China’s Foreign Cooperation on Food Security under the Global Development Initiative

Since 2020, the resilience and flexibility of the global food system has been at stake because of the continuously raging COVID-19 pandemic, and multiple other factors including aggravating extreme climate events, protracted local conflicts and disturbances, as well as a weak world economy. The deficit of global development, of which food security is a major component, has become a common concern of the international community. Food security is among the eight priority cooperation areas that Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed in his Global Development Initiative.1Xi Jinping, “Bolstering Confidence and Jointly Overcoming Difficulties to Build a Better World:Statement at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, September 21, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202109/t20210922_9580293.html.Advancing international cooperation on food security under the Global Development Initiative is not only key to overcoming the development deficit, but also crucial for building a new development paradigm of domestic and international “dual circulation” of food and related resources. Serving the UN’s goal of ending hunger by 2030 will create a bond that connects all within a community of shared future for global development.

Current Situation of Global Food Security

Food security is an issue that concerns both security and development: it is a non-traditional security issue centered on a resource of strategic importance, with implications for regional tranquility, national stability and individual survival;it is also an issue oriented to sustainable development and highly relevant to economic, environmental and resource sustainability.2Zhang Shuai, “People’s Livelihood First: Food Security in Contemporary Middle East and Its Governance,” Forum of World Economics & Politics, No.5. 2021, pp.149-152.The dual nature of food security makes it an issue of major concern to the international community.Currently, the outlook for global food security is far from optimistic, with food supply, industrial and value chains exposed to multifold risks and challenges.The frequent occurrences of extreme weather such as drought, flood and wildfire since the summer of 2021 have constrained the increase of grain output by major exporters including the United States, Brazil and Canada, and worsened food security situation in various countries including Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan,Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. According to the 2022 report on the state of food security and nutrition in the world by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 73FAO et al., The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World: Repurposing Food and Agricultural Policies to Make Healthy Diets More Affordable, Rome: FAO, 2022, p.26..6 million more people were severely food insecure in 2021 than in 2020, among which 37.5 million were in Asia, about 21.5 million in Africa, and about 9.8 million in Latin America and the Caribbean.3More recently, with the escalation of conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, both of which are globally important food exporters, food transportation in the Black Sea region has been severely disrupted, leading to a spike in global food prices. The FAO Food Price Index averaged 157.4 points in May 2022. Though declining modestly from the historic peak in March immediately following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, it remained 22.8 percent higher than in May 2021.4“FAO Food Price Index Dips in May,” United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, June 3, 2022,https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/fao-food-price-index-dips-in-may/en.In general, problems of global food security are reflected in the three areas of availability, access and utilization, all indicators for measuring food security.

The overall global food availability is increasingly under strain, even though the gap between supply and demand varies in size depending on the region. This can be seen from the changing figures for production and consumption of regional staple crops. From 2018/19 to 2020/21, wheat consumption was constantly higher than its production in the Middle East,Africa, South America and South Asia, and consumption was on the rise while production experienced a steady decline in all these regions except South Asia.5“Grain: World Markets and Trade,” United States Department of Agriculture, February 2022, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/grain.pdf.In terms of rice, production in South America, South Asia and Southeast Asia in 2018Yao Yuchun and Li Bing, “Producing, Trading and Reserving: Food Security in Southeast Asia and China-ASEAN Food Cooperation,” Southeast Asian Studies, No.2, 2021, pp.42-44./19, 2019/20 and 2020/21 could roughly meet consumption demands in these respective years, while a “deficit” of rice existed in the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, among which the situation in Africa was the most severe, with a gap of over ten million tons between consumption and production in all three periods.6Ibid.As for corn, its production and consumption remained in a tight balance in South Asia from 2018/19 to 2020/21; in South America, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, overall corn production was declining while consumption was constantly on the rise,yet supply was still sufficient; in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia,however, consumption was more than ten million tons above production,resulting in a sharp disproportion between supply and demand.7Ibid.Generally speaking, all three staple crops were in severely short supply in the Middle East and Africa, while there existed major gaps between supply and demand of at least one staple crop in South Asia, Southeast Asia, South America and Eastern Europe. For these regions, food imports have become the main approach to bridge the gaps, which, however, has weakened their initiative over food security to some extent.

In terms of access, the size of food imports is large, and vulnerable groups within the importing countries are still struggling to obtain adequate amounts of food. In Southeast Asia, food import is relatively lower in Thailand, Vietnam,Myanmar and Cambodia, while Indonesia and the Philippines are among the world’s largest food importers, and Brunei and Singapore have the highest dependence ratio on foreign food.8In Central Asia, all regional countries except Kazakhstan have a low self-sufficiency rate of food. The gap is especially large in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, making import necessary to cover the shortage.9Jiang Ye, “Prospects of China-Central Asia Agricultural Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative,”Farmers Daily, May 23, 2015, p.3.For a long time, the West Asian and North African region has been among the largest importers of wheat in the world. In 2019 and 2020, the value of wheat imports for 14 Arab countries exceeded US$100 million.10“Wheat Imports by Country,” World’s Top Exports, https://www.worldstopexports.com/wheat-importsby-country/.In South Asia, wheat and rice imports have been climbing steadily from 2018/19 to 2020/21, increasing by 5.68 and 3.44 million tons respectively.11“Grain: World Markets and Trade,” United States Department of Agriculture, February 2022.In Sub-Saharan Africa, wheat and rice imports have remained over ten million tons for the three consecutive years.12Ibid.The high dependence ratio on foreign food has made these regions more sensitive and vulnerable to changes in the international food market, making the food security of importing countries susceptible to global food price fluctuations and the interests of food exporters. For example, the raging coronavirus pandemic has triggered a “food nationalism,” under which food exporters implement export restrictions to ensure their own food supply. This has undermined the access capacity of food importing countries. Moreover, the mere volume of food imports is only an indication of the purchasing power at the state level and is unable to reflect the access capacity of families and individuals. In the global food system, women, children, the elderly, small farmers and other vulnerable groups are chronically affected by hunger and are often the first to be hit when food crises erupt. This is especially the case in food importing countries. The imported food does not truly benefit the marginalized groups in the food system. There are considerable discrepancies between the state and society at large, and between political elites and the general population in terms of food access, making it a distinctly hierarchical issue.

From the perspective of utilization, malnutrition, food loss and waste are equally severe. On the one hand, while it is ultimately the goal of food security to eat healthy and achieve a nutritionally rich diet, there remains a multitude of problems to be solved that affect the supply of nutrients for all people in the global food system. These problems include insecurity concerning food quantity and quality, serious environmental pollution, frequent outbreaks of epidemic diseases, and a shortage of clean drinking water. This is especially the case in developing regions. From 2015 to 2021, the prevalence of undernourishment(PoU) in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 4.4,1.1 and 2.8 percentage points.13FAO et al., The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World: Repurposing Food and Agricultural Policies to Make Healthy Diets More Affordable, p.14.Specifically, East and Central Africa, and South and West Asia registered higher PoU figures. On the other hand, food loss and waste has become a serious problem under the combined effect of endogenous and exogenous factors, which reflects the deficiencies of the states in question with regard to the harvesting, processing, transporting, storing, and saving of food. The 2021 Food Waste Index Report of the United Nations Environment Program estimated that the annual average household food waste in Sub-Saharan Africa is 108kg, and the figures in Latin America and the Caribbean,Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia, and Eastern Europe are 69kg, 82kg, 66kg,110kg, and 61kg respectively,14Hamish Forbes and Tom Quested et al., Food Waste Index Report 2021, Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, 2021, p.58.demonstrating that the problem of food waste is concurrently haunting various regions. For these regions, food loss and waste amid a large gap between supply and demand will undoubtedly increase the burden on states in terms of food governance and undermine the sustainability of food security.

Food insecurity has become a pressing problem for some regions and has even been considered a major trigger for regional turbulences. In fact, the turmoil of West Asia and North Africa which erupted at the end of 2010 was closely related to the global food crisis from 2008 to 2009.15Zhang Shuai, “Food Security of Egypt: Dilemmas and Attributions,” West Asia and Africa, No.3, 2018,p.114.Consequently, the issue of food security not only concerns people’s basic existential necessities, but is also urgently needed to enhance the state’s capability to govern and to consolidate the foundations of its rule, which explains why countries around the world attach importance to cooperation in the area of food security.

Basis of China’s Foreign Cooperation on Food Security

Thanks to its rich experience in food and agricultural governance as well as its advantageous position in agricultural infrastructure building, China is endowed with abundant resources when carrying out food security cooperation. In fact, agriculture has been a consistent emphasis of China’s international exchanges. At the China–Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) summit in February 2021, President Xi stressed that China would speed up the entry of agri-food products from CEE countries into the Chinese market, in a bid to double agricultural exports of CEE countries to China and raise two-way agricultural trade by 50 percent over the next five years. In addition, China proposed setting up a farm produce wholesale market in the CEEC region.16“Full Text: Xi Jinping’s Speech at the China-CEEC Summit,” China-CEEC Cooperation, February 9,2021, http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zyxw_4/202202/t20220209_10640454.htm.At the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations in November of the same year, President Xi announced that “China is ready to launch the Action Plan on China-ASEAN Green Agriculture to make our countries’ agricultural sector more resilient and sustainable.”17“For a Shared Future and Our Common Home: Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping at the Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, November 22, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202111/t20211122_10451280.html.At the ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)in November 2021, Xi reiterated China’s commitment to advancing agricultural cooperation with the African continent. Specifically, China will undertake 10 poverty reduction and agricultural projects for Africa, and send 500 agricultural experts to Africa; it will set up a number of China-Africa joint centers for modern agrotechnology exchange, demonstration and training in China, and encourage Chinese institutions and companies to build demonstration villages for China-Africa cooperation on agricultural development and poverty reduction in Africa; and “green lanes” will be opened for African agricultural exports to China.18“Full Text: Keynote Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Opening Ceremony of 8th FOCAC Ministerial Conference,” Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, November 29, 2021, http://www.focac.org/eng/gdtp/202112/t20211202_10461080.htm.Regarding Central Asia, Xi announced at a regional summit that China would help Central Asian countries train professionals in poverty reduction for agricultural development and strengthen the driving forces for self-generated development.19“Joining Hands for a Shared Future: Remarks by H.E. Xi Jinping at the Virtual Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between China and Central Asian Countries,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, January 25, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202201/t20220125_10633542.html.It makes clear that safeguarding food security and pursuing sustainable agricultural development has become a core issue in China’s pragmatic international cooperation. It is worth noting that modern cooperation on food security involves much more than plant cultivation; based on a macroscopic perception of the food system,it integrates and coordinates multiple areas including ecology, science and technology, economics and trade, digital information, and transportation,covering the entire food industrial chain to ensure sustainable food security in all dimensions of availability, access, utilization and stability. With the proposal of the Global Development Initiative, the significance of food security for sustainable development is again highlighted. The diverse partnerships that China has established with other countries, the various cooperation mechanisms that have been set up, the policies of their multi-sector cooperation, as well as the different types of projects that have been put in place, have all together laid a solid foundation for the implementation of the Global Development Initiative in the area of food security.

Guided by Chinese partnership diplomacy

Partnership building is a major component of Chinese major-country diplomacy. Apart from establishing new partnerships, China has been upgrading existing partnerships by reaching consensus on deepening or expanding pragmatic cooperation with its partners.20Sun Xuefeng and Ding Lu, “Explaining the Upgrading of China’s Partnership: Pivot Partners, Broker Partners and Beyond,” World Economics and Politics, No.2, 2017, p.55.Meanwhile, with the expansion of bilateral partnerships, both China and its partners have given their relations greater strategic significance, helping to broaden and reinforce existing areas of cooperation while translating accumulated knowledge about development into concrete practices. The twofold effect of enhancing partnerships and expanding areas of cooperation has created a dynamic interaction that has deepened their interdependence and facilitated their mutual development. China’s foreign cooperation on food security and its close relevance to China’s partnership diplomacy is the best illustration. In any country, there exist the social forces advocating social and economic exchange and cooperation in the area of food with the outside world despite all the dogmas of “high politics.” The intrinsic demand for exchange and cooperation in the area of food on the social and economic dimensions is the very force that can defuse potential conflicts in the areas of “high politics,” and an important resource for improving, maintaining,or strengthening bilateral ties.21Zha Daojiong, “China’s Overseas Food Access Perspective of the History of China-US Relations,” in Wang Jisi, ed., China International Strategy Review (2011), World Affairs Press, 2011, p.369.At the same time, the continuous innovation of China’s partnership diplomacy has won it increasingly diverse friends around the world, which has created a stable political underpinning for the implementation of the Global Development Initiative in the food security area.

In terms of relations with Central Asian countries, in January 2022,China and the five countries in the region jointly forged a substantial strategic partnership with mutual interests, fruitful results and enduring friendship,identifying the food and agriculture sector as a major arena for their all-round pragmatic cooperation.22“Joint Statement between Leaders of China and the Five Central Asian Countries on the 30th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Ties,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, January 26,2022, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/1179_674909/202201/t20220126_10633759.shtml.As for relations with ASEAN, China and ASEAN,when announcing the establishment of a meaningful, substantive and mutually beneficial comprehensive strategic partnership in November 2021, promised to strengthen communication and cooperation on food security at global and regional levels.23“Joint Statement of the ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations,” Xinhua, November 22, 2021, http://www.news.cn/english/2021-11/22/c_1310325939.htm.Regarding the relations between China and Arab states, the two sides agreed in July 2018 to establish a future-oriented strategic partnership of comprehensive cooperation and common development, and listed food security as a major issue of their economic and development cooperation.24“Beijing Declaration of the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum,”China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, July 13, 2018, http://www.chinaarabcf.org/lthyjwx/bzjhywj/dbjbzjhy/201807/t20180713_6836925.htm.On China-Africa relations, the two sides upgraded their new type of strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership in 2015, and agreed to jointly manage non-traditional security issues and global challenges such as food security.25“Declaration of the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,”Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, December 10, 2015, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/201512/t20151210_679428.html.

All the above-mentioned developments that have taken place in different directions of China’s diplomacy are testimony to the integration of food security into the fabric of China’s various types of partnerships. The differences in content between these partnerships, and between the regional partners’ perceptions of the role of food security in cooperation, have determined how their respective cooperation on food security, whether multilateral or bilateral, would proceed,and what they would expect out of the cooperation. China does not pursue uniformity in its foreign cooperation on food security; instead, it stresses the specificity of each cooperation format and values the diversity of orientations regarding food security cooperation by regional partners. On this basis, the issues and models of cooperation are constantly upgraded in terms of both geographical extension (global or regional) and policy domain (security or development). It is the best example of the implementation of the guidelines of practical cooperation as proposed by the Global Development Initiative, and serves to translate the consensus of cooperation between China and regional countries into concrete practices, which helps find solutions to the multiple problems of food security.

Safeguarded by solid cooperation mechanisms

China’s foreign cooperation on food security under the guidance of its partnership diplomacy calls for a mechanism that features openness,inclusiveness, and equal treatment of all parties. By bringing together the relevant countries in such a mechanism and coordinating their demands for a common denominator of their interests, the cooperation process will be accelerated, and cooperation outcomes will be widely shared. This is what guarantees the effective implementation of the Global Development Initiative in the area of food security.

At the global level, the system of international organizations centered around the United Nations constitutes the core mechanism for China to conduct food security cooperation. As both a participant and a leading player,China has been taking advantage of its experience in food and agricultural governance, proposing its own vision and solution in response to the difficulties the global food system is facing. When the UN Food Systems Summit was held in September 2021, China released a position paper and a report on the path to sustainable development of its food systems, which uphold people-centered development and champion a new concept of innovative, coordinated, green,open and shared development. Urging all parties to give priority to development,China advocates providing greater support for developing countries and vulnerable groups in the form of funds and technologies to raise their food supply capacity, thus jointly maintaining global food security.26“The UN Food Systems Summit: China’s Position,” September 23, 2021, Food Systems Summit Dialogues, https://summitdialogues.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/The-UN-Food-Systems-Summit-Chinas-Position.doc; “Report on Path to Sustainable Development of Food Systems in China,” Food Systems Summit Dialogues, September 23, 2021, https://summitdialogues.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Report-on-Path-to-Sustainable-Development-of-Food-Systems-in-China.doc.The ideas and concepts of development elaborated in these documents are also the core tenets of the Global Development Initiative, which demonstrate to the international community China’s position and propositions on safeguarding food security.

At the regional level, numerous mechanisms that China established together with countries of different regions have put food security among the main issues on the agenda. These include the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum, the ASEAN-China “10+1”mechanism, the Summit of China and Central and Eastern European Countries,the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) mechanism, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).27The Shanghai Cooperation Organization remains the only major platform for China’s cooperation with Central Asian countries as a collective, even though it has non-Central Asian nations such as Russia, India,Pakistan and Iran as members. It is therefore regarded as a regional mechanism for food security cooperation between China and Central Asian countries.Leveraging the advantages of China’s economic size on one side and the large number of regional countries on the other, the framework for China’s foreign cooperation on food security is both consistent with its own interests and responsive to the demands of other parties.

Under these regional development mechanisms, China has been committed to strategic planning for food security cooperation from a macroscopic perspective, treating regional countries as a collective and adopting a holistic approach to cooperation. China and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean agreed to “strengthen policy exchanges on public policy issues in food security, support joint research and development of variety selection and breeding, cultivation, and food processing technology, encourage business to invest in cultivation, processing and storage and logistics infrastructure for agricultural products.”28“China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022-2024),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, December 7, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202112/t20211207_10463459.html.China and African countries will launch trials in such areas as reduction of post-harvest grain loss in order to support African countries to improve their food supply capacity with existing production capabilities.29“Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, November 30, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202112/t20211202_10461183.html.Within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China and other member countries intend to promote cooperation for engaging in a voluntary exchange of information on food security, and have expressed their interest in further promoting SCO cooperation on food security with international organizations,including the FAO.30“Joint Statement of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on Food Security,” Shanghai Cooperation Organization, September 17, 2021, http://eng.sectsco.org/news/20210917/782626.html.China and ASEAN countries agreed to carry out the Agreement on ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve and strengthen cooperation in food security with a view to improving regional food security.31“Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2021-2025),” ASEAN, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ASEAN-China-POA-2021-2025.pdf.China and Arab states will step up cooperation in areas including organic or biological agriculture as well as food security, while actively exchanging experience in agricultural development and learning from China’s best practices.32“China-Arab States Cooperation Forum Execution Plan for 2020-2022,” China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, August 10, 2020, http://www.chinaarabcf.org/lthyjwx/bzjhywj/djjbzjhy/202008/t20200810_6836922.htm.As the examples above demonstrate, China’s foreign cooperation on food security has different focuses in different regions. This is made possible by the development needs of regional countries and the advantages that China enjoys,which has also served to expand and improve the existing cooperation areas.Mutual sustainable development can be achieved by leveraging the growth in technology, knowledge, agricultural capital goods, and infrastructure that China has accumulated in different regions.

Promoted by cooperation action plans

While the mechanisms that are in place to serve as cooperation platforms between China and its partners are laying out the main direction,regulations and code of conduct for all participants, it still requires interdepartmental coordination between government agencies in charge of agriculture, commerce, and science and technology for cooperation agreements to be concluded and concrete projects to be implemented.Between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries, two meetings of agricultural ministers have been held, and a joint declaration was adopted at the second forum in 2021, in which the two sides pledged that the total volume of their agri-trade and China’s accumulated agricultural investment in LAC would reach US$100 billion and US$5 billion respectively by 2030.33“Second China-CELAC Ministerial Forum on Agriculture Convenes,” Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China, February 26, 2021, http://english.moa.gov.cn/news_522/202103/t20210301_300598.html.Under the framework of the “eight major initiatives,”34The eight major initiatives, announced by President Xi Jinping at the 2018 FOCAC Beijing summit,cover the fields of industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation, green development,capacity building, health care, people-to-people exchanges as well as peace and security.the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Agriculture was held in 2019,and the Sanya Declaration on China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation was adopted. Guided by the “nine programs” of China-Africa cooperation,35The nine programs, announced by President Xi Jinping at the eighth ministerial conference of FOCAC in 2021, are anchored on medicine and health, poverty reduction and agricultural development, trade promotion, investment promotion, digital innovation, green development, capacity building, cultural and people-to-people exchange, and peace and security. Under the first three-year plan of the China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035, China will work closely with African countries to implement the programs.both sides committed to convening the second Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Agriculture and the first meeting of the China-AU Agricultural Cooperation Commission, to ensure the implementation of agricultural cooperation projects of mutual concern. For the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, six meetings of agricultural ministers have been held, with the adoption of a series of documents including the 2021-2025 Action Plan to Implement the SCO Agreement on Agricultural Cooperation, and the Plan for the Implementation of the SCO Cooperation Program on Food Security. Between China and ASEAN, five forums on agricultural cooperation have been convened since 2016. China has reached more than 30 agricultural cooperation agreements with ASEAN countries, and set up joint committees on agriculture with eight of the ten ASEAN members.36“China and ASEAN Deepen Pragmatic Cooperation on Agriculture,” China News, September 9, 2021,https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/ 2021/09-09/9561967.shtml.With those countries in the Mekong subregion in particular, China established the Joint Working Group on Lancang-Mekong Agricultural Cooperation and the Exchange and Cooperation Consortium for Agricultural Science and Technology in the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation in 2017 and 2019 respectively. The LMC Three-Year Action Plan on Agricultural Cooperation (2020-2022) was released in 2020, and the LMC Agricultural Cooperation Center was set up by China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs in the previous year to facilitate the success of the LMC Bumper Harvest projects.37“Deepen Agricultural Cooperation for LMC Bumper Harvest,” Xinhua Silk Road, September 9, 2020,https://www.imsilkroad.com/news/p/426556.html.Between China and Arab states,five meetings have been held on agricultural issues, and 36 cooperation agreements were signed at the Modern Agricultural Cooperation Conference of the fifth China-Arab States Expo to boost sustainable agricultural development and improve the food security of regional countries.38“Modern Agricultural Cooperation Conference of China-Arab States Expo to Boost All-Round Agricultural Cooperation,” Guangming, August 14, 2021, https://difang.gmw.cn/nx/2021-08/14/content_35093020.htm.China has also had four meetings of agricultural ministers with Central and Eastern European countries, with a joint declaration adopted at the 2016 meeting. At the 2021 China-CEEC summit, all sides expressed support for holding the fifth China-CEEC meeting of agricultural ministers, the 15th Agri-trade and Economic Cooperation Forum, and the 10th and 11th consultative board meeting of the Association for the Promotion of China-CEEC Agricultural Cooperation.39“2021 Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries Beijing List of Activities,” China-CEEC Cooperation, February 9, 2021, http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zywj/ldrhhcgwj/202112/t20211222_10474168.htm.

Meanwhile, China has signed agreements on various specific issues of food security. Regarding food tariffs, high-quality agricultural development is bracing for new opportunities as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement came into effect in 2022. Tariff concessions are realized between China and ASEAN, New Zealand, South Korea,Australia and Japan to varying degrees according to RCEP rules, which will reshape the landscape of global and regional agri-trade and improve the food industrial, supply and value chains.40“Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement,” ASEAN Secretariat, https://rcepsec.org/legal-text.In terms of food quality security,the agricultural departments of China, Cambodia, Myanmar, Pakistan,and Vietnam jointly released the Statement of Intent for Cooperation on Promoting Specification-setting for Pesticide Quality under the Belt and Road Initiative in 2021, aiming to support the FAO Asia-Pacific Plant Protection Commission (APPPC) in “setting up a series of specifications for pesticide quality … for its implementation within the Asia-Pacific region so as to promote the sustainable development of agriculture.”41“Statement of Intent for Cooperation on Promoting Specification-setting for Pesticide Quality under the Belt and Road Initiative,” July 2, 2021, http://www.gjs.moa.gov.cn/ydylhzhhnyzcq/202107/t20210702_6370854.htm.This indicates the importance attached by the countries to green development and quality in food security. As for inspection and quarantine, 95 relevant cooperation documents have been signed between China and CEE countries, which allow 173 kinds of food and agricultural products from 14 countries to enter the Chinese market.42“China Customs: 95 Documents on Customs Inspection and Quarantine Cooperation Signed between China and CEE Countries,” People.com.cn, June 8, 2021, http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0608/c1004-32125152.html.

The above agreements constitute a basic framework for China’s foreign cooperation on food security, and in a sense guide the implementation of the Global Development Initiative concerning food security issues. It reflects the development needs and concerns on both sides of the cooperation partnership, and calls for extensive consultation, joint contribution, winwin outcomes and shared benefits for the sake of sustainable development.As for the content of the agreements, the comprehensive arrangements are short- to medium-term, so that the parties involved can improve their future cooperation according to changes in their food security environment and fluctuations in international food markets. With a new development strategy proposed in this case, cooperation can keep pace with the times and remain innovative. In contrast, those agreements that concentrate on specific issues are usually long-term, which demonstrates the parties’ willingness to keep clearly defined, sustainable and stable policies in place for the foreseeable future throughout the process of food production and sale. By so doing, a food industry chain based on mutual trust can be established in the regional or global food system to safeguard food security.

Apart from reaching cooperation consensus with countries in different regions, China has also concluded agreements with UN agencies for food and agriculture to jointly protect the food security of developing countries. Since 2015, China and the FAO have jointly organized annual consultation meetings on the FAO-China South-South Cooperation Program, the Ministerial Level Forum on Global South-South Cooperation in Agriculture, and the Dialogue on Strengthening South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Global Agricultural Development. In 2015 and 2021 respectively, the second and third phases of the China-FAO South-South Cooperation Trust Fund were launched, to each of which China donated US$50 million.43“China Announces Phase III of China-FAO South-South Cooperation Trust Fund,” Permanent Representation of China to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture, September 23, 2020,http://www.cnafun.moa.gov.cn/news/ldcxw/202009/t20200925_6353306.html; “Dialogue Convened on South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Global Agricultural Development,” Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China, February 28, 2022, http://english.moa.gov.cn/news_522/202203/t20220302_300810.html.In 2017, the then Ministry of Agriculture of China and the World Food Program (WFP) jointly formulated and released the China Country Strategic Plan (2017-2021), in which the two sides made a shared commitment to achieving zero hunger and promoting global sustainable development.44“WFP Releases Five-Year Country Strategic Plan,” Xinhua, March 28, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-03/28/c_129520551.htm.In 2019, the WFP signed a memorandum of understanding with China’s Ministry of Emergency Management on collaboration towards strengthening emergency preparedness and response capacity, and another MOU with China’s National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration to promote South-South cooperation in food security and help other developing countries improve food security and nutrition.45“WFP and China to Partner on Emergency Management,” World Food Program, April 26, 2019, https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-and-china-partner-emergency-management; “WFP and China’s NAFRA sign MOU to Promote South-South Cooperation in Food Security,” World Food Program, June 20, 2019, https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-and-chinas-nafra-sign-mou-promote-south-south-cooperation-food-security.In 2018,China and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)announced the creation of a new South-South and triangular cooperation facility,for which China would make an additional US$10 million contribution in support of exchanging and mobilizing development knowledge, expertise and resources from the Global South.46“IFAD and China Announce Creation of New South-South and Triangular Cooperation Facility,”IFAD, February 16, 2018, https://www.ifad.org/es/web/latest/-/news/ifad-and-china-announce-creation-ofnew-south-south-and-triangular-cooperation-facility.

Implemented through specific projects

China’s foreign cooperation on food security typically follows an approach that puts top-level bilateral dialogue first before ministerial coordination comes into play. While the former serves to identify each other’s main concerns in food security cooperation, the latter coordinates the details of cooperation implementation. Under this two-fold mechanism, relevant projects are rapidly coming to fruition. In Africa, China had set up 25 agricultural technology demonstration centers by 2020. As an important carrier of China-Africa food security cooperation, these centers feature paired collaboration between Chinese provinces and African countries, and give a priority role to agricultural enterprises and research institutions, to enhance the overall capacity of African agricultural practitioners, help raise the production and income of local farmers, and support Africa in cultivating endogenous development momentum and achieving food security sustainability.47Zhang Shuai, “China’s Food Security Cooperation in Africa: Concepts, Models and Prospects,”Contemporary World and Socialism, No.6, 2021, pp.161-162.For example, the production of a super hybrid rice variety cultivated by the China-Burundi Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center has been more than three times the local average,48“China-Aided Rice in Burundi Achieves Record Production,” Ministry of Commerce of China,November 7, 2016, http://bi.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201611/20161101649188.shtml.making local food supply more resilient. The yield of a cotton variety developed by the China-Sudan Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center has been five to six times greater than local cotton varieties,49Zhao Yining, China and Africa in the 21st Century, CITIC Press, 2018, p.258.which increases farmers’ revenues and improves the security of food access. In Central Asia, to support the modernization of food production and make it more eco-friendly, China and regional countries have established the Xinjiang-Central Asia Modern Agriculture Technological Innovation and Exchange Center and the China-Kazakhstan Modern Agriculture Innovation Park, set up branches of the Research Center for Ecology and Environment of Central Asia in Almaty, Bishkek and Dushanbe, and launched the SCO Demonstration Base for Agricultural Technology Exchange and Training in Yangling, Shaanxi Province of China.50Zhang Qingping, Wang Jingjing and Wang Jin, “Agricultural Cooperation between China and the SCO Member States for the Period 2001-2020,” Journal of Eurasian Economy, No.1, 2022, p.95.In Arab states, China set up the agricultural technology transfer centers in Mauritania, Jordan and Morocco.These centers, with China’s Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region as the chief responsible province, aim at empowering agriculture with technology, facilitating local agricultural economy and trade, and enhancing the food access capacity of the countries concerned.51Zhang Shuai, “Agricultural Cooperation under the Framework of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum: Characteristics, Motivations and Challenges,” West Asia and Africa, No.6, 2020, p.98.In Southeast Asia, China has fully utilized the geographical advantage of its Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. Supported by the Lancang-Mekong Agricultural Cooperation branch in Guangxi, which was set up in 2020, China has carried out more than 60 projects in the Mekong countries. A batch of projects by the China (Guangxi)-ASEAN crop testing station have been implemented in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. The crop varieties introduced by the station for experimentation and demonstration are generally 20-50% more productive and over 20% more profitable than local varieties.52“Lancang-Mekong Agricultural Cooperation: Projects Advanced in Parallel with Planning,” Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China, March 4, 2021, http://www.gjs.moa.gov.cn/ ydylhzhhnyzcq/202103/t20210304_6362927.htm.Besides, China has utilized the South-South cooperation platform that it established in partnership with international bodies such as the FAO and the WFP to strengthen food security cooperation with developing countries,which has benefited about 1 million farmers in nearly 30 developing states. By far, China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has sent 225 agricultural experts to 23 countries, promoted 428 new technology transfers, and held over 400 training courses for more than 11,000 visiting foreign agricultural officials and technicians.53“14th Five-Year Plan for International Cooperation in Agriculture and Rural Affairs,” Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China, January 18, 2022, http://www.moa.gov.cn/govpublic/GJHZS/202201/P020220128632546567867.pdf.

As per the Construction Plan for Overseas Agricultural Cooperation Demonstration Zones and Experimental Zones for Agricultural Openingup Cooperation, released by China’s Ministry of Agriculture in 2016, pilot demonstration zones for overseas agricultural cooperation were set up in countries along the Belt and Road routes and other key regions,54“Construction Plan for Overseas Agricultural Cooperation Demonstration Zones and Experimental Zones for Agricultural Opening-Up Cooperation,” Ministry of Agriculture of China, November 13, 2016,http://www.moa.gov.cn/nybgb/2016/shierqi/201711/t20171125_5919532.htm.with Tajikistan,Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Sudan, Laos, Cambodia and Fiji becoming the first ten host countries. Because of the satisfactory results of these pilot zones, the number of overseas agricultural cooperation demonstration zones has been steadily increasing, becoming a new platform for China’s foreign cooperation on food security and gradually producing a scale effect. During the certification process of demonstration zones, a series of standards are highlighted: on the part of enterprises, it is important that they are competitive and socially responsible, with a complete industrial chain and an industrial plan that is consistent with local socio-economic development; on the part of areas that host these enterprises, factors such as political stability and public security of the host country, infrastructural base and logistical services are stressed.55“Belt and Road Agricultural Cooperation Enters Period of In-Depth Development,” Farmers Daily,August 13, 2019, p.4.Incorporating these multi-dimensional political, economic and social factors have contributed to numerous successes in food security cooperation. For example, the demonstration zone in Mozambique, managed by China’s Hubei Province, has a per mu yield of potatoes of over 1,760kg, 300kg more than when local traditional cultivation methods are used, contributing greatly to the security of staple crops and to increasing the income of farmers.56“Hubei Overseas Demonstration Zone Effectively Improves Staple Crop Security of Mozambique,”Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China, March 4, 2021, http://www.gjs.moa.gov.cn/ydylhzhhnyzcq/202103/t20210304_6362932.htm.As a key project of China-Russia cooperation, the agricultural park established by Sichuan Province in Russia’s Chuvash Republic has leased 8,000 hectares of land, which is expected to enhance the food access capacity of local people.57“Sichuan’s Overseas Agri-Cooperation Zone Carried Out in Russia,” Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China, November 23, 2020, http://www.gjs.moa.gov.cn/ydylhzhhnyzcq/202011/t20201123_6356793.htm.The agricultural technology demonstration zone implemented by Henan Province in Ukraine has introduced China’s agricultural machinery, which is transported by the China-Europe freight trains, to improve local irrigation conditions and advance the construction of high-standard demonstration fields.58“Henan’s Overseas Agri-Cooperation Zone Restores Normal Production,” Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China, July 17, 2020, http://www.gjs.moa.gov.cn/ydylhzhhnyzcq/202007/t20200717_6348846.htm.

Moreover, China has attached much importance to policy communication and strategic synergy with partner countries, and has actively participated in some of their major agricultural projects to help them bridge gaps in food governance. In Egypt, the Belt and Road Initiative has deeply integrated with the Vision 2030 of Egypt, lending crucial support to bilateral food security cooperation. The desert drilling projects carried out by Chinese enterprises in the country have boosted the 1.5 million feddan59A feddan is a unit of area used in Egypt that is approximately 4,200 square meters.land reclamation project launched by the Egyptian government, turning more desert into fertile farmland.In Russia, the synergy between the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union has promoted cooperation between the two sides’ agricultural enterprises. The COFCO Group has participated in projects in the Russian Far East and Siberia to conduct bulk grain trade, while setting up a branch in Vladivostok to invest in the grain storage and logistics system and improve local storage conditions.60“COFCO Expands Agricultural Cooperation in Russian Far East,” Guangming, September 12, 2018,https://economy.gmw.cn/xinxi/2018-09/12/content_31128528.htm.In Algeria, PowerChina has helped construct large-scale granaries, with the first part of the country’s largest granary completed in 2018 to provide a strong guarantee for Algeria’s food-saving and loss-reduction efforts as well as self-sufficiency in grain.61“POWERCHINA Subsidiary Completes Building Part of Largest Granary in Algeria,” Xinhua, June 6,2018, http://m.xinhuanet.com/2018-06/06/c_129887836.htm.

The implementation of these projects will strengthen the positive impact of cooperation and make it more sustainable as a concrete embodiment of China’s foreign cooperation on food security. On the one hand, China has brought its hard- and soft-power resources in terms of technology, infrastructure, talents,knowledge and experience into its cooperation projects, and reorganized and multiplied these resources in practice. The integration of modern Chinese methods and local conditions creates farming techniques and finely tuned plant varieties adapted to the local climate. On the other hand, as a regular platform for food security cooperation, the cooperation centers established overseas by China are not only suitable as venues for policy coordination with agricultural officials of partner countries, but also beneficial for intellectual exchange with local agricultural researchers as well as for stronger people-to-people ties with local farmers. Such a multi-level way of exchange between agricultural stakeholders of China and its cooperation partners has enhanced communication on food and agricultural governance. Moreover, the accumulated project outcomes from China’s foreign cooperation on food security have laid a solid foundation for further cooperation under the Global Development Initiative.

Challenges Facing China’s Food Security Cooperation

Through years of unremitting efforts, China’s foreign cooperation on food security has achieved major progress, thus creating favorable conditions for implementing the Global Development Initiative. However, it should be admitted that there remains a multitude of challenges for more in-depth cooperation.

Frequent occurrences of correlated crises

Due to its thematic complexity, the issue of food security is susceptible to domino effects. The primary reason for this is the existence of intricately intertwined areas that frequently overlap with the area of food security. Apart from agriculture, such areas include ecology, trade, finance, health, biology and transportation. Any signs of instability in one area may trigger a food crisis, which demands that the issue of food security has to be premised on a comprehensive system of security that covers all the above areas.62Yu Hongyuan and Li Kunhai, “Global Governance of Food Security and China’s Participation,” The Journal of International Studies, No.6, 2021, pp.86-88.Besides, the indicators of food security, which include availability, access, utilization and stability, are diverse and interdependent.63Tony Castleman and Gilles Bergeron, “Food Security and Program Integration: An Overview,” in Louise C. Ivers, ed., Food Insecurity and Public Health, New York: CRC Press, 2015, p.2.Long-lasting food security is only attainable when security is guaranteed in all of the four dimensions.

The complex nature of the food security problem has made cooperation in this domain even more difficult. Take the impact of health security and ecological security on food security cooperation as an example. As for health security, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a stagnation of the global transport industry and hence to a contraction of food production as well as to an obstruction of food trade. Due to the epidemic control measures, local employees of Chinese agricultural enterprises find it difficult to resume normal production, and a majority of overseas projects had to be suspended, ruining the original cooperation plans between China and partner countries. In terms of ecological security, the frequent occurrences of climate disasters have greatly increased the pressure for more effective food security cooperation. More frequent extreme weather phenomena have been witnessed since 2021 that have catastrophic effects on global ecological systems, especially those of developing countries. Natural disasters such as droughts, floods and dust storms, coupled with secondary disasters like locust plagues and water pollution, have sharply intensified pressure on food producers in East Africa, South Asia and West Asia.Given that a stable climate is the precondition for any successful grain planting,the frequent occurrences of natural disasters have increased the costs of bilateral cooperation, posed more challenges to the local adaptability of agricultural technologies, and impacted the experiments for fine varieties.

Mounting financial pressures on enterprises

Compared with other sectors of the economy, the agriculture industry is relatively “weak” because its investment cycle is usually long and the effects often only become apparent over a long period of time. This makes sustainable funding all the more important for the operation of projects. Since 2014,the Department of International Cooperation and the Foreign Economic Cooperation Center under China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs have issued nine reports that have consistently traced the overseas development of Chinese agricultural enterprises, especially those in developing regions. Among all the problems brought up by enterprises in these reports, financing is the most common difficulty.64Department of International Cooperation and the Foreign Economic Cooperation Center, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of China, China Foreign Agricultural Investment Cooperation Report (2018),China Agriculture Press, 2019.This can mainly be attributed to the high interest rates and short maturities of the loans provided by domestic banks. Besides, banks in many provinces have set conditions for the size of enterprises and the destinations of investment. Such obstruction to smooth capital flow has directly stifled the expansion and innovation of cooperation, and reduced the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, making them disadvantaged in the exploration of overseas food markets. Meanwhile, in the context of sluggish global economic growth and the still raging coronavirus pandemic, the economies of several regions have ground to a halt and even registered overall recession. According to World Bank statistics, the annual GDP growth rates in the Middle East and North Africa,South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Central Asia were respectively -4.0%, -5.7%, -6.7%, -2.0%, and -5.6% in 2020.65“GDP growth (annual %)”, The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?view=chart.The economic plights in these regions have aggravated the already heavy burden on Chinese agricultural enterprises. For example, a company from Shanxi Province with operations in Africa complained that a lack of local investment in agricultural infrastructure would consume too much of their operational capital and make their projects more costly.66Foreign Economic Cooperation Center, Ministry of Agriculture of China, China Foreign Agricultural Investment Cooperation Report (2016), China Agriculture Press, 2017, p.51.Another enterprise from Jiangxi Province with businesses in Southeast Asia indicated that the shortage of agricultural investment and the under-development of water conservancy facilities have added to difficulties in implementing projects.67Ibid., p.138.

Unsatisfying business environment in host countries

For China to successfully cooperate on food security in foreign countries,social stability, consistency of policies as well as compliance with cooperation agreements on the part of host countries are required, as fluctuations on any of the above factors would make cooperation hard to proceed. Some countries in cooperation with China on issues of food security are still under multiple pressures including regime change, ethnic and religious clashes, resources contention, frictions between the central and local governments, and majorpower rivalry, all of which are destabilizing factors for business environment.According to the 2021 Fragile States Index published by the US-based Fund for Peace, the majority of countries with an index higher than 60, which are put in the “warning” category or above, host agricultural projects in cooperation with China.68Natalie Fiertz, Fragile States Index Annual Report 2021, Washington D.C.: The Fund for Peace, 2021,pp.6-7.The Sudanese turmoil in 2019, the Ethiopian conflict in 2020,and the political turbulence in Myanmar in 2021 have all impeded the local implementation of China’s agricultural projects. More recently, with the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine and the escalation of Western sanctions on Russia, China’s food trade with Ukraine and Russia, both major partners of its foreign cooperation on food security, has been inevitably affected. Meanwhile,as food security cooperation entails multiple stakeholders including the central and local governments, enterprises and farmers of partner countries, cooperation may face constraints when there are disagreements between the interests and demands of these actors. For example, following grain harvests, contradictions may arise when local governments intend to increase domestic food supply while foreign producers need to favor the export side. Chinese enterprises from Jiangsu Province once complained that high export tariffs were imposed by local governments to prevent agricultural products from being shipped out.69China Foreign Agricultural Investment Cooperation Report (2018), p.117.Chinese companies in Sudan also indicated that the central government has rather weak control over local authorities due to its weak political structure.Despite preferential policies for Chinese enterprises at the central level, there are difficulties in implementing them locally. Empowered by advantages at home,some Sudanese companies even attempted to squeeze Chinese enterprises out of the market.70Zhang Shuai, “Current Situation and Prospect of Sino-Sudanese Agricultural Cooperation,” Arab World Studies, No.1, 2022, p.34.

Imbalances between different areas of food security cooperation

Generally, food security cooperation covers food production and sales as well as risk prevention. The former focuses on crop planting, seed experimentation and agricultural product sales, whose role in safeguarding food security is most prominent when the political situation is stable and there are fewer external interventions. The latter puts more emphasis on food storage and food information exchange, which is more influential on food security in the event of force majeure such as regional turmoil, meteorological disasters,and public health emergencies. Looking at the existing projects, China’s foreign cooperation on food security is mainly concentrated on food production and sales, while cooperation in risk prevention is relatively inadequate. On the one hand, China has yet to establish a food information sharing mechanism with most of its partners. Without sufficient communication and information exchange on specifics of the food security situation, any joint response in the event of a crisis would be far less effective, which would prevent the formation of an inherently dynamic food security network. On the other hand, China has yet to fully demonstrate its advantages in food storage and other areas to its partners,participating far less actively in projects of granary construction and coldchain logistics. This has negatively affected the overseas promotion of China’s experience in food crisis management and has hurt attempts to jointly build an entire industrial chain with other countries.

How China Should Deepen Food Security Cooperation

According to China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for International Cooperation in Agriculture and Rural Affairs published in 2022, multilateral and bilateral cooperation on food security should be strengthened, which is all the more urgent as world hunger is still on the rise and food security has become an issue drawing global attention. With systematic planning and a particular focus on Belt and Road countries, China should deeply explore the potential for cooperation on grain and other major agricultural products.71“14th Five-Year Plan for International Cooperation in Agriculture and Rural Affairs.”In the face of challenges in food security cooperation, China needs to take comprehensive measures to build new mechanisms, innovate its cooperation models, prevent all kinds of risks, and expand the areas of cooperation, so that food security can become sustainable and the UN’s goal of zero hunger by 2030 can be achieved.

First, a systematic cooperation mechanism centered on food security should be constructed to reduce the vulnerability of food security cooperation to unexpected disturbances. As mentioned above, food security is never a singledimensional issue, but intertwined with health, ecological, biological, financial,and water security. Therefore, agricultural departments should not be the sole player in food security cooperation; instead, inter-departmental collaboration should be further promoted. Based on the dialogues between agricultural ministries, China should consider setting up a cross-departmental systematic mechanism for food security cooperation. Currently, an inter-ministerial joint meeting mechanism on agricultural international cooperation has been in place, with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs as the convenor, and attended by the Commerce, Foreign, Finance Ministries as well as the National Development and Reform Commission. China and its cooperation partners can learn from the arrangement and establish a transnational ministerial cooperation mechanism on agriculture, headed by agricultural ministries of the two sides and incorporating other departments closely related to agriculture.Under such a mechanism, dialogue platforms of “agriculture plus” should be set up to address any impact on food security by unexpected disturbances. For example, an “agriculture + health” response mechanism could be activated when a health crisis breaks out, which would be centered on both sides’ agricultural and health departments and supported by other government agencies. In the event of a climate crisis, the agricultural and environmental ministries could make a joint response with the help of other departments. Furthermore, China and its partners can turn this mechanism and relevant dialogues into a regular arrangement and an important platform to jointly handle any crises related to food security.

Second, cooperation models should be rethought to reduce the financial burden on agricultural enterprises. Domestically, Chinese agricultural companies should take the initiative to explore solutions to financing bottlenecks from the perspective of cooperation models. They can join forces with other enterprises in the provinces where they are located that are also interested in international cooperation in agriculture and make joint investment overseas. They can also leverage their locational advantages and build a region-wide alliance of enterprises, for example in the Yangtze River Delta region and within the three provinces of Northeast China. By synergizing the comparative strengths of different companies, they can collectively go global with more confidence. In this process, local agricultural departments should provide the necessary support for building coordination and dialogue platforms and facilitate the conclusion of cooperation agreements. Overseas, China needs to go beyond traditional bilateral or trilateral formats of food security cooperation and actively advance thirdparty market cooperation, which refers to multilateral economic, financial or infrastructure cooperation between a sovereign government and enterprises with overseas operations on one side, and their counterparts in another country with comparable industrial capacity and economic power as well as complementary resource endowment and trade condition on the other side, in a third country or region with more resources and stronger trade complementarity.72Men Honghua and Yu Qinwen, “Third-Party Market Cooperation: Theoretical Construction, Historical Evolution and China’s Path,” Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific, No.6, 2020, p.9.Given the current situation, the prospects are promising for China’s third-party food security cooperation in overseas markets. For example, China and the Persian Gulf countries can consider cooperation in African markets and achieve win-win outcomes for all three sides by giving full play to China’s technological edges, the Gulf countries’ financial advantages, and African countries’ favorable land and water resources. With the RCEP now coming into force, China, the ROK and New Zealand can cooperate on agricultural infrastructure in ASEAN countries.Under the “10+3” mechanism, China can also implement rice reserve and other projects in Southeast Asia with Japan and the ROK. In Central Asia, China and Russia can consider cooperation to support local development of agricultural land resources under the SCO framework.

Third, an overseas risk assessment system should be set up to improve early warning on crises in China’s investment destinations. Early warning is crucial for Chinese enterprises with overseas operations, especially when they are under considerable financial pressures, since timely and accurate information is critical to reducing economic losses. To construct an overseas risk assessment system, efforts should be made by governments and enterprises. On the part of governments, given that Chinese agricultural attachés have yet to be posted to all of its partner countries on agricultural cooperation, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs should train more relevant diplomats and send them overseas to collect local information and public opinions in a timely manner. Besides,it can consider publishing analysis reports on the risks of overseas agricultural investment based on the operations of Chinese enterprises in the previous year and on assessments of the current situation in the host countries. Risk predictions for cooperation in the present year would make up for the lack of relevant content in the current Foreign Agricultural Investment Cooperation Report. On the part of enterprises, the position of a Chief Information Officer (CIO) who is responsible for following the latest developments in investment destinations can be set up. In the process of recruitment, employers should not only fix their eyes on applicants with agricultural education backgrounds, but should also value professionals in diplomacy, international relations, and communication studies.Moreover, before making overseas investments, the enterprises should conduct sufficient field surveys, get contingency plans prepared, and seek intellectual support from think tanks and universities when necessary.

Last, the areas of food security cooperation should be expanded to make it more sustainable. Food security is the common concern in the “nine programs”of China-Africa cooperation, the “1+3+6” cooperation73Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the “1+3+6” framework for China-Latin America pragmatic cooperation at the first summit between Chinese and Latin American and Caribbean leaders in 2014. It refers to the one guidance of the China-Latin American and Caribbean Countries Cooperation Plan (2015-2019), utilizing trade, investment and financial cooperation as driving forces, and identifying energy and resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, scientific and technological innovation and information technology as cooperation priorities.between China and Latin America and the Caribbean, and the “3+5” cooperation74At the first leaders’ meeting of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation in 2016, leaders of the six countries identified the three cooperation pillars of political and security issues, economic and sustainable development, and social, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, as well as the five key priority areas,namely, connectivity, production capacity, cross-border economic cooperation, water resources, agriculture and poverty reduction.between China and the five Mekong countries. It is also a major issue in China’s Arab Policy Paper and China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean published in 2016, as well as the white paper on China-Africa Cooperation in the New Era released in 2021. All this has laid a solid political foundation for China to deepen food security cooperation under the Global Development Initiative. In the area of food crisis management, China can utilize its strengths in infrastructure building and promote the construction of food storage facilities and the development of cold-chain logistics in its partner countries, in order to reduce food loss and waste and enhance the food supply capacity of partner countries in times of crisis. Meanwhile, China and its partners can establish platforms for sharing food-related information with the support of internet communications technology, and strengthen coordinated action in the event of a crisis. Moreover,as the digital economy and the green economy become new growth points,there are ample opportunities ahead for the construction of the China-proposed Digital Silk Road and Green Silk Road. Given this, China can promote its technologies on the Internet of Things and drone seeding abroad to boost the development of precision agriculture and digital agriculture while safeguarding food security in terms of both quantity and quality. Under its pledge to have CO2 emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060,China can also conduct cooperation on ecological agriculture with its partners to achieve green production of grains and ensure ecological security. Cooperation should also be considered in the area of poverty alleviation and rural development to empower vulnerable groups in developing countries like women and poor farmers through skill training and protecting their right to food.

Food security cooperation is an important component of China’s foreign cooperation and is gradually becoming a new growth factor in the country’s bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Amid a deteriorating situation of global food security, the global food system is also facing unprecedented challenges.China needs to use its rich experience in food and agricultural policies to actively respond to its partners’ demands for food security, facilitate connectivity between the food markets on both sides, and enhance the unimpeded flow of food resources across borders. An earnest implementation of the Global Development Initiative in the area of food security is expected to accelerate the transformation and further development of the global food system.