唐人街的盡頭?

譯 / 廖星宇

多年以前，數(shù)以萬計(jì)的華人離開故土，踏上異域，追求心中的“淘金”夢。華人在異域靠個人謀生異常艱難，唐人街由此應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。近兩個世紀(jì)以來，唐人街記錄了海外華人為夢想艱辛創(chuàng)業(yè)的歷程，也間接見證了中國發(fā)展變化的足跡。一部唐人街的歷史，也是一部微縮的海外華人發(fā)展史。如今，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)迅速發(fā)展，移民潮回流，華人不必再去異域?qū)?，今日的唐人街不再像昔日那樣人潮涌動。這份曾承載無數(shù)華人夢想的希望之“城”，是否會最終走向盡頭？

As the manager of a Chinatown career center on Kearny Street in San Francisco， Winnie Yu has watched working-class clients come and go. Most of them， like Shen Ming Fa， have the makings of2) the quintessential3) Chinese American immigrant success story. Shen， who is 40， moved to San Francisco with his family in the fall of 2010， an English-speaking future in mind for his 10-year-old daughter. His first stop was Chinatown， where he found an instant community and help with job and immigration problems.

But lately， Yu has been seeing a shift: rather than coming， her clients have been going—in pursuit of what might be called the Chinese Dream.

“Now the American Dream is broken，” Shen tells me one evening at the career center， his fingers drumming restlessly on the table. Shen has mostly been unemployed， picking up part-time work when he can find it. Back in China， he worked as a veterinarian4) and at a school of traditional Chinese culture. “In China， people live more comfortably: in a big house， with a good job. Life is definitely better there.” On his fingers， he counts out several people he knows who have gone back since he came to the United States. When I ask him if he thinks about returning to China， he glances at his daughter， who is sitting nearby， then looks me in the eye. “My daughter is thriving，” he says， carefully. “But I think about it every day.”

Recent years have seen stories of Chinese “sea turtles”—those who are educated overseas and migrate back to China—lured by Chinese-government incentives that include financial aid， cash bonuses， tax breaks， and housing assistance. In 2008， Shi Yigong， a molecular biologist at Princeton， turned down a $10 million research grant5) to return to China and become the dean of life sciences at Beijing’s Tsinghua University. “My postdocs are getting great offers，” says Robert H. Austin， a physics professor at Princeton.

But unskilled laborers are going back， too. Labor shortages in China have led to both higher wages and more options in where they can work. The Migration Policy Institute， a Washington， D.C.–based think tank， published a paper on China’s demography6) through 2030 that says thinking of migration as moving in just one direction is a mistake: the flows are actually much more dynamic. “Migration， the way we understand it in the U.S.， is about people coming， staying， and dying in our country. The reality is that it has never been that way，” says the institute’s president， Demetrios Papademetriou. “Historically， over 50 percent of the people who came here in the first half of the 20th century left. In the second half， the return migration slowed down to 25～30 percent. But today， when we talk about China， what you’re actually seeing is more people going back … This may still be a trickle7)， in terms of our data being able to capture it—there’s always going to be a lag time of a couple of years—but with the combination of bad labor conditions in the U.S. and sustained or better conditions back in China， increasing numbers of people will go home.”

In the past five years， the number of Chinese immigrants to the U.S. has been on the decline， from a peak of 87，307 in 2006 to 70，863 in 2010. Because Chinatowns are where working-class immigrants have traditionally gathered for support， the rise of China—and the slowing of immigrant flows—all but8) ensures the end of Chinatowns.

Smaller Chinatowns have been fading for years—just look at Washington， D.C.， where Chinatown is down to a few blocks marked by an ornate9) welcome gate and populated mostly by chains like Starbucks and Hooters， with signs in Chinese. But now the Chinatowns in San Francisco and New York are depopulating， becoming less residential and more service-oriented. When the initial 2010 U.S. census10) results were released in March 2011， they revealed drops in core areas of San Francisco’s Chinatown. In Manhattan， the census showed a decline in Chinatown’s population for the first time in recent memory—almost 9 percent overall， and a 14 percent decline in the Asian population.

The exodus from Chinatown is happening partly because the working class is getting priced out of11) this traditional community and heading to the “ethnoburbs12)”; development continues to push residents out of the neighborhood and into other secondary enclaves like Flushing， Queens， in New York. But the influx13) of migrants who need the networks that Chinatown provides is itself slowing down. Notably， the percentage of foreign-born Chinese New Yorkers fell from about 75 percent in 2000 to 69 percent in 2009.

Chinatowns almost died once before， in the first half of the 20th century， when various exclusion acts limited immigration. Philip Choy， a retired architect and historian who grew up in San Francisco’s Chinatown， has observed the neighborhood population of Chinese immigrants being replaced by new generations of Chinese Americans. “Chinatown might have disappeared if it weren’t for the changing immigration policies，” he said. Only after the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act14) lifted quotas did the Chinese revive Chinatowns all across the US—especially those communities in New York， San Francisco， and Los Angeles.

Of course， since the days of the Gold Rush15)， the Chinese always thought they were going to move back to China after earning their fortune elsewhere. As Papademetriou told me， what came before often happens again. Only now， fortune can be found at home.

This departure portends16) the loss of a place once so integral to Chinese American that Victor Nee17) and Brett de Bary Nee18)， in their 1973 book， Longtime Californ’， noted that “virtually every Chinese living in San Francisco has something to do with Chinatown.” Two years ago， when I was on tour for my book about Chinatowns—a kind of love letter to the neighborhood that accepted my family when it first arrived in the United States—the future of these enclaves was an open question. But if China continues to boom， Chinatowns will lose their reason for being， as vital ports of entry for working-class immigrants. These workers will have better things to do than come to America.

于溫妮是舊金山干尼街上一個唐人街就業(yè)中心的經(jīng)理，迎來又送走了一批又一批勞工階層的客戶。他們中的大多數(shù)人都有潛力寫一篇典型的美國華裔移民的成功故事，比如沈明發(fā)。40歲的沈明發(fā)于2010年秋舉家遷往舊金山，想給他十歲的女兒在講英語的世界里謀求一個未來。他的第一站就是唐人街，在那兒，他找到了一個即時社區(qū)，并在工作和移民問題上得到了幫助。

但最近，于溫妮卻一直在目睹一個變化：她的客戶們不再涌入唐人街，而是紛紛離開，去追逐一種或許可以稱作“中國夢”的理想去了。

“現(xiàn)在，‘美國夢’已經(jīng)破滅了?！币惶焱砩?，沈明發(fā)在就業(yè)中心告訴我。他一邊說，一邊用手指不安地敲著桌子。沈明發(fā)大部分時間里都處于失業(yè)狀態(tài)，有機(jī)會時就做些兼職工作。在中國的時候，他是一名獸醫(yī)，還在一所教授中國傳統(tǒng)文化的學(xué)校里工作?！霸谥袊藗兓畹帽冗@兒舒服：住的是大房子，工作也不錯。國內(nèi)的生活毫無疑問要好些。”他掰著手指頭數(shù)了幾個他認(rèn)識的人，他們在他來美國后卻都紛紛回到了中國。我問他想不想回國，他瞥了一眼坐在旁邊的女兒，然后看著我的眼睛?！拔遗畠赫亲聣殉砷L的時候，”他小心翼翼地說，“但我沒有一天不在想回國的問題?！?/p>

近年來，中國“海龜”受政府政策吸引“回流”的情況不斷發(fā)生。所謂“海龜”，是指那些在海外接受教育后回國的中國人。中國政府吸引“海龜”回國的激勵手段包括財(cái)政資助、現(xiàn)金獎勵、減稅以及住房補(bǔ)貼。2008年，普林斯頓大學(xué)分子生物學(xué)家施一公推掉了一筆一千萬美金的科研補(bǔ)助金，回到中國，成為清華大學(xué)生命科學(xué)院院長。“我的博士后學(xué)生們獲得的待遇非常好。”普林斯頓大學(xué)物理學(xué)教授羅伯特·H·奧斯汀說道。

但是，無一技之長的工人也開始紛紛回國。中國的用工短缺提高了工人的工資水平，也讓他們有更多的機(jī)會選擇在哪里工作。移民政策研究所是一家總部設(shè)在華盛頓的智庫機(jī)構(gòu)，其發(fā)表的一篇關(guān)于中國截至2030年人口統(tǒng)計(jì)方面的文章稱，那種認(rèn)為移民只是單向人口流動的想法是錯誤的，實(shí)際上人口流動要活躍得多?！鞍凑彰绹说睦斫猓泼窬褪侨藗儊淼矫绹?，留下來，在這里終老一生。但事實(shí)從來都不是如此，”該研究所所長季米特里奧斯·帕帕德美特里歐說道，“從歷史上看，20世紀(jì)上半葉來美國的人有一半以上都離開了。到了下半葉，這種回流率下降至25%～30%。但今天，在談到中國的時候，你真正看到的情況是越來越多的人在回去……就我們手中的數(shù)據(jù)所能掌握的情況來看(數(shù)據(jù)總是要落后現(xiàn)實(shí)幾年)，這股回流潮也許還只是涓涓細(xì)流，但綜合考慮到美國糟糕的就業(yè)環(huán)境和中國穩(wěn)定或更佳的就業(yè)環(huán)境，越來越多的人會選擇回國?！?/p>

過去五年間，移民美國的中國人數(shù)量一直在減少，從2006年巔峰時期的87，307人降到了2010年的70，863人。由于唐人街歷來是勞工階層的移民聚集一處尋求幫助的地方，因而中國的崛起——以及移民潮的放緩——勢必導(dǎo)致唐人街的沒落。

規(guī)模小一點(diǎn)的唐人街近幾年一直在萎縮。這只要看看華盛頓就知道了，那里的唐人街萎縮得只剩下幾個街區(qū)和一個標(biāo)志性的華麗牌樓，聚居其中的大部分是星巴克和貓頭鷹餐廳之類的連鎖店，只不過掛了中文招牌而已。不過，現(xiàn)在舊金山和紐約的唐人街人口也在不斷減少，變得不再像居民區(qū)，倒更像是商業(yè)服務(wù)區(qū)了。2011年3月，美國公布的2010年人口普查初步結(jié)果顯示，舊金山唐人街核心地區(qū)的人口在下降。人口普查還顯示，在曼哈頓，唐人街的人口近年來首次出現(xiàn)下降——總?cè)丝趲缀鯗p少了9%，亞洲人口則減少了14%。

唐人街人口大批流失的部分原因在于高物價(jià)逼迫勞工階層放棄了這一傳統(tǒng)社區(qū)，遷往少數(shù)族裔移民社區(qū)；另外，這里的持續(xù)開發(fā)也迫使當(dāng)?shù)鼐用癜嵬渌壘劬訁^(qū)，比如紐約皇后區(qū)的法拉盛。不過，那些需要唐人街提供關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)的移民涌入美國的勢頭本身也在放緩。這尤其體現(xiàn)在非美國本土出生的華裔“紐約客”所占的比例上：該比例已經(jīng)從2000年的75%降至2009年的69%。

歷史上，唐人街一度幾近消亡。那是在20世紀(jì)上半葉，當(dāng)時美國的各種排外法案對移民給以種種限制。菲利普·蔡是一位退休的建筑師和歷史學(xué)家，在舊金山的唐人街長大。他目睹了社區(qū)的華裔移民漸漸被新一代的華裔美國人所取代的過程?！耙皇且泼裾甙l(fā)生變化，唐人街也許早就銷聲匿跡了?！彼f。直到《1965年移民歸化法》提高了移民配額后，中國人才又使全美范圍內(nèi)的唐人街煥發(fā)了勃勃生機(jī)——特別是紐約、舊金山和洛杉磯的唐人街。

當(dāng)然，從“淘金熱”開始，中國人就一直覺得他們在外“淘”到“金”后就會回到中國去。正如帕帕德美特里歐告訴我的那樣，歷史常常會重演。只是現(xiàn)在，在中國國內(nèi)也能“淘”到“金”了。

唐人街居民的離開預(yù)示著一個地方即將消失，這對美籍華人來說曾是一個不可或缺的地方。在1973年出版的Longtime Californ’一書中，作者倪志偉和布萊特·迪百·倪提到，“實(shí)際上住在舊金山的每一個中國人都與唐人街多多少少有些聯(lián)系?！蔽以鴮戇^一本關(guān)于唐人街的書，算是寫給這個社區(qū)的一封情書——因?yàn)閯偟矫绹鴷r，是它接納了我們一家。兩年前，在我為這本書做巡回推廣的時候，這些少數(shù)族裔聚居地的未來還是個未知數(shù)。不過，如果中國繼續(xù)繁榮下去，唐人街作為勞工階層移民的關(guān)鍵入境港，將會失去其存在的理由。因?yàn)檩^之于前往美國，他們將會有更好的選擇。

1.Bonnie Tsui：徐靈鳳，美國華裔記者，為《大西洋月刊》(The Atlantic Monthly)、《國家地理探險(xiǎn)》(National Geographic Adventure)、《沙龍》(Salon)等雜志撰稿。

2.have the makings of：有潛力做……

3.quintessential [#716;kw#618;nt#618;#712;sen#643;(#601;)l] adj. 典型的，精華的

4.veterinarian [#716;vet(#601;)r#618;#712;ne#601;ri#601;n] n. 獸醫(yī)

5.research grant：科研補(bǔ)助金

6.demography [d#618;#712;m#594;ɡr#601;fi] n. 人口統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)

7.trickle [#712;tr#618;k(#601;)l] n. 涓滴，細(xì)流

8.all but：幾乎完全地

9.ornate [#596;#720;(r)#712;ne#618;t] adj. 華麗的，絢麗的

10.census [#712;sens#601;s] n. 人口普查

11.price out of：向……漫天要價(jià)致使失去

12.ethnoburb：少數(shù)族裔移民社區(qū)

13.influx [#712;#618;nfl#652;ks] n. 流入，涌入

14.1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act：《1965年移民歸化法》，由美國國會制訂。該法案提高了移民配額，引發(fā)了新一波移民浪潮，成千上萬的移民從世界各地涌向美國，并在數(shù)年后成為美國公民。

15.Gold Rush：淘金熱，指當(dāng)一個地區(qū)戲劇性地發(fā)現(xiàn)了擁有商業(yè)價(jià)值的黃金時，大量移民工人涌入這個地區(qū)的時期。通常特指始自1849年并貫穿19世紀(jì)50年代在美國加利福尼亞發(fā)現(xiàn)大量黃金儲量后的淘金浪潮。在這次浪潮中，不僅有美國本地人，也有大量外籍移民，其中包括大量華人。

16.portend [p#596;#720;(r)#712;tend] vt. 預(yù)示

17.Victor Nee：倪志偉，美國康奈爾大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與社會研究中心主任，哈佛大學(xué)博士

18.Brett de Bary Nee：布萊特·迪百·倪，美國康奈爾大學(xué)亞洲研究與比較文學(xué)教授，哈佛大學(xué)博士