The Global Security Initiative and Building a New Neighborhood Security Architecture

Han Aiyong

There is a dichotomy in the structure of cooperation in Chinas neighborhood. On the one hand， there is a multitude of economic cooperation architectures， while on the other hand， there is a lack of security architectures that conform to regional realities and meet the needs of all sides.1 The sustained growth of economic output and defense expenditures in the neighborhood is a vivid illustration.2 In recent years， hot-spot issues kept emerging， especially in the wake of increasingly fierce geopolitical competition among major countries， which have exacerbated regional security deficits and are hurting regional cooperation and development. This makes it ever more urgent to build a new regional security architecture and improve regional security governance.3 To this day， Chinas neighboring region has failed to build a complete regional security architecture， which is primarily due to a lack of a guiding framework and action plan to regulate security interactions among countries and coordinate regional security institutions.

President Xi Jinping put forward the Global Security Initiative at the Opening Ceremony of the 2022 Annual Conference of the Boao Forum for Asia， which is featuring “six commitments” as core requirements.4 The Initiative serves as a systemic answer to a pressing question of our time， namely “what security concepts the world needs and how to achieve common security among countries.”5 It has also provided an entirely new practical solution for fostering a new security architecture in the neighborhood region plagued by numerous security problems. It is worth noting that the Initiative points out the need to “build a balanced， effective and sustainable security architecture，” which provides a coordinated reference frame for building a security architecture in neighborhood regions. It can be expected that under the guidance of the Global Security Initiative， fostering a new security architecture would be an important agenda for Chinas neighborhood diplomacy in the coming period.

The Relationship between Neighborhood Security Environment， Security Governance， and Fostering a New Neighborhood Security Architecture

The security environment in Chinas neighborhood is complex and sensitive， and distinguished by three prominent characteristics. First， security problems are diverse， long-term and region-wide. The security issues in the neighborhood can be divided into four categories in terms of origin： the first security issue arises from the process of modern nation-state building， with territorial and maritime disputes as prime examples. Unlike in Western countries， the process of nation-state building in Chinas neighborhood began at the end of the Second World War and reached a climax in the nationalist movements of the 1950s and 1960s. Due to the relatively short period of the process and the influence of Western colonial rule， disputes over territorial and maritime boundaries between neighboring countries are relatively common. For example， Japan， India， Australia， the ROK and other countries in the region all have territorial and maritime disputes with their neighbors to varying degrees. Territory is the most basic component of a nation-state， and safeguarding territorial sovereignty is the crucial foundation of national legitimacy. However， territorial disputes directly or indirectly lead to mutual hostility and arms races among countries， and they also provide an excuse for extraterritorial powers to intervene in regional security affairs.

The second category consists of security problems arising from the process of national modernization， including conflicts due to the competitive utilization of cross-border resources and security problems from political transformation. The first task of national modernization is the need to tap natural resources for the use by the population. There are many countries boasting a population of over 100 million in Chinas neighborhood region. In 2022， among the 14 countries with a population of over 100 million in the world， eight resided in this neighborhood.6 Such a large number of countries with a population over 100 million gathered in this region， most of which are developing countries， inevitably leads to competition for the development and utilization of cross-border resources. This process often results in conflicts directly affecting the security interaction of relevant countries concerning areas such as international rivers and cross-border ocean fishing. Political modernization is a key stage of national modernization. Since the end of the Second World War， countries in the region have gone through different degrees and types of political transformation， belonging to the so-called “transition belt” countries. Except for a small number of countries that have completed political transformation， most countries are still involved in the process.7 Recent Western attempts to democratize some countries in the neighborhood created Color Revolutions in the process of political transformation， which dealt a heavy blow to regional security and stability.8

The third category is the strategic competition among major countries in the region. At present， the interaction between major countries in the neighborhood is becoming increasingly competitive. China-Japan and China-India relations are cases in point， while the most prominent remains the strategic competition between China and the United States. Major powers have a decisive impact on regional security， which initiates， on the one hand， a transition period of the regional security structure and security order toward a more complex and diverse regional security environment， and on the other hand， indicates that coordinating the security relations of major countries has become the crux for stabilizing regional security and fostering a new regional security architecture. This also marks the biggest structural change in the neighborhood security environment in recent years.

The fourth category includes non-traditional security issues. Chinas neighborhood is one of the regions most affected by non-traditional security issues. Since the end of the 20th century， the region has witnessed one financial crisis and two public health crises， namely， the SARS and COVID-19 pandemics， which have left a profound impact on regional security concepts and governance. Other issues such as water resource shortage， food shortage， environmental and ecological changes， should also not be ignored.

These security problems share two common characteristics： they occur over a prolonged time and throughout the entire region. Most of the countries in the neighborhood are modern nation-states established after the end of the Second World War， which are confronted with the historical task of building up their national strength and achieving national modernization.9 This means that the security problems arising from these two historical processes are not only geographically widespread within the region， but are also very persistent before appropriate solutions towards the end of these processes can be applied. At the same time， these two historical processes which started in different periods of time are presently concurrent，10 which is also the reason why different types of security issues in the region are intertwined.

Second， there is a mismatch between security institutions and security problems.11 The neighborhood boasts various security institutions， which can be roughly divided into four types： the US-led alliance， the ASEANled collective security institution， the multilateral security institution participated by China， and the track 1.5 and track 2 dialogues represented by the Shangri-La Dialogue， the Western Pacific Naval Symposium， and the Xiangshan Forum.12 Among them， the US-led alliance system plays a dominant role since it is the most institutionalized， the strongest in terms of collective action， and the oldest in terms of its history. However， it is not adapted to the security problems in the region. The US-led alliance system was born during the Cold War， aiming to solve the problem of “hegemonic rivalry with the Soviet Union” by means of “hard confrontation.”However， at present， regional countries have neither the intention nor the ability to compete with the United States for global hegemony. At the same time， not all security issues in the neighborhood， especially non-traditional ones， such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the financial crisis， have the characteristics of “hard confrontation.” Therefore， they can only be resolved through development and cooperation， which is obviously inconsistent with the confrontational nature of the alliance. The other three types of security institutions either focus on communication or on management of regional security problems to prevent new problems from emerging and cannot solve the existing security problems. In addition， these security institutions are unable to cover the entire geographical region and are relatively non-binding， which makes it difficult to exercise effective security governance.13 The lack of coordination or even the existence of competition among security institutions makes those dedicated to solving security problems turn into a new problem afflicting the regional security.

Third， the emergence of dual structural contradictions and the trend of over-securitization have become new factors in the regional security environment. The United States is at an advantaged position of wielding influence in the region as a whole， while among the sub-regions such as Central Asia， South Asia and Southeast Asia， Russia， India and Japan maintain traditional and pre-eminent regional influence. This illustrates that the neighborhood security structure is composed of two layers of regional and sub-regional structures. In the eyes of these powerful countries， Chinas rise and the expansion of its influence in the region， undoubtedly has an impact on the dominance of the United States at the“regional level” and also affects the dominant position of Russia， India and Japan at the “sub-regional level.” Thus， “dual structural contradictions”have emerged at both the regional and sub-regional levels. Driven by these contradictions， it is easier for the United States， Japan， India and Australia to come together to jointly counterbalance the expansion of Chinas regional influence. The adoption of the “Indo-Pacific strategy” and the“Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” is the countermeasures taken by the four countries against China. Geopolitical competition has become the new normal of interaction among major countries in the region， and the pressure on small and medium-sized countries to choose sides is mounting. These changes have thrust the relationship among neighboring countries into an unstable state and have increased the level of uncertainty in the regional security environment.

The intensification of geopolitical competition has also led to the tendency of over-securitization in certain countries， further deteriorating the regional security environment. Its logic implies that the return of geopolitics means that the issue of security as a priority in major countriesdecision-making and policy preferences has risen to a level above all other politics.14 Therefore， as long as an agenda is indiscriminately labeled as“security，” policymakers could use it to demand that “urgent and special measures be taken to deal with this threat，”15 so as to win the support of domestic resources more conveniently.16 This in turn heightens competition among major countries， which then prompts decision makers to play the“security card” to gain more resources to engage in intensified great power competition. They would not only construct a security context to seek absolute security， but also to respond to emerging challenges according to the principles， logic and theory of traditional security，17 which would lead to over-securitization.

At present， the country with the most obvious tendency of oversecuritization in the region is the United States. Since the emergence of the Trump administration， the United States has wantonly suppressed Chinas high-tech enterprises under the pretext of “national security” and maliciously obstructed China-US cultural and social exchanges， bringing the China-US relations to a new low. In comparison， the Biden administration is more concerned about so-called “supply chain security.” It pledged to“ensure supply chain security” in the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance， declared to “reduce dependence on foreign supply chains” in the 2022 State of the Union Address， issued the Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains at the Tokyo QUAD summit，18 and promoted “supply chain resilience” in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework，19 all of which reflect the US strategic attempt to reshape the global supply chain in the name of security with the intention of isolating China. As a result， the two foundations of regional security have been under tremendous pressure. First， the strategic space for China-US interaction has been narrowed and the strategic mutual trust seriously harmed. The major-country relationship which should have served as the cornerstone of regional stability has turned into a major source for regional insecurity instead. Second， the regional supply chain was reshaped by force， shaking the foundation of regional development. Aside from the US， in recent years， India and Australia have also obstructed the normal operation of Chinese businesses on the grounds of security， serving US strategic objectives against China， causing damage to the bilateral relations and aggravating regional security tensions. More importantly， the tendency of over-securitization fundamentally deviates from the trend of regional development and weakens the foundation of regional security.

On the whole， the security problems in Chinas neighborhood are complex and diverse， and the current security institution cannot solve existing security problems， resulting in the continued emergence of new factors and challenges affecting regional security. The characteristics of the regional security environment not only reflect the serious shortcomings of the regional security governance， but also has adverse effects on the regional security governance.

First， it widens the trust gap. The existence of security problems does not affect the development of inter-state relations， but seriously restrains the building of strategic mutual trust among relevant countries，20 since the existence of security problems indicates that a country faces varying degrees of threats. At the same time， the intensification of great power strategic competition and over-securitization also prompts each country in the region to accelerate its own improvement of its national security standard and view security interaction from the perspective of relative individual benefits. Recently， the United States， Japan， Australia， India and other countries have adjusted their policies toward China， stressing elements of competition and zero-sum game， which will lead to an even larger trust deficit in the region.

Second， it leads to structural security problems. Many security problems in the region originate from the process of nation-state building and modernization and have little to do with “structure.” However， the intensified great power competition has changed the way in which security problems exist. China has become the biggest and most influential variable concerning changes in the regional order owing to its rising comprehensive strength， which is the natural result of its development as a major country. However， in the eyes of the US and other established powers， China poses the “most serious long-term challenge to the international order.”21 With the resulting intensification of great power competition， many regional security issues， especially those involving China， have become the subject of transformation of the regional structure and order. Thus， only when the regional countries have clearly defined Chinas status and extraterritorial actors refrain from intervening， can the opportunity arise to effectively resolve the territorial and maritime disputes involving China. Similarly， the resolution of hot-spot issues in other regions is closely related to whether the countries in the region could properly solve the mutual-positioning problem.22 It demonstrates that problems concerning security have become structural with the great power competition in the region and the transformation of regional order.

Third， it leads to the instrumentalization of the security institution. The regional security institutions are not sufficient to solve the security problems， which puts the rationality of their existence in question. Under this scenario the security institutions underwent a functional transformation from focusing on resolving regional security problems to becoming a tool for certain actors to pursue their own interests. Although the USled alliance system is the security institution with the highest degree of institutionalization and military strength in the region， its regional security governance is disappointing， Because the US original intention of the alliance system was not to solve regional security problems. Instead， it uses the alliance to replace the diversified and differentiated demands of Asian countries with its own security needs， take its own absolute security as the primary goal of the regional security architecture， and shapes the Asian security order with American values and norms.23 With the acceleration of Chinas rise， the US alliance system has completely become a tool for the US to curb the expansion of Chinas influence， slow down Chinas development， and maintain US regional hegemony. The collective security institution created by ASEAN， with a security cooperation pattern of low institutionalization and low effectiveness， provides a platform for sustained consultation on regional security cooperation. Despite its less-than-ideal effect， it is conducive to the goal of ASEAN Centrality in regional security cooperation.24

The regional security architecture is an organic arrangement of security relations among regional security institutions and actors. The growing trust deficit and the instrumentalization of the security institutions in the region indicate that the regional security institution and security relations are in a laissez faire state and lack effective coordination and management， which are necessary to form a complete security structure. From the perspective of specific functions of regional security governance， in addition to coordinating security institutions and shaping security relations， the regional security architecture can also foster security consensus and solve security problems， thus greatly reducing the emergence of new security problems. As far as the outcome in terms of governance is concerned， the region obviously fails in all four of these categories. Furthermore， the existing problems in the regional security environment and the weaknesses of the regional security governance are precisely the security governance problems that the regional security architecture is aimed at addressing， and the two are highly correlated.

The high degree of correlation indicates that fostering a new regional security architecture is a strategic necessity to bring security benefits to regional countries. However， there is still no practical plan that could build consensus among regional countries and guide collective action. The Global Security Initiative undoubtedly provides a guideline， which coupled with Chinas capability of action， could usher in a rare strategic opportunity for building of a new regional security architecture.

Global Security Initiative and the Pragmatic Path to Building a New Regional Security Architecture

President Xi Jinping proposed the “six commitments” as the core principle in the Global Security Initiative： stay committed to the vision of common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable security； stay committed to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries； stay committed to abiding by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter； stay committed to taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously； stay committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation； stay committed to maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains.25 On the whole， the Initiative is guided by the New Security Concept， based on mutual respect， takes the indivisibility of security as an important principle， and aims at the long-term goal of building a security community.26 Thus， as an integrated thought system， it could effectively guide the building of a new regional security architecture. The existing practices demonstrated that the regional security architecture include four basic functions： building security consensus， solving security problems， shaping security relations， and coordinating security institutions. In this way， the fostering of a new security architecture in the region could draw ideas from the Global Security Initiative as the conceptual guidance and try to take the four basic functions as its objective based on “balanced， effective and sustainable” security institutions.

The New Security Concept and the fostering of security consensus among regional countries

Consensus is the precondition for action. To build a regional security architecture， the first step is to shape a regional consensus on security. The region has diverse security concepts， including the security upheld by the United States-led alliance， the collective security advocated by ASEAN， and the New Security Concept proposed by China. The diversity of security concepts makes it difficult to form effective collective actions， and， more importantly， some security concepts are even manifestations of insecurity. For example， the alliances security aims at ensuring regional dominance of the US rather than safeguarding regional security， as it does not seek regional security and stability but “controllable tension” or even “controllable chaos”instead， which is the main reason for the US to remain in the region as an extraterritorial power. As far as the governance effect is concerned， the alliance system is chiefly a maritime-based institution where a sea power is trying to contain a land-based power， resulting in a contradictory “sealand separation” in the security governance， which is hardly acknowledged by regional countries. The problem of collective security lies in the fact that ASEAN intends to maintain its centrality status in the region while safeguarding its own security but is evidently unable to provide more public security goods. These problems make it difficult for either the alliance security system or the collective security model to become the main security consensus of regional countries.

The goal of the New Security Concept， which holds “common， comprehensive， cooperative and sustainable” security as its core characteristics， is to build a security community through cooperation. In terms of the process， the new security concept pursues cooperative security， that is， all countries in the region carry out equal cooperation in security affairs， so that the security of all countries could be guaranteed.27 In this way， the goal of the New Security Concept is to achieve common security， which is to respect and guarantee the security of every country.28 Thus， the security under the New Security Concept has acquired two unique connotations： on the one hand， security is equal， and acquiring security is an organic part of the equal rights of states， irrespective of the power of a state. On the other hand， security is common， as no one country could achieve security for itself in isolation from international security， and one countrys security is premised on promoting international security，29 rather than relying solely on its own power. These two points also reflect the current security concerns of regional countries， which is that most of them cherish equal rights of countries since they achieved independence after World War II and are naturally alert to power politics since they are developing countries that underwent colonization or invasion. This is why the New Security Concept resonates with most countries in the region.

Furthermore， the new security concept could align the security concerns of regional countries because of the security philosophy embedded in it， that is， countries are equal members of the international community and any security concept and institutional design serves to better protect the equal rights of each and every country in the security realm， not vice versa. Because of this， the new security concept could accurately depict the basic perceptions and real security need of regional countries， which gives it a sense of history and contemporaneity， and then become a regional security consensus. The specific connotations of the new security concept might evolve with future changes of the regional situation， but the impact of its philosophy on the regional security consensus would not change. This is undoubtedly of ontological significance for the shaping of regional security consensus.

Mutual Respect and the Solutions to Regional Security Problems

It is the basic function of a regional security architecture to solve security problems. The Global Security Initiative puts forward principles and a basic path to solving the security problems in the region. Taking the most intractable territorial and maritime disputes in the region as an example， the Initiative proposes to “stay committed to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries，” as the basic principle for problemsolving， and to “stay committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation，” as the basic path to solving problems.

Taking mutual respect as the principle and starting point for the settlement of disputes and differences reflects the unique thinking of regional countries： first， seek common ground while reserving differences， and find “commonalities” within “differences，” where differences exist due to varying interests of different sides and commonalities are shared with all as equal members of the international community. Second， seek a type of problem-solving that is based on the “common ground” of sovereign equality， instead of seeking the most favorable scenario based on the “differences” of strength. Finally， focus on the process. Territorial and maritime disputes involve the national interest of the countries concerned， which is undoubtedly important but do not make up the entirety of interstate relations. Focusing on the process is to examine the problems against the totality inter-state relations. Problem-solving is not the sole purpose， it is also essential to further promote the friendly development of interstate relations； if this cannot be achieved in the short term， it is advisable to shelve the problem and wait until conditions are more favorable. In practice， the first priority for mutual respect is respecting the social system and development path chosen by each country， and respecting each others core interests and major concerns，30 i.e.， the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries. This seems to require that the international community adopts the Lockean notion of “l(fā)ive and let live.”31 However， this is only part of the picture. Respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries is the basic principle for resolving differences， indicating that the means to solve problems and the results should similarly guarantee “national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Therefore， the principle of “staying committed to peaceful settlement of differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation” has naturally become the basic path to problem-solving. International practice has repeatedly proven that dialogue and consultation are effective ways to resolve differences， and political negotiation is the fundamental way to resolve conflicts.32 The cooperative and non-violent means of problemsolving obviously go beyond the scope of Lockean culture and acquire the characteristics of a community.

Territorial and maritime disputes is linked to regional stability. Therefore， mutual respect is not only aimed at the claimants but also the stakeholders. Only in this way could regional security and stability be better maintained. China has set an example in this regard. In dealing with the South China Sea issue， China has proposed a “dual-track approach，”that is， the specific disputes should be resolved peacefully by the countries directly concerned through negotiation and consultation. This should be based on respect for historical facts and international law， and peace and stability in the South China Sea should be jointly maintained by China and ASEAN countries.33 The “dual-track approach” has taken into consideration the interests and concerns of all parties and has become a basic norm for maintaining stability in the South China Sea.

The security issues in the region are far more than territorial and maritime disputes. However， adhering to the principle of mutual respect reflects the logic of respecting equal sovereignty， core interests and major concerns of all countries， and cooperating to build a regional community. This approach not only considers the core interests of the country and the historical scope of the problem itself， but also breaks the shackles of specific problems by focusing on the problem-solving process from a long-term and strategic perspective， which is both realistically feasible and acceptable. It also gives the idea long-term and universal applicability when solving other types of regional security problems.

The principle of indivisible security and the reshaping of security relations among major countries in the region

Major countries play a key role in regional security due to their strength and action competence， and the nature and status of their security relations directly affect the basic working level of the regional security architecture. Under the pressure of intensified geopolitical competition， the security relations among neighboring major countries are characterized by low trust，high volatility， strong antagonism， and a prominent zero-sum game， which is not conducive to the construction of a regional security architecture. For example， the current containment and suppression of China by the United States poses a key challenge to the construction of a regional security architecture. Reshaping major-country security relations has become the main focus of building a new regional security architecture.

To reshape the security relations between major countries， we need to be clear about what to reject and what to promote. The Cold War mentality is undoubtedly responsible for the above characteristics in the security relations between major countries. The Cold War mentality， in short， overemphasizes the confrontational aspects of ideologies or values and insists on a friend or foe scheme. Any security relations shaped by Cold War mentality are inevitably confrontational and zero-sum. When we say that the Cold War mentality is obsolete， we do not just mean that the Cold War is over， but that the whole mindset is completely outdated. Since the end of the Cold War， the rapid development of productivity and globalization has brought the lives of people around the world closer than ever before. On this basis， countries share common interests and face common threats. More importantly， the common values of “peace， development， equity， justice， democracy and freedom” have come into being.34 The formation of common values means that countries globally practice the same values despite their differences in governance and international exchanges. Even when differences are huge， can they be bridged in practice and thus dialogues can be held. Exchanges and mutual learning， rather than confrontation， are the only way to resolve misunderstandings. The way to achieve lasting success is for major countries to respect each other， abandon the Cold War mentality and refrain from bloc confrontation.35

What is the best direction for reshaping great power security relations？ The Global Security Initiative puts forward the principle of“indivisible security.” It emphasizes indivisible security because mankind as a community is an indivisible whole. Indivisible security has different characteristics： First， security is becoming a non-exclusive and noncompetitive public goods. The right to security of every country is equal， so it is evenly distributed among countries. Second， security is holistic. The security of any country is regarded as the security of all member states.36 The legitimate security concerns of any country should be taken seriously， and the security of any country should not exist at the expense of others. Third， the means to achieve security should be peaceful and cooperative. Ones own and regional security should be guaranteed through security cooperation rather than coercive means and the strengthening of military blocs. The inherent changes in the nature of security require major countries to guide and regulate their security relations with new concepts and principles. This is why the principle of indivisible security has been widely recognized by the international community. It can be deduced that， under the guidance of the principle of indivisible security， the security relations among countries will show the following characteristics： cooperation—the security interests of both sides can be promoted by means or ways of cooperation； mutual benefit—measures to ensure security help to increase security gains for both sides； dependence—the realization of one partys security interests depends on the degree to which the other partys security interests are realized； stability—as one can anticipate the others security intentions and use of means， the incentive for drastic changes in the security relations can be eliminated.

Obviously， this type of major-country security relations is what is needed to build a new regional security architecture. Based on the premise that the rights to national security is equal and security as public goods is evenly distributed among countries， it not only eliminates the hidden danger of security conflicts among great powers， but also provides a foundation for them to response to other regional security challenges.

ASEAN Centrality and the establishment of a multi-level network of neighborhood security institutions

There are several security institutions in this region， which are overlapping covering only part of the area and are competing with each other.37 Some studies have pertinently pointed out that the most important thing for Asian countries is still to coordinate the complex relations among various security institutions， rather than establishing a strong and unified regional security institution.38 This means that the future network of neighborhood security institutions will be a multi-level architecture， covering different levels of bilateral， sub-regional and regional security institutions， including coordinated， forum-based， mandatory and other types of security institutions. But beyond that， there may nevertheless be a need for a regionwide， even forum-like， security institution to coordinate or negotiate security issues across the region. Although the Global Security Initiative does not address security institution building directly， President Xi Jinping still pointed out that “ASEANs centrality in the regional architecture should be consolidated.”39 In combination with Chinas long-standing position on regional security institution building， this is actually a framework arrangement and conceptual assumption for coordinating regional diversified security institutions.

To be specific： First， ASEAN is a successful model of multilateral cooperation in this region. To consolidate ASEAN Centrality is above all to uphold real multilateralism. Second， the development of ASEAN is the rise of regional normative power.40 The unique ASEAN way， which emphasizes mutual respect， consensus building and accommodating each others level of convenience， provides useful references for countries in the region to develop relations， deepen cooperation and advance integration.41 It can be expected that in the new regional security architecture， ASEAN way will also set important norms for the operation of regional security institutions. Third， the claim that “ASEAN occupies a central position in the regional architecture” seems to be at odds with the fact that “great powers always play a major role in the security architecture，” but it is objectively correct. It not only accumulates the successful experience of ASEAN cooperation， but also results from the coordination and balance of regional powers such as the United States， China， Japan， India， and Russia. Fourth， the ASEAN-led East Asia Summit （EAS） brings together major neighboring countries， and further expansion of the EAS is expected to achieve the full coverage of the region. This makes clear that the consolidation of ASEAN Centrality itself reflects the uniqueness of the neighborhood security architecture， and thus becomes a more appropriate choice for the current region.

Consolidating ASEAN Centrality in the regional security architecture does not mean turning ASEAN into a power center in the regional security structure. In fact， ASEAN does not have such a power base. Rather， it means that the ASEAN way， together with the major power coordination that establishes ASEAN Centrality， will become the main route to coordinate the operation of regional security institutions. On the basis of combining the existing security institutions， then a multi-dimensional network of regional security institution should be built： First， we need to build a forum-like institution at the regional level to expand the scope of such institutions as the East Asia Summit and the Conference on Interactions and Confidence Building Measures in Asia （CICA）. The complete coverage of the institution will realize the synergy of neighborhood countries with other institutions to maintain the security and stability of the whole region. Second， we need to develop coordinated institutions at the sub-regional level and use existing institutions， such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization， ASEAN and SAARC as platforms to synergize major countries with major interests，stabilize the security structure in the sub-region and resolve security issues in the region. Third， we need to build binding institutions at the level of specific issues， such as the Afghan issue and the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue， coordinate relevant national security concerns and manage regional hotspot issues. Fourth， we should promote major-country coordination institutions at the bilateral or “bilateral plus” level， especially security coordination between China and the United States， manage security differences between major countries， and enhance strategic mutual trust and security coordination among major countries. In addition， we will vigorously support the development of the Xiangshan Forum and the Shangri-La Forum and other Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogue platforms， pool intelligence on regional security research， and expand channels for regional security dialogue. In theory， a network of multi-level security institutions can be constructed， with clear and distinct security functions of each institution and with effective coordination of the security relations among the institutions and among the major powers.

The Practical Approach and Chinas Role in Building a New Neighborhood Security Architecture

The Global Security Initiative is not only a macro-level thought system， but also an in-depth analysis from the medium and micro perspective of the relationship between security and development， the solutions to security problems， the national equality and security rights， the characteristic of indivisible security and the principles to be followed for security interaction. It points out in particular the need to build a “balanced， effective and sustainable” security architecture， which brings great inspiration to the choice of practice to build the security architecture in the region. Considering the characteristics of the neighborhood security environment and the long-term practice of neighboring countries， the following three approaches are worthy of attention.

The first approach is developmentalism. A fundamental concept of the Global Security Initiative is the emphasis on the sustainability of security and the security architecture. In short， the approach of developmentalism is to focus on development， restructure security issues according to development objectives， ensure sustainable security through sustainable development， build a community of development and a community of shared interests through common development， thus laying a solid foundation and create conditions for the construction of a new security architecture. This approach corresponds to the fact that for most Asian countries， development provides the greatest security and is the master key to resolving regional security issues.42

The most striking feature of the post-Cold War neighboring region is how it has developed， including at the national level in the cooperation process， all of which together created the regions mainstream economic ideology of developmentalism.43 The reasons for choosing this approach are as follows： First， economic development strengthens the countrys preference for peace and shapes the regional culture of peace. In the process of national development， neighboring countries not only pursue economic development， but also attach special importance to peace as the foundation of development and lay special emphasis on resolving disputes through dialogue and consultation， so as to create a favorable external environment for development. Thus， a peaceful regional atmosphere and culture are gradually created in the process of development. Secondly， economic development has created a regional security concept with “development as the underlying principle.”44 For example， in the long-term development process of East Asian countries， economic development not only enjoys major significance and high priority， but is the core of national security and security of the government system.45 This means that in the eyes of neighboring countries， the most fundamental security threat comes from internal rather than external sources， which is common basic attitude for neighboring countries to reach a compromise on external security issues. Finally， economic development has brought about a high degree of interdependence among countries in the region. For example， 95 percent of neighboring countries have China as their largest trading partner， with an average dependency rate of more than 20 percent.46 In addition， common interests have been increasing with the progress in development， and a community of development and a community of shared interests have actually taken shape among countries in the region. Interdependence cannot solve security problems， but a high degree of mutual interests helps to prevent countries from committing hasty actions. Especially the formation of the two mentioned communities would help countries to consciously reject coercive means when resolving conflicts， and maintain regional peace and stability.

To sum up， the approach of developmentalism has shaped the regional security concept of “development as a fundamental principle，”providing a unique consensual basis for regional countries to carry out security cooperation. In terms of security concerns， although the approach of developmentalism cannot solve security problems directly， focusing on development can effectively prevent the deterioration of problems and create conditions for their solution. In terms of security relations， developmentalism has linked shared interests with regional security and created the prototype of a community of development and a community of shared interests， strengthened the national preference for peace， and formed the perception of security threats from an inner perspective. In terms of security institutions， although regional cooperation institutions spawned by regional developmentalism， such as the “ASEAN+1，” “ASEAN+3” and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership （RCEP）， are not designed for security issues，they have become important platforms for regional communication and coordination. Hotspot issues in the neighborhood continue to persist， but the overall situation remains stable. Developmentalism is playing a fundamental role in this.

The second approach is incrementalism. The Global Security Initiative emphasizes the effectiveness of a security architecture. The incrementalism approach takes specific security problems as the starting point and reshapes security relations among countries in the process of the problem-solving practice， in a bid to build an effective security institution and coordination institution. In this way， a security governance approach of “problem solving—reshaping relations—coordination institution” has been developed. This approach is based on the cultural preference of neighboring countries that attach importance to process， and establishes a new identity of interaction among all parties in the process of practice， thus shaping a new interactive relationship.47

Take the sensitive issue of territory as an example： After the collapse of the Soviet Union， China established diplomatic relations with the five Central Asian states of Uzbekistan， Kazakhstan， Tajikistan， Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan in January 1992. At this time， the main obstacle affecting the relations between China and the five countries was the boundary demarcation left over after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the course of interaction after the establishment of diplomatic ties， China and Central Asian countries adhered to the principles of “sovereignty， objectivity and friendship”48 and ended boundary demarcation disputes through friendly negotiations. This has laid the foundation for security and mutual trust in Chinas relations with the five countries， so that bilateral relations were able to develop rapidly. By the end of 2021， Chinas trade volume with the five countries has increased by more than 100 times compared to when they established diplomatic ties.49 In order to continue and promote the security trust accumulated in the process of border demarcation negotiations， China， Russia， Kazakhstan， Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan established the “Shanghai Five” institution in 1996， and on this basis established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization （SCO） in 2001. After more than two decades of development， the SCO has achieved remarkable results in combating the “three evil forces”—religious extremism， ethnic separatism and violent terrorism， drug trafficking and transnational organized crime， and has become a key institution and platform for maintaining regional stability and promoting regional security.

Not only the SCO， but also the “ASEAN+3” and “ASEAN+1，” which are the main channels of cooperation in East Asia， are the institutional products of regional cooperation in responding to the Asian financial crisis. The principle of the approach of incrementalism is the application of dialectical thinking to turn danger into opportunity. Unlike developmentalism， incrementalism comes with preconditions， namely， the Global Security Initiatives guideline of “attaching importance to the legitimate security concerns of all countries and peacefully resolving the differences and disputes among countries through dialogue and consultation.” If incrementalism fails to deliver， it will lose its potential for progress.

The third approach is consultationism. The Global Security Initiative emphasizes equality of rights among states， solidarity and cooperation， and the balanced character of the security architecture. The approach of consultationism is to uphold the concept of equal security rights of all countries， big or small， and address security issues candidly and with mutual respect， in order to build a balanced structure that “accommodates the demands and interests of all parties.” The approach of consultationism is based on the political traditions and practices of neighboring countries. As the most distinctive political concept in the region， it embodies the concepts of equality， respect， independence and solidarity. It is the process of recognizing and respecting the equal rights of the other party， finding mutually acceptable solutions to problems through communication， and maintaining mutual solidarity. Consultative politics is practiced in Chinas neighboring regions， and in China itself， democratic consultation is an important element of whole-process democracy with Chinese characteristics.50 In ASEAN， on the other hand， consensus constitutes a crucial component of the ASEAN way.

To understand the approach of consultationism， we can take the operation of the ASEAN way as a contrast. The ASEAN way includes mutual respect， consensus building and accommodating each others convenience level. Respect is the precondition for carrying out consultations， and the result is not only a lack of any opposing views but also that everyone is “comfortable.”51 In other words， consensus is “more concerned with not isolating or embarrassing any member state in international forums， even when an ASEAN member has put forward an idea that is unacceptable to the other member states， and the other member states will restrain themselves from acting in a manner that publicly humiliates the member state.”52 Furthermore， although the approach of consultationism starts with solving problems， what matters is not only how the problems are solved， but also whether the rights and interests of all parties are respected， whether the results of communication meet the expectations of all parties， and whether the unity among members is maintained. In particular， it should be noted that consultationism is not only applicable to small countries， but also should be applied to regional powers to make up for the gap between them and major powers that only pay attention to power while ignoring rights.

In this way， although the approach of consultationism does not ensure that security problems are fully solved， at least it does not perpetuate them.In terms of security concepts， the joint governance of regional security， especially under the framework of consultation between major countries， is itself a new security model， to which the name “co-governance security” has been given.53 In terms of security relations， consultationism pays attention to respecting the rights of all countries and maintaining mutual solidarity， which can effectively meet the demands of major countries for their status to be respected and thus build interactive security relations. Consultationism not only ensures equal security rights for all countries， but also lays emphasis on the realization of national security benefits， in order to better balance between equal rights and distinct interests， thereby helping to create an equitable security pattern of “accommodating the demands and interests of all parties.”

The above three practice models all have a common feature of longterm nature. In fact， building a new regional security architecture will not be accomplished overnight. In particular， it requires determined action by major countries in the region to play a leading role. As early as 2013， Chinese premier Li Keqiang has pointed out， “Since there are so many economic cooperation architectures in the Asia-Pacific region， it is imperative to build a regional security architecture that suits the actual conditions of the region and meets the needs of all parties.”54 President Xi Jinping proposed in the Global Security Initiative to build a balanced， effective and sustainable security architecture， which shows that Chinas exploration of a new regional security architecture has become more and more complete. Next， China needs to have a clear understanding and a plan for the role it will play in building a new regional security architecture.

At present， there are two key problems in building the new neighborhood security architecture in the region， namely， the lack of effective interaction between security institutions， and the strategic competition between China and the United States. As for institutional interaction，China has two options： First， as China has participated in many regional institutions， it can play a role as a bridge to carry out dialogues and coordination among them.55 Second， China can use its regional influence to promote coordination and communication among different security institutions by means of linking issues. Stabilizing China-US relations does not depend solely on what China does. It requires the two countries to work in the same direction. The recent changes in China-US relations show that the stability of their relations should be maintained not only by the linkage of interests， but also by institutions. In other words， in addition to the work already carried out， China also needs to foster and maintain institutional exchanges between the two countries， especially between the two militaries， so as to accurately convey Chinas intentions and prevent miscalculation. In the medium to long term， China needs to continue to play a constructive role in the following four areas.

First， to be a practitioner of the new security concept. The new security concept advocated by China has been highly recognized by most neighboring countries， and the whole region is expected to reshape the security consensus on this basis. However， the United States， Japan， Australia and other countries still regard their own alliance security model as a yardstick. They are unable to look at Chinas rise rationally， and are determined to consolidate and expand the alliance to contain Chinas development， which has undermined the mutual trust among major countries and damaged the regional security structure. China should currently not only continue to advocate the new security concept， but also actively practice it， making it the norm for security interaction among neighboring countries. In particular， China should put the new security concept into practice in major-country relations， maintain flexibility， reshape the mode of interaction， and gradually increase strategic mutual trust among major powers.

Second， to be a facilitator of security cooperation. Since the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis， China has been a key force in facilitating regional economic cooperation， but it has made little effort in security cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on the public health systems of neighboring countries. While taking good precautions against the epidemic， China actively provided vaccines and epidemic prevention supplies to neighboring countries， making outstanding contributions to their defeat of the epidemic. Chinas relations with its neighbors have improved in all respects through joint efforts to fight the epidemic. Take ASEAN as an example： trade in goods between China and ASEAN reached $878.2 billion in 2021， up 28.1 percent year on year， making ASEAN Chinas largest trading partner for the second consecutive year.56 Taking the joint fight against the epidemic as an opportunity， China has put forward the initiative of building a global community of health for all and made strides in cooperation in non-traditional security fields. In the field of traditional security， neighboring countries also hope that China will not only “accept the invitation，” but also take the initiative to participate in and organize security cooperation activities in such fields as maritime security and multilateral military exercises， so as to promote the development of regional security cooperation in a sound， stable and diversified direction.

Third， to be a supplier of security-related public goods. According to its meaning， security-related public goods can be divided into three categories： conceptual， institutional， and normative goods. In terms of conceptual goods， China has recently put forward major concepts and initiatives， such as the New Security Vision and the Global Security Initiative， which have been widely praised by neighboring countries， and have provided high-quality conceptual security goods to the region. In terms of institutional goods， the Shanghai Cooperation Organization， established by China and Central Asian countries， has become a key pillar for maintaining regional stability and promoting regional development. In terms of normative goods， however， the supply cannot meet the demand of neighboring countries. An important reason is that China itself is also just getting familiar with security rules. As a large country， Chinas regional and international influence in modern times has always been based on the logic that “changing itself is the main source of Chinas power and is also the main way for China to influence the world.”57 This suggests that the norms of behavior that China adheres to will largely become the norms of behavior for countries in the region. Therefore， when China provides normative security goods， what is important is not only the norm itself， but also Chinas awareness of the norm and the way it complies with it. This demands a higher standard from China in its practice of multilateralism， observance of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law than from those small and medium-sized countries in the region.

Fourth， to be a mediator in regional security hotspots. There are numerous security hotspots in the region. Major countries bear a special responsibility for resolving regional and international hotspot issues. So， they should uphold fairness， encourage dialogue， promote peace talks and mediation in light of the needs and aspirations of countries concerned， and act as a stabilizer of peace rather than an instigator of conflict.58 Over the years， China has advocated peace talks on regional hotspots such as the Middle East， the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue， the Iranian nuclear issue and the Afghan conflict， and taken the initiative in international and regional coordination， thus playing a constructive role in stabilizing regional security situations. It is expected that in the process of building a regional security architecture in the future， as the security architecture is still imperfect and hotspots will continue to emerge， Chinas responsibility as a mediator of hotspot issues will only grow bigger and its role will become increasingly critical. Based on its dynamic mediation method， China should actively explore political and institutional solutions to hotspot issues and turn each outbreak of conflict into a new opportunity for improving the security architecture.

Conclusion

There is a high degree of correlation between the problems of neighborhood security governance and the basic functions of a regional security architecture. For all we know there is no perfect regional security architecture in these areas yet， which makes it a strategic necessity for regional countries to build a new security architecture. Based on the functions of a regional security architecture in the general sense， we can estimate the practical direction of establishing a new neighborhood security architecture in the region. In view of the security practice of the surrounding area， we can also explore the practical approach of constructing a new regional security architecture. The Global Security Initiative not only endows these two practices with specific meaning， but also brings inspiration on how to practically execute it. This is the high value that the Global Security Initiative brings to building a new neighborhood security architecture.

Major countries play a special role in building a new regional security architecture， and China has been leading the way in recent years. At present， China needs to stabilize its relationship with the United States， coordinate exchanges and interactions between different institutions， and especially promote the transformation of the relationship from a simple partnership of interests to linking common interests with institutions. In the medium to long term， China needs to continue to play its role as a practitioner of the new security concept， a promoter of security cooperation， a provider of security public goods， and a mediator of regional security hotspots. However， it should be noted that building a new regional security architecture is the common cause of regional countries to achieve regional security. How to organize neighboring countries with distinct security demands to take collective action， and then manage the collective activities and balance the costs and benefits will be a topic worthy of further study.

1 For details， please refer to the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China， “Premier Li Keqiangs Remarks at the 8th East Asia Summit，” October 10， 2013， http：//english.www.gov.cn/premier/ speeches/2014/08/23/content_281474983013282.htm.

2 Nick Bisley， “Chinas Rise and the Making of East Asias Security Architecture，” Journal of Contemporary China， Vol.21， No.73， 2012， p.20.

3 Security architecture is neither security institution nor security structure. Generally speaking， security institution refers to a system of principles， norms， rules and procedures that coordinate security relations among countries； security structure essentially is a concrete form of power structure among countries in security interactions； security architecture is an institutional architecture and an organic arrangement of security relations among different security institutions and actors. See Harald Muller， “The Internalization of Principles， Norms， and Rules by Governments： The Case of Security Regimes，” in Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer， eds.， Regime Theory in International Relations， Appleton Century Crofts， 1993， p.361； Li Kaisheng， “Institutional Coordination and the Future Asian Security Architecture，” International Security Studies， No.4， 2015， p.3.

4 Xi Jinping， “Rising to Challenges and Building a Bright Future Through Cooperation—Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia，” Peoples Daily， April 22， 2022， p.2.

5 Wang Yi， “Acting on the Global Security Initiative to Safeguard World Peace and Tranquility，” Peoples Daily， April 24， 2022， p.6.

6 These eight countries include China， India， Indonesia， Pakistan， Bangladesh， Russia， Japan and the Philippines. Please refer to the database of the United Nations Population Division for relevant data， https：// population.un.org/wpp/DataSources/.

7 Zhang Xiaoming， “Factors Affecting Chinas Future Security Environment in the Neighborhood，”Contemporary World， No.6， 2010， p.26.

8 Since the beginning of the 21st century， the color revolutions in the neighborhood regions include the 2005 Yellow Revolution in Kazakhstan， the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan， the 2007 Cassock Revolution in Myanmar， the 2008 Yurt Revolution in Mongolia， the 2010 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan， and the 2022 Armed Color Revolution in Kazakhstan.

9 Han Aiyong and Han Baojiang， “The Root of the Asian Paradox—from the Perspective of the Modernization Process of East Asian Countries，” Northeast Asia Forum， No.3， 2015， pp.41-43.

10 The widespread existence of territorial issues in the region means that the historical process of modern nation-state building in neighborhood countries has not been completed.

11 Li Kaisheng， “Institutional Coordination and the Future Asian Security Architecture，” p.7.

12 For the research on the classification of regional security institutions， please refer to Wang Jisi，“Building an Asian-Pacific Regional Security Architecture： Objectives， Conditions and Visions，”International Security Studies， No.1， 2016， p.5； Liu Zhenmin， “Work Together to Improve Regional Security Architecture and Address Common Challenges，” International Studies， No.6， 2016， p.1.

13 T.J. Pempel， “Soft Balancing， Hedging， and Institutional Darwin： the Economic Security Nexus and East Asian Regionalism，” Journal of East Asian Studies， Vol.10， No.2， 2010， pp.209-238.

14 Barry Buzan， Ole Waver and Jaap De Wilde， eds， Security： A New Framework for Analysis， Zhu Ning trans.， Zhejiang Peoples Publishing House， 2003， p.35.

15 Barry Buzan and Ole Waver， Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security， Pan Zhongqi， et al.， trans.， Shanghai Peoples Publishing House， 2010， p.474.

16 David Baldwin， “The Concept of Security，” Review of International Studies， Vol.23， No.1， 1997， p.26.

17 Zhang Chao and Wu Baiyi， “On Overcoming the ‘Oversecuritization Trap，” Global Review， No.2， 2022， pp.26-27.

18 “Quad Joint Leaders Statement，” May 24， 2022， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/.

19 “Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic framework for Prosperity，” May 23， 2022， https：//www. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/statement-on-indo-pacific-economicframework-for-prosperity/.

20 Zhang Qingmin， “Enlightenment from Chinas Experience in Resolving Land Borders on Resolving Maritime Borders，” Foreign Affairs Review， No.4， 2013， p.2.

21 “The Administrations Approach to the Peoples Republic of China，” US Department of State， May 26， 2022， https：//www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.

22 Zhou Fangyin， “Trend of the Surrounding Environment and Chinas Neighborhood Strategic Choice，”Foreign Affairs Review， No.1 2014， p.34.

23 Wang Yajun， “COVID-19 and the Transformation of Security Governance in Asia，” World Economics and Politics， No.1， 2021， p.14.

24 Ling Shengli， “Building a Community of Common Security： Chinas Approach to Its Neighborhood，”International Studies， No.5， 2017， p.38.

25 Xi Jinping， “Rising to Challenges and Building a Bright Future Through Cooperation—Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia，” Peoples Daily， April 22， 2022， p.2.

26 “Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng Delivers a Keynote Speech at ‘Seeking Peace and Promoting Development： An Online Dialogue of Global Think Tanks of 20 Countries，” May 6， 2022， https：//www. fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbxw/202205/t20220507_10683086.html.

27 Janne Nolan， ed.， Global Engagement： Cooperation and Security in 21st Century， The Brookings Institution， 1994， pp.3-8.

28 Xi Jinping on the Holistic Approach to National Security， Central Party Literature Press， 2018， pp.229-231.

29 “Xi Jinping Delivered Important Speech at the First Meeting of the National Security Committee of the CPC，” April 14， 2014， http：//www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-04/15/content_2659641.htm.

30 Collection of Xi Jinpings Diplomatic Speeches， Volume 1， Central Party Literature Press， 2022， p.232.

31 Alexander Wendt， Social Theory of International Politics， Qin Yaqing， trans.， Shanghai Peoples Publishing House， 2001， pp.350-354.

32 Collection of Xi Jinpings Diplomatic Speeches， Volume 2， Central Party Literature Press， 2022， p.18.

33 “Li Keqiangs Speech at the 9th East Asia Summit （full text），” November 14， 2014， http：//www. xinhuanet.com//politics/2014-11/14/c_1113240192.htm.

34 Collection of Xi Jinpings Diplomatic Speeches， Volume 1， p.286.

35 “Xi Jinping Had a Video Call with US President Joe Biden，” March 19， 2022， http：//www.xinhuanet. com/photo/2022-03/19/c_1128483893.htm.

36 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett， Security Community， Cambridge University Press， 1998， Chapter1， p.135.

37 Wang Yajun， “COVID-19 and the Transformation of Security Governance in Asia，” pp.12-14.

38 Li Kaisheng， “Institutional Coordination and the Future Asian Security Architecture，” p.2.

39 Xi Jinping， “Rising to Challenges and Building a Bright Future Through Cooperation—Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia.”

40 Men Honghua， “Order Building in East Asia： A Research agenda，” Journal of Contemporary AsiaPacific Studies， p.80.

41 Collection of Xi Jinpings Diplomatic Speeches， Volume 1， p.319.

42 Collection of Xi Jinpings Diplomatic Speeches， Volume 1， p.136.

43 Wei Ling， “Local Practices and Regional Order： ASEAN， China， and the Indo-Pacific Construct，”Southeast Asian Affairs， p.9.

44 Zhou Fangyin， “Ideas on Chinas Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries： Real Conditions and Practical Strategy，” Journal of Chinas Neighboring Diplomacy， No.2， 2017， p.14.

45 Rosemary Foot and Evelyn Goh， “The International Relations of East Asia： A New Research Prospectus，” International Studies Review， Vol.21， 2019， p.401.

46 According to the statistics of China Customs in 2019 and 2021.

47 For the definition of “process” see Qin Yaqing， “Relationality and Processual Construction： Bring Chinese Ideas into International Relations Theory，” Social Sciences in China， 2009， No.3， pp.70-72.

48 Xu Haiyan， “Three Border Divisions between China and Central Asian States，” Social Sciences in Xinjiang， No.1， 2010， p.43.

49 “Trade between China and Five Central Asian Countries Has Increased by More Than 100 Times in the Past 30 Years，” January 18， 2022， http：//www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-01/18/content_5669037.htm.

50 The State Council Information Office of China， China： Democracy That Works， Peoples Publishing House， 2021， p.18.

51 Qin Yaqing， “Practical Process and East Asian Regional Governance，” The Nanjing University AsiaPacific Review， No.2， 2018， p.18.

52 Amitav Acharya， Constructing a Security Community in East Asia， Wang Zhengyi and Feng Huaixin， trans.， Shanghai Peoples Publishing House， 2004， p.96.

53 Zhu Ning， “Three Modes of East Asian Security Cooperation，” World Economics and Politics， No.9， 2006， p.56.

54 “Premier Li Keqiangs Remarks at the 8th East Asia Summit.”

55 Ling Shengli， “Building a Community of Common Security： Chinas Approach to Its Neighborhood，”pp.45-48.

56 China-ASEAN Economic and Trade Cooperation in 2021， January 29， 2022， http：//bn.mofcom.gov.cn/ article/jmxw/202201/20220103265625.shtml.

57 Zhang Baijia， “An Outline of Chinese Diplomacy during the 20th Century，” Social Sciences in China， 2002， No.1， p.17.

58 Wang Yi， “Acting on the Global Security Initiative to Safeguard World Peace and Tranquility.”