論白令海峽的法律地位

Joshua Owens

論白令海峽的法律地位

Joshua Owens*

本文主旨是探究白令海峽的法律地位,特別是有關(guān)國際航行海峽的管理體制問題。在檢視國際法的相關(guān)文獻,特別是檢視《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》后,本文得出結(jié)論認為白令海峽應(yīng)被認定為是用于國際航行的海峽,通過者享有過境通行權(quán);白令海峽沿岸國——俄羅斯和美國——的法律立場也會在本文中探討。隨著北極航線使用率的增加,白令海峽的地緣政治地位可能會有新的變化,因此最好能建立一個透明公正的管理體制以便應(yīng)對。如何根據(jù)國際法并且參照其它國際海峽實施的管理方法來建立這一體制,本文將提出若干建議以供參考。

白令海峽 用于國際航行的海峽 過境通行

一、引 言

在北極圈所有海峽中,白令海峽是最窄的,也許也是最重要的一個海峽。盡管到現(xiàn)在為止,白令海峽還沒有像西北航道和東北航道那樣造成很多爭議,但和這兩個航道不同的是,其不能被繞行。換言之,只要關(guān)閉白令海峽,那么從白令海到北冰洋的船舶通道都將會被一舉關(guān)閉。如同南太平洋的馬六甲海峽那樣,白令海峽是處于至關(guān)重要位置的天然要塞。在此區(qū)域大規(guī)模商業(yè)航行開始之前,如果有可能預(yù)防性地解決關(guān)于主權(quán)和外國船舶通行權(quán)的相關(guān)法律問題,那么將極大地有利于避免未來不必要的沖突和緊張。

白令海峽位于俄羅斯最東部大陸的凸出處和美國最西邊大陸的凸出處間,是一條狹窄的海洋通道,其將北太平洋和北極水域連接起來。北極出口非常少,而白令海峽是其中一個,但是,鑒于歷史上其海洋運輸量相當少,到目前為止這個事實并沒有造成一個重大的全球性問題。①See discussion below in sec.Ⅱ(B).然而,正如近期一些學(xué)術(shù)論文和相關(guān)新聞報道所證實的,對北極的興趣,特別是關(guān)于北極資源(包括生物和非生物資源)開發(fā)和運輸航線使用的興趣正在隨北極冰層的不斷消失而不斷增加。②An attempt at presenting an exhaustive list would be unnecessarily cumbersome,but for an idea of recently-published academic pieces on the subject,see Angelle C.Smith,Frozen Assets:Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must be Resolved to Prevent the Really Cold War,George Washington International Law Review,Vol.41,2010,p.651;Aldo Chircop, The Growth of International Shipping in the Arctic:Is a Regulatory Review Timely?,The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law,Vol.24,No.2,2009,p.355;Michael Byers,Who Owns the Arctic?Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North,Vancouver:Douglas&McIntyre Publishers INC,2009;Roger Howard,The Arctic Gold Rush:The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources,London:Continuum International Publishing Group,2009.毫無疑問,其中最重要的航道就包括了東北航道和西北航道,俄羅斯和加拿大各自主張對此兩航道享有主權(quán)。有關(guān)這些航道法律地位這個棘手問題有待圓滿的解決,此問題并不在本文的討論范圍之內(nèi)。但是,“低調(diào)的”白令海峽有可能構(gòu)成穿越這些航道的航線組成部分。③See Figure 1.See also E.J.Molenaar,Arctic Marine Shipping:Overview of the International Legal Framework,Gaps,and Options,Journal of Transnational Law&Policy, Vol.18,2009,p.293(remarking that“all trans-Arctic marine shipping must pass through the Bering Strait”).因此對白令海峽法律地位進行研究,對其潛在的地緣政治意義進行分析,包括對其環(huán)境保護和沿岸國家的管理進行討論并提出建議,都將會有實際可用之處。④The present essay will analyze global issues from a realist perspective,taking account of the fact that,unless the international zeitgeist for development,sustainable or otherwise,is drastically altered soon,the demand for resources will push implacably toward large-scale exploitation of the Arctic,including mining,shipping,fishing,touring and other such commercial activities.One hopes that as access increases,the proper environmental protections will be enacted and enforced with an equivalent fervor through appropriate national legislation and international fora.For an alarming warning on the dangers posed by reckless development in the Arctic,see Andrew Van Wagner,It’s Getting Hot in Here,So Take Away all the Arctic’s Resources:A Look at a Melting Arctic and the Hot Competition for its Resources,Villanova Environmental Law Journal,Vol.21,2010,p.189.It should be noted that Donald Rothwell’s insightful presentation Arctic Choke Points and the Law of the Sea,Australian National University—ANU College of Law Research Paper No.10-81,2010 has broken ground on the analysis of the Bering Strait as it relates to law of the sea;however due to the comprehensive nature of that paper’s topic,it still seems worthwhile to delve further into circumstances pertaining specifically to the Bering Strait.

本文在接下來的第二部分介紹了關(guān)于海洋法的一些相關(guān)背景資料以及關(guān)于白令海峽的相關(guān)情況,在第三部分考察了俄美兩個沿岸國的法律立場,本文的第四部分提出了在未來,對于白令海峽進行謹慎、無沖突管理的一些建議。

二、白令海峽和國際海洋法

為了更好地理解商業(yè)航行、國際交往與白令海峽的關(guān)聯(lián)性,本部分的法律分析會從該海峽的地理狀況和地理限制開始,也會進一步討論其在國際海洋法之下的意蘊,并著重于1982年的《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》。①United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaties and Agreements:Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea(done at Montego Bay),opened for signature December 10,1982,UN Doc.A/Conf.62/122,16 Nov 1994;reprinted at International Legal Materials,Vol.21,p.1261 and U.N.T.S.,No.1833,p.397[hereinafter UNCLOS].

(一)地理因素及其法律意蘊

白令海峽由亞洲到北美大陸,從俄羅斯的迭日涅夫角到阿拉斯加的威爾士王子角,測量距離大約53英里(約85千米,45海里)寬,深度在30～50米之間。②World Atlas,Bering Strait,at http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/bering.htm, 11 October 2011.In the Arctic Council’s 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment,it is observed that“[a]t the strait’s narrowest point,the continents of North America and Asia are just 90 km apart.”Arctic Council 2009,Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report,Arctic Council,Norwegian Chairmanship,Oslo,Norway,190 pp,at http://www. arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/category/62-pame?download= 245:the-amsa-2009-report,p.106,30 November 2011.靠近海峽中央有大代奧米德群島和小代奧米德群島,兩個群島之間是美俄兩國國界線。③This boundary was reaffirmed in the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary,1 June 1990,International Legal Materials,Vol.29,p.941(hereinafter 1990 US-Soviet Boundary Agreement).See map 1.1990 US-Soviet Boundary Agreement,Art.2(1)states:“From the initial point,65°30′N.,168°58′37″W.,the maritime boundary extends north along the 168°58′37″W.meridian through the Bering Strait and Chukchi Sea into the Arctic Ocean as far as permitted under international law.”In effect,the boundary line runs neatly between the two Diomedes,as shown in map 2.For the Senate document including the text of the agreement as well as the US Senate’s advice and approval thereof,see Senate Treaty Document 101-22,at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125431.pdf,11 October 2011.This agreement has not been ratified by the Russian Duma.這兩個小群島分屬俄美兩國,相距僅4千米。

在海峽最狹窄處,即兩海角鄰近之處沒有公?；?qū)俳?jīng)濟區(qū),而這兩者都可以為潛在的通行者提供充足的航行自由。④See UNCLOS,Arts.58(1),87(1).實際上,在小代奧米德群島(美國)和威爾士王子角間的水域構(gòu)成了一片領(lǐng)海,而無其它水域。①See map 2 and accompanying explanation.根據(jù)國際法規(guī)定,領(lǐng)海是沿岸國家享有完全主權(quán)的區(qū)域,②See UNCLOS,Art.2.對于其它國家船舶享有的無害通過權(quán)可以進行警告。③See UNCLOS,Art.17 reads:“Subject to this Convention,ships of all States,whether coastal or land-locked,enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.”關(guān)于“無害通過權(quán)”這一術(shù)語的意蘊,《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》規(guī)定通過時應(yīng)“繼續(xù)不停和迅速進行”④See UNCLOS,Art.18.以及“不損害沿海國的和平、良好秩序或安全”。⑤See UNCLOS,Art.19(1).《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》第19條第2款列舉了許多可被視為非無害的活動,這些活動包括但不限于使用武力、捕魚、故意污染和起落飛機。⑥Interestingly,this article does not state whether the list is exhaustive,leaving the possible interpretation that other acts may also be considered“prejudicial to the peace”of a coastal State.本文關(guān)注的是那些并沒有違反無害通過原則的活動,如集裝箱貨船、油輪、漁船的商業(yè)航行。

白令海峽不僅僅是因為包含領(lǐng)海而必然構(gòu)成一個會吸引很多未來海上運輸?shù)牡胤?。在接下來小標題的內(nèi)容中會簡單地評估通過白令海峽而建立和維持大洋航線的可行性。

(二)海運可行性

如之前所暗示的,白令海峽可能會在大洋航線中扮演一個重要角色。在通過北極(東北或西北)航道時,商船、軍艦、科研考察船、漁船及其它船舶都有興趣通過此海峽。迄今為止,在北極的航行活動相對很少,⑦Take,for example,the fact that from 1903 to May 2010,only 135 voyages had gone through the Northwest Passage.Sixty of those voyages,nearly half,had taken place since 2000:this indicates a growing trend of willingness to brave the Arctic.Lawson W. Brigham,The Fast-Changing Maritime Arctic,Proceedings,May 2010,U.S.Naval Institute,Annapolis,Maryland,at https://www.princeton.edu/lisd/events/talks/brigham_ may2010.pdf,p.56,12 October 2011.See also 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, pp.36～49(recounting the history of Arctic navigation).有史以來,北極惡劣、不可預(yù)知的天氣和險惡的覆冰往往都使投資者和探險者打消此念頭,當然極少數(shù)最強悍的冒險家除外。①Nicholas Wapshott,Strife Looms between America,Canada over Route,N.Y.Sun,11 October 2007,at http://www.nysun.com/foreign/strife-looms-between-america-canada-over-route/64337/(stating that“[u]ntil now the passage has been icebound and immensely dangerous to navigate”),12 October 2011.On the other hand,2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment,p.36,relates that navigation among indigenous peoples in the Arctic has been afoot since ancient times;at p.49 it points out that accumulating the necessary field data“may help to reduce the perceived risks of year-round marine transport in the Arctic,”which suggests that in the Arctic Council’s view,current obstacles to Arctic marine shipping are certainly not insurmountable.然而伴隨近期融冰引起的適航可能性不斷增加,潛在的北極地區(qū)活動參與者開始重新考慮他們的定位。②Matt Roston,Note and Comment,The Northwest Passage’s Emergence as an International Highway,Southwestern Journal of International Law,Vol.15,2009,p.450(asserting the likelihood of Northwest Passage becoming a major navigational route following the ice melt);Roger Howard,The Arctic Gold Rush:The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources,London:Continuum International Publishing Group,2009,pp.109～110(stating that the distance of a Tokyo-London voyage could be reduced by 3,500 miles if using Arctic routes instead of the Suez Canal or as much as 5,500 if used instead of the Panama Canal;the author further relates that a Bremen-Shanghai voyage could be reduced by 3, 200 miles;in short,the distance of many such journeys would be cut by about a third).很清楚的是這兩條航道——想必它們都要穿過白令海峽——具有經(jīng)濟可行性,或者說在未來會如此。在描述東北航道(經(jīng)常也稱北方航道③Some sources use the two appellations“Northern Sea Route”(NSR)and“Northeast Passage”synonymously;more accurately,the two should be considered separate entities,the NSR constituting the center portion of the longer Northeast Passage.See Leonid Tymchenko,The Northern Sea Route:Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Seas,in Alex G.Oude Elferink and Donald Rothwell ed.,The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001,pp.269～291.The present essay usually employs the term NSR because the discussion revolves around Russia’s legal stance concerning this route,which it regards as a domestic one.)時,一個評論者做了如下說明:

北方航道連接了巴倫支海和白令海峽。當可通航時,連接亞洲和歐洲的航道比起通過蘇伊士運河的替代航線要快三倍。這將顯著減少在泛太平洋和北歐及歐亞大陸間的運輸時間和運輸費用。④Ariel Cohen,From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access:Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy 2010,Backgrounder,No.2421,Heritage Foundation,at http://thf_media. s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2421.pdf,p.9,12 October 2011.

但是在穿越這兩條北極航道時有一些困難。就北方航道而言,與由俄羅斯聯(lián)邦所提出的主權(quán)問題有密切關(guān)系的是莫斯科政策,即強制性為通過俄羅斯沿岸的運輸船舶提供破冰船服務(wù)。①Leonid Tymchenko,The Northern Sea Route:Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Seas,in Alex G.Oude Elferink and Donald Rothwell ed.,The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2001,pp.284～285.Another commentator notes:“Russia’s mandatory ice-breaker fees are high,and the fees are not directly linked to actual services rendered. For instance,during light summer ice conditions,an ice-strengthened vessel may be able to transit the NSR unescorted,but will still have to pay a full fee.The fee system is a major obstacle to transit traffic,and since the opening of the NSR to foreign vessels in 1991,the Russian authorities have yet to design a system that encourages the use of the route even under otherwise ideal conditions.”Claes Lykke Ragner,Den norra sj?v?gen,in Torsten Hallbeg ed.,Barents-ett gr?nsland i Norden,Stockholm:Arena Norden,2008,pp.114～127[English translation unpaginated,at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/clr-norden-nsr -en.pdf,16 October 2011.].這些服務(wù)費用過高,②Claes Lykke Ragner,Den norra sj?v?gen,in Torsten Hallbeg ed.,Barents-ett gr?nsland i Norden,Stockholm:Arena Norden,2008,pp.114～127.盡管有報告顯示近期有些航行是在沒有破冰船的協(xié)助之下完成的,③Michael A.Becker,Russia and the Arctic:Opportunities for Engagement within the Existing Legal Framework Symposium:Russia and the Rule of Law:New Opportunities in Domestic and International Affairs,American University International Law Review,Vol. 25,2010,p.241(stating that in August 2009 two German-owned ships,the Beluga Fraternity and Beluga Foresight,“undertook and completed the voyage,with Russian approval and without ice-breaker assistance”).這意味著俄羅斯可能會改變其北方航道航行政策。④Leonid Tymchenko,The Northern Sea Route:Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Seas,in Alex G.Oude Elferink and Donald Rothwell ed.,The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2001,pp.286～288.Outlines a possible solution to problems posed by Russian administration of its NSR,namely internationalization of said passage,perhaps via an international NSR Convention.同樣地,對于西北航道是否位于加拿大內(nèi)水還是屬于用于國際航行海峽這一問題也存在分歧。⑤See generally John Kennair,Conference:International Arctic Change and the Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean Seabed,An Inconsistent Truth:Canadian Foreign Policy and the Northwest Passage,Vermont Law Review,Vol.34,2009,p.15;James Kraska,Symposium:Mounting Tension and Melting Ice:Exploring the Legal and Political Future of the Arctic,International Security and International Law in the Northwest Passage,Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,Vol.42,2009,p.1109;Michael Byers and Suzanne Lalonde,Symposium:Mounting Tension and Melting Ice:Exploring the Legal and Political Future of the Arctic,Who Controls the Northwest Passage?,Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,Vol.42,2009,p.1133.與北極航線相關(guān)的這些不確定性因素會讓那些可能使用這些航線的謹慎投資者打消念頭?，F(xiàn)在已有很多資料詳述俄羅斯和加拿大的北極水域管理問題、這兩國的主權(quán)主張和其它國家的相應(yīng)回應(yīng),基于本文的目的,對此不再進行深入討論。①For recent treatments of the subject concerning Canada’s position,see Rob Huebert,Canada and the Newly Emerging International Arctic Security Regime,in James Kraska ed., Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change,New York:Cambridge University Press, 2011,p.193;Christopher Mark Macneill,Gaining Command and Control of the Northwest Passage:Strait Talk on Sovereignty,Transportation Law Journal,Vol.34,2007,p.355; Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel,Politics,Pride,and Precedent:The United States and Canada in the Northwest Passage,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.4,2009,p.204;for a look at Russian policy and practice,in addition to the discussion below in sec.Ⅲ(a)of the present text,see also Betsy Baker,Symposium,Russia and the Rule of Law:New Opportunities in Domestic and International Affairs,Law,Science,and the Continental Shelf: Russia and the Promise of Arctic Cooperation,American University International Law Review,Vol.25,2010,p.251;R.Douglas Brubaker,The Russian Arctic Straits,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,2005;David L.Vander Zwaag et al.,Governance of Arctic Marine Shipping,Dalhousie University Marine&Environmental Law Institute,10 October 2008,at http://arcticportal.org/uploads/bC/JU/bCJUa KAo52XTt HDZ359QNA/5.nov AMSA-Governance-of-Arctic-Marine-Shipping-Final-Report-1-Aug.pdf, pp.62～68,30 November 2011.Some foundational works on the subject include Donat Pharand,Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law,New York:Cambridge University Press,1988 and Erik Franckx,Maritime Claims in the Arctic:Canadian and Russian Perspectives,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1993.

除了對破冰船費用和主權(quán)的關(guān)注外,還需要考慮惡劣的天氣。從海運來說,與世隔絕以及不斷增加的與天氣有關(guān)事故發(fā)生的可能性,就等同于增加了風險。當然這并不是說其不可克服,如一位評論者指出:“如果海運需要使用東北航道,保險公司將會提供必要的風險承保?！雹赗akish Suppiah,The Northeast Arctic Passage:possibilities and economic considerations, Mar Studies,Vol.32,2006;Maritime Studies,Vol.151,2006,unpaginated,at http:// www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MarStudies/2006/32.html,p.151,12 October 2011.不可否認,在某些方面,相比更為傳統(tǒng)的蘇伊士或巴拿馬運河航線來說,北極航道目前是不大宜航的航線,但可以想象一下,在北極,隨著未來基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的改善和有關(guān)松解航行限制的多邊協(xié)議的達成,會有越來越多的主體有意愿使用北極航線,特別是私營部門。最終的結(jié)果將是白令海峽在海運流量不斷增加,盡管增加的多少在某種程度上很可能受制于環(huán)保考慮。如此假設(shè)下,本文在接下來部分將會討論把《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》中用于國際航行海峽的管理體制適用于白令海峽的問題。

(三)用于國際航行海峽的管理體制

如上文所推出的結(jié)論,通過白令海峽的船舶應(yīng)享有不少于《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》規(guī)定的無害通過的權(quán)利。③See UNCLOS,partⅡ,sec.3,subsec.A.然而另一個重要問題仍然存在:白令海峽將會被視為用于國際航行的海峽嗎?用于國際航行的海峽,由《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》規(guī)范管理,①See UNCLOS,partⅢ.提供航行者過境通行的權(quán)利,是一個比無害通過更自由的制度。這兩種不同的通過制度在兩個獨立的區(qū)域?qū)嵤?過境通行,僅在用于國際航行的海峽中享有;無害通過,僅在不能被分類為用于國際航行的海峽水域的領(lǐng)?；虿贿m用過境通行的國際航行的海峽水域中享有。②See UNCLOS,Art.45 and United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,Art.16(4);see also Ana G.López Martín,International Straits:Concept, Classification and Rules of Passage,Madrid:Springer,2010,pp.109～149.如前所述的非無害活動清單使相關(guān)無害通過的聲稱無效,這多少有些限制性;③UNCLOS,Art.19(2).這些條件中許多并不適用于航行或飛行在用于國際航行的海峽中實施過境通行權(quán)的船舶或飛行器。④R.R.Churchill and A.V.Lowe,The Law of the Sea,3rded.,Juris Publishing,Manchester University Press,1999,p.105.關(guān)于過境通行的管理機制,如邱吉爾和勞思所言:“盡管并不存在需要遵守的‘無害’標準,但是船舶和飛行器在行使權(quán)利時注定要避免武力威脅或使用武力……然而,這與其說是行使過境通行權(quán)利的條件,不如說是過境通行的附屬義務(wù)?！雹軷.R.Churchill and A.V.Lowe,The Law of the Sea,3rded.,Juris Publishing,Manchester University Press,1999,p.107(emphasis in original).具體而言,這意味著擁有海峽的國家并不被允許為了確保這些船舶“要避免武力威脅或使用武力”而限制外國船舶沿著其海岸實施過境通行的權(quán)利,因為這種做法將會大幅減少航行自由,而航行自由正是最初制定過境通行管理機制的目的所在。

另外,“任何活動,如果不是行使過境通行權(quán),將會受制于《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》的‘其它適用條款’……因此,任何威脅一個沿岸國家的活動將會使船舶或飛行器受到無害通過制的管制,在這種情況下的通行將會被制止,因為沒有“無害”條件?！雹轗.R.Churchill and A.V.Lowe,The Law of the Sea,3rded.,Juris Publishing,Manchester University Press,1999,p.107.換句話說,只有在面對異乎尋常挑釁時,沿岸國家才有理由取消過境者的過境通行權(quán)。在用于國際航行的海峽中執(zhí)行過境通行權(quán)時,恰恰是什么才構(gòu)成越軌行為本身就是沒有確切定義,并依賴于許多因素,其中包括政治因素、經(jīng)濟因素,因此可以說聲稱行使航行權(quán)的航行者和執(zhí)行管轄權(quán)的沿岸國家間的沖突是不太可能發(fā)生的。⑦Such as the Corfu Channel case,discussed below;see also Mark Valencia,Policy Forum Online 08-013A:US Hypocrisy in the Strait of Hormuz?,12 February 2008,Nautilus Institute,unpaginated,at http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/ security/08013 Valencia.html,12 October 2011(analyzing the legal implications of certain Iran-US naval incidents that occurred in Iran’s territorial sea).

這里需要強調(diào)一下無害通過制和過境通行間的主要差別:其一,過境通行權(quán)的行使可能會被飛機器和船舶所享有,潛水艇也可以從用于國際航行的海峽水下穿過,過境通行不可以被中止;其二,領(lǐng)海的無害通過權(quán)沒有授予飛行器,潛水艇必須在水面航行且要顯示國旗,這樣的話,通行權(quán)可能會在某些情況下被沿岸國家所中止,①See UNCLOS,partⅡ,sec.3,subsec.A,UNCLOS partⅢand accompanying text.除非是在無害通過制度下的用于國際航行的海峽。②UNCLOS,Art.45.1949年國際法院聽審了克拉基海峽爭議,其是在國際法下定義用于國際航行的海峽的一個先例。③International Court of Justice Report,1949,p.4.法院確立了一個“質(zhì)優(yōu)于量”方法來鑒定用于國際航行的海峽,詳文如下:

人們會問,檢驗的標準是通過海峽的交通流量抑或是其對國際航行的重要性嗎?然而在法院看來,決定性的標準主要是連接公海兩個部分的地理情況和其被用于國際航行的事實。該海峽不是連接公海的兩個部分的必要航線,而只是愛琴海和亞得里亞海間的一條替代航線,這一點也不是決定性的。但其歷來是國際海上運輸?shù)囊粭l有用航線。④International Court of Justice Report,Rep.4,1949,p.28.

這一描述有一定的主觀性,或者說至少存有司法自由裁量權(quán),即在定義哪些海峽符合作為用于國際航行的海峽的條件,哪些不符合的問題上——例如一個海峽要達到何種程度才是一個“國際海上運輸?shù)挠杏煤骄€”?！堵?lián)合國海洋法公約》第37條規(guī)定了用于國際航行的海峽制度適用于“公海或?qū)俳?jīng)濟區(qū)的一個部分和另一部分之間用于國際航行的海峽”。白令海峽符合這個標準,然而很明顯的是,本條排除了僅連接公海和一個國家領(lǐng)海的海峽,或者專屬經(jīng)濟區(qū)和一個國家領(lǐng)海的海峽。⑤In contrast,the United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,Art.16(4)provided:“There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State.”This arrangement was reached at the behest of Israel and its allies,in order to ensure free navigation to and from the port of Eilat.Wang Zelin,Research on the Legal Status of Arctic Passage,Doctoral Thesis,Xiamen University,2011(Ch.),p.13.UNCLOS,Art.45 upholds the principle that innocent passage may not be suspended in SUFINs which connect“a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State”.用于國際航行的海峽的一些例子包括了直布羅陀海峽、霍爾木茲海峽、曼德海峽、馬六甲海峽和多佛海峽。⑥R.R.Churchill and A.V.Lowe,The Law of the Sea,3rded.,Juris Publishing,Manchester University Press,1999,p.105.現(xiàn)在并不存在權(quán)威機構(gòu)來明確定義世界上用于國際航行的海峽,因此似乎一個海峽被選定作為用于國際航行海峽不只是一個法律過程,還是政治和外交過程;⑦For example,in 1971 Indonesia and Malaysia jointly declared that the Straits of Malacca were not“an international waterway”.Nadaisan Logaraj,Navigational Safety,Oil Pollution and Passage in the Straits of Malacca,Malaya Law Review,Vol.20,1978,p.288.而且,這些政治、外交上的主張,私營部門的聲音,在某些程度上甚至包括法律,都不是固定不變的,而是在不斷變化中。在沒有國際法院或法庭裁決的情況下,決定性因素很可能是國際共識,特別是在一個特定海峽中利益相關(guān)最大國家之間所達成的共識。自然而然,沿岸國對于環(huán)境和安全的關(guān)注會經(jīng)常與非沿岸國的航行利益相沖突。不言而喻,如同兩條北極航道的情況,在沿岸國管轄權(quán)利益和自由航行間形成切實可行的平衡將不會是一帆風順的,而且兩個陣營間的意見很難達成一致?？紤]到這些因素,我們接下來將會審視白令海峽作為用于國際航行的海峽的可行性。

(四)白令海峽作為用于國際航行的海峽的可行性

在界定一個地理實體時,除了基本的地圖或地理上的注意事項外,還需著重考慮有關(guān)國家的一些無形因素,就拿白令海峽來說,兩個沿岸國之間就有一個顯著區(qū)別:美國仍不是《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》成員國,①As of August 2012.然而其認為公約中關(guān)于“海洋的傳統(tǒng)使用”的規(guī)定已成為了國際法慣例,②See President Ronald Reagan’s Statement on United States Ocean Policy,10 March 1983, International Legal Material s,Vol.22,1983,p.464;American Journal of International Law,Vol.77,1983,p.619.因此盡管其未正式參與《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》管理機制,美國在某種程度上也受其制約。③The US Dept.of State’s website recounts America’s track record vis-à-vis UNCLOS,at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/opa/convention/,15 October 2011.沒有規(guī)定禁止將一個毗連非成員國的海峽指定為用于國際航行的海峽,所以在決定白令海峽法律地位時,美國的非成員地位不應(yīng)起主要作用,而應(yīng)通過國際討論和合意達成決定。

白令海峽現(xiàn)在不是一條海上高速公路,④Though according to Arctic Council 2009,Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report,Norwegian Chairmanship,Oslo,Norway,at http://www.arctic-council.org/index. php/en/about/documents/category/62-pame?download=245:the-amsa-2009-report,p.109,30 November 2011:“approximately 150 large commercial vessels pass through the Bering Strait during the July-October open water period,”excluding“fishing vessels,which are generally smaller,as well as fuel barges serving coastal mining activities and coastal communities.”See map 3 for an idea of traffic volume through the Bering Strait in recent years.但不能因此而必然排除在任何時候其將會被視為用于國際航行的海峽的可能。如果審慎閱讀《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》條款就不會得出這樣一種解釋,即認為要在后來認定一個特定海峽為用于國際航行的海峽,其在《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》頒布時就擁有用于國際航行的海峽的地位;①UNCLOS,Art.37 states that the SUFIN status and accompanying right of transit passage“applies to straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.”There is no chronological precondition mentioned here defining when international traffic must begin in a strait for it to be considered a SUFIN.相反,從邏輯上其結(jié)果必然是:即使一海峽在1982年沒有大量的國際運輸,一旦國際航行開始,其在以后仍能被認定為用于國際航行的海峽。想必某些國家的或單方面的主張并不能成為在一個特定位置產(chǎn)生國際航行的最終障礙。因此,考慮到白令海峽的地理位置適宜性以及用于運輸?shù)谋睒O航線不斷增加的可能性,那么根據(jù)國際法,白令海峽應(yīng)被視為用于國際航行的海峽,在此航行者享有過境通行權(quán)。

三、美國和俄羅斯的法律立場

本部分試圖通過分析各政府的相關(guān)主張、政策或?qū)嵺`,探討兩個沿岸國在將白令海峽劃分為用于國際航行的海峽這一觀點上所持的法律立場。

(一)俄羅斯

從俄羅斯方面來看,很難在考量白令海峽時不考慮其與北方航道(傳統(tǒng)上是俄羅斯國內(nèi)航線)的相關(guān)性。如A.科恩所解釋:“俄羅斯聯(lián)邦的北極政策宣稱‘在俄羅斯聯(lián)邦,北方航線被視為其在北極區(qū)域的一條全國統(tǒng)一的運輸環(huán)節(jié)’,這是俄羅斯的國家利益”(省略相關(guān)腳注)。②Ariel Cohen,From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access:Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy 2010,Backgrounder,No.2421,Heritage Foundation,at http://thf_media. s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2421.pdf,p.9,12 October 2011.而且,俄羅斯的現(xiàn)行北極法律制度應(yīng)在其歷史背景(包括蘇聯(lián)政府)下進行解讀。③Erik Franckx,The Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic,Journal of Transnational Law&Policy,Vol.18,2009,p.330(stating that“the current legal regime of Arctic marine shipping in the Northern Sea Route”is based on regulations dating back to 1990,a year before the USSR’s collapse).概括北方航道航行的整個歷史并不在本文的探討范圍之內(nèi),但一些關(guān)于在俄羅斯管轄下的北極水域的現(xiàn)行管理若干要點需要在這里重申一下。本文在接下來幾段里會試圖勾勒出俄羅斯有關(guān)通過白令海峽航行的立場,方法是通過審視其根據(jù)國際法和國內(nèi)法應(yīng)承擔的義務(wù)責任。

1.國際義務(wù)

作為《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》的締約國,俄羅斯聯(lián)邦應(yīng)該授予通過其領(lǐng)海的航行者無害通過權(quán);然而由于《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》第234條特別規(guī)定了冰封區(qū)域,俄羅斯(與其它極圈國家)頒布和執(zhí)行相關(guān)措施來保護脆弱的海洋環(huán)境并確保安全航行的自主權(quán)在北極冰封區(qū)域也因此明顯擴大了。①UNCLOS,Art.234 reads:Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention,reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone,where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation,and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.該點再加上《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》所規(guī)定的封閉海和半閉海制度下對于北極管理特權(quán)的可能主張,②Joshua Owens,Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas:A Glimpse at State Practice with Special Regard to the Arctic,China Oceans Law Review[to be published](asserting that a similar regime based on the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas’regime may be established in the Arctic ocean).構(gòu)成了俄羅斯根據(jù)國際法在北極執(zhí)行超越措施的主要杠桿。③There are,of course,other international treaties that influence Russia’s governance of its Arctic waters,but none so germane to the issues at hand as the ones discussed above.A list of other relevant sources of international law with implications for Arctic governance may be found in Michael A.Becker,Russia and the Arctic:Opportunities for Engagement within the Existing Legal Framework Symposium:Russia and the Rule of Law:New Opportunities in Domestic and International Affairs,American University International Law Review,Vol.25,2010,pp.233～234.

由于北太平洋暖流的匯入,白令海峽在一年中冰川覆蓋的時間沒有北極更北地區(qū)那樣長,④See Lynn Mc Nutt,How Does Ice Cover in the Bering Sea Vary from Year to Year?,National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association(NOAA),Bering Climate Essay,undated and unpaginated,at http://www.beringclimate.noaa.gov/essays_mcnutt.html,2 November 2011(observing that ice usually begins forming in the Northern Bering Sea in late fall and lasts until late spring).但這兩個沿岸國家對第234條有關(guān)保護北極環(huán)境規(guī)定的執(zhí)行將可能也適用于白令海峽,因為通過白令海峽的交通運輸要么剛退出北極水域,要么將迅速進入更北的北極水域。然而,這些措施的頒布和執(zhí)行必須“適當顧及航行”。⑤UNCLOS,Art.234.顯然,這種規(guī)定阻止了沿岸國家試圖阻礙或干擾航行,因此,俄羅斯方面試圖褫奪或者說阻止通過白令海峽的自由航行的任何企圖,將可能遭到來自其它國家的抗議,這些抗議的國家包括美國,其立場會在下個部分進行討論。無論怎樣,因為海峽有兩邊,如果俄羅斯的政策不能為航行者所接受,那么通行者會更傾向選擇在美國領(lǐng)海通過海峽;同樣,如果美國征收通過其領(lǐng)海穿越海峽的費用,在交通運輸上的數(shù)量增加只會導(dǎo)致對美國有利的情況,這種情況是另一個北極競爭對手不愿意看到的。①The collection of fees by a riparian state from vessels merely transiting through its territorial sea is not allowed,while charging for special services is.See UNCLOS,Art.26.

蘇聯(lián)使用直線基線確定其海洋區(qū)域的界線,但美國拒絕接受這種方法。②Pacific Ocean,Sea of Japan,Sea of Okhotsk,and Bering Sea:Straight Baselines:USSR, Limits in the Seas,No.107,US State Dept.,Office of the Geographer,1987,at http:// www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/ls107.pdf,p.3,2 December 2011.This source states that many of USSR’s straight baselines“do not meet the international legal criteria for drawing such baselines.”See also Sam Bateman and Clive Schofield,Conference Paper,State Practice Regarding Straight Baselines in East Asia:Legal,Technical and Political Issues in a Changing Environment,presented at Difficulties in Implementing the Provisions of UNCLOS,Monaco,2008,unpaginated(remarking that“[t]he former USSR claimed a system of straight baselines in the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan,which has been protested by the United States”),at http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOS08Folder/Session7-Paper1-Bateman.pdf,2 December 2011.蘇聯(lián)以直線基線劃定的界線,包括了俄羅斯沿岸和四個俄羅斯群島間的若干海峽:維爾基特斯基、紹卡爾斯基、德米特里·拉普捷夫、桑尼科夫。③Katarzyna Zysk,The Evolving Arctic Security Environment,in Stephen Blank ed.,Russia in the Arctic,2011,Strategic Studies Institute,at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute. army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1073,p.108,2 December 2011.據(jù)推測,俄羅斯聯(lián)邦已經(jīng)繼承前蘇聯(lián)的海洋主張,另有聲明除外,④Maritime Claims Reference Manual,US Dept.of Defense,2005[hereinafter MCRM],at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/MCRM.pdf,p.489,2 December 2011.但是直線基線這一規(guī)則在白令海峽劃線問題上賦予了俄羅斯更大的領(lǐng)海范圍;⑤Map:USSR Straight Baseline Claims in the Bering Sea,accompanying Limits in the Seas, No.107,1987,US State Dept.,Office of the Geographer,at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/maps/ls107b.html,2 December 2011.基于這個理由,沒有必要深入評價俄羅斯在《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》框架下的直線基線有效性來判斷其關(guān)于通過白令海峽航行采取的可能立場,然而可能值得注意的是1997年俄羅斯批準《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》時發(fā)布的聲明:雖然聯(lián)邦選擇拒絕根據(jù)《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》對“有關(guān)海洋邊界劃定或那些涉及歷史海灣或權(quán)利”進行強制糾紛解決,但其也明確“反對在過去或未來在簽屬、批準或者同意加入公約時做出的、或基于與公約相關(guān)聯(lián)的任何原因做出的任何違反公約第310條規(guī)定的宣言和聲明”。俄羅斯聯(lián)邦認為無論在何種措詞或名義下,這種宣言和聲明并不能排除或改變公約條款在適用于做出這些宣言和聲明的公約成員國時所產(chǎn)生的法律效力?；谶@個原因,在俄羅斯聯(lián)邦政府處理與其它公約成員國的關(guān)系時,不會考慮這些宣言和聲明”。⑥This declaration may be viewed by clicking“Russian Federation”,at http://www.un. org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm,2 December 2011.從這里可以推斷出,俄羅斯并不認為其對直線基線的使用與《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》的規(guī)定不一致。①See UNCLOS,Arts.298(1)(a)(i),309,310.The US disagrees:according to the MCRM,US Dept.of Defense,2005,at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/MCRM.pdf,p.489,2 December 2011,Russia’s straight baseline claims“are not recognized by the U.S.U.S.protested claims in 1984-1987 and conducted operational assertions in 1982,1984,and 1986.”其有意拒絕通過《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》糾紛解決機制來解決有關(guān)“歷史海灣或權(quán)利”的主張,這是否揭示了對于其直線基線主張的法律地位的不確定性,這是一個值得認真揣摩的問題。

根據(jù)美國國防部所說,“1998年俄羅斯(在其關(guān)于內(nèi)水、領(lǐng)海和專屬經(jīng)濟區(qū)的聯(lián)邦法案中)似乎并沒有撤回關(guān)于歷史海灣的主張”。②MCRM,2005,US Dept.of Defense,at http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/MCRM.pdf,p.489,2 December 2011.相反,俄羅斯似乎并沒有將其內(nèi)水范圍擴展到包括了白令海峽,關(guān)于此,據(jù)作者所知也沒有任何其它相關(guān)法案。

2.國內(nèi)立法

關(guān)于在北極水域航行的俄羅斯立法,已有多位學(xué)識淵博的學(xué)者進行過詳盡分析,③See Erik Franckx,The Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic,Journal of Transnational Law&Policy,Vol.18,2009,p.327;Leonid Tymchenko,The Northern Sea Route:Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic Seas,in Alex G.Oude Elferink and Donald Rothwell ed.,The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2001;R.Douglas Brubaker,The Russian Arctic Straits,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2005.因此本文不再對此進行深究。不過我想說的是,俄羅斯的國內(nèi)立法——盡管國內(nèi)立法比起國際法所要求的來說,授予了更大的執(zhí)行權(quán)和更少的義務(wù),特別是關(guān)于直線基線——早已過時,亟需修改。④Erik Franckx,The Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic,Journal of Transnational Law&Policy,Vol.18,2009,p.342(noting that“substantial changes are to be expected concerning the legal regime applicable to foreign shipping in the Russian Arctic in a not too distant future”).如前面部分所指出,現(xiàn)在外國船舶,雖然是少量的,可以在沒有破冰船服務(wù)下通過北方航道。⑤Michael A.Becker,Russia and the Arctic:Opportunities for Engagement within the Existing Legal Framework Symposium:Russia and the Rule of Law:New Opportunities in Domestic and International Affairs,American University International Law Review,Vol. 25,2010,p.241.這意味著俄羅斯將越來越愿意向外國航運開放北方航道。換個角度來說,俄羅斯自己的立法清楚地表明白令海峽大部分范圍并不構(gòu)成北方航道的一部分,①The relevant legislation provides that the NSR ends“in the east(in the Bering Strait)by the parallel 66 N and the meridian 168 58′37″W.”1990 Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route,approved 14 Sept.,1990,29 Izveshcheniia Moreplavateliam[Notices to Mariners](18 June,1991)(Rus.),quoted in Erik Franckx,The Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic,Journal of Transnational Law&Policy, Vol.18,2009,p.331.This point lies some ten minutes’latitude north of the Diomede Islands,a distance of about 18 km(10 nm).See map 2.因此以白令海峽是北方航道組成部分為由來試圖禁止或阻礙通過海峽的航行的法律依據(jù)是站不住腳的?？傊?前述分析表明俄羅斯在國際義務(wù)之下應(yīng)該授予通過其領(lǐng)海的船舶無害通過權(quán);承認白令海峽是用于國際航行的海峽將會迫使其允許航行者有通過海峽的過境通行權(quán);盡管如此,如本文其它部分所述,俄羅斯將享有有關(guān)在冰封地區(qū)保護環(huán)境的一些權(quán)利;②See sec.IV of the present text and UNCLOS,Art.234.最后,如果俄羅斯能夠使其在監(jiān)管方面作出的努力與美國在白令海峽頒布和執(zhí)行的相關(guān)措施相協(xié)調(diào),那就再好不過了。

(二)美國

美國歷來崇尚航行自由,維護傳統(tǒng)上對于海洋的利用,如航行、飛越。③See Reagan’s Statement on U.S.Oceans Policy,10 March,1983,International Legal Material s,Vol.22,1983,p.464;American Journal of International Law,Vol.77,1983,p. 619.For a detailed account of US protests against“excessive maritime claims”,including restrictions on navigation,see Robert Smith,Navigation Issues in the Law of the Sea,in Kim,Park,Lee&Paik ed.,Maritime Issues in the 1990s:Antarctica,Law of the Sea and Marine Environment,Seoul Press,1991,pp.87～125;See also J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1996.對于白令海峽,美國也想要采用相類似的方式來使用。如前面所指出的,美國關(guān)于過境通行的立場是“眾所周知的”。④J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1996,p.284.羅奇和史密斯引用包括美國發(fā)布的備忘錄和其它外交文件等很有說服力的資料表明:美國希望在用于國際航行的海峽維護過境通行的自由。⑤J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1996,pp.284～287.例如,里根總統(tǒng)明確表明“依據(jù)國際法規(guī)定,比如《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》有關(guān)適用條款,在美國的領(lǐng)海里……所有國家的船舶和飛行器享有通過國際海峽的過境通行權(quán)利?！雹轕residential Proclamation 5928,27 December 1988.Cited in J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1996,p.285.至于軍艦,美國主張其僅在執(zhí)行過境通行時,不會威脅到沿岸國的領(lǐng)土主權(quán)。①Aide-memoire delivered 4 December 1984 from American Embassy Stockholm,State Department telegram 355149,1 December 1984;American Embassy Stockholm telegram 08539,10 December 1984.Cited in J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1996,p. 286.美國認為“過境通行也適用于在通過國際海峽時。”②J.Ashley Roach&Robert W.Smith,United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims,2nded.,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1996,pp.286～287.依據(jù)近期美國國務(wù)院的情況陳述,“過去的執(zhí)政黨(共和黨和民主黨)、美國軍事部門、相關(guān)工業(yè)和其它組織強烈支持加入公約?！雹跢act Sheet on the Law of the Sea Convention,1 July 2011,Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,[emphasis in original],at http://www.state. gov/g/oes/lawofthesea/factsheets/177207.htm,2 December 2011.自從里根時代起,關(guān)于通過國際海峽的過境通行,美國政府的立場從未改變;有關(guān)白令海峽的問題仍然是其是否具備國際海峽航行使用的條件。如上文第二部分的(三)、(四)以及在其它資料中所總結(jié)的,答案毫無疑問是肯定的。④See Arctic Council 2009,Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report,Arctic Council, Norwegian Chairmanship,Oslo,Norway,at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/ en/about/documents/category/62-pame?download=245:the-amsa-2009-report,p. 109,30 November 2011;Donald Rothwell,Arctic Choke Points and the Law of the Sea, Australian National University—ANU College of Law Research Paper No.10～81,2010, p.17(relaying the US military’s view:“Bering Strait East[the US half]and Bering Strait West[the Russian half]are recognized by the US Navy as international straits for the purposes of the LOSC.”).針對這些情況,從政策方面可以穩(wěn)妥地假定美國會盡一切努力以確保在白令海峽通過其領(lǐng)海的所有國家船舶的過境通行權(quán)。

從商業(yè)立場看,不斷增加的交通運輸經(jīng)常會導(dǎo)致稅收的不斷增加(假設(shè)一部分運輸船舶會停靠美國港口或利用其它相關(guān)服務(wù)),這想必也符合美國的發(fā)展利益。如前所述,美國可能希望嚴格規(guī)范北極交通,以促進保護脆弱的北極海洋環(huán)境。⑤See Jerry Beilinson,Oil Drilling in the Arctic Ocean:Is It Safe?,24 June 2011,Popular Mechanics,at http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/oildrilling-in-the-arctic-ocean-is-it-safe,4 November 2011(observing that the conclusion regarding the safety of offshore drilling in the Arctic in a recent USGS study“seems to be that there’s still a great amount we just don’t know”).理想情況下,這些措施將不會由單方面來實施,而是通過適當?shù)膰H平臺,如北極委員會或者國際海事組織來實施:這些組織已經(jīng)發(fā)布了相關(guān)文件,如北極委員會的《北極海運評估報告2009》和國際海事組織近期修訂的《極地水域航行船舶操作指南》。無論如何,環(huán)境保護措施不必過度地干擾航行自由?？傊?美

國極不可能會試圖阻礙在白令海峽合理使用過境通行權(quán)。①See Wang ZeLin,Research on the Legal Status of Arctic Passage,Doctoral Thesis,Xiamen University,2011(Ch.),p.33(recounting the US interpretation that straits may be considered SUFINs regardless of the point in time at which international navigation commences);William Schachte,International Straits and Navigational Freedoms,Remarks prepared for presentation to the 26th Law of the Sea Institute Annual Conference Genoa, Italy,1992(relating the US’s view that navigational freedoms are paramount and should be preserved to the fullest extent possible),at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65946.pdf,30 November 2011.See also Christopher Mark Macneill,Gaining Command and Control of the Northwest Passage:Strait Talk on Sovereignty,Transportation Law Journal,Vol.34,2007,pp.356～364(reiterating US’s stance toward the freedom of navigation through the Northwest Passage).

四、未來白令海峽管理的若干建議

白令海峽沿岸兩國在鼓勵自由航行和貿(mào)易的同時保護脆弱的北極海洋環(huán)境,以便有效管理白令海峽,兩國在處理管理事務(wù)時有許多選擇,在海峽被頻繁用于商貿(mào)船舶通行前這些措施的一部分或全部就可以先一步實施。當然白令海峽的某些管理特權(quán)應(yīng)授予美國和俄羅斯,因為在白令海峽只有其領(lǐng)海,而沒有公海。這些特權(quán)中就可能包括對助航設(shè)備或領(lǐng)航費等特殊服務(wù)支出進行征稅;②This would be fully in accordance with UNCLOS,Art.26,which stipulates:(1)No charge may be levied upon foreign ships by reason only of their passage through the territorial sea;and(2)Charges may be levied upon a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea as payment only for specific services rendered to the ship.These charges shall be levied without discrimination.外國船舶也必須遵守根據(jù)國際法頒布的本地法規(guī),包括國內(nèi)環(huán)境法、關(guān)稅法或者移民法。③See UNCLOS,Art.42(4).雖然這樣說,沿岸國家還要與相關(guān)國際組織——特別是北極委員會和國際海事組織——協(xié)作、合作起草和實施關(guān)于海峽航行的法案,這是為謹慎起見,甚至也是必要的。在管理白令海峽時,國際海事組織的《極地水域航行船舶操作指南》毫無疑問是一個有用的工具,盡管其在法律上不具約束性。④?ystein Jensen,The IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters: From Voluntary to Mandatory Tool for Navigation Safety and Environmental Protection?, 2007,Fridtjof Nansen Institute,(stating the desirability of establishing binding legal requirements for ships operating in polar waters),at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNIR0207.pdf,pp.23～24,4 November 2011.《指南》在2009年修訂,但沒有達到具有法律約束的地位。⑤Developing a Mandatory Polar Code-Progress and Gaps,Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition,34thAntarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Buenos Aires 2011,at http:// asoc.org/storage/documents/Meetings/ATCM/XXXIV/Developing_a_Mandatory_Polar_ Code___Progress_and_Gaps.pdf,p.3,30 November 2011.現(xiàn)正在進行談判,以通過國際海事組織公布一個有約束力的極地法典,這可能在2013年實現(xiàn)。①Developing a Mandatory Polar Code-Progress and Gaps,Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition,34thAntarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Buenos Aires 2011,at http:// asoc.org/storage/documents/Meetings/ATCM/XXXIV/Developing_a_Mandatory_Polar _Code___Progress_and_Gaps.pdf,p.6,30 November 2011.

兩個沿岸國的直接合作也將是最合適的。通過科學(xué)知識、專業(yè)調(diào)查和評估的公開共享,兩國將更能有準備地合作設(shè)計理想的大洋航線,②UNCLOS,Art.41.認定并減輕環(huán)境問題,更經(jīng)濟有效地安排充足的助航設(shè)備和通信設(shè)備;③UNCLOS,Art.43.有了政治和諧局面并通過團結(jié)合作,雙方能一同規(guī)劃一個行政管理框架以保護雙方的利益,并避免被其它國家鉆漏洞(如上文所提到的)。④See sec.Ⅲ(A)of the present text.雙方在白令海峽和楚克奇海已經(jīng)就漏油預(yù)防和處理達成了初步協(xié)議,⑤The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas in Emergency Situations(signed 11 May 1989,entered into force 17 August 1989),U.N.T.S.,No.2190,p.180.然而鑒于協(xié)議適用范圍的特定性,其它重要的環(huán)境因素沒有包括在其中?！侗睒O海運評估報告2009》指出了關(guān)于在白令海峽建立安全、可持續(xù)的航行條件所涉及的尚未解決的若干關(guān)注點。⑥Arctic Council 2009,Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report,Arctic Council, Norwegian Chairmanship,Oslo,Norway,at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/ en/about/documents/category/62-pame?download=245:the-amsa-2009-report,p. 109,30 November 2011:current areas in need of improvement include emergency response such as search and rescue;lack of differential GPS coverage,sufficient navigational aids, very-high frequency communication services and a traffic separation scheme.如果費用、規(guī)范和要求是有既定標準的,那么當外國船舶通過一個國家的領(lǐng)海而不是另一個國家的領(lǐng)海時,是不存在所謂的優(yōu)先問題的;雖然交通運輸量的不平等不會必然引起緊張,但是如果考慮財政問題的話,那么就有存在緊張的可能性:例如,如果更多的船舶通過一個國家領(lǐng)海而穿越海峽,那么此國家應(yīng)承擔更大的財政負擔嗎?關(guān)于這一點,為了適當管理白令海峽,應(yīng)當進行跨國性磋商,以謀求在環(huán)境、航行或其它相關(guān)費用怎樣征收上達成一致。

在為白令海峽管理設(shè)計管理制度時,沿岸國家可以參照歷史較為悠久的用于國際航行的海峽——在這些實例中最值得注意的或許是馬六甲和新加坡海峽。①For pre-UNCLOS commentaries on Malacca Straits administration,see Michael Leifer, Malacca,Singapore and Indonesia,Sijthoff and Noordhoff,1978;See also Nadaisan Logaraj,Navigational Safety,Oil Pollution and Passage in the Straits of Malacca,Malaya Law Review,Vol.20,1978,p.287.For more current treatments,see Lim Lei Theng,Safety of Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:Modalities of Cooperation, Rapporteur’s Report,Singapore Journal of International&Comparative Law,Vol.2, 1998,p.254;Nihanünlü,Straits of Malacca,International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law,Vol.21,No.4,2006,p.539.諸如預(yù)防污染、船舶標準、法律執(zhí)行和大洋航線設(shè)計等問題,以前的解決辦法可以用來參考,必要時,可以做一定的修訂以適合北極環(huán)境。建立合適的白令海峽管理機制的一個最重要問題是如何獲取充足的經(jīng)費。在馬六甲海峽,如浮標和信號燈等助航設(shè)備的供給和維護經(jīng)費的主要來源是日本的馬六甲海峽委員會。②Gurpreet S.Singhota,The IMO’s Role in Promoting Safety of Navigation and Control of Marine Pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,Singapore Journal of International&Comparative Law,Vol.2,1998,p.291.這說明除了沿岸國,其他利益相關(guān)方會樂意支付必要的費用以滿足達到在白令海峽安全航行的環(huán)境。因此俄美應(yīng)考慮識別那些可能會認為北極安全航行與其利益攸關(guān)的主體。一些候選者包括亞洲海運“大戶”:中國、日本、中國香港、中國臺灣和韓國;其它的頻繁使用者可能還有挪威、加拿大、冰島和英國。當然,一些私營部門——特別是海運業(yè)——也應(yīng)值得考慮。

在過去幾年里,馬六甲海峽沿岸國家(即印度尼西亞、馬來西亞和新加坡)已經(jīng)與國際海事組織和其它使用海峽的國家合作,以提高海峽的安全和治安水平,全方位解決管理問題。③See Joshua H.Ho,Enhancing Safety,Security,and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:The Cooperative Mechanism,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,p.233.這種合作機制產(chǎn)生的一個值得注意的成果是海上電子航線,一個“航行支持和管理系統(tǒng),其使海上環(huán)境管理與保護系統(tǒng)和最先進的海洋航行技術(shù)相結(jié)合。”④Joshua H.Ho,Enhancing Safety,Security,and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:The Cooperative Mechanism,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,p.236.喬休爾·胡解釋道:“海上電子航線會給船舶實時提供重要的航海信息,如潮汐和水流信息,并且實現(xiàn)集成電子導(dǎo)航。海上環(huán)境管理與保護系統(tǒng)將能在地圖上標出石油和化學(xué)溢出物的軌跡,提供溢出損失評估,監(jiān)控沿岸和海洋環(huán)境,提供環(huán)境影響評價。海上電子航線能使每一艘船在整體交通管理系統(tǒng)之下精確航行,其將顯著地增加船舶安全和航行安全,從而降低可能引起災(zāi)難性環(huán)境污染事故發(fā)生的風險?！雹軯oshua H.Ho,Enhancing Safety,Security,and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:The Cooperative Mechanism,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,p.236.這一系統(tǒng)的安裝尚未完成。這一項規(guī)模龐大的工程不僅顯示了從利益相關(guān)方獲得經(jīng)費的可行性,而且特別反映了沿岸國和使用國在實施此類工程時希望能得到國際海事組織的幫助。

這一使用國/沿岸國聯(lián)合體在吉隆坡舉行的2006年會議上在六個主要工程建議書的基礎(chǔ)上創(chuàng)設(shè)了一個“合作機制”,包括“合作做好并準備相關(guān)力量以應(yīng)對發(fā)生在馬六甲海峽和新加坡海峽的有毒物質(zhì)危險,包括建立有毒物質(zhì)應(yīng)急中心,”①Joshua H.Ho,Enhancing Safety,Security,and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:The Cooperative Mechanism,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,p.237.以及“為馬六甲和新加坡海峽建立一個潮汐、水流和風速測定系統(tǒng),以提高航行安全和海洋環(huán)境保護水平?！雹贘oshua H.Ho,Enhancing Safety,Security,and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore:The Cooperative Mechanism,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.40,2009,p.238.美俄應(yīng)考慮在白令海峽其它利益相關(guān)方和國際海事組織的幫助下實施類似工程,特別是在未來大量石油、天然氣和其它有毒物質(zhì)通過白令海峽運輸?shù)那闆r下。因為白令海峽相對較淺,公開可用的頻繁、精確的水文測量結(jié)果也會有助于安全地通過海峽。美國海岸警衛(wèi)隊高頻度的船舶檢查和實施“嚴厲的”處罰有助于減少在美國水域運行的不適格船舶。③Ho-Sam Bang,Is Port-State Control an Effective Means to Combat Vessel-Source Pollution?An Empirical Survey of the Practical Exercise by Port States of Their Powers of Control,International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law,Vol.23,2008,p.744.為了防止不適格船舶繞道經(jīng)由規(guī)制相對松弛(如果情況果真如此)的俄羅斯水域通過,兩國有必要通過諒解備忘錄或者一些類似文書達成一致,以取得船舶檢查的一致并提高通過海峽的整體航行質(zhì)量。

最后,為方便起見,俄美也可以考慮在白令海峽建立一種類似公路的通行規(guī)則:海峽已被代奧米德群島天然地分成兩個部分,代奧米德群島可以作為中線,在兩邊的航行交通方向相反。在理論上,向北方航行的船舶在美國領(lǐng)海這邊通過,向南方航行的船舶在俄羅斯領(lǐng)海這邊通過,經(jīng)由兩國的交通運輸量會大致相等;同時碰撞風險將會減少,因為一般情況下所有船舶將會有序通過。在兩個代奧米德群島間包括國界的狹窄分水線處,航行可以被禁止,當然特殊情況除外。

五、結(jié) 論

北極航行的興起現(xiàn)在僅僅是一個開始。隨著北極冰層的進一步融化,縮短航線里程這個有利條件將會吸引不少航行者向北橫穿北極航道。在途中,這些船舶可能會穿過白令海峽。因為白令海峽可能擁有的地緣政治地位,應(yīng)立即解決其法律地位問題,從而有利于北極商業(yè)航行的持續(xù)穩(wěn)定和繁榮。白令海峽應(yīng)被視為用于國際航行的海峽,在此可以行使過境通行權(quán)。沿岸國應(yīng)尊重此權(quán)利,但同時努力適當管理白令海峽以保護北極海洋環(huán)境的完整性。俄美應(yīng)努力加強彼此的合作,以及與使用國和相關(guān)國際組織的合作,以使如大洋航線、船舶標準、法律執(zhí)行、收費標準、通信設(shè)備、助航設(shè)備等系統(tǒng)制度合理化。通過學(xué)習(xí)用于國際航行海峽管理的早先范例,俄羅斯、美國和世界其它國家將確定能在白令海峽建立一個健全、可持續(xù)的管理框架體系。

附:

Figure 1UNEP/GRID-Arendal.Arctic sea routes—Northern sea route and Northwest passage. UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library(2007).Available at:http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/arctic-sea-routes-northern-sea-route-and-northwest-passage. Accessed 13 Oct 2011.

Map 1NOAA,Office of Coast Survey.Map of US Maritime Zones/Boundaries.Available at http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/csdl/mbound.htm(last updated 26 May 2011).Accessed 11 Oct 2011.Image captured via Google Earth.本圖描繪了根據(jù)1990美蘇邊界協(xié)議所確定的俄美國界。

Map 2NOAA,Office of Coast Survey.Map of US Maritime Zones/Boundaries.Available at http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/csdl/mbound.htm(last updated 26 May 2011).Accessed 11 Oct 2011.Image captured via Google Earth.本圖為上圖所包含的邊界部分的特寫圖像。其顯示了邊界線沿代奧米德群島分開;請注意在小代奧米德島(美國)和威爾士王子角間僅有領(lǐng)海存在。

Map 3Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report,p.107.Vessel traffic in the Bering Strait during the summer of 2004.

(中譯:鄧云成 上海交通大學(xué)凱原法學(xué)院;編輯:韓 旭)

*Joshua Owens,所在單位:臺灣國立金門大學(xué)海洋事務(wù)研究所。電子郵箱:jko113@gmail. com。