European Powers’Engagement in the Indian Ocean:Features,Motives and Implications

Zeng Xiangyu

The Indian Ocean is currently a major hub of international political and economic activities.1 Since 2017， the UK， France， Germany， and other European powers have all stepped up their engagement in the Indian Ocean， which has turned it into a hotspot where strategic coordination and policy differences among major powers are intertwined. Assessing this new situation with focus on the impact of European powersengagement in the Indian Ocean is of great practical significance not only for a comprehensive understanding of the synergies and divergences of major powers policies in the Indian Ocean， and for an objective analysis of the evolution and development of the situation in this area， but also for the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative and the expansion of cooperation between China and other major powers in the region.

Main Features of European Powers Engagement in the Indian Ocean

European powers have long been involved in the Indian Ocean. The British military has occupied the Chagos Archipelago in the central Indian Ocean for a long time. Ever since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980， the UK has been sending ships to the Persian Gulf for regular patrols， known as Operation Kipion. Between 2003 and 2011， the British navy intervened in the Gulf as part of its “peacekeeping” operations， helping Iraq protect its two oil platforms and train its naval forces.2 France has two overseas provinces and millions of citizens in the Indian Ocean region. Besides， it has strong military and political influence in the southwestern Indian Ocean， with a permanently stationed garrison of more than 3，000 soldiers.3 In May 2009， France started the use of its military base in the Middle East. Germany has also increased its presence in the Indian Ocean in recent years， with its warships deployed in the Arabian Sea alongside US ships in 2010 and 2013.4

In addition， European powers are actively participating in multilateral naval mechanisms in the northwestern Indian Ocean. The UK was an active participant in NATOs anti-piracy Operation Ocean Shield in the area from August 2009 until the end of the operation in December 2016.5 Moreover， the UK， France， Germany and other European countries have been jointly carrying out Operation Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore， European powers were actively involved in the Combined Maritime Forces（CMF） led by the United States， with the UK， France and Germany serving as command of their combined task forces for 13 times， 11 times and 5 times respectively.6

After the United States re-proposed the concept of “Indo-Pacific”at the end of 2017， the UK， France， and Germany followed suit and even took the initiative， with France being the most prominent， to upgrade their involvement in the Indian Ocean from relatively scattered policy measures to a systematic strategic design. However， the shifts in the strategies of the European powers served only to further upgrade their original policies in the Indian Ocean. In implementing their respective visions， there is a strong tendency for these powers to pursue their economic interests， geopolitical influence， and great-power strategies. At present， the upgraded involvement of the UK， France and Germany in the Indian Ocean mainly has three characteristics.

Integrating the Indian Ocean policy into the Indo-Pacific strategy

The Indo-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean are closely related but not identical. Due to various considerations， the UK， France， Germany and other European powers have not formulated clear strategies for the Indian Ocean. Instead， they have launched their own Indo-Pacific strategies， incorporating strategic considerations for the Indian Ocean into their respective Indo-Pacific strategies.

After Brexit， the UK was busy with a variety of complex affairs. Thus， it did not launch its Indo-Pacific strategy until March 2021， when it released its policy document “Global Britain in a Competitive Age.” The document emphasized that “the Indo-Pacific region matters to the UK： it is critical to our economy， our security and our global ambition to support open societies，” making clear that the UK aims to rebalance its strategic focus towards the region and become the European power with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific by 2030.7

France was the first European power to embrace the Indo-Pacific narrative. In May 2018， President Emmanuel Macron took the lead in expressing his endorsement of the Indo-Pacific concept. Since then， France has issued or updated five Indo-Pacific policy documents. In 2018， Frances Ministry of the Armed Forces issued “France and Security in the IndoPacific，” which defined the Indo-Pacific as a vast area stretching from the African coastline to the seabed of America across the entire Indian and Pacific Oceans， with special emphasis on Frances unique role in the region.8 In May 2019， the Armed Forces Ministry further issued “Frances Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific，” declaring that France is an Indo-Pacific power closely linked to the regions security situation.9 Frances Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs has since released several policy documents including“Frances Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific” （April 2021） and “Frances IndoPacific Strategy” （published in July 2021 and updated in February 2022）， emphasizing that the Indo-Pacific strategy has become the priority of Frances foreign policy and soft power efforts.10 The ministry also subdivided the countrys Indian Ocean interests into developing the blue economy， enhancing connectivity， addressing climate change， protecting biodiversity， safeguarding maritime security， and promoting people-to-people and cultural exchanges.11

Germany has also taken a positive attitude toward the Indo-Pacific concept. In September 2020， Germany launched “Germany-Europe-Asia： Shaping the 21st Century Together” as its policy guideline that specifies the Indo-Pacific region as a priority agenda of Germanys foreign policy.12 The Indo-Pacific region defined in the guideline covers the entire Indian and Pacific Oceans，13 similar to the French version. In practice， Germanys Indo-Pacific strategy is characterized by an openly framed concept， a comprehensive account of interests and demands， multilateralism in practical approach， and concreteness in policy initiatives.14

Enhancing security presence

Deploying forces and conducting military exercises are the main levers for European powers to engage in Indian Ocean affairs. After 1971， the UK was forced to withdraw from the Indian Ocean15 and only retained a small British Indian Ocean Territory （BIOT） with its military facilities on Diego Garcia Island.16 It was only after Brexit in 2016 that the UK decided to return to East of Suez. In autumn 2017， the UK opened a naval support facility at the Salman Port in Bahrain， which houses more than 300 British troops. In October 2018， the UK opened a joint logistics support base at Duqm， Oman， which can support British nuclear submarines and its aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth.17 In September 2020， the UK announced that it would spend 23.8 million pounds （about $30 million） to triple the size of its base at Duqm and build a new dry dock， which， upon completion， could be used to dock British aircraft carriers and support training activities of the British army.18 In September 2021， Tony Radakin， First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff， publicly expressed the hope that “we want to have the ships that are operating much more strongly with Oman， with India， using Diego Garcia and operating down the east coast of Africa.”19 The statement sparked speculation that the UK would move further to Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean， after returning to the Middle East in the northwestern Indian Ocean.

In addition to permanent forces， the British navy is also active in Indian Ocean operations. In September 2021， British River-class patrol vessels HMS Tamar and HMS Spey set sail from the UK for a long-term engagement in the Indo-Pacific， which is expected to last for five years. In July 2021， the British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and its carrier strike group were dispatched to conduct a joint exercise called Exercise Konkan with the Indian navy in the Bay of Bengal.20 In October of the same year， the two countries launched their maiden joint tri-service Exercise Konkan Shakti.21

France has been operating in the Indian Ocean for many years and has already established a considerable military presence in the southwestern and northwestern Indian Ocean. Frances security layout in the southwestern Indian Ocean is centered in La Réunion， where about 1，600 military22 and 300 non-military personnel of the French Armed Forces are stationed in the Southern Indian Ocean Zone （FAZSOI）， whose commander reports directly to French Chief of Staff.23 Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and the United Arab Emirates in the Persian Gulf region complement each other as the gravity of Frances maritime security presence in the northwestern Indian Ocean. The Djibouti base is Frances largest overseas military base with 1，450 troops.24 Frances Camp de la Paix in the UAE， which guards the Strait of Hormuz and hosts about 650 French troops， is composed of a naval camp， an air force camp and an army training camp. As the headquarters of the French Forces in the United Arab Emirates （FFEAU）， the naval camp at the Zayed Port can harbor all types of French vessels except aircraft carriers. If necessary， French aircraft carriers can also dock at the port.25

In the past two years， France has further strengthened its security layout in the Indian Ocean with joint security operations and military exercises. In February 2020， the European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz （EMASOH） was officially launched with the participation of eight European countries including France， Germany and Italy. Its military branch， known as AGENOR， focuses on monitoring shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf， the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. Operation AGENOR was initiated by France， headquartered at the French naval camp in the UAE， and led by a French combatant commander.26 In September 2020， France deployed the nuclear attack submarine SSN émeraude and the support vessel BSAM Seine to patrol the Indian and Pacific oceans.27 France and India have long conducted Varuna joint naval exercises. In April 2021， the two countries navies launched their 19th Varuna exercise in the Indian Ocean. On the French side， the Charles de Gaulle nuclear-powered carrier strike group， the Rafale marine fighter jets， and several naval helicopters participated in the exercise.28 From March to April 2022， the latest bilateral exercise was held in the Arabian Sea.

By contrast， Germany， which has no overseas territories or military bases in the Indian Ocean， has kept a low profile. In the past two years，Germany has significantly increased its security involvement in the Indian Ocean through ship visits， escort operations and small-scale exercises. In early March 2020， Germany announced plans to send its frigate FGS Hamburg to the Indian Ocean， with a stop at Frances La Réunion and then all the way to Australia， before being forced to postpone the trip due to the impact of COVID-19.29 In July 2021， Germany announced the deployment of the frigate FGS Bayern through the Mediterranean Sea， the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean to Australia and East Asia.30 The frigate visited Pakistan， Australia， Singapore， Sri Lanka， India and other countries along the Indian Ocean coasts. In January 2022， Bayern arrived at the Colombo port for a joint exercise with the Sri Lankan navy，31 followed by a visit to Indias Mumbai.

Stepping up participation in Indian Ocean regional mechanisms

In recent years， European powers have constructed new regional mechanisms in the Indian Ocean. In September 2021， the UK， the US and Australia launched the AUKUS trilateral security partnership， and the US has publicly expressed its intention to use AUKUS to realize coordination between its own Indo-Pacific strategy and those of its European partners.32 Germanys strategy is to strengthen collaboration with regional， subregional and functional mechanisms simultaneously. To this end， Germany has formally become a dialogue partner of the Indian Ocean Rim Association （IORA）， has planned to strengthen dialogue with the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation（BIMSTEC）， and is seeking institutional collaboration with regional partners in the areas of maritime security and disaster management. It also plans to join the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia （ReCAAP）33 and contribute to anti-piracy cooperation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

In contrast to Germany， Frances participation in Indian Ocean regional mechanisms is guided by stronger geopolitical considerations. While attaching great importance to regional mechanisms， it aims for a complete geopolitical layout in the Indian Ocean through multiple subregional mechanisms. After becoming an observer state of IORA in 2001， France became a full member of the association in December 2020，34 further expanding its influence. France is also a founding member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and has assumed its presidency for two years since June 2021. During this period， France has hosted a number of exchange activities， which has effectively enhanced its influence.

In recent years， France has continually implemented a differentiated geo-strategy in different parts of the Indian Ocean region. By means of sub-regional mechanisms， France， while stabilizing its presence in the southwestern Indian Ocean and consolidating its foothold in the northwest（the Middle East）， has been building strategic fulcrums in the north and southeast of the region.

In the southwest， the Indian Ocean Commission （IOC）， which was established by France， Mauritius， Madagascar， Seychelles， and Comoros， has admitted China， Japan， India， the United Nations， the European Union and the International Organization of La Francophonie as observer members. The commission， which has French as its official language， is the de facto community of French-speaking countries in the southwestern Indian Ocean region. In July 2020， France took over the post of secretary-general of the IOC， and in May 2021， it assumed the commissions presidency， both of which have consolidated Frances force deployment and influence in the southwestern Indian Ocean.35

In the northwestern Indian Ocean， Macron visited the UAE， Qatar and Saudi Arabia in December 2021 and concluded a weapons contract worth $18 billion.36 Then French Defense Minister Florence Parly said in early 2022 that France was providing aerial surveillance support to the UAE with Rafale fighter jets stationed at its air base in Abu Dhabi.37

In northern and southeastern Indian Ocean， where France traditionally lacks influence， it has actively promoted the trilateral dialogue mechanism between France， India and Australia. During a visit to Australia in May 2018， Macron called for the creation of the Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis， describing it as “key for the region and our joint objectives in the IndianPacific region.”38 Pushed by France， foreign ministers of the three countries held their first ministerial dialogue in May 2021， emphasizing that their trilateral cooperation is based on the three pillars of maritime safety and security， marine and environmental cooperation， and multilateral engagement.39 It is in this context that France-India relations continue to deepen. In March 2020 and May 2022， the Indian navys P8I aircraft carried out reconnaissance missions in collaboration with the French military in La Réunion.40

Motives for European Powers Engagement

The increased involvement of European powers such as the UK， France and Germany in the Indian Ocean reflects a series of deep and complex considerations surrounding economic development， geopolitics and global strategy.

Safeguarding economic interests

The UK， France， Germany and other European powers are all deepening their involvement in the Indian Ocean not only to safeguard their own economic interests in the region， but also to ensure that European countries can safely and conveniently use the shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean region is home to important economic partners of the European powers. In 2020， the total trade volume of the UK， France and Germany with 24 major countries around the Indian Ocean reached $142.7 billion， $56.1 billion and $89 billion respectively.41 Since the beginning of the 21st century， the three countries have invested $54.1 billion in India alone， the largest emerging market in the region. By 2020， there had been 572 British companies in India， employing nearly 420，000 people， and about 1，000 French companies with more than 320，000 employees.42

Europes trade with most Asian countries， especially in East and Southeast Asia， is also highly dependent on Indian Ocean routes. According to some estimates， 25% of the worlds shipping （about 2，000 ships a day） passes through the Strait of Malacca，43 a large portion of which carry imports and exports of Europe. In 2020， the combined trade volume of the UK， France and Germany with China （including Hong Kong and Macao）， Japan，the ROK and Vietnam reached $598.9 billion， equivalent to 12.78% of the three countries total foreign trade.44 Between 2017 and 2020， the annual trade volume between China and all European countries except Russia expanded from $671.9 billion to $800.1 billion， with the total volume approaching $3 trillion.45 Except a small amount of air and rail transport， most trade between China and Europe transit through the shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean.

In view of this， economic interests naturally become an important consideration for European powers in their engagement in the Indian Ocean. In describing its vision of a “Global Britain” and its Indo-Pacific

46 pivot， the UK puts economic opportunities first， emphasizing that much of the UKs trade with Asia depends on shipping that goes through a range of Indo-Pacific choke points.47 In order to make full use of the economic opportunities， the UK envisages concluding new bilateral trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand， building an Enhanced Trade Partnership with India as a stepping stone towards a comprehensive trade deal， and acceding to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership （CPTPP）， which has incorporated Australia， Singapore， Malaysia and several other Indian Ocean countries， to secure increased trade and investment opportunities.48 In the foreword by Macron to “Frances Indo-Pacific Strategy，” the economic aspect was regarded as the second of the four pillars of its Indo-Pacific policy. The document emphasized the need of promoting export in areas such as the blue economy by resorting to export support instruments.49 Germany also acknowledges that its prosperity depends on open shipping routes， arguing that millions of jobs in the country depend on these trade and investment relations.50 In order to continuously expand its competitive advantage and improve market access， Germany has signaled great interest in being involved in shaping the IndoPacific region.51

Expanding geopolitical influence

Both the UK and France have territories in the Indian Ocean and thus consider themselves regional countries. The UK was once even a colonial hegemon in the Indian Ocean region. Its Diego Garcia Island in the central Indian Ocean was opened to the US military as early as 1966， where the facilities were nominally shared by the UK and the US， but in fact were completely dominated by the US. The lack of independent and sustained support for the UKs strategic layout in the Indian Ocean has put it in a disadvantageous position. Following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980， the British navy resumed sending ships to the Persian Gulf for regular patrols， a practice that continues even today. Since 1986， sailors， soldiers and air crews from the UK and Oman have periodically come together to train and reinforce their long-standing military alliance. Between 2003 and 2011， the British navy conducted so-called “peacekeeping operations” off the coast of Iraq.52 Despite this， the UK still lacked a stable foothold in the northwestern Indian Ocean. It was not until the opening of naval support facilities at t he Salman Port in 2017 and at the Duqm base the following year that this unfavorable situation changed substantially and greatly enhanced Britains influence in the northwestern Indian Ocean.

Unlike Britain， France has long maintained a strong presence in the Indian Ocean region. In southwestern and southern Indian Ocean， France has three overseas territories， namely La Réunion， Mayotte and the French Southern and Antarctic Lands （TAAF）. The three territories occupy a total area of slightly more than 10，000 square kilometers， with a population of over 1 million. Their exclusive economic zones （EEZs） combined cover 20% of Frances total EEZs. France has a special influence in the southwestern Indian Ocean， and the French navy has its largest overseas base in Djibouti in the northwestern Indian Ocean. Nevertheless， Frances traditional strategic layout in the Indian Ocean still has defects and hidden dangers. On the one hand， this layout is heavily biased towards the western part（especially the southwest） of the Indian Ocean， with little influence in central， northern and southeastern Indian Ocean， which is not completely consistent with Frances self-expected positioning as a great power. On the other hand， the strategic layout of La Réunion in the south and Djibouti in the north overlaps heavily with Frances security presence in Africa， which in effect means that security deployment resources in the two major strategic spaces of Africa and the Indian Ocean are extremely limited. Although this might bring advantages in saving resources and could slightly increase effectiveness， it is not a long-term solution. In order to change the situation， France has established large bases and stationed troops in the UAE， dispatched naval forces to regularly patrol Middle East waters， enhanced trilateral relations between France， India and Australia， and strengthened the French-Indian partnership， all with the aim of compensating for Frances geopolitical weakness in the Indian Ocean and building a more comprehensive strategic influence in the region. Up to now， this policy has achieved obvious results.

Germany has deliberately kept a low profile in politics and security， reluctant to highlight the geopolitical significance of its actions. But Germanys return to the Indian Ocean has indeed increased its political influence in the region， which has recently emboldened some senior German officials to utter some rather ostentatious political signals. For example， in January 2022， Kay-Achim Sch？nbach， Chief of the German Navy， visited India and delivered a speech on Germanys Indo-Pacific strategy. Describing India as an important strategic partner in the region， he said that both nations should explore avenues to strengthen naval cooperation and enhance strategic engagement.53

Supporting major-power strategy

The fundamental motive of European powers to get involved in the Indian Ocean is to consolidate their status as major powers and enhance their political influence in the world. After the Brexit referendum in June 2016， the UK has lost the EUs backing， and its special relationship with the US alone is far from enough to support its all-round great-power status. In this context， the UK launched the idea of “Global Britain” only one month after Brexit， making the “pivot to the Indo-Pacific” increasingly a focal point of British foreign policy. On a visit to Bahrain as British Foreign Secretary in December 2016， Boris Johnson declared that “Britain is back east of Suez.”54 It is not hard to see that the UKs return to the Indian Ocean serves not only to expand its influence in the region but is also an important means to maintain and even improve its status as a great power.

France has long pursued the notion of “Gaullism” to safeguard its unique position in international politics. Macron， who took office in May 2017， emphasized independent major-country diplomacy and even publicly said that NATO was “brain dead.” France was the first country in Europe to embrace the concept of the Indo-Pacific， which includes the Indian Ocean， as an opportunity to reinvigorate its status as a great power. Macron publicly described France as a “full-fledged Indo-Pacific state” and proposed a comprehensive Indo Pacific strategy that involves concrete and diversified actions carried out in four large areas or “pillars”： 1） security and defense； 2） economy， connectivity， research， and innovation； 3） multilateralism and the rule of law； and 4） climate change， biodiversity， and sustainable management of oceans.55 Unlike the UK and Germany， which primarily highlight economic considerations， Frances Indian Ocean policy and its Indo-Pacific strategy clearly place security and defense at the top of the agenda， attempting to demonstrate its strength in traditional and non-traditional security fields. This preference clearly reflects Frances great-power ambition to increase its global political influence by participating in Indian Ocean affairs.

After the end of the Cold War， Germany began to gradually expand its political influence by actively promoting the EU integration process， seeking to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and increasing its presence in hotspot areas. In September 2020， Germany released its guidelines on the Indo-Pacific， expounding the necessity to participate in Indian Ocean affairs. The document points out that the influence of the Indo-Pacific region， which covers the entire Indian Ocean， on the future international order stands above any other factor， and stresses that Germany must expand its involvement in regional affairs.56 Making international contributions through deepening its participation in Indian Ocean affairs has become an important means for Germany to enhance its status as a great power.

Impact of European Powers Engagement

The enhanced involvement by the UK， France， Germany and other European powers in the Indian Ocean has led to significant changes in the regional landscape.

Increasing militarization of the Indian Ocean

The greater involvement of major powers in the Indian Ocean has resulted in a clearly perceptible militarization of the region. Since the United States announced its “return to the Asia-Pacific，” especially after implementing its Indo-Pacific strategy， the European powers have made efforts to strengthen their presence in the Indian Ocean. The UK opened a naval support facility in Bahrain and a joint logistics support base at Duqm， Oman. About 3，700 French army， navy and air force personnel are stationed in La Réunion， Djibouti and the UAE. French naval vessels， including aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines， have strengthened their patrol， escort， and exercise activities in the Indian Ocean. Germany， despite keeping a relatively low profile， is also expanding its naval activities from the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters to the entire Indian Ocean.

Arms exports from European powers have also pooled into the Indian Ocean region. The UK， France and Germany are the worlds sixth， third and fourth largest exporters of arms， accounting for 4.2%， 6.8% and 6.4% of the worlds arms exports from 2014 to 2018， respectively.57 During this period， the Indian Ocean region， which hosts four of the worlds top five arms buyers， namely Saudi Arabia， India， Egypt and Australia， was the worlds leading importer of arms， accounting for 51% of global imports.58 The region is also a major customer for arms exports from European powers. According to statistics， 80.4%， 62% and 45% of arms sales from the UK， France and Germany went to the Indian Ocean region during the same period respectively.59 The UKs three largest arms export customers， namely Saudi Arabia， Oman and Indonesia， are all located in the region， and their purchases account for 70% of the countrys total arms exports. The top three buyers of French arms—Egypt， India and Saudi Arabia—are also from the Indian Ocean region， and their total procurement accounts for 45.2% of Frances arms exports.60 All in all， with their military deployments and arms exports， the European powers have significantly intensified the militarization trends in the Indian Ocean region.

Strengthening Indias strategic advantage

In the course of their involvement in the Indian Ocean， all European powers have proposed to enhance their partnerships with India as a major lever to expand their influence in the region. In its vision of “Global Britain，” the UK plans to promote defense cooperation with India to improve the security level of the Indian Ocean region.61 As early as 2018， France and India issued the Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region， which emphasized the need for both sides to strengthen joint maritime exercises and enhance maritime domain awareness in the region.62 Frances partnership with India was even put at the top in the document “Frances Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific，” as deepening the main thrusts of the France-India partnership （defense， nuclear， space， etc.） has been accompanied more recently by swift growth in bilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific， particularly with regards to maritime security， renewable energy and marine pollution. France and India are also going to take joint actions， especially within Indian Ocean regional organizations including the IORA and the IOC.63 Germany also attaches importance to the role of India as a nuclear-armed regional power in the Indo-Pacific， estimating that India will soon become the worlds fourth largest economy. For Germany， its relationship with India should be built on the basis of multi-field cooperation， and the two countries should jointly promote the reform of the UN Security Council.64 To win India over， European powers are also more willing to accommodate Indias concerns. For example， when France held the first Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in Paris in February 2022 as the EUs rotating presidency， it did not invite Pakistan， also a coastal state in the Indian Ocean， out of consideration for France-India relations.

Although this approach towards India by the European powers undoubtedly serves primarily their own interests， it has nevertheless put India in a position to benefit in multiple ways. Compared with major powers like China and Russia which face serious opposition and even containment， or regional powers like Iran and Pakistan which are frequently sidelined， India is indeed in a more favorable strategic situation.

Producing limited synergies with the US Indo-Pacific strategy

The further involvement of European powers in the Indian Ocean region has a complex impact on the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States. As the UK， France， Germany are all allies of the US， there are no fundamental contradictions between their Indian Ocean policies and that of the US.

For one， the European powers have all regarded the China factor as a challenge in their Indian Ocean policies， albeit to varying degrees. Although using different expressions， they share the idea of guarding against and reining in China. The UK directly defined China as a “systemic competitor”that poses a systemic challenge to the security， prosperity and values of Britain and its allies and partners.65 The French Ministry for the Armed Forces said the structural effects of US-China competition were the primary factor shaping the geopolitical map of the Indo-Pacific， arguing that China was seeking to redefine the balance of power through military might.66 In “Frances Indo-Pacific Strategy，” Chinas increasing power and its more forceful articulation of territorial claims， alongside China-US competition and the tensions at the Chinese-Indian border， in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula， are identified as elements that are changing regional balances of power.67 The German foreign ministers foreword to the countrys Indo-Pacific guidelines also regards the strategic rivalry between China and the US as one of the major trends in todays world.68 It is clear that the UK， France and Germany have all considered various China-related issues as destabilizing factors.

Furthermore， European powers attach great importance to cooperation with the US and the US-Japan-India-Australia Quad mechanism. The UK has been Americas strongest ally since the Cold War era. After Brexit， the value of the transatlantic special relationship has been further highlighted. The British side publicly declared that “the United States will remain our most important bilateral relationship.”69 France regards the US as a central partner in the Indo-Pacific region， stressing that France shares the same values with the Quad members， and that its strategic partnerships with the four countries are crucial to preserving regional stability and preventing a logic of unilateralism.70 To this end， France has actively pursued the deepening of interoperability with the four Quad countries armed forces as the primary means to maintain strategic stability.71 Germany also views the US as a “key partner.” The German Federal Foreign Office stated that Germany and the US are bound by a close friendship based on historical ties， shared experiences， values and interests， while stressing that close transatlantic coordination remains as important as in the past decades for maintaining peace and security in Europe and around the world.72 The combination of the above two points objectively forms Germanys tacit support for the US Indo-Pacific strategy.

Challenges of European Powers Engagement

European powers involvement in the Indian Ocean has witnessed rapid progress and attracted much attention. However， there are still a number of severe challenges， which restrict the outcomes and prospects of European powers engagement in the Indian Ocean.

Limited resources available

Maintaining an effective and sustained overseas security presence is costly and resource-intensive. Under the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the European debt crisis in 2011， European countries generally suffered from an economic downturn， severe unemployment and a heavy financial burden. The UKs economic growth rate rose from 1.4% in 2011 to 3% in 2014， and then continuously declined to about 1.6%. Frances GDP growth rate climbed from 0.3% in 2011 to 2.3% in 2017 and then also started to decline. Germanys economic growth rate climbed from a low of 0.4% in 2012 to 2.7% in 2017， before plunging to around 1%.73 By 2019， the GDP of the UK， France and Germany grew only by 1.672%， 1.843% and 1.056% respectively. Due to the impact of COVID-19， the economies of these three countries contracted significantly in 2020， with their growth rates dropping to -9.396%， -7.855% and -4.570%， respectively.74 The picture looks also looks grim for unemployment. In the UK and Germany， unemployment rates have been falling since 2009， but rose for the first time in 2020， a warning sign. The unemployment rate in France has been above 8% since 1984 （with the exception of 2007 and 2008）， exceeded 11% for seven consecutive years since 1993 （with the highest reaching 12.59%）， and exceeded 10% for three consecutive years since 2014.75 Under such circumstances， it will be difficult for European powers to significantly increase their investment in overseas security. Therefore， the UKs claim to establish a Middle East-Diego Garcia-Singapore axis by building new bases in the Indian or Pacific Ocean （Singapore or Brunei as candidates） and returning to Diego Garcia should be treated with some caution.76

Difficulty in balancing multiple strategic directions

European powers need to balance multiple strategic directions. The Indo-Pacific region is of great relevance， but it is by no means the only strategic direction for countries such as the UK， France and Germany. The European continent and its immediate surroundings have always been the top strategic concern of European countries， especially Germany and France. No matter how important the Indo-Pacific region may be， it can never be compared with the European continent. At present， the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has escalated into the largest in Europe after the Second World War， seriously impacting the current European security system. European powers， especially Germany and France， must focus most of their energy and resources on the Ukraine issue and its implications. Their strategic “contraction” back to Europe will become a general trend in the future， and this will inevitably restrain their strategic input in the Indo-Pacific， including the Indian Ocean region. For example， the EUs first Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific held in Paris in February 2022 was supposed to be an opportunity for European powers to enhance their influence in the Indian Ocean. A whole series of measures were expected to be implemented following that meeting， but the crisis in Ukraine escalated into open warfare during the forum and forced the attending Europeans to turn their attention and respond to this completely new situation. Even though the forum was eventually held as planned， its international impact was greatly reduced， and the European powers had no time to take follow-up measures.

Besides the European continent and the Indo-Pacific， the European powers have even more strategic directions to balance. After Brexit， the UK quickly released its “Global Britain” policy paper， which devoted only two pages to the Indo-Pacific pivot， but five pages to the relationship between the UK and other countries in the world.77 Frances diplomatic strategy attaches particular importance to Africa， especially Francophone Africa. In August 2014， the French army launched Operation Barkhane， a multinational fight against terrorism in the Sahel region of Africa. Around 4，000 French troops were dispatched annually and the operation was only concluded in June 2021.78 Apparently， the French military had deployed more troops to Operation Barkhane than to the entire Indian Ocean. Thus， it is extremely difficult， if not impossible， for European powers to balance multiple strategic directions.

Inefficiency in strategic coordination

Although the European powers policies on involvement in the Indian Ocean can be aligned to some extent with the Indo-Pacific strategy of the US， they are not completely in harmony. Eager to open up its diplomatic space in the world after Brexit， the UK has not formulated a systematic Indo-Pacific strategy document， and it can only provide limited substantive support to the US. For example， the US and the UK share the Diego Garcia military facility， but the British presence is only symbolic， with only 40 to 50 staff mainly responsible for the islands daily management， while the American side has thousands. France clearly regards the Indo-Pacific region， including the Indian Ocean， as the core of its vision for a stable multipolar order，79 believing that bipolarization will undermine regional balances.80 This is radically different from the unipolar system that the US is pursuing and through which it dominates the West. Moreover， France has singled out India， Australia， Japan and ASEAN as partners who share its commitment to a rules-based international order，81 while deliberately excluding the United States， which it has almost directly criticized. Germany explicitly states that it supports neither unipolarity nor bipolarity in its Indo-Pacific policy， stressing that “no country should be forced to choose between two sides or fall into a state of unilateral dependency.”82 It can be seen that Germany does not want to be directly involved in the China-US rivalry.

The strategic coordination between European powers and the US is also adversely affected by their different definitions of the geographical scope of the Indo-Pacific. In fact， the Indo-Pacific region defined by the US is basically equivalent to the original Asia-Pacific plus India. The US National Security Strategy released by the Trump administration in December 2017 defined the Indo-Pacific as an area from the western coast of India to the western shores of the United States.83 The US Indo-Pacific strategy released by the Biden administration in February 2022 broadly defined the Indo-Pacific as an area stretching from the Pacific coastline to the Indian Ocean， but the Middle East and Africa were not mentioned in the list of sub-regions.84 In fact， the US still focuses on the eastern Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. It is indicative that although the US military renamed the Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific Command， its area of responsibility （AOR） remained unchanged， with its western side ending in the middle of the Indian Ocean. This geographical definition， which focuses on the eastern Indian Ocean， is quite different from that of European powers. The UK， France and Germany use different expressions as to the scope of the Indo-Pacific， but their practical actions have all put emphasis on the western Indian Ocean， especially the northwestern Indian Ocean. Among the European powers， France has the most far-reaching strategic layout in the Indian Ocean， but its overall design of stabilizing presence in the southwestern Indian Ocean， consolidating foothold in the northwest， and building strategic fulcrums in the north and southeast of the region also clearly shows where its strategic focus lies. France has no intention of investing heavily in the eastern Indian Ocean， as can be seen from its reliance on joint exploration with India and Australia in this sub-region. France is actively engaged in security and defense dialogues with the US in the Indo-Pacific， but mainly in the Indian Ocean and the south Pacific， which have greater significance for France.85 This is quite different from the demands of the US side.

Strategic coordination between the UK， France and Germany also faces difficulties. After Brexit， the UK has distanced itself from EU countries. More importantly， the UK is much more motivated to follow the US than to seek coordination with the EU or other European powers， which often has a direct impact on the interests of the UKs European partners. The surprise launch of the AUKUS trilateral security mechanism is a case in point. France has been pushing for cooperation with Australia in recent years. The report “Frances Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific”gives top priority to cooperation with Australia and the trilateral dialogue mechanism between France， India， and Australia.86 Under the initiative of France， two events， including one ministerial meeting， were held under the mechanism in the first half of 2021， while the UK communicated frequently with Australia and the US at the same time without informing France. The sudden announcement of AUKUS in September of the same year led to the abrupt collapse of the multi-billion-dollar submarine construction contract between France and Australia. This not only damaged the economic interests of France， but also greatly weakened the international prestige and political credibility of the UK， the US and Australia. Amid the outrage over the failed deal， France cancelled the British and French defense ministers meeting and recalled its ambassadors to the US and Australia in protest. What is more， France revised its IndoPacific strategy in February 2022. With respect to Australia and AUKUS， the document stated that the breaking of the partnership of trust has led to France re-evaluating its strategic partnership with Australia and has resulted in the pursuit of bilateral cooperation on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the national interests of France and those of its regional partners.87

Even France and Germany， which have much in common， are having trouble in coordinating their Indian Ocean strategies. Admittedly， the two countries jointly promoted the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the IndoPacific， which was released at the EU Council in April 2021 and approved by the European Commission in September of the same year. However， the actual coordination between the two countries security forces in the Indian Ocean is still limited and shows little progress. Germany originally planned to send its frigate Hamburg to the Indian Ocean， with a stop in La Réunion， but the trip failed to materialize due to the pandemic.

Complex challenges in strategic fulcrums

European powers need to rely on numerous strategic fulcrums to engage in the Indian Ocean， but these fulcrums are often faced with a variety of complex challenges， some of which are quite intractable， making their role for strategic support increasingly uncertain.

The legal status of Diego Garcia is a major challenge for the UK and the US. Mauritius has been demanding the return of the entire Chagos Archipelago， including Diego Garcia， and its claim has received extensive backing from Indian Ocean countries and overwhelming support at the UN General Assembly. In addition， since the late 1990s， the indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago and their descendants have been suing for the right to return home， and in 2000 a British court ruled that a 1971 ordinance banning them from returning to the islands was unlawful. It was not until 2008 that a majority of the panel at the House of Lords overturned the case. In 2017 the UN General Assembly formally requested that the International Court of Justice（ICJ） review whether the decolonization of Mauritius， with regard to the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius， had been lawfully completed and what the consequences of British rule over Diego Garcia had been. The ICJs ruling， which came in February 2019， found that the decolonization process had been illegal and recommended that the UK return the islands to Mauritius as soon as possible.88 The ruling was advisory and therefore nonbinding， but it did have some influence on the international stage， which is all the more ironic at a time when the UK and the US are repeatedly advocating the so-called “rules-based order” and respect for international law.

Frances strategic fulcrum in the southwestern Indian Ocean is also faced with challenges. It has long argued with the Comoros over the ownership of Mayotte.89 The dispute between the two countries escalated significantly in 2018， when Comorians staged large-scale demonstrations， protesting that Mayotte is a sovereign territory of the Comoros and not France.90 France is also embroiled in territorial disputes with Madagascar， Mauritius and the Comoros over the ownership of some French islands in the Indian Ocean. These long-term disputes not only form political uncertainties， but also constrain the maritime security layout of France and objectively weaken its political and security influence.

Conclusion

Assessing the prospects for European powers greater involvement in the Indian Ocean requires a comprehensive consideration of advantageous and disadvantageous factors， as well as of domestic and diplomatic constraints. Some initial conclusions can be reached through the assessment in this article. First， European powers will further strengthen the integration of their Indian Ocean policies and Indo-Pacific strategies. If the Indian Ocean strategy were formulated separately， European powers had to not only avoid the vigilance of countries and especially major powers in the region， but also face the constraints of insufficient resources and limited input. Perhaps mindful of the dilemma， European powers would rather fit their Indian Ocean policies into the broader Indo-Pacific strategic framework than articulate them separately. At present， it seems that only France has realized the integration of its Indian Ocean policy and Indo-Pacific strategy by clearly defining its distribution of interests， strategic considerations， and policy measures in the Indian Ocean. In contrast， British and German discourse on their Indian Ocean policies remains scattered and fragmented， often using the Indo-Pacific concept in too general and vague terms. But this should be regarded as a transitional phenomenon， as the UK and Germany are latecomers in formulating their Indo-pacific strategies and still have inadequacies in their strategic design for the Indian Ocean region.With the passage of time， this gap in strategic planning is expected to be gradually closed.

Second， although the European powers are seeking to further engage in the Indian Ocean， they are not able to make sufficient progress in the coming years. Instead， they will resort to a “soft” strategy to make up for the deficiencies in their “hard” input. In the short term， the resources available for European powers to devote to the Indian Ocean will be more constrained， as the world economy， especially major European economies， has been chronically sluggish， aggravated even more by the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis in Ukraine. Meanwhile， however， to make up for the lack of resources， there will be greater incentives for European powers to strengthen policy planning and coordination， and to actively generate more publicity through high-level meetings， joint statements， and the dispatching of ships.

Finally， Indias strategic position will continue to grow as it looms as the focal point for partnerships with European powers in the Indian Ocean. India is in no way stronger than the European powers， but it enjoys an extremely favorable geographical position thanks to its location in the middle of the northern Indian Ocean. Its national strength is rising rapidly， but it is far from being able to effectively edge out the European powers. Moreover， India has the same ideology and political system as the West， and its foreign policy is generally flexible. Therefore， the UK， France and Germany all regard it as the most suitable partner. Given that the Ukraine crisis is seriously constraining the ability of major powers to act， the European powers are more likely to encourage India to take a leadership role in the Indian Ocean region to maintain the balance of power， especially to counter Chinese influence in the region. This strategy will have a complex impact on the situation in the Indian Ocean， the development of Indian maritime power， as well as China-India interaction， which deserves further study.

1 Zeng Xiangyu， Maritime Strategy of India： Policies and Practices， Huaxia Publishing House， June 2021， pp.40-42.

2 “Operation Kipion，” Royal Navy of the United Kingdom， https：//www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-andlatest-activity/operations/red-sea-and-gulf/operation-kipion.

3 Ministry for the Armed Forces of France， “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific，” 2018， p.8， https：// franceintheus.org/IMG/pdf/France_and_Security_in_the_Indo-Pacific_-_2019.pdf.

4 “Germany Needs a Permanent Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean，” The Center for International Maritime Security （CIMSEC）， November 14， 2013， https：//cimsec.org/germany-needs-permanent-navalpresence-indian-ocean.

5 “Operation Ocean Shield，” NATO Allied Maritime Command， https：//mc.nato.int/missions/operationocean-shield.

6 “Combined Maritime Forces （CMF），” CMF， https：//combinedmaritimeforces.com/.

7 Government of the United Kingdom， “Global Britain in a Competitive Age： The Integrated Review of Security， Defence， Development and Foreign Policy，” July 2， 2021， p.6， pp.66-67， https：//assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_ Competitive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy. pdf.

8 Ministry for the Armed Forces of France， “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific，” 2018， p.1.

9 Ministry for the Armed Forces of France， “Frances Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific，” May 2019， https：//apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/France-Defence_Strategy_in_the_Indo-Pacific_2019.pdf.

10 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Frances Indo-Pacific Strategy，” July 2021， p.5， pp.45-51， https：//www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/en_a4_indopacifique_v2_rvb_cle432726.pdf； Frances Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs， “Frances Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific，” April 2021， p.5， pp.12-15， https：//www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/en_a4_indopacifique_16p_2021_v4_cle4b8b46.pdf.

11 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Indian Ocean — Frances Accession to the Indian Ocean Rim Association，” December 17， 2020， https：//www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/africa/ france-in-the-south-west-indian-ocean/article/indian-ocean-france-s-accession-to-the-indian-ocean-rimassociation-17-12-20.

12 Federal Foreign Office of Germany， “Foreign Minister Maas on the Adoption of the German Government Policy Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific Region，” September 2， 2020， https：//www.auswaertigesamt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-indo-pacific/2380474.

13 Federal Government of Germany， “Germany-Europe-Asia： Shaping the 21st Century Together，”September 2020， p.8， https：//www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380514/f9784f7e3b3fa1bd7c5446d274a 4169e/200901-indo-pazifik-leitlinien--1--data.pdf.

14 Zhao Ningning， “The German ‘Indo-pacific Strategy： Strategic Consideration， Characteristics and Impacts，” Peace and Development， No.5， 2021， pp.77-81.

15 The UK still retains a military logistics support facility in Singapore （Naval Party 1022） and continues to station troops in Brunei. See J. Victor Tossini， “A Look at the Considered Locations for New British Military Bases Overseas，” UK Defense Journal， March 1， 2019.

16 See the official website of British Indian Ocean Territory， https：//biot.gov.io/about/history/.

17 “Defence Minister Reaffirms UK Commitment to the Gulf，” UK Government Portal， October 5， 2018， https：//www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-minister-reaffirms-uk-commitment-to-the-gulf--2； UK Ministry of Defence， “Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2018-19，” 2019， p.18， https：// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/831728/MOD_ Annual_Report_and_Accounts_2018-19_WEB__ERRATUM_CORRECTED_.pdf.

18 “Defence Secretary Announces Investment in Strategic Omani Port，” UK Government Portal， September12， 2020， https：//www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-announces-investment-instrategic-omani-port.

19 The Council on Pacific Affairs， “Remote Indian Ocean Atoll Key for U.K.， U.S. Indo-Pacific Push，”O(jiān)ctober 4， 2021， https：//www.councilpacificaffairs.org/initiatives/remote-indian-ocean-atoll-key-for-u-k-us-indo-pacific-push/.

20 Dzirhan Mahadzir， “Carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth Drills with Indian Navy ahead of More Pacific Exercises，” USNI News， July 22， 2021， https：//news.usni.org/2021/07/22/carrier-hms-queen-elizabethdrills-with-indian-navy-ahead-of-more-pacific-exercises.

21 “Maiden India-UK Joint Tri-Service Exercise Konkan Shakti，” Indian Navy， https：//www.indiannavy. nic.in/content/maiden-india-uk-joint-tri-service-exercise-konkan-shakti-0.

22 “Overview of La Réunion，” Consulate-General of China in Saint-Denis， December 20， 2017， http：// reunion-sdn.chineseconsulate.org/lnwzt/201712/t20171220_4123664.htm； “France in the South-west Indian Ocean，” Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， https：//www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/countryfiles/africa/france-in-the-south-west-indian-ocean/.

23 “Les Forces armées dans la zone sud de lOcéan Indien，” Ministry for the Armed Forces of France， July 7， 2021， https：//www.defense.gouv.fr/english/operations/territoire-national/forces-de-souverainete/forcesarmees-dans-la-zone-sud-de-l-ocean-indien/dossier-de-reference/les-forces-armees-dans-la-zone-sud-de-locean-indien.

24 “Djibouti，” Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， https：//www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/ country-files/djibouti/#sommaire_5； “Les forces fran？aises stationées à Djibouti，” Ministry for the Armed Forces of France， October 22， 2020， https：//www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/afrique/afrique-de-l-est/forcesfrancaises-stationnees-a-djibouti/dossier-de-reference/les-forces-francaises-stationnees-a-djibouti.

25 “FFEAU/Alindien，” Ministry for the Armed Forces of France， February 4， 2022， https：//www.defense. gouv.fr/operations/monde/grand-levant/forces-francaises-aux-emirats-arabes-unis/dossier-de-reference/ ffeau-alindien.

26 “EMASOH （European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz），” Ministry for the Armed Forces of France， https：//www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/612443/10254096/Download%20the%20 english%20version.pdf.

27 Xavier Vavasseur， “A French Navy SSN Patrolled the South China Sea，” Navalnews， February 9， 2021， https：//www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/02/a-french-navy-ssn-patrolled-the-south-china-sea/.

28 “Exercise Varuna-2021，” Navy of India， https：//indiannavy.nic.in/content/exercise-varuna-–-2021； Nathan Gain， “French Indian Naval Exercise VARUNA 2021 Concludes，” Navalnews， April 28， 2021， https：//www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/04/french-indian-naval-exercise-varuna-2021-concludes/.

29 Martin Manaranche， “German Navy Postpones ‘Hamburg Frigate Deployment to Indian Ocean，”Navalnews， May 29， 2020， https：//www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/05/german-navy-postponeshamburg-frigate-deployment-to-indian-ocean/.

30 Martin Manaranche， “German Navy to Deploy a Frigate in Indo-Pacific Region for the First Time since 2016，” Navalnews， July 30， 2021， https：//www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/07/german-navy-todeploy-a-frigate-in-indo-pacific-region-for-the-first-time-since-2016/.

31 “German Navy Ship ‘Bayern Arrives in Sri Lanka Tomorrow，” Daily FT， January 14， 2022， https：// www.ft.lk/news/German-Navy-ship-BAYERN-arrives-in-Sri-Lanka-tomorrow/56-729152.

32 The White House， “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States，” February 2022， pp.10&13， https：// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.

33 Federal Government of Germany， “Germany-Europe-Asia： Shaping the 21st Century Together，” p.9， p.26.

34 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Indian Ocean — Frances Accession to the Indian Ocean Rim Association （Dec. 17， 2020），” https：//www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/africa/ france-in-the-south-west-indian-ocean/article/indian-ocean-france-s-accession-to-the-indian-ocean-rimassociation-17-12-20.

35 “The Indian Ocean Commission，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China， https：//www.fmprc.gov.cn/ web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/ydywyh_689356/jbqk_689358/.

36 “France Signs Weapons Mega-deal with UAE as Macron Tours Gulf，” Business Standard， December 4， 2021， https：//www.business-standard.com/article/international/france-signs-weapons-mega-deal-withuae-as-macron-tours-gulf-121120300979_1.html； “France Signs $18B Weapons Deal with UAE，” Defense News， December 3， 2021， https：//www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2021/12/03/france-signs-18b-weapons-deal-with-uae/.

37 “France to Help UAE Secure Airspace from Yemen Attacks，” The New Arab， February 4， 2022， https：// english.alaraby.co.uk/news/france-help-uae-secure-airspace-yemen-attacks.

38 “Macron Wants Strategic Paris-Delhi-Canberra Axis amid Pacific Tension，” Deccan Chronicle， May 3， 2018， https：//www.deccanchronicle.com/world/europe/030518/macron-wants-strategic-paris-delhicanberra-axis-amid-pacific-tension.html.

39 “India-France-Australia Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue，”Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， May 4， 2021， https：//www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/countryfiles/asia-and-oceania/news/article/india-france-australia-joint-statement-on-the-occasion-of-the-trilateral. 40 “P8I LRMR ASW Aircraft at La Reunion Island，” Indian Navy， May 9， 2022， https：//www.indiannavy. nic.in/content/p8i-lrmr-asw-aircraft-la-reunion-island.

41 The data was queried from the United Nations international trade statistics database （UN Comtrade）.

42 The figures were aggregated from statistics by Indias National Investment Promotion and Facilitation Agency， see https：//www.investindia.gov.in/country/united-kingdom， https：//www.investindia.gov.in/ country/france， and https：//www.investindia.gov.in/country/germany.

43 Federal Government of Germany， “Germany-Europe-Asia： Shaping the 21st Century Together，” p.9.

44 The raw data was queried from the United Nations international trade statistics database （UN Comtrade）.

45 The data was queried from the official website of Chinas National Bureau of Statistics on February 20， 2022.https：//data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm？cn=C01.

46 The UK Government， “Global Britain in a Competitive Age： The Integrated Review of Security， Defence， Development and Foreign Policy，” p.66.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.， p.67.

49 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Frances Indo-Pacific Strategy，” July 2021， p.3， pp.57-58.

50 Federal Government of Germany， “Germany-Europe-Asia： Shaping the 21st Century Together，” pp.2&9.

51 Ibid.， p.8.

52 “Operation Kipion”； “Saif Sareea，” Royal Navy of the United Kingdom， https：//www.royalnavy.mod. uk/news-and-latest-activity/operations/red-sea-and-gulf/saif-sareea.

53 “German Navy Chief Says India an Important Strategic Partner in Indo Pacific，” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses， January 21， 2022， https：//idsa.in/pressrelease/german-navy-chief-says-india-animportant-strategic-partner.

54 “Foreign Secretary Speech： ‘Britain is back East of Suez，” UK Government Portal， December 9， 2016， https：//www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-speech-britain-is-back-east-of-suez.

55 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Frances Indo-Pacific Strategy，” July 2021， pp.3-4.

56 Federal Government of Germany， “Germany-Europe-Asia： Shaping the 21st Century Together，”pp.2， 4&8.

57 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute， SIPRI Yearbook 2019， Oxford University Press， November 18， 2019， p.232.

58 Ibid.， p.246， pp.252-253， p.258. The data was aggregated by the author.

59 Ibid.， p.234. The data was aggregated by the author.

60 Ibid.， p.236.

61 The UK Government， “Global Britain in a Competitive Age： The Integrated Review of Security， Defence， Development and Foreign Policy，” p.62.

62 “Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region，” Embassy of France in India， March 10， 2018， https：//in.ambafrance.org/Joint-Strategic-Vision-of-India-France-Coop-in-theIOR-15423.

63 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Frances Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific，” p.6.

64 Federal Government of Germany， “Germany-Europe-Asia： Shaping the 21st Century Together，”pp.8， 9&14.

65 The UK Government， “Global Britain in a Competitive Age： The Integrated Review of Security， Defence， Development and Foreign Policy，” pp.17&26.

66 Ministry of the Armed Forces of France， “Frances Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific，” May 2019， pp.5&8.

67 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Frances Indo-Pacific Strategy，” July 2021， p.9.

68 Federal Government of Germany， “Germany-Europe-Asia： Shaping The 21st Century Together，” p.2.

69 The UK Government， “Global Britain in a Competitive Age： The Integrated Review of Security， Defence， Development and Foreign Policy，” p.20.

70 Ministry of the Armed Forces of France， “Frances Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific，” May 2019， p.17.

71 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Frances Indo-Pacific Strategy，” July 2021， p.55.

72 “Germany and the United States of America： Bilateral Relations，” German Federal Foreign Office， December 27， 2021， https：//www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/ usavereinigtestaaten-node/unitedstatesofamerica/218718.

73 “GDP growth （annual %） 2011-2019： United States， United Kingdom， France， Germany，” World Bank database， https：//data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG？end=2019&locations=US-GB-FRDE&start=2011&view=chart.

74 “GDP growth （annual %） 2018-2020： United States， United Kingdom， France， Germany，” World Bank database， https：//data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG？end=2020&locations=US-GB-FRDE&start=2018&view=chart.

75 “Unemployment， total （% of total labor force） （national estimate） 1982-2020： United States， United Kingdom， France， Germany，” World Bank database， https：//data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL. NE.ZS？end=2020&locations=US-GB-FR-DE&start=1982&view=chart.

76 J. Victor Tossini， “A Look at the Considered Locations for New British Military Bases Overseas，”UK Defense Journal， March 1， 2019， https：//ukdefencejournal.org.uk/a-look-at-the-considered-locationsfor-new-british-military-bases-overseas/； John Hemmings et al.， “Infrastructure， Ideas， and Strategy in the Indo-Pacific，” April 2， 2019， p.50， https：//henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/HJSInfrastructure-Ideas-and-Strategy-in-Indo-Pacific-web.pdf.

77 The UK Government， “Global Britain in a Competitive Age： The Integrated Review of Security， Defence， Development and Foreign Policy，” pp.60-67.

78 “Opération Barkhane，” Ministry for the Armed Forces of France， February 17， 2022， https：//www. defense.gouv.fr/operations/afrique/bande-sahelo-saharienne/operation-barkhane/dossier-de-reference/ operation-barkhane.

79 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “The Indo-Pacific Region： A Priority for France，”November 2021， https：//www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/asia-and-oceania/the-indo-pacific-regiona-priority-for-france/article/the-indo-pacific-region-a-priority-for-france.

80 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Frances Indo-Pacific Strategy： For an Inclusive Indo-Pacific，” 2018， p.27.

81 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Frances Indo-Pacific Strategy，” July 2021， p.10. 82 Federal Government of Germany， “Germany-Europe-Asia： Shaping the 21st Century Together，”pp.2， 9&10.

83 The White House， “National Security Strategy of the United States of America，” December 2017， p.46.

84 The White House， “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States of America，” February 2022， pp.4&6.

85 Ministry of the Armed Forces of France， “Frances Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific，” May 2019， p.17.

86 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Frances Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific，” pp.6-7.

87 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “Frances Indo-Pacific Strategy，” February 2022， p.41.

88 See entries of Diego Garcia and the British Indian Ocean Territory on Encyclop？dia Britannica， https：// www.britannica.com/place/Diego-Garcia-island-Indian-Ocean， https：//www.britannica.com/place/BritishIndian-Ocean-Territory.

89 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France， “The Union of the Comoros and Mayotte，” https：// www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/africa/france-in-the-south-west-indian-ocean/article/the-union-ofthe-comoros-and-mayotte.

90 Victor Muisyo， “Comoros Protests to Re-claim French Island， Mayotte，” April 13， 2018， https：//www. africanews.com/2018/04/13/comoros-protests-to-re-claim-french-island-mayotte/.