philosophers such as David Hume and Bertrand Russell. The structure of the book betrays Jins endeavor to establish connections between Chinese philosophy and Western learning， especially logic， adopting an approach typical of comparative philosophy. With regard to Zhu Xis theory of li existing before qi， Jin writes in the preface of this book， “That what is real cannot fail to be is probably what Zhu Xi means when he says li and qi are inseparable， or in the words of Aristotle， matter and form are inseparable.” It is obvious that Jin is making a comparison between Zhu Xis li and qi and Aristotles matter and form.

However， unlike Feng Youlan， Jin is not explicit about the relationship between li and qi; he takes a roundabout approach， trying to use the relationship between shi 式and neng 能 to account for the relationship between li and qi rather than equating the former relationship with the latter. But from his treatment of the subject， we can basically see Jins position on the relationship between li and qi. It is true that throughout the book Jins answer to the issue is not definite， and it can even be said that Jin does not address the issue substantially; however， most assuredly there is evidence in the book that Jin seeks to construe Zhu Xis li and qi through logical analysis. Logical analysis is used amply to illustrate Zhu Xis concepts， such as wuji 無極， taiji 太極， qi， li， qing 情， xing 性， ti 體， yong 用， and dao 道， and in consequence， the precedence of li over qi is also accounted for logically.

Although in On the Dao Jin does not give a lengthy discussion of the precedence of li over qi， Fengs influence on him is obvious. Still， the only conclusion drawn from an examination of Jins view on shi and neng is that Jin believes that li and qi “cannot be understood by prioritizing one over the other.” For Tang Junyi， Jin probably can offer no clear and adequate account of the relationship between li and qi; moreover， Jins choice of logical analysis in interpreting Zhu Xis theory is the last thing Tang will accept.

The Development of Tang Junyis Interpretation [76]

Clarifying the Context [76]

According to Tang， previous interpretations of Zhu Xis theory can be classified into four types. “First， the precedence of li over qi in time. . . . Second， the precedence of li over qi in human cognition of objects. . . . Third， the epistemological precedence of li over qi. . . . Fourth， the logical precedence of li over qi.”

However， Tang rejects all four interpretations. First， he claims， it is unsound to claim that li exists before qi in time. This view has been questioned by many and assumed to be invalid， but not surprisingly， it is first rejected by Tang. Second， the spontaneous precedence of li over qi in human cognition involves the concept of universal category （共相）， and on this issue Tangs comment is that “Zhu Xis li and qi are innovative philosophical concepts proposed to account for the being of the universe instead of addressing the spontaneous order in human cognition.” Third， with regard to the epistemological precedence of li over qi， Tang argues that the interpretation of Zhu Xis li and qi in terms of Kantian epistemology， especially a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge， clearly “bears little relevance to Zhu Xis thought” and is hence quite arbitrary. Fourth， the logical priority of li over qi， Tang contends， is “an easy interpretation without delving deep into the subject.” As a consequence， Tang proposed his own theory， namely that of metaphysical precedence of li over qi.

Tang writes as follows：

Since we cannot take Zhu Xis idea of the precedence of li over qi to be precedence in time， in the order of human cognition， epistemological precedence， or logical priority， we can only interpret this precedence in Zhu Xis own terms. That is， the precedence of li over qi is metaphysical precedence， or li exists before qi metaphysically.

Yang Cho-hon explains that

After establishing the metaphysical priority of li over qi， Mr. Tang thinks this priority can be achieved neither by analyzing the logical order of concepts nor by deriving universal category from the observation and experience of things. That which enjoys logical priority may not have metaphysical priority， for logical priority depends on the relationship between concepts in terms of inclusion while metaphysical priority deals with the actuality of the concepts referents.

Yangs explanation is very clear， but it raises the question of whether the logical priority spoken of by Feng Youlan and Jin Yuelin means priority in formal logic. Or does this logic have broader implications？ These question need to be answered.

Refutation of the Logical Priority of Li over Qi [77]

Tang Junyi says， “That which has logical priority means that which is necessarily presupposed or included by a concept. . . . If a concept has logical priority， it is subject more to extensional definition than to intensional definition. Therefore it refers to a wide range of things but says little about the thing per se.” As a result， Tang thinks construing the priority of li over qi as logical priority may be “far from truth.”

According to Tang， the logical priority of li over qi tends to result in a situation where “saying li takes precedence over qi amounts to saying li takes precedence over wu 物 （thing）.” In Zhu Xis philosophy， qi and wu are definitely different concepts in both denotation and connotation. The convergence of qi and wu is a far cry from Zhu Xis statement that “l(fā)i and qi are different but they mix and get unified.” Moreover， Tang notes that the identification of qi with wu is an inevitable outcome of establishing the logical priority of li over qi， with qi referring to qi as principle already realized. However， “the qi as principle already realized is wu， and it means more than qi per se.” In other words， “qi per se cannot be confused with qi as already realized principle，” and “the blame for this confusion does not lie with Zhu Xi.” If the logical priority of li over qi results in equating qi with wu， the logical priority is indeed “far from truth.”

Also， Tang says that “[g]iven that A has logical priority over B， A must first be affirmed before B is affirmed. However， following this， we do not know whether A is actual， nor can we conclude that the affirmation of the actuality of A directly leads to the affirmation of the actuality of B.” As we can see， Tang refutes the logical interpretation of li and qi by the standard of actuality. Tang proceeds， “Logical priority in its purest form has little to do with actuality. That is， even though two concepts have no relevance to actuality， it is sensible enough to say that one concept has logical priority over the other.” Evidently， logical priority proves ineffective in giving a proper account of the actual state of things. Tang contends that， compared with logical priority， metaphysical priority is better suited to Zhu Xis conception of li as actual principle; in other words， Tang takes the li that exists prior to qi to be real and actual， and it follows that metaphysical priority is more appropriate in “addressing the real and actual state of things.”

Finally， Tang uses the “sense of [moral] obligation” to refute the logical priority of li over qi. He asserts that

In the case of a sense of obligation， the consciousness of the decree of li exists before the consciousness of the movement of qi responding to the decree; however， it is mistaken to assume that li exists before qi chronologically in this process. In the case of a sense of obligation， the consciousness of li and that of the movement of xinqi 心氣 （vital forces of the mind） following li . . . take place simultaneously.

In Tangs theory， the decree of li exists first in a sense of obligation; however， li which exists before qi in Zhu Xis philosophy is li in consciousness， a term used to highlight the simultaneous arising of li and qi in the consciousness of the mind. As can be seen， Tang emphasizes the co-existence of li and qi in Zhu Xis thought. On the basis of this idea， Tang continues， “The priority cannot be logical priority. Li expresses itself as an ought， resembling a decree issued from above. The decree is to transform xinqi which previously did not conform to li into xinqi which conforms to li. . . . The xinqi which conforms to li is guided into existence by li.” As Tang views li as an ought， he is illustrating Zhu Xis li in terms of gongfu theory and ontology， betraying a shift to the learning of creation and recreation. This is the destination toward which Tangs discussions are heading， which also testifies to the innovativeness of Tangs interpretation.

The Metaphysical Priority of Li [79]

Tang Junyi says that Zhu Xis proposition that li exists before qi is “not a general proposition summarized from experience because li and qi are not objects experienced in daily life but metaphysical concepts.” That is to say， the metaphysical priority Tang speaks of has to do with moral metaphysics rather than metaphysics in its ordinary sense. Specifically， “Zhu Xis metaphysics is one that is constructed through moral practice，” and this view serves as the foundation of Tangs interpretation of Zhu Xis proposition. “A metaphysical proposition is one that says something about the ultimate reality of the universe.” Regarding metaphysical priority， Tang writes that

To say that li has metaphysical priority over qi， in todays terms， means that in terms of the ultimate reality of the universe， li which is beyond shapes and forms is more actual， and qi， which is within shapes and forms， derives its actuality from the actuality of li. When we talk about the ultimate reality of the universe， we should first affirm the actuality of li which is above shapes and forms， and then we can affirm the actuality of qi which is within shapes and forms.

As can be seen， the concept of actuality is central to Tangs interpretation of the relationship between li and qi， and it is the major tool Tang uses to deconstruct Feng and Jins logical priority. Tang says， “Judging by the standard of actuality， the actuality of li is more fundamental， and the actuality of qi is derived from and accords with the actuality of li.” He also adds that

Zhu Xi says li exists before qi， and what he really means is that the affirmation of the actuality of li precedes the affirmation of the actuality of qi. The actuality of qi depends on the actuality of li. Therefore， Zhu Xi often calls li “actual principle” to emphasize the actuality and realness of li. Zhu also says nothing is more actual than li. So it is abundantly clear that the priority li has over qi is metaphysical priority.

On the basis of this view， Tang designates Zhu Xis metaphysics as “metaphysics constructed through moral practice.” However， it should be noted that metaphysical priority and logical priority are not utterly unrelated.

After clarifying “priority in moral metaphysics” as the standard， Tang proposes li as an ought （as mentioned earlier） and uses this theory to explain Zhu Xis thought， highlighting the “oughtness” which is ingrained in Zhus li. Tang says， “No sooner is li with its oughtness affirmed than a decree is given that we should transform our qi， to get rid of the old qi and generate the qi which is in accord with li. Without getting rid of the old qi， we cannot generate the new qi.” Tangs words also explain Zhus idea that “l(fā)i generates qi.” Given that li generates qi， it follows that li exists before qi. Tang thus concludes that

Upon reflection， li is realized through qi， and this realization is preceded by qi per se; the generation of qi per se is also preceded by the actuality of li per se. Therefore， the actuality of li per se is a precondition for the generation of qi per se. Moreover， affirming the actuality of li per se is a precondition for affirming the actuality of the particular li and qi. As a consequence， metaphysical priority is accorded to the actuality of li， from which the actuality of qi is derived. So it is right to say that li exists before qi and wrong to say that qi exists before li.

So far， Tang has finished his interpretation of Zhu Xis theory that li exists before qi by construing it from the perspective of moral metaphysics. Evidently， Tangs metaphysical priority is a significant departure from previous interpretations espousing logical priority.

Conclusion and Further Reflection [80]

This paper mainly discusses Tang Junyis interpretation of Zhu Xis theory of li existing before qi. In general， the controversy over this proposition is owed to three factors. First， later thinkers disagree with the priority of li over qi， especially followers of the Yangming School and the Qing scholars. Second， those in the Ming and Qing dynasties who espouse Zhu Xis theory are confused about the meaning of the priority of li over qi. Third， the distinctions and commonalities between lis intrinsic and extrinsic existence need further explanation. To clarify the issue， Feng Youlan and Jin Yuelin propose to “interpret the priority of li over qi in Zhu Xi as logical priority，” but this logical priority is not to Tang Junyis satisfaction. As a consequence， Tang seeks to settle the issue by proposing that “l(fā)i as an ought exists before qi， through which li is realized.” In fact， Tangs approach is to “follow todays way of thinking to smooth away the difficulties of Zhu Xis thought，” and it shows the aspiration of Contemporary New Confucianism to renovate the tradition by returning to its roots.

According to Yang Cho-hon， Tang Junyi “construes Zhu Xis remark from the perspective of a persons moral awareness and sense of obligation and， following this line of thought， proves the priority of li over qi. This approach is appropriate and fits with Neo-Confucian doctrines.” It can be concluded that Tang places the theory of li existing before qi in the context of moral metaphysics， yet he does not employ Mou Zongsans notion of the principle of being; instead Tang interprets Zhu Xis li as the moral principle， or as an ought， or as human nature. At the same time， Tang interprets qi as xin 心 （mind）， echoing Zhu Xis thought that “xin is the soul of qi.” Yang summarizes Tangs thought in one remark： “Zhu Xis metaphysics is metaphysics constructed through moral practice.”

However， we still have reservations about Tang Junyis interpretation. Is his theory true to Zhu Xis original meaning？ Tang himself writes， “Many of the arguments presented in my text are not already expressed by Zhu Xi; it is just that they ought to be implicit in his system. Proof text for what I have written here cannot be located point by point in Zhus own words， so I do not need to quote a word from Zhu.” Is Zhu Xis li which takes priority over qi Mous principle of being， Tangs principle as an ought， or both？ In other words， is the priority of li over qi in Zhu Xi metaphysical， epistemological， ethical， or all three？ This question is in need of further exploration. Moreover， Tangs metaphysical priority is not without problems. First， is there really a big difference between metaphysical priority and logical priority？ Second， can Tangs interpretation stand the test of future challenges？ Third， will metaphysical priority become another priority in the order of theorizing， thus deviating from the theory of ceaseless creation which Tang constantly uses to explain the principle as an ought？ These questions need to be answered.

From the foregoing， we may attempt a rudimentary evaluation of Tang Junyis interpretation： in fact， Tang does not try to disclose Zhu Xis exact meaning of li existing before qi; rather， he has found a new way to interpret this remark. Zhu Xi himself has made various comments on this remark， giving rise to the controversy among later scholars. As a consequence， Tang Junyi， Feng Youlan， Jin Yuelin， Mou Zongsan， and Yang Cho-hon approach the issue with different perspectives and understandings， all of which are reasonable to a certain extent. Also， the very fact that later scholars disagree on this issue also indicates conflicts in Zhu Xis own views on the priority of li over qi.

Translated by Hou Jian