網(wǎng)絡(luò)與羞恥心

By+Firmin+DeBrabander

Theres a well-known contradiction in the way many of us behave online， which is this： we know were being watched all the time， and pay lip service to the evils of surveillance by Google and the government.1 But the bounds of whats considered too personal， revealing or banal to be uploaded to an app or shared with a circle of social media “followers” seems to shrink by the day.

I moan about the lack of privacy， for example， and yet I willingly and routinely trade it for convenience. I am no longer forced to take my chances on a restaurant and guess which one is best； Yelp will tell me and then escort me to its front door.2 I no longer run the risk of unforeseen delays on public transport； Google Maps will inform me of the fastest route to my destination， and， in a pinch3， an Uber can get me there via any number of hidden by-roads. I no longer need to remember my friends birthdays； Facebook will nudge4 me， and invariably lure me to post an update to remind people I exist. To avail myself of5 these applications， all I have to do is make my location， habits and beliefs transparent to their parent companies whenever they choose to check in on me.

So whats going on？ “Visibility is a trap，” wrote the French philosopher Michel Foucault6 in Discipline and Punish： the Birth of the Prison （1975）. What he meant was that allowing oneself to be watched， and learning to watch others， is both seductive and dangerous. He drew upon Jeremy Benthams 18th-century plans for a “Panopticon”， a prison in which inmates are observed from a central tower manned by an invisible occupant，7 his watchful eye seeing but unseen. The idea was that the prisoners would internalize the presence of the spectral watchman， whether or not anyone was actually inside， and behave of their own accord.8

According to Foucault， the dynamics of the Panopticon bore an uncanny resemblance to how people self-monitor in society at large.9 In the presence of ever-watchful witnesses， he said， physical coercion10 is no longer necessary. People police themselves. They do not know what the observers are registering at any given moment， what they are looking for， exactly， or what the punishments are for disobedience. But the imagination keeps them pliant11. In these circumstances， Foucault claimed， the architecture of surveillances become perniciously subtle and seamless，12 so “l(fā)ight” as to be scarcely noticeable.

Individuals not only accept this form of discipline， but it soon becomes invisible to them， and they willingly perpetuate13 it.

Foucaults central claim is that such monitoring is worrisome， not just because of what corporations and states might do with our data， but because the act of watching is itself a devastating exercise of power. It has the capacity to influence behaviour and compel conformity and complicity，14 without our fully realising it.

But somethings not right here. The internet has no centre； we dont need hard evidence of a conspiracy15 between companies and governments to know that we are seen online. We seem to be surveilled from everywhere and nowhere， and yet the self-display continues. Have we been so thoroughly disciplined that the guards have taken away the watchtower， or is some other dynamic at work？

Social media provides a public space that often operates more like a private venue， where many people express themselves knowing that those watching will agree—or， particularly for internet trolls， in the belief that there they wont suffer the consequences of what they say online， as if protected by the mediation of technology. Having a smartphone and access to the internet does not automatically equip us with the tools necessary for effective and respectful collaboration， negotiation and speech.

Plato would be alarmed by the lack of shame online. He thought that shame was a crucial emotion， indispensable16 for doing philosophy and acting morally. Shame presupposes that we ought to know better but flout the rules regardless.17 This is precisely Platos point about moral knowledge： we already know the right way to live a just and fulfilling life， but are constantly diverted from that noble aim. For Plato， then， shame is a force that helps us resist the urge to conform when we know its wrong to do so. Shame helps us be true to ourselves and to heed18 the moral knowledge within. A man without shame， Plato says， is a slave to desire—for material goods， power， fame， respect. Such desire is tyrannical19 because， by its nature， it cannot be satisfied.

眾所周知，很多人在網(wǎng)絡(luò)上的表現(xiàn)都是矛盾的。一方面，我們知道自己時刻被監(jiān)視，口頭上認(rèn)同谷歌和政府的監(jiān)視行為有著種種弊端。另一方面，當(dāng)我們不斷把過于私人、暴露或平庸乏味的信息上傳到應(yīng)用軟件或分享給社交媒體上的“粉絲”時，我們對于隱私的界定似乎越來越開放。

比如說，我擔(dān)心失去隱私，卻自愿并習(xí)慣性地借此來換取便利。選擇餐廳的時候，我可以不用碰運氣；Yelp會告訴我哪家最好，并把我?guī)У讲蛷d門口。我再不用擔(dān)心公共交通突發(fā)的延誤；谷歌地圖會告訴我最快的路線，必要時可以優(yōu)步叫車送我到目的地，再偏僻的小路它都認(rèn)識。我無需再記住朋友們的生日；Facebook會給我發(fā)推送，一如既往地誘使我發(fā)一條狀態(tài)，告訴大家我還活著。為了利用這些應(yīng)用軟件，我需要做的只是把自己的位置、習(xí)慣乃至信仰對這些軟件的母公司透明公開，以便其隨時調(diào)出我的信息。

這是一種怎樣的情形？“可見度是一個陷阱，”法國哲學(xué)家米歇爾·?？略凇兑?guī)訓(xùn)與懲罰：監(jiān)獄的誕生》（1975）中寫道。他的意思是，讓自己處于監(jiān)視之中，并嘗試監(jiān)視他人，是極具誘惑力而又非常危險的。他引用杰里米·邊沁在18世紀(jì)提出的“圓形監(jiān)獄”概念：在這種監(jiān)獄里，犯人被藏身于中央塔樓上的看守者監(jiān)視著，看守可以看見犯人，犯人卻看不見他。其用意就在于使犯人心存看守者無時不在的想法，這樣不管塔樓上有人沒人，犯人都會老老實實的。

?？抡J(rèn)為，圓形監(jiān)獄的動態(tài)與整個社會內(nèi)人們的自我監(jiān)督有著驚人的相似。在他看來，因為時刻處于監(jiān)督之下，對身體的強制約束就沒必要了。人們會自己管好自己。即使不知道監(jiān)視者會在哪一刻記錄些什么，不知道他們究竟在尋找什么，也不知道違規(guī)的懲罰是什么，但是被監(jiān)視的想象就構(gòu)成了約束。?？抡J(rèn)為，這種監(jiān)視機制相當(dāng)無跡可尋，些微到令人難以察覺。

人們不僅接受了這種規(guī)訓(xùn)的形式，而且逐漸忽視了它的存在，自愿將其延續(xù)下去。

福柯的中心論點在于，這樣的監(jiān)視是讓人擔(dān)憂的。不只是因為公司和政府會利用我們的個人數(shù)據(jù)干點什么，而是因為監(jiān)視舉動本身就是一種權(quán)力的濫用。它會在不知不覺中影響人們的行為，強制人們遵守并與之共謀。

但這里有點兒不對勁?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)并沒有一個明確的中心；即使沒有確鑿的證據(jù)，我們也很清楚公司和政府合謀在網(wǎng)絡(luò)上對我們進行了監(jiān)視。我們似乎無時無刻不被監(jiān)視，但自我展示依然持續(xù)進行著。是因為我們被規(guī)訓(xùn)得太過徹底，看守塔里已經(jīng)不再需要監(jiān)視者，還是有其他因素在作祟？

社交媒體提供的公共空間更像是一個私人場所，因為人們在發(fā)表自己意見的時候，認(rèn)為監(jiān)控者會同意自己的觀點——尤其是那些網(wǎng)絡(luò)噴子，他們認(rèn)為自己無需承擔(dān)網(wǎng)絡(luò)發(fā)言的后果，因為技術(shù)調(diào)節(jié)會保護他們。持有一部手機并且能夠上網(wǎng)，并不意味著我們就具備了高效互敬的合作、談判和演說所需要的能力。

網(wǎng)絡(luò)上羞恥心的匱乏，大概會讓柏拉圖感到震驚。柏拉圖認(rèn)為，不管是研究哲學(xué)還是依道德行事，都離不開羞恥心這一關(guān)鍵情感。羞恥心之所以會產(chǎn)生，是因為我們明白事理，卻要明知故犯。這正是柏拉圖的道德哲學(xué)觀點：我們并非不知道該如何過上正直和充實的人生，只是常常跑偏了而已。對柏拉圖來說，羞恥心可以幫助我們遏制明知會犯錯還要堅持下去的沖動，幫助我們誠實地面對自己，聽從內(nèi)心的道德召喚。柏拉圖說，沒有羞恥心的人是欲望的奴隸，被物質(zhì)、權(quán)力、名聲和虛榮所驅(qū)使。而這種欲望是專橫的，因為從本質(zhì)上說，它是永遠(yuǎn)無法得到滿足的。

1. pay lip service to： 口頭上贊同，口惠而實不至；surveillance： 監(jiān)視。

2. Yelp： 美國著名商戶點評網(wǎng)站，囊括餐館、購物中心、酒店等領(lǐng)域，供用戶打分、點評、交流體驗；escort：護送。

3. in a pinch： 必要時，在緊要關(guān)頭。

4. nudge： 輕推。

5. avail oneself of sth.： 利用。

6. Michel Foucault： 米歇爾·?？拢?926—1984），法國哲學(xué)家、語言學(xué)家、文學(xué)評論家。

7. Jeremy Bentham： 杰里米·邊沁（1748—1832），英國哲學(xué)家、法學(xué)家和社會改革家；Panopticon： 圓形監(jiān)獄；inmate： 囚犯；man： v. 給……配備人員；occupant： 占據(jù)者。

8. internalize： 內(nèi)化；spectral： 幽靈的，幽靈似的；of ones own accord： 出于自愿，主動地。

9. uncanny： 不可思議的，怪異的；at large： 普遍的。

10. coercion： 強制，脅迫。

11. pliant： 順從的。

12. perniciously： 有害地；seamless： 無縫的，渾然一體的。

13. perpetuate： 使持續(xù)，使長存。

14. compel： 強迫，迫使；conformity： 遵從；complicity： 同謀，串通。

15. conspiracy： 陰謀，密謀。

16. indispensable： 必不可少的，必需的。

17. presuppose： 以……為前提；flout：藐視，無視。

18. heed： 注意，聽從。

19. tyrannical： 殘暴的，專橫的。