The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Impact on China

Since entering the White House, Biden has placed the Indo-Pacific region at the center of US global strategy, advancing the vision and strategic goals of an Indo-Pacific order in diplomatic, economic, military, and other dimensions. The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, released by the Biden administration in February 2022, further clarified the strategic goals and recent policy measures of the US in the region. The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy is a regional strategy to coordinate diplomatic, economic,and military affairs and win over allies and partners. It exhibits new trends in implementation methods, strategies, action plans and its approach to China,which will significantly impact the Asia-Pacific regional order and China-US relations.

The Biden Administration’s View of the Indo-Pacific Order and Strategy

The “Indo-Pacific” is not a conventional geospatial concept. In the 1960s and 1970s, some international strategic scholars in Australia began to put forward and use this term, but it was not well known until the Obama administration implemented the Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy.1Wei Zongyou, “The Strategic Adjustment of the United States in the Indo-Pacific Region and Its Geostrategic Influence,” World Economics and Politics, No.10, 2013, pp.141-142.During his presidency,President Donald Trump, intent on maintaining the US hegemony, tried to raise the status of India to contain China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region.He began to use the term “Indo-Pacific” in official documents, referring to the vast geographical space from the United States’ west coast to India’s west coast,instead of the traditional “Asia-Pacific.”2“Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting A Networked Region,” US Department of Defense, June 1, 2019, p.1. In the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States released by the Biden administration, the geographical space of the Indo-Pacific stretches from the Pacific coastline to the Indian Ocean.Led by the United States, Australia3The Australian government used “Indo-Pacific” in the White Paper on Australia in the Asian Century published in 2021. It is the first country that uses this word in an official policy document. See The Australian Government, “Australia in the Asian Century,” October 2021, p.232.,Japan, India, ASEAN and some European countries began to adopt the term and issued relevant policy documents one after another.

Despite its widely different governing philosophy and style from the previous administration, the Biden government’s strategic vision and goals in the region have basically inherited Trump’s “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Before issuing its National Security Strategy report, the Biden administration released the Indo-Pacific strategy, demonstrating its close attention to the Indo-Pacific region and continuity in its vision of the Indo-Pacific order.

In March 2021, Biden outlined his view of the Indo-Pacific order in an article co-signed by the heads of state of Japan, India, and Australia. It said the four countries were committed to “a shared vision for an Indo-Pacific region that is free, open, resilient and inclusive” and would “ensure that the Indo-Pacific is accessible and dynamic.”4Joe Biden, Narendra Modi, Scott Morrison and Yoshihide Suga, “Our Four Nations Are Committed to A Free, Open, Secure and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region,” The Washington Post, March 13, 2021 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/13/biden-modi-morrison-suga-quad-nations-indo-pacific/.On a visit to Indonesia in December 2021, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken further stated that the United States would advance “a free and open Indo-Pacific in which problems will be dealt with openly, rules will be reached transparently, and applied fairly, goods and ideas and people will flow freely with governance that is transparent and responsive to the people.”5“Secretary Blinken’s Remarks on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” US Department of State, December 13, 2021, https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-secretary-blinkens-remarks-on-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/.These remarks illustrate the essence of the Biden administration’s view of the Indo-Pacific order.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States clearly calls for continuing to advance a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and comprehensively explains the Biden administration’s view of the Indo-Pacific order. The Strategy focuses on three areas. First is to promote the American value of “democracy.” The report states that “the United States will support open societies” and “ensure that Indo-Pacific governments can make independent political choices free from coercion. The United States will bolster freedom of information and expression. It will support investigative journalism, promote media literacy and pluralistic and independent media, and increase collaboration to address threats from information manipulation.” The US will also improve “fiscal transparency in the Indo-Pacific to expose corruption. Through diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and work with regional organizations,” the US “will be a partner in strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and accountable democratic governance” and will “stand up to economic coercion.”6“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” The White House, 2022, p.8.Apparently, the Biden administration takes the American values of freedom and democracy as the yardstick and benchmark of the political system and order in the Indo-Pacific region. Under the guise of promoting regional freedom and democracy and opposing “external interference and coercion,” the Biden administration intends to defame and contain China and maintain the political influence of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.

Second is to ensure “freedom of movement” for the United States in the Indo-Pacific seas and skies and to set standards and norms in new frontiers such as cyberspace. In the co-signed article with the leaders of Japan, India, and Australia, Biden said the United States must ensure that the Indo-Pacific region adheres to “international law and bedrock principles such as freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes.”7Joe Biden, Narendra Modi, Scott Morrison and Yoshihide Suga, “Our Four Nations Are Committed to A Free, Open, Secure and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region.”Blinken stressed the need to ensure free and open movement for “l(fā)and, cyberspace,and the open seas.”8“Secretary Blinken’s Remarks on A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” US Department of State.The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States further states that the US will work with its closest partners for a free and open Indo-Pacific region and ensure that “the region’s seas and skies are governed and used according to international law.” The Strategy also states that the US will work with its allies to support “rule-based approaches to the maritime domain, including in the South China Sea and the East China Sea and other Indo-Pacific waters.” Moreover, the US will pursue an “open, interoperable,reliable, and secure internet,” promote “consensus-based, values-aligned technology standards,” and advance “responsible behavior” in cyberspace.9“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” p.8.Flaunting the banner of “a free and open order based on rule of law,” the Biden administration hopes to ensure freedom of movement for the United States and maintain its regional hegemony.

Third is to guard against China and maintain the “balance of influence”that favors the United States. Maintaining the unipolar hegemony of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and preventing the emergence of a “peer competitor” in the Indo-Pacific region has always been a strategic goal of the United States and its persistent expectation for the distribution of power in the region. Preventing “the potential emergence of a peer competitor is probably the most important long-term planning challenge for the [US] Department of Defense.”10Thomas S. Szayna et al., “The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis,” VA:RAND, 2001, p.xi.In April 2021, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence released its Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, stating that “China increasingly is a nearpeer competitor, challenging the United States in multiple arenas – especially economically, militarily, and technologically – and is pushing to change global norms.”11“Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 9, 2021, p.4.It asserts that “the PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic,military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power” so that the US needs “to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, build a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share.”12“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” p.5.The Biden administration wants to work with “l(fā)ike-minded” partners to assert US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region and maintain a power structure that favors the US.

In general, brandishing the flag of a “free and open” society, the Biden administration’s vision of the Indo-Pacific order requires countries in the region to “align with the United States” in their political systems and values and ensure “open and free movement” in the maritime, space and cyberspace domains for the US in the name of “rules and the rule of law.” And in the name of countering the “China challenge,” it seeks to maintain the American hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and the distribution of power that favors the US. It is actually a vision of hegemonic order in the disguise of “freedom and openness.”

Under this view of hegemonic order, the Biden administration has attempted to promote a zero-sum strategic idea of “great-power competition”in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, the growing focus on the Indo-Pacific region is due to“mounting challenges, particularly from the PRC.” The Strategy is relatively moderate in language compared with that of the Trump administration,without obtrusive wordings like “geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions” and malicious attacks on China’s political system and the ruling party. It even claims that the “objective is not to change the PRC but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates.”However, its keynote is constant. The Biden administration continues to view China as an all-around strategic competitor and the most important long-term strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region. In the 2022 National Defense Strategy submitted to the Congress, the US Department of Defense identified China as “the most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department” and said it was “prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe.”13“Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy,” US Department of Defense, March 28, 2022, pp.1-2.Obviously, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy is still guided by great-power competition, especially the strategic competition against China.It perceives interaction between the two countries in the Indo-Pacific region from a perspective of strategic competition, characterized by the zero-sum thinking of “you lose, I win.”

Compared to the Trump administration’s primary focus on military security, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy highlights regional governance agendas such as economy, science and technology, and nontraditional security. It “accommodates” the concerns of Indo-Pacific allies and partners while focusing on the geostrategic competition with China. The Indo-Pacific strategy does not only serve US interests but also operates “in concert”with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.14“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” p.7.In other words, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy emphasizes geostrategic competition,keeps regional governance issues in mind, and intends to fully compete with China in both high and low political issues.

Under this strategic view, the Biden administration has outlined five strategic goals for the United States in the Indo-Pacific: advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific, building connections within and beyond the region, driving Indo-Pacific prosperity, bolstering Indo-Pacific security,and building regional resilience to transnational threats.15Ibid.To be specific,it continues to smear China in the name of freedom and democracy and competes with China for political influence and for the high ground of public opinion in the Indo-Pacific region. Economically, through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, it strives to secure commercial interests and influence for the US in the Indo-Pacific, and prevent China from turning the Indo-Pacific into China’s “economic backyard” through trade,infrastructure, and commercial connectivity. In terms of security, the US strengthens cooperation with its allies and security partners, forms a variety of exclusive cliques, increases military deterrence against China through“integrated deterrence” and forward military deployment to maintain the military superiority and viability of the US in the Second and even the First Island Chain. In regional governance, the United States will use COVID-19, climate change and non-conventional security threats as diplomatic means to enhance its international image and win strategic competition with China.

Means of Implementation and Resource Investment

The formulation and implementation of any grand strategy must attach importance to matching the objectives with available means and limited resources. The US Indo-Pacific strategy aims to advance the vision of the Indo-Pacific order and maintain the hegemony of the United States in the Indo-Pacific. It focuses on multiple means of diplomacy, economy, and security, as well as forging allies and partners in advancing strategic goals in a “mini-lateral”and “small group” approach. What’s more, the Biden administration has laid out a detailed roadmap for implementing the strategy in the near term and significantly increased defense spending, demonstrating its determination to implement the Indo-Pacific strategy.

A three-pronged approach of implementation

The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy adopts a threepronged approach of implementation, utilizing diplomatic, economic, and military means, rather than relying solely on military might. In terms of diplomacy, the Biden administration has returned to the concept of forward diplomacy during the Obama era and increased its diplomatic efforts in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance US presence in the area. Since taking office more than a year ago, Biden has launched an intensive diplomatic offensive, frequently holding bilateral or multilateral online meetings with heads of state of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. The Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Commerce,Trade Representative, and other cabinet officials have frequently visited the Indo-Pacific region, correcting the neglect of diplomacy during the Trump administration. The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States proposes to“focus on every corner of the region, from Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia to South Asia and Oceania, including the Pacific Islands” and to “open new embassies and consulates, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.”16“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” p.5, p.15.

On the economic front, the Biden administration has proposed the Build Back Better World (B3W) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as essential steps to enhance US economic influence in the region and counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative. During the G7 summit in June 2021, Biden put forward the B3W, which emphasized that the seven Western countries and other like-minded partners should strengthen coordination, leverage private capital investment through their respective development financial institutions, and focus on investments in the four major fields of climate change, health care, digital technology and gender equality. This will “help narrow the $40 trillion-plus infrastructure need in the developing world” and better compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.17“Fact Sheet: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership,” The White House, June 12, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/.In October 2021, Biden announced during the online East Asia Summit (EAS) that the US would discuss with partners the creation of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework that would focus on “objectives around trade facilitation, standards for the digital economy and technology,supply chain resiliency, decarbonization and clean energy, infrastructure,worker standards, and other areas of shared interest.”18“Readout of President Biden’s Participation in the East Asia Summit,” The White House, October 27, 2021, whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/27/readout-of-president-bidensparticipation-in-the-east-asia-summit/.The Strategy further elaborates on key elements of the framework, that is, to safeguard US economic interests through creation of trade facilitating rules, especially the digital trade rules, improve supply-chain resiliency and security, and strengthen cooperation in emerging technology with Indo-Pacific allies and partners.19“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” pp.11-12.During his visit to Japan in May 2022, Biden formally announced the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.20“Remarks by President Biden at Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity Launch Event,” The White House, May 123, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/23/remarks-by-president-biden-at-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity-launch-event.To sum up, the Biden administration’s economic initiative focuses on hard infrastructure and, more importantly, on soft infrastructure, trying to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative in all respects and hedge against China’s economic influence.

On the military front, the Biden administration has intensified its military presence and forward deployment in the Western Pacific region through “integrated deterrence” to maintain regional US military hegemony. “Integrated deterrence” is a new US military concept to address the security challenges of the 21st century. It uses all military and non-military tools to work closely with allies and partners to address the challenges. Under integrated deterrence, existing capabilities will be used to build new ones and capacities be deployed in new and networked ways to address security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States will “coordinate better, to network tighter and to innovate faster”to ensure that allies and partners have the “the capacities and information they need.” US Defense Secretary Llyod Austin said “integrated deterrence” will “deter coercion and aggression across the spectrum of conflict including in the so-called ‘grey-zone,’” by strengthening“integrated high-end maritime operations” with partners in Southeast Asia, improving interoperability with Japan and other military allies and security partners, and increasing Taiwan’s own “capabilities and its readiness to deter threats and coercion.”21“Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Participates in Fullerton Lecture Series in Singapore,”US Department of Defense, July 27, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2711025/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-participates-in-fullerton-lecture-serie/.

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, the US Congress appropriated $7.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative(PDI) to strengthen defense cooperation and combat any incompatibility with regional allies and security partners by increasing forward military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. More flexible and decentralized military deployments are being made outside the First Island Chain, including Guam,Australia and Diego Garcia, a military base in the Indian Ocean.22Andrew Eversden, “Pacific Deterrence Initiative Gets $2.1 Billion Boost in Final NDAA,” Breaking Defense, December 7, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/pacific-deterrence-initiative-gets-2-1-billion-boost-in-final-ndaa/.In March 2022, the Biden administration submitted its fiscal year 2023“Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2023,” US Office of Management and Budget, Washington D.C., March 28, 2022, p.18, p.53.budget request to the Congress, which included a defense budget request of $773 billion,a 9.8 percent increase over the defense budget that took effect in 2021.The budget “prioritizes China as the Department’s pacing challenge” and strengthens “integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative.”23

An implementation strategy of “2+3+4+5”

The Biden administration highly values allies and partners. Drawing allies and partners to its side and building a US-dominated network of“concentric circles” is an important tactic to promote the Indo-Pacific strategy. The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy emphasizes that the US view of the Indo-Pacific order is closely linked to its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. The US has to work with them to advance its strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific region. “A free and open Indo-Pacific can only be possible if we build collective capacity for a new age; common action is now a strategic necessity.”24“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” pp.7-9.In particular, the Biden administration hopes to promote the Indo-Pacific strategy and safeguard US hegemony in an approach of alliance and partner formation that can be summarized into a“2+3+4+5” formula, namely the bilateral military alliances, the two trilateral partnerships of the United States with the United Kingdom and Australia(AUKUS) and the US with Japan and the Republic of Korea, the US-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral security dialogue (Quad), as well as the “Five Eyes” alliance.

The United States’ five bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region are the cornerstone of its Indo-Pacific strategy and the first set of concentric circles for the Biden administration to advance the strategy.The AUKUS trilateral partnership, established in 2021, together with the tripartite partnership among the US, Japan and the ROK, constitute the second set of concentric circles. The former strengthens defense and security cooperation by providing nuclear-powered submarine technology to Australia, extending its defense tentacles to the South Pacific and even the South China Sea. The latter closely follows the situation on the Korean Peninsula through enhanced defense consultations and intelligence sharing and carries out military deterrence against the DPRK.

The Biden administration also intends to build the Quad as a “premier regional grouping in the Indo-Pacific region” and ensures that “it delivers on issues that matter to the Indo-Pacific.”25“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” p.16.Since Biden entered the White House, he has not only upgraded the quadrilateral mechanism to a summit dialogue platform, but greatly expanded areas of coordinating issues and established working groups for the COVID-19 pandemic, the climate crisis,and critical and emerging technologies. These moves aim to strengthen the consultation and cooperation on maritime security, climate change,vaccine production and distribution, technology and supply chain security,and infrastructure.26“Joint Statement from Quad Leaders,” The White House, September 24, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-leaders/.This is the third set of concentric circles for the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

The old “Five Eyes” alliance is the fourth set of concentric circles.The Biden administration has placed high value on this intelligence alliance consisting of five Anglo-Saxon nations – the US, the UK, Canada,Australia, and New Zealand, and hopes it can play a more active role in the competition with China. In a 2021 report, the US Congressional Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations stated that “to counter great-power competition (with China and Russia), the Five Eyes countries must work more closely together and expand the circle of trust to include other like-minded democracies.” The report proposes to include Japan,India, and Germany in the “Five Eyes” alliance.27Raghav Bikhchandani, “What is ‘Five Eyes’, the Intelligence Alliance US Wants South Korea,India, Japan to Be Part of,” The Print, September 9, 2021, https://theprint.in/world/what-is-five-eyes-theintelligence-alliance-us-wants-south-korea-india-japan-to-be-part-of/730475/.Although the Congress has not adopted the expansion plan, it is an indisputable fact that the Biden administration would like to strengthen the Five Eyes alliance to meet the“China challenge.”

Ten core lines of effort

Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy lays out detailed implementation plans in the near term, especially ten core lines of effort covering diplomacy,economy, military, governance, and alliance and partnership building in the next one to two years. It demonstrates the importance of the Indo-Pacific region and its determination to advance the Indo-Pacific strategy. To be specific, in diplomacy, it aims to expand US presence in the Indo-Pacific region, including opening new embassies and consulates, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands; in economy, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework has been launched with a focus on high-standard trade, digital economy management, supply chain security and resiliency,infrastructure investment, and digital communications; in the military field, it focuses on the situation across the Taiwan Straits, implements the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative, and provides nuclear-powered submarines to Australia through the AUKUS trilateral security partnership; in terms of regional governance, it supports“good governance” and “anti-corruption” efforts in Indo-Pacific countries,and helps Pacific island countries improve maritime domain awareness and infrastructure construction; in terms of alliance and partnership building, it will strengthen relations with ASEAN, support India’s regional leadership,deepen and substantiate the Quad, and expand trilateral cooperation with Japan and the ROK.28“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” pp.15-17.

Resource investment

The US military budget for the fiscal year 2022 is $777.7 billion,a five percent increase from the previous year and $60 billion more than the Biden administration’s original proposal of $715 billion. The Biden administration’s initial budget proposed $66 billion for the Indo-Pacific,including $5.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. Considering that the Congress increased the budget for the PDI to $7.1 billion and allocated an additional $500 million to the Indo-Pacific Command,29“Summary of the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act,” p.1, p.5.US military spending in the Indo-Pacific region will reach at least $68.5 billion. The Biden administration’s budget request to the Congress for the fiscal year 2023 provides $773 billion for defense, including $6.1 billion for the PDI,which seeks to further enhance the US forward military presence in the Indo-Pacific region.30US Department of Defense, “The Department of Defense Releases the President’s Fiscal Year 2023 Defense Budget,” March 28, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2980014/thedepartment-of-defense-releases-the-presidents-fiscal-year-2023-defense-budg/.

Compared to the “l(fā)avish” military spending, the Biden administration has been quite stingy with economic investment in the Indo-Pacific region.Despite the high-profile announcement of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, its willingness and ability to invest economic resources in the region are very weak. In addition to the $100 million pledged to ASEAN during a video summit with ASEAN leaders in October 2021 for COVID-19, climate change, education, etc,31“Biden to Announce up to $102 mln in Funding for US-ASEAN Partnership,” Reuters, October 26, 2021,https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-announce-up-102-mln-funding-us-asean-partnership-2021-10-26/.the Biden administration announced only $150 million at the Special US–ASEAN Summit in May 2022, to deepen US-ASEAN ties in economy, security, health, and people-topeople exchange.32“Remarks by President Biden at the US-ASEAN Special Summit,” The White House, May 13, 2022,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/13/remarks-by-president-biden-atthe-u-s-asean-special-summit/.

Challenges of Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Biden administration stresses that the Indo-Pacific region has become the top priority of the US global strategy, and the US needs to garner its diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities to respond to the “China challenge” in an all-round way. Despite opposition at home and abroad, the Biden administration’s hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was also intended to complete the US strategic shift and focus on China. However,the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis shows that there are fundamental errors in the strategic positioning and judgment of the US which regards China as its primary security and strategic challenge. The shift to the Indo-Pacific strategy is also facing significant challenges. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine will result in a new round of adjustments and changes in majorpower relations and the international order, which will restrict the Biden administration’s determination, ability, and resources to implement the Indo-Pacific strategy.

Dilemma of strategic balance amid the Ukraine crisis

The massive military conflict between Russia and Ukraine has caused millions of Ukrainians to flee, and many more have lost their homes. The United States, the European Union and the G7 have imposed rounds of unprecedented tough sanctions on Russia, including in finance, technology,energy, trade and against its core decision-making circle. The US Congress has approved $13.6 billion in emergency military and humanitarian aid33Daniel Uria, “Biden Signs $1.5 Trillion Spending Bill, Including $13.6 Billion in Ukraine Aid,” UPI,March 15, 2022, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2022/03/15/Biden-signs-15-trillion-spending-bill-136-billion-Ukraine-adi/1641647378835/.and provided over $3 billion in military security assistance to Ukraine,34“Fact Sheet on US Security Assistance for Ukraine,” US Department of Defense, April 22, 2022,https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3008717/fact-sheet-on-us-security-assistance-forukraine/.and plans to provide another $40 billion in economic and military aid.35Alexander Bolton, “Senate Advances $40 Billion Ukraine Aid Package,” The Hill, May 16, 2022,https://thehill.com/news/senate/3490453-senate-set-to-advance-40-billion-ukraine-aid-package/.Some scholars have analyzed that the Ukraine crisis may be the most prominent event in international politics since World War II and may change the relationship between major powers and the trend of international politics.36Anne-Marie Slaughter, et al., “US Grand Strategy after Ukraine: Seven Thinkers Weigh in on How the War Will Shift US Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/21/us-geopolitics-security-strategy-war-russia-ukraine-china-indo-pacific-europe/.While officials in the Biden administration claimed that the Ukraine crisis would not change the strategic importance and global priorities of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, the simmering dissent and fallout from the conflict will draw heavily on the Biden administration’s already overstretched economic and diplomatic resources to fully concentrate on the Indo-Pacific. Some scholars believe that the Ukraine crisis “has become a prism through which nearly all American foreign policy decisions will be cast for the foreseeable future” and “a renewed focus on Europe will inevitably divert attention from Asia.”37Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “Ukraine War Ushers in ‘New Era’ for US Abroad,” The New York Times, March 12, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/12/us/politics/biden-ukraine-diplomacy.html.

Differences and contradictions between the US and its allies

The Biden administration stresses that its Indo-Pacific strategy fully considers the interests and needs of its Indo-Pacific allies and partners and is a shared vision. Still, countries in the Indo-Pacific region may not fully accept this statement. ASEAN is concerned that the Quad may challenge ASEAN centrality.38Evan A. Laksmana, “Whose Centrality? ASEAN and the Quad in the Indo-Pacific,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Vol.3, No.5, Special Issue 2020, pp.106-114.The US Indo-Pacific strategy, which emphasizes building the Quad into the region’s premier grouping, will obviously undermine ASEAN centrality and further heighten ASEAN’s misgivings.ASEAN is also worried about the China-US strategic competition, under which Southeast Asia may become the main battlefield of a great-power game. Therefore, ASEAN is reluctant to take sides between China and the US. “ASEAN countries do not want to take sides between China and the United States, and hope that the United States will continue to maintain its military presence. ASEAN countries also hope to develop economic and trade relations with China,” said Chea Munyrith, Director of the Planning and Project Department of the Cambodian Civil Society Alliance Forum and President of the Cambodian Chinese Evolution Researcher Association.The realistic position of maintaining this balance is the consistent diplomatic strategy of Southeast Asian countries. The United States is unlikely to draw ASEAN into a policy that counters China as it has with the European Union,and its Indo-Pacific strategy will only find it difficult to stir up trouble in ASEAN.

In addition, as a vital member of the Quad, India has always had great-power aspirations and non-alignment traditions, and it will not be willing to act as a blind supporter or minor partner in the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Since the Ukraine crisis, India did not follow the other three Quad countries in criticizing or opposing Russia at the foreign ministers’meeting and the summit meeting, which were hastily convened by the Biden administration, but only stressed its concern about the humanitarian crisis and called for a negotiated solution.39“US Hopes India will Distance Itself from Russia After Ukraine Invasion,” Reuters, March 3, 2022,https://www.reuters.com/world/us-hopes-india-will-distance-itself-russia-after-ukraine-invasion-2022-03-03/.India also did not follow the US in voting on the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the United Nations, but, like China, abstained.40Nirupama Subramanian, “Friends and Partners on Both Sides: Why India Abstained on UN Vote against Russia,” The Indian Express, March 3, 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explainedwhy-india-abstained-un-vote-against-russia-7791879/.Upset about India’s position, the US even threatened to impose sanctions on India for its previous purchase of Russia’s S-400 antimissile system as a warning to others.41Laura Kelly, “Biden Weighing Sanctions on India over Russian Military Stockpiles,” The Hill, March 3, 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/international/596693-biden-weighing-sanctions-on-india-over-russianmilitary-stockpiles.This episode showed that the US attempt to use ASEAN, India, and other Indo-Pacific allies and partners to contain China and achieve its own strategic goals could very well be more wishful thinking.

Bottleneck in resource investment

As a regional strategy covering the entire Indo-Pacific region and including diplomatic, economic, military and non-traditional security dimensions, implementing the Indo-Pacific strategy needs a massive investment of resources, especially financial ones. However, with the US federal debt approaching $30 trillion and its urgent need for funds for domestic infrastructure investment, pandemic relief, and social welfare reforms in education and health care, the Biden administration will find it challenging to spend money to advance the non-military policy agenda of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Coupled with the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, the Biden administration has to invest more military and humanitarian resources to Ukraine and NATO,which further seriously weakens its ability to invest in the Indo-Pacific region. It is questionable how much the planning and action plans in the Indo-Pacific strategy can be implemented.

Economic agenda disconnected with regional needs

The Biden administration knows that if its Indo-Pacific strategy focuses only on military security and ignores the economic dimension, it will not be able to effectively engage allies and partners in the region and compete with China. After all, for most countries in the Indo-Pacific,developing the economy, creating jobs, and improving the living standards of their people are their top priorities. However, due to protectionism and populism at home, the US cannot join or conclude new multilateral free trade agreements, nor can it invest enough money in the Indo-Pacific to advance its economic agenda. As a result, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the Build Back Better World initiative put more attention on trade promotion, rules for the digital economy and the development of infrastructure and communications standards, rather than direct investment.

These seemingly “supreme” rules and standards of the US are more of a “copycatting” of the experience of Western developed countries. They are seriously out of pace with the needs of developing countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The latter needs more investment, not projects requiring less finance, generating quicker returns, or saving on costs. As one Indonesian diplomat puts it, it is doubtful that Washington can deliver on its promises to bring more private investment and infrastructure capital to Asia.He believes it is unrealistic to expect the American bureaucracy to reform itself to deliver better results.42“Blinken in Southeast Asia: Is This the Real ‘Pivot’?” The Diplomat, December 21, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/blinken-in-southeast-asia-is-this-the-real-pivot.

Challenges in policy consistency

Currently, political polarization in the United States is severe. Although the Democratic and Republican Parties share many views on China and agree on the importance of the Indo-Pacific region, they are far from holding the same positions. And they have considerable differences in policy priorities and implementation methods. Suppose the Republican Party regains control of one or both houses of the Congress in the 2022 midterm elections or even wins the 2024 presidential election, the pace, the approach and policy focus of the Indo-Pacific strategy could change significantly. By then, even current action plans could be affected, let alone ten-year plans.

Impact of the Indo-Pacific Strategy on China

Although senior government officials in the Biden administration stressed that the Indo-Pacific strategy is not a “China strategy,” and reiterated that China is only one of the challenges the region faces,43Jacqueline Feldscher, “Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Will Rely on Partnerships to Counter China,”Defense One, February 11, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/02/bidens-indo-pac-strategywill-rely-partnerships-counter-china/361909/.there is no denying that the US pays special attention to the Indo-Pacific region because “the PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power.”44“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” p.5.The new trend and policy implementation of Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy in China-related aspects will adversely affect China’s diplomatic, economic, security and strategic interests in the region.

First, it increases resistance to China’s neighborhood diplomacy. As noted earlier, the Biden administration has initiated an intensive diplomatic offensive in the Indo-Pacific, with senior cabinet officials traveling all over the region. The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States stresses the importance of listening to the voices of allies and partners in the region, and aligns the US Indo-Pacific strategy with the visions of its allies and partners. The recent action plan proposed in the Strategy emphasizes the need to intensify the diplomatic offensive in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. At the same time,it attempts to draw in India, ASEAN, South Pacific island countries, and the Republic of Korea to jointly respond to the “China challenge” with collective strength and a unified voice by accommodating their concerns and needs.

The ROK’s attitude toward the US Indo-Pacific strategy has changed considerably. In the joint statement of the trilateral foreign ministers’meeting between the US, Japan and the ROK issued on February 12,2022, the ROK not only stressed that “the three countries share common views on a free and open Indo-Pacific,” but also welcomed the new Indo-Pacific strategy issued by the US. To strengthen trilateral cooperation on climate change, COVID-19, infrastructure, supply chain security, and critical and emerging technologies, the ROK also mentioned for the first time that “peace and stability” across the Taiwan Straits was vital for them.45“Joint Statement on the US-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Meeting,” US Department of State, February 12, 2022, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-japan-republic-of-koreatrilateral-ministerial-meeting/.The new president of the ROK, Yoon Suk-yeol, is expected to further tilt the country’s diplomacy toward the US and strengthen overall cooperation with the US and Japan on semiconductor chips, emerging technologies,supply chain security, and the Indo-Pacific strategy.46Yoon Suk-yeol, “South Korea Needs to Step Up: The Country’s Next President on His Foreign Policy Vision,” Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2022-02-08/south-korea-needs-step.A stepped-up US diplomatic offensive against ASEAN and Pacific island countries could also put diplomatic pressure on China in the region.

Second, it imposes a negative impact on regional economic agendas including the Belt and Road Initiative. The Biden government launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework with a particular emphasis on strengthening rules-making in trade promotion, digital trade, network communications, and infrastructure with regional allies and partners.It supports cooperation in the export control of critical and emerging technologies. It attaches great importance to collaboration on the resilience of supply chains in semiconductor chips, critical raw materials and mineral resources, and pharmaceutical products and equipment. The introduction and implementation of this economic framework will harm China’s digital trade, energy, power and digital infrastructure construction, scientific and technological cooperation, and supply chain security in Southeast Asia. It could further create new obstacles for China to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA).

Third, it disrupts the situation in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea. Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy pays great attention to the Taiwan question. The Biden administration has repeatedly played up the Chinese Mainland’s “threat” to Taiwan to create an excuse for arms sales to Taiwan.At a congressional hearing in March 2021, former Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command Philip Davidson said that the Mainland “could attempt to attack and take over Taiwan” “during this decade, in fact, in the next six years.”47Mallory Shelbourne, “Davidson: China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan in ‘Next Six Years,’”USNI News, March 9, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-oftaiwan-in-next-six-years.The current Commander of the Indo-Pacific Command,John Aquilino, said at his hearing in March 2021 that the most dangerous concern for the Indo-Pacific region is “that of a [Chinese Mainland’s] military force against Taiwan.”48“China Threat to Invade Taiwan Is ‘Closer than Most Think’, Says US Admiral,” The Guardian, March 23, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/23/taiwan-china-threat-admiral-john-aquilino.After taking office, Biden not only continued the extreme approach on the Taiwan question in the latter period of the Trump administration, but also abandoned some long-standing restrictions on the exchanges between the US government and Taiwan. He also stated that “we will also work with partners inside and outside of the region to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, including by supporting Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, to ensure an environment in which Taiwan’s future is determined peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best interests of Taiwan’s people.”49“Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” p.13.In the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, Taiwan is listed as a security partner of the US in the region. The Strategy also proposes strengthening the military deterrence of the US and its allies and partners by developing new military capabilities and implementing the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and other measures, to “deter” the Mainland from militarily taking over Taiwan.50Ibid., p.9, p.13, p.15.On May 13, 2022, Biden signed a bill to “help” Taiwan obtain observer status in the World Health Assembly.51“Bills Signed: S. 812 and S. 3059,” The White House, May 13, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/legislation/2022/05/13/bills-signed-s-812-and-s-3059/.These practices highlight the strategic ambition of the Biden administration to maintain the division of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and “rein in China with Taiwan.”

The Biden administration has raised the level of exchanges between US and Taiwan officials, increased arms sales to Taiwan and enhanced Taiwan’s so-called “asymmetric self-defense capabilities.” This has sent a wrong signal to the “Taiwan independence” forces on the island and contravened stability across the Taiwan Strait. With the “integrated deterrence” strategy, the US has strengthened military presence and introduced new military technologies in the Indo-Pacific. It frequently sent warships through the Taiwan Strait and,together with its allies such as Japan and Australia, expressed joint “concern” on the cross-Strait situation, which will further aggravate tensions in the Taiwan Strait and turn Taiwan into the forefront of China-US military struggle.

The Biden administration’s actions on the South China Sea under the Indo-Pacific strategy are also undermining peace and stability in the South China Sea. First, it provides military and maritime assistance to Southeast Asian countries through the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the Maritime Security Initiative to improve their naval capabilities and maritime domain awareness, which encourages military adventures by ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea and creates new elements of confrontation and conflict.Second, it stresses the so-called international maritime rules, and calls on China to abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) and accept the China-Philippines South China Sea arbitration in 2016.52“Fifth Anniversary of the Arbitral Tribunal Ruling on the South China Sea,” US Department of State,July 11, 2021, https://www.state.gov/fifth-anniversary-of-the-arbitral-tribunal-ruling-on-the-south-chinasea/.It also issues a new policy document on China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, encouraging Vietnam, Malaysia and other countries to take their disputes in the region to international arbitration,53“Limits in the Seas: People’s Republic of China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” US Department of State, No.150, January 2022, pp.11-30.thus challenging China’s sovereignty and maritime rights and interests on its South China Sea islands and reefs and stirring up situation in the area through legal wrangling,rules-making struggles, and public opinion campaigns. Third, it increases the attention to and policy coordination on the South China Sea issue through“mini-lateral” mechanisms including Quad, AUKUS and the US-Japan-ROK.By strengthening the maritime capabilities and situational awareness of other claimants, it seeks to engage them in a “group fight” with China and thus put more pressure on China. Fourth, it deploys the US Coast Guard to the South China Sea for “joint enforcement” with Southeast Asian countries to “protect”their fishery and other marine resources. This amounts to a US version of“grey-zone operation” and erodes China’s maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea.

Fourth, it aggravates the strategic environment around China. Since taking office, Biden has tried to attract allies and partners inside and outside the region to intervene in the Indo-Pacific region, including strengthening the traditional bilateral military alliances, upgrading the Quad mechanism,and establishing the AUKUS trilateral security partnership, etc. These moves try to pressure China on the Taiwan question and the South China Sea issue and stir up the regional security situation. In March 2021, the UK government released a document “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,”which proposed a “tilt to the Indo-Pacific” to engage more deeply in the Indo-Pacific region in terms of economy, security and values.54“Global Britain in A Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” British Government, March, 2021, p.66.In September of the same year, the European Commission issued the EU Indo-Pacific Cooperation Strategy. It proposes to increase engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, build partnerships with the United States, India, Japan, and ASEAN,strengthen the rules-based international order, address global challenges, and promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.55“The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” European Commission, September 16, 2021,pp.1-5.In March 2022, the US and the UK held their first consultations on the Indo-Pacific, reinforcing their commitment to coordinate and advance the US Indo-Pacific strategy and the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt.56“Joint Statement on US-UK Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” The White House, March 11, 2022,https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/11/joint-statement-on-u-s-ukconsultations-on-the-indo-pacific/.Together with the Indo-Pacific policy documents released by France and Germany, Europe has generally increased its attention to and involvement in the Indo-Pacific region at the policy or strategic level. Europe’s “turn” toward the Indo-Pacific region, together with the strengthening of coordination and cooperation in the region with the US, Japan, India, and Australia, has led to the escalation of major-power strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region.

Conclusion

The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy embodies the US view of maintaining the hegemonic order and a zero-sum strategic view concerning great-power competition. The Biden administration organizes allies and partners, forms various cliques, and increases diplomatic, economic, and military input in the Indo-Pacific region. The essence is to contain China and offset its influence to maintain the United States’ regional hegemony.However, the Ukraine crisis and the concerns of US allies and partners about the China-US strategic competition have demonstrated that the US judgment and strategy in taking China as a significant strategic challenge does not serve its global and long-term interests, and will find it difficult to win sincere support from most allies and partners. Moreover, it will exacerbate regional tensions and the competition and confrontation between the two countries.

In the virtual meeting with US President Joe Biden in November 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out that the most important event in international relations over the past 50 years was the reopening and development of China-US relations, which has benefited the two countries and the whole world. The most important event in international relations in the coming 50 years will be for China and the US to find the right way to get along.57“President Xi Jinping Had a Virtual Meeting with US President Joe Biden,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, November 16, 2021, 2021 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202111/t20211116_10448843.htmlAs two major countries with different histories,cultures, systems, and stages of development, it is natural that there are differences and even contradictions between China and the United States.As President Xi underscored in the video call with Biden in March 2022,there have been and will continue to be differences between China and the US, and “What matters is to keep such differences under control.”58“President Xi Jinping Has a Video Call with US President Joe Biden,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, March 19, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202203/t20220319_10653207.html.If the Biden administration sees China through a prejudiced lens, views China-US relations from the perspective of hegemonic order and zerosum strategy, and builds an anti-China circle with its allies and partners to contain China’s development, it will be difficult for Biden to get out of the trap of his predecessor’s China policy, and it will cast a new shadow on China-US relations and the regional order.