The ROK’s Perceptions of China-US Strategic Competition and Its Impact on China-ROK Relations

The world is undergoing profound transformation unprecedented in a century, and the strategic competition between China and the United States is an important part of it. Since the Trump administration, the US containment policy toward China has brought unprecedented risks and challenges to China-US relations and also trapped many third parties in a dilemma of strategic choice, among which the Republic of Korea (ROK) is a typical representative. As a US ally in the Asia-Pacific region and an important neighbor and strategic partner of China, the ROK depends on the US for immediate security and on China for trade. The China-US strategic competition has triggered a sense of crisis and heated debate in the ROK. A review of the ROK’s perceptions of and response to China-US strategic competition will help grasp the direction of the ROK’s foreign policy and facilitate the upgrading of China-ROK ties on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations.

ROK Perceptions of and Response to China-US Competition

The development and changes of China-US relations have always had an important influence on the ROK. During the Cold War, the ROK stood firmly with the US. For a long time, the ROK referred to the People’s Republic of China as the “Chinese Communist Party” rather than “China,”which clearly reflected the profound influence of ideological confrontation on the ROK’s perception of China.1Chung Moon-sang, “Between ‘Communist China’ and ‘China’: The Transition of Korean Perception of China during the Cold War Era,” Dongbuga Yeoksa Nonchong, No.33, 2011, pp.57-60.However, with the disintegration of the bipolar structure and the growth of its national strength, the ROK’s perceptions of China-US relations began to change. On the one hand, the ROK was increasingly aware of China’s important role on issues related to its core interests, including economy and the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue;on the other hand, it has also tried to be more autonomous within the USROK alliance. Therefore, President Kim Young-sam promoted exchanges with China and Russia and conducted all-around diplomacy while strengthening relations with the US and Japan. President Kim Dae-jung proposed a coordinated diplomatic strategy to upgrade the ROK’s relations with the US, Japan, China, and Russia. President Roh Moo-hyun, claiming himself as a diplomatic balancer in Northeast Asia, accommodated China while strengthening the alliance with the US.2Bi Yingda, “The US-ROK Alliance in Adjustment: History of Development, Strengthening Motivation,and Challenges,” The Chinese Journal of American Studies, No.1, 2018, p.89.The Lee Myung-bak and Park Geunhye governments also tried to strike a balance between the US and China.3Koo Bon-hak, “Balancing Relations with the US and China,” New Asia, Vol.22, No.4, 2015, pp.135-160.

In general, in the first decade or so after the end of the Cold War, when the keywords of China-US relations were engagement and cooperation, topics involving China-US competition were rarely discussed in the ROK. However,since the 2008 financial crisis, the order in East Asia has undergone profound changes. The relative decline of the US and the rise of China have led to the transition of America’s China policy from cooperation to competition, which made the ROK feel the pressure brought by major-power competition.

It is widely believed in the ROK’s academic community that since China became the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, the China-US relations have substantially changed and focused more on competition than cooperation.4Zhang Huizhi, “The Direction of China-ROK and US-ROK Relations amid the China-US Strategic Competition,” Northeast Asia Forum, No.2, 2019, p.22.On this basis, there are two different opinions. Influenced by Western conservatives, some ROK scholars believe that China and the US are slipping into a “new Cold War” due to their irreconcilability in ideology and political systems. Other scholars acknowledge the possibility of a “new Cold War” but insist that the strategic competition is rather limited and the two countries will eventually move toward “peaceful coexistence.”5Shin Jong-ho, “US-China Strategic Competition and the Korean Peninsula: South Korea’s Response,” in Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, The Situation in Asia and the Tasks of Korean Diplomacy under China-US Competition (Proceedings), November 19,2021, pp.130-132.Although the second opinion prevails, the influence of the “new Cold War” rhetoric still cannot be underestimated. According to a K-Stat survey in June 2020, while most respondents thought that a world war was unlikely to break out, the proportion of those who believed that tensions among the two major powers could trigger a world war reached 40 percent. Many experts also believe the proportion would be even higher if China-US strategic competition spread from the economy to all aspects.6K-Stat, “An Analysis of South Korean People’s Perceptions of International Relations and the US-China Conflict,” K-Stat Report, No.29, 2021, p.10.

Since 2010, China-US strategic competition has been the focus of all circles in the ROK. Discussions around its causes, connotations and implications are frequent, and the most hotly debated topic is what exactly should the ROK’s response be. So far, five different options have been proposed.

The first option is to support the US, prioritize the US-ROK alliance,and work in tandem with the US strategy to contain China. Conservative scholars and media promote the pro-US approach, arguing that the only choice for the ROK is to strengthen its alliance with the US and to check and balance China despite the economic cooperation between the two countries.7Park Min-hyoung, “The Rise of China and the ROK’s Military Strategic Choices,” Korean Journal of International Relations, Vol.52, No.1, 2012, pp.107-108; Kim Sang-tae, “The Power Transition in Northeast Asia and South Korea’s Foreign Policy,” Social Sciences Research, Vol.19, No.2, 2012, pp.99-126.However,there are slight differences as to the intensity of the ROK’s balancing efforts.The hard-line faction sees China as a potential threat and advocates continuous strengthening of the US-ROK alliance, which includes potential threats and areas for strategic cooperation beyond the Korean Peninsula.8Choi Kang and Shin Beomchul, “The U.S.-North Korea Summit Evaluation and South Korea’s Security Concerns,” The Asan Institute, June 22, 2018, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/the-us-north-koreasummitevaluation-and-south-koreas-security-concerns/.Others suggest“soft counterbalance” toward China, hedging against China’s growing influence on the Korean Peninsula by strengthening the alliance with the US but retreating from military conflict.9Han Suk-hee, “From Engagement to Hedging: South Korea’s New China Policy,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.20, No.4, 2008, p.345.The pro-US approach is influential both in the academic and strategic circles and among the general public in the ROK,especially after the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system was deployed in the country. Some scholars claim that it has become the mainstream public opinion in recent years.10“Moon Chung-in: The Biggest Obstacle to Inter-Korean Relations Is the United Nations Command,”Chosun Ilbo, September 10, 2019.

The second option is to take a free ride on China’s growth, and learn from historical experiences in East Asia to find a strategic path forward for the ROK. David Kang, a leading American scholar of Korean descent,argues that a hierarchical order centered on China in history was more peaceful and stable than the Westphalian order.11David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, Vol.27, No.4, 2003, pp.57-85.Therefore, he suggested a strategy of accommodation with China, recognizing and taking advantage of its rise.12David C. Kang, “Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea’s Response to China,” Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol.9, No.1, 2009, pp.9-13.Kang’s opinion has encouraged some Korean scholars to view China’s rise from a pragmatic perspective and suggest taking a free ride on its growth. Professor Lee Sang-man at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University believed that the deployment of THAAD is a strategic miscalculation, and the ROK should upgrade its relations with China to an all-weather strategic cooperative partnership, similar to that between China and Pakistan, while actively joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to share its benefits.13Lee Sang-man, “One Belt One Road: Political and Economic Implications of the Maritime Silk Road,”Journal of China Area Studies, Vol.2, No.1, 2015, p.47.However, this free-ride approach is not popular in the ROK. Even scholars who advocate taking a free ride on China’s development insist on not damaging the US-ROK alliance.14Lee Sang-man, “Deployment of THAAD in the Republic of Korea and the Security Dilemma in Northeast Asia: Analysis Based on Neorealism,” Northeast Asia Forum, No.6, 2016, p.15.

The third option is to remain independent, rely on the country’s own strength and detach from China-US strategic competition. There are three approaches to this option. First is to use nuclear weapons to ensure national security. These voices, mostly from politicians, opinion leaders and bureaucrats,are loud but unrealistic.15Lee Byong-chul, “Rethinking a Public Discourse over South Korea’s Going Nuclear,” Journal of National Defense Studies, Vol.63, No.2, 2020, p.27.The second approach is to stay neutral to be free from the competition between major powers. After the end of World War II,there were voices for neutrality in both North and South Koreas, advocating declaration of a neutral status after reunification. Fearing that the China-US strategic competition would herald a return to confrontation of the Cold War era, these scholars support the withdrawal of US troops and the neutrality of the Peninsula.16Lee Jae-bong, “Neutrality or Alliance: Seeking for Permanently Neutral Unification of the Korean Peninsula,” Yonhap Maeil Shinmun, March 22, 2021.However, permanent neutrality is contrary to the US-ROK alliance, and neutrality is predicated on reunifying the North and the South.Thus, staying neutral can hardly happen in the short to medium term. The third approach is to implement the middle-power diplomatic strategy. To be a true middle power on the world stage, the ROK should uphold the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful coexistence and multilateralism,act as a bridge between China and the US to mitigate the effects of great-power competition, and avoid the dilemma of choosing sides.17Jun Bong-geun, “Exploring South Korea’s Middle-Power Diplomatic Strategy in the Era of US-China Competition,” Seoul: Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, 2019, pp.89-91.

The fourth option is to maintain the status quo. The ROK continues its diplomatic approach of depending on the US for immediate security and China for trade by consolidating the US-ROK alliance to balance China militarily and strengthening economic cooperation with China.18Lee Ji-yun, “Hedging Strategies of Middle Powers in East Asian Security: The Case of South Korea and Malaysia,” East Asia, Vol.34, No.1, 2017, p.2.This approach is a hedging strategy for small and medium-sized countries to seize benefits through exchanges with major powers while reducing corresponding risks with preventive measures. It emphasizes the maximization of the ROK’s interests and adopts a diversified and flexible policy, either following the US or China to gain more maneuvering space. However, maintaining the status quo is possible when the China-US strategic competition is mild but will be rather difficult as competition intensifies.19Song Wenzhi, “Systematic Pressure, Threats, and the ROK’s Strategic Choice between China and the Unites States,” Northeast Asia Forum, No.4, 2019, p.90.

The fifth option is to transcend the diplomatic situation. Proposed by Moon Chung-in, Special Assistant to President Moon Jae-in, this approach inherits Roh Moo-hyun’s diplomatic idea of being a balancer in Northeast Asia. Moon Chung-in believes that the ROK should go beyond choosing sides between China and the US and establish a new international order that transcends any camp and unites like-minded countries.20Moon Chung-in, Moon Chung-in’s Future Scenario, Seoul: Cheonglim Publishing, 2021, pp.294-301.This approach is similar to the middle-power diplomacy in that the ROK should be a balancer and coordinator among major powers. Still, it sees the dilemma that the middle powers are limited when playing their role independently. Thus, this approach advocates that the ROK should join other regional powers such as Japan, India,Australia, and Canada to build a new multilateral order based on universal values, with the United Nations at the security center and the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the economic center, and encourage China and the US to converge to this order. However, Moon Chung-in also admitted that this approach is constrained by the country’s limited diplomatic influence, the lack of consensus at home, and the possible opposition of major powers.21Ibid., pp.272-273.

The five options basically fall into two types of the ROK’s response to China-US strategic competition: following the great powers or seeking strategic autonomy. The first two options are variations of following the great powers and the latter three options are to seek strategic autonomy. In terms of influence, the pro-US approach, the status-quo approach, and the middle power approach are more influential in the Korean society, while the other options have few echoes. However, unlike the pro-US approach and the statusquo approach, which are direct answers to China-US strategic competition,the middle-power approach is more a part of the ROK’s overall diplomatic strategy. Based on the policy practices of successive governments in the postfinancial crisis era, whether it was Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye in the conservative camp or Moon Jae-in in the progressive camp, their diplomacy was hovering between the pro-US approach and the status-quo approach.Admittedly, the emphasis may differ when different camps are in power, but the general strategy is to maintain the US-ROK alliance while avoiding sending clear signals about which side to choose.

Strategies and Dilemmas of the Moon Jae-in Government

Moon Jae-in took office at a time when the Trump administration was carrying out containment and suppression against China, which brought enormous pressure on the ROK. Moon said at the beginning of his term that while the ROK “values its alliance with the US which is the cornerstone of its diplomacy and security,” the China-ROK relationship is also “increasingly important,” and the ROK must take advantage of China’s positive influence on North Korea.22“President Moon Jae-in Talks with Finance and Business Entrepreneurs in New York,” ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 21, 2017.On the eve of Trump’s visit to the ROK in November 2017, Moon formally stated that he would implement “balanced diplomacy” between China and the US. “The US-ROK alliance is crucial to our security, and we must continue to value diplomatic ties with the US; however, the China-ROK relationship is also very important, including economic cooperation and strategic cooperation for a peaceful settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.”23“Interview with President Moon Jae-in on Channel News Asia,” https://www1.president.go.kr/articles/1390.Thus, at the beginning of his tenure, Moon hoped to maintain the status quo and pursue the ROK’s national interests, giving nearly equal importance to the country’s relations with the US and China instead of choosing sides.

First, Moon made a “three-no promise” on the deployment of THAAD and took the initiative to repair relations with China. Park Geun-hye’s insistence on deploying THAAD in the latter part of her administration caused serious damage to China-ROK relations, making the country turn to the US side. However, instead of any substantial support and assistance after the entry of THAAD, the Trump administration coerced the ROK to pay higher military expenses for US troops in the ROK, arousing doubts about US commitment and the sustainability of the US-ROK alliance.24Park Yong-soo, “US-China Rivalry and the Moon Jae-in Government’s Strategy,” The Korean Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol.25, No.1, 2020, p.20.Under this circumstance,the Moon Jae-in administration first suspended the deployment on the pretext of parliamentary approval procedure and environmental assessment,and then issued the “three-no promise” in October 2017 that it would “not consider additional THAAD deployment, not participate in the US-led antimissile system, and not develop the US-Japan-ROK military alliance.” He finally realized the presidential visit to China in December of that year. Highlevel contacts between China and the ROK gradually resumed, economic cooperation continued to deepen, and bilateral trade volume rebounded to the level before the THAAD deployment.25“ROK-China Trade Recovers to Pre-THAAD Retaliation Level in Fourth Year of Bilateral FTA,”Yonhap News, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20181219047800003.Bilateral people-to-people exchanges,including tourism, returned to normal. In addition, the Moon administration strengthened cooperation with China in non-traditional security areas such as fisheries disputes, environmental protection and public health, achieving a series of results, such as the establishment of the China-ROK Environmental Cooperation Center, and contributing to the warming of bilateral relations.

Second, Moon responded to certain demands of the US regarding trade, investment and military cost-sharing to maintain the US-ROK alliance. While extending an olive branch to China, Moon also signaled that the US-ROK alliance was unbreakable. He visited Washington just 51 days after taking office, setting a record for the fastest visit to the US by any ROK president. Moon held talks with Trump and pledged to invest US$12.8 billion in the US over five years and purchase a total of US$22.4 billion in US products.26“During US Visit, Business Group Pledges to Invest $12.8 Billion over the Next Five Years,” The Asia Business Daily, June 29, 2017.Although Trump insisted on “America First” and pushed the ROK on issues related to investment and military, which caused a backlash in the ROK, the Moon administration still compromised and met the US demands to a certain extent. For instance, they agreed to revise the US-ROK Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to facilitate the entry of US automobiles, pharmaceuticals,and agricultural products into the Korean market, and reached the 10th and 11th defense cost-sharing agreements, which raised the ROK’s annual payment of around US$ 830 million to US$924 million and even US$1.04 billion.These moves gained US support for Moon’s policy toward North Korea and showed goodwill to the US.

Third, Moon promoted the synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific strategy to strike a balance between major powers. The Moon administration’s vision for economic cooperation consisted of the “New Economic Map of the Korean Peninsula,” the New Northern Policy, and the New Southern Policy. The latter two, known as the “Two New Policies,” included the Eurasian countries in the north and the Southeast and South Asian countries in the south. As the ROK dovetailed with the BRI in building the Eurasia Initiative during the Park Geun-hye era, Moon proposed connecting the “Two New Policies” with the BRI soon after taking office.In April 2018, the ROK Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation published a policy paper “Exploring the Synergy of Two New Polices and China’s Belt and Road Initiative” with concrete proposals on areas and projects for cooperation. In November 2019, after initial rejection and cautious engagement with the Indo-Pacific strategy, the Moon Jae-in administration issued a policy document with the US entitled “Working Together to Promote Cooperation between the Indo-Pacific strategy and the New Southern Policy”and agreed to cooperate in economy, social governance, and security.27Zhan Debin, “The ROK’s Perceptions and Policies on the US Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Northeast Asia Forum, No.2, 2021, pp.32-33.However, the Moon administration paid special attention to avoid the nerves of China and the US. For example, security cooperation within the framework of Indo-Pacific strategy was limited to non-traditional security, and Moon also reacted negatively toward the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)mechanism.28Lee Sang-hyun, “Quad and South Korea: How to Participate in Quad?” Situation and Policy, June 2021, p.5.

But Moon’s perception of the China-US strategic competition slightly changed in the latter part of his administration, with the stalemate in the US-DPRK negotiation and the deterioration of China-US relations. Moon’s policy focused more on the pro-US approach while maintaining the status quo. On the one hand, Moon began to highlight the values link between the ROK and the US. In an audience with US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, he stated, “the US-ROK alliance is not just about security but also about such universal values as democracy, peace and human rights.”29“Written Briefing on the Meeting with US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Haines,”Cheongwadae, May 14, 2021, https://www1.president.go.kr/articles/10299.On the other hand, the Moon Jae-in administration tried to strengthen USROK economic ties and reduce dependence on China. Former ROK Minister of SMEs and Startups Park Young-sun said the US-ROK alliance needs to be upgraded to an economic alliance.30Park Young-sun, “Korea-US Economic Alliance and Tasks to Be Advanced After the Moon Jae-in Administration,” CSIS, October 29, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/korea-us-economic-alliance-andtasks-be-advanced-after-moon-jae-administration.A report on changes in China-ROK trade due to the China-US trade dispute released by the ROK Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy also calls for “reducing export dependence on China by diversifying export markets and relocating important key facilities back to the ROK.”31“Moon Jae-in Government’s Cooperation with Belt and Road Initiative in Conflict with the United States,” Monthly Chosun, October 10, 2021.The Moon Jae-in administration also began to cooperate with the US on China-related issues at the policy level. Moon made a highprofile visit to the US soon after US President Biden took office, showing his determination to enhance the US-ROK alliance. As a result, the bilateral cooperation on China-related issues was expanded to key areas of the China-US strategic competition, including the Taiwan Straits, the Asia-Pacific region,economy, science and technology, and international order.32Sun Ru and Wang Fudong, “China-Related Cooperation in US-ROK Alliance,” Contemporary International Relations, No.8, 2021, p.25.The reasons for these changes include the following four aspects.

First, the intensifying China-US strategic competition limited the ROK’s strategic space. Observers used to believe that the ROK, as a middle power, could play a stabilizing role amid the China-US strategic competition through engagement, bandwagoning, prevention and balancing, so as to maintain its status in a “dual hierarchy” marked by a US-led security hierarchy and a China-dominated economic hierarchy.33See G. John Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.131, No.1, 2016, pp.9-43; Stephen M. Walt,“Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, Vol.9, No.4, 1985, pp.3-43.But James Kim, Research Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, used basic bargaining theory to analyze the limited influence of middle powers in a shifting regional order and their less decisive role in reconciling various options than major powers.34J. James Kim, “South Korea’s Choice between China and the United States,” Shi Yanfang, trans.,Journal of International Security Studies, No.4, 2017, p.19.He mentioned the THAAD deployment as an example to demonstrate that the ROK does not have many options on strategic issues, and the choices of major powers would constrain the ROK’s options. If the China-US strategic competition intensifies, the ROK must make a clear choice. Many Korean strategic experts also believe that the ROK has to side with the US if China-US strategic competition leaves no room for reconciliation.35Park Kwang-deuk, “Moon Jae-in Government’s Negotiation Strategy and Dilemma for China,”Unification Strategy, Vol.18, No.1, 2018, p.75; Choi Kang and Shin Beom-chul, “Evaluation of the USDPRK Summit and South Korea’s Security Concerns,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, http://www.asaninst.org/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/action/dl.php?id=57984.As the Trump administration imposed more pressure on China from all fronts and the US Indo-Pacific strategy took shape, fierce competition between the two countries has now covered the full range of security, economic, and technological fields,which pushed the ROK to pick sides.

Second, US pressure constrained Moon’s “balanced diplomacy.” For example, Trump increased pressure on Moon when the ROK needed the US to deal with the Korean Peninsula issue and the Japan-ROK trade friction.After Trump’s second meeting with Kim Jong-un ended inconclusively,Moon eagerly hoped the US to take positive action and break the deadlock.The trade dispute with Japan also forced the ROK to seek US mediation.However, Trump was ambiguous on both issues, refused any concessions on the path toward denuclearization and stated that Japan and the ROK should resolve the dispute on their own. Such an attitude has aggravated the ROK’s fear of being abandoned. From the second half of 2019, the ROK significantly changed its attitude toward the Indo-Pacific strategy, from exploring ways of synergy to seeking smooth cooperation.36Zhan Debin, “The ROK’s Perceptions and Policies on the US Indo-Pacific Strategy,” pp.29-31.Since coming to power, Biden,instead of imposing pressure on the ally, has emphasized the value connections between the US and the ROK, and also approved the termination of the USROK Missile Guidelines, lifting restrictions on the latter’s missile development program. These policies, aimed at winning over a major ally in the region, did have some effect and the ROK strategic circles actively echoed the idea that the country’s diplomacy should center on democratic values and institutions.37“Competition over the Rebuilding of International Order,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies,January 5, 2022, https://www.asaninst.org/wp-content/themes/twentythirteen/action/dl.php?id=81865.

Third, the stalemate on inter-Korean relations propelled the ROK to pick sides. The relations between the US and the DPRK turned cold after Trump’s second meeting with Kim Jong-un. Moon’s failed coordination triggered a conservative backlash against his policy toward the North, and Pyongyang also lost confidence in Moon’s government, leading to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations. In June 2020, the DPRK blew up the Inter-Korean Liaison Office on the pretext that the Moon administration condoned the distribution of anti-DPRK leaflets by conservative groups in the border area. Since the beginning of 2022, the DPRK has been conducting frequent missile tests and even test-fired a new intercontinental ballistic missile, Hwasong-17, on March 24, leaving the Moon Jae-in government with limited policy flexibility. After Biden took office,the Trump-era working group on the DPRK was replaced with a dialogue at the director-general level. The two countries are converging on policies toward the DPRK through high-profile talks.38Zhai Fusheng, “The Moon Jae-in Government’s Policy towards North Korea under the ‘Triple Squeeze,’” Asia Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs, No.5, 2021, p.120.In the face of the stark contrast between the steadily advancing China-DPRK relations and the fluctuating US-DPRK and inter-Korean relationships, some in the ROK believe that China’s support of inter-Korean dialogue and advocacy of better US-DPRK relations are merely diplomatic gestures, and China’s real intention is to better manage its relations with the DPRK and delay the resolution of the nuclear issue.39Choo Jae-woo, “China’s Fear of North Korea’s Defection in the Era of US-China Strategic Competition,” Strategic Studies, Vol.28, No.2, 2021, p.74.The ferment of similar rhetoric has also contributed to changes in the ROK’s view of the China-US strategic competition.

Fourth, Moon’s domestic support decline and the public’s negative sentiment toward China also led to a wavering of the ROK’s position.Moon’s high public approval rating in the early days enabled him to maintain balance between China and the US. His approval rating was once close to 90 percent, but it fluctuated and hovered at a modest 40 percent in early 2022 because of a failed real estate policy, a sloppy procuratorial system reform,and a recurring domestic epidemic.40“Realmeter-Ohmynews Weekly Trend of the 1st Week of February,” Realmeter, February 7, 2022.The obvious decline in popular support constrained Moon’s implementation of his internal and external policies. At the same time, the public sentiment toward China has become more negative since the THAAD deployment and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.A spring 2021 Pew Center poll showed that 77 percent of people in the ROK have an unfavorable opinion of China, and 75 percent of the respondents believe that the ROK should have closer economic ties with the US.41Laura Silver, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang, “Large Majorities Say China Does Not Respect the Personal Freedoms of Its People,” Pew Research Center, June 30, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/06/30/large-majorities-say-china-does-not-respect-the-personal-freedoms-of-its-people/.During the Beijing Winter Olympics, the hanbok controversy and the short track speed skating referee controversy largely spread negative public sentiment toward China, which undoubtedly influenced Moon’s China policy.

With the loosening of “balanced diplomacy,” the ROK’s cooperation with the US on China-related issues has increased in the past two years. Firstly,on May 21, 2021, the US-ROK summit issued a joint statement mentioning Taiwan for the first time, touching on China’s core interests.42“United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, May 22, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korealeaders-joint-statement.Two days later,First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choi Jong-kun said that the peace and stability of Taiwan Strait affect the ROK’s national interests and are related to the New Southern Policy as well as the issue of freedom of navigation.43“Choi Jong-kun: Mentioning Taiwan in ROK-US Joint Statement in Our National Interests,” Yonhap News, May 23, 2021, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210523045700504.Given that the Taiwan question is sensitive in China-ROK relations and successive ROK governments never made similar statements in the 30 years of bilateral diplomatic relations, this is an important indicator of the ROK’s policy shift.Secondly, the ROK’s cautious attitude toward participation in the Indo-Pacific strategy and the QUAD mechanism changed from March 2021 when Chung Eui-yong replaced Kang Kyung-wha as foreign minister. According to Chung,“the ROK can cooperate with any regional mechanism including the QUAD, if it upholds transparency, openness, inclusiveness and international norms.”44“Moon Jae-in Government Debates over Participation in ‘Anti-China’ QUAD,” Sisa Focus, March 10,2021, http://www.sisafocus.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=256788.The joint statement in May between the ROK and the US mentioned the synergy of the New Southern Policy and the Indo-Pacific strategy to promote human rights and the rule of law, protect the freedom of navigation and facilitate vaccine cooperation, which responded to major demands of the Indo-Pacific strategy for the ROK. Evans Revere, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, went so far as to say the statement contained everything QUAD or QUAD Plus wanted to do.45“US Expert: Joint Statement Includes Everything about QUAD,” Chosun Ilbo, May 25, 2021.Thirdly, Biden terminated the US-ROK Missile Guidelines, allowing the ROK to develop missiles with a range of more than 800 kilometers. This move kills two birds with one stone as it pulls the ROK in while containing China. Some media outlets even called for developing hypersonic missiles that can deter neighboring countries such as China and Russia.46“With ROK-US Missile Guidelines Terminated, the Target Now Is Hypersonic Long-Range Missile,”New Daily, May 24, 2021, https://www.newdaily.co.kr/site/data/html/2021/05/24/2021052400186.html.Fourthly, the ROK closely cooperated with the US on high technology. In December 2020, KT and SK, two telecommunications giants in the ROK participated in the Clean Network Initiative of the US. In May 2021, some Korean companies joined the US Semiconductor Alliance. According to the US-ROK joint statement, the two countries will cooperate in the fields of next-generation batteries, hydrogen energy, carbon capture and storage (CCS), artificial intelligence (AI), 5G and 6G, open radio access networks (Open RAN), and quantum technology. These are all vital areas of the China-US strategic competition. Robert Manning, a senior researcher at the Atlantic Council, believes that the ROK’s technology investment in the US and the bilateral high-tech cooperation in areas including 5G have indicated its geo-economic tilt toward the US.47“US Expert: ROK Should Join the United Front toward China with Its Tightrope Diplomacy at Risk,”Newspim, June 17, 2021, https://www.newspim.com/news/view/20210617000116.

In summary, in the five years of Moon Jae-in’s administration, his attitude toward the China-US strategic competition changed from strategic ambiguity to a pro-US “balanced diplomacy.” The US-ROK cooperation expands and is becoming closer. Indeed, throughout Moon’s term of office, he tried to maintain the status quo and strike a balance between China and the US. Still,the increase in the US-ROK cooperation has reflected the country’s growing pressure to pick sides and the increasingly conservative atmosphere. In this context, the successive administration will prioritize the US-ROK alliance and coordinate with the China policy of the US.

Prospect of China-ROK Relations under the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration

In March 2022, Yoon Suk-yeol, the candidate of the ROK’s largest opposition People Power Party, was elected as the new president after defeating Lee Jaemyung of the ruling Democratic Party by a very narrow margin. He officially took office on May 10. Yoon comes from the conservative camp, and his views on the China-US strategic competition are quite different from his predecessor.During Yoon’s election campaign, he released obvious signals of moving closer to the US, such as expanding the US-ROK alliance from military to multiple fields including economy, science and technology, supply chain, and public health, and upgrading the scope of bilateral cooperation from the Korean Peninsula to the broader region and even the world. He also supported closer US-Japan-ROK cooperation and active participation in the QUAD.48Chen Xiangyang, “Yoon Suk-yeol’s Road to Power,” Fudan University, March 25, 2022, https://brgg.fudan.edu.cn/articleinfo_4740.html.Before the presidential election, Yoon published an article titled “South Korea Needs to Step Up” inForeign Affairs, further elaborating his diplomatic vision. On the China-US strategic competition, he criticized Moon’s policy of strategic ambiguity, and denounced such policy as creating an impression that the ROK has been “tilting toward China and away from its longtime ally, the United States.”49Yoon Suk-yeol, “South Korea Needs to Step Up,” Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2022-02-08/south-korea-needs-step.Accordingly,Yoon Suk-yeol believes that the ROK should establish a comprehensive strategic alliance with the US and not submit to China’s economic retaliation at the expense of the country’s security interests. Meanwhile, Yoon and his team have tried to add their leverage with China by consolidating the US-ROK alliance.His foreign policy adviser Kim Sung-han said in a pre-election interview with the Voice of America that China would respect the ROK if the US-ROK alliance grows steadily and plays a key role.50“Kim Sung-han to Lead Foreign Affairs and Security Subcommittee of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol’s Transition Team,” Yonhap News, March 15, 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220315056000504.Admittedly, Yoon does not completely fall in line with the US or ignore the importance of China-ROK relations. He expressed the willingness to advance bilateral cooperation in a phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping.51“President Xi Jinping Speaks with ROK President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol on the Phone,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, March 25, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/202203/t20220325_10655756.html.However, compared to Moon’s later stance of maintaining the status quo while getting closer to the US, the Yoon administration will probably focus more on the US while continuing the strategy of depending on the US for immediate security and on China for trade. Future China-ROK relations may face the following major challenges.

First, the uncertainty of Yoon’s DPRK policy could impact China-ROK relations. Yoon Suk-yeol has major differences with Moon Jae-in on policy toward the DPRK. He said in a televised presidential debate, “the only way to stop a war is to enable a preventive strike.”52“Yoon Suk-yeol Wins Tightest Ever Election, New ROK Government’s China Policy under Scrutiny,”Huanqiu, March 10, 2022, https://world.huanqiu.com/article/478703LStaz.Also, he supported tough sanctions against the DPRK, joint exercises with the US, and even additional deployment of the THAAD system. In his presidential inauguration speech,Yoon made the suspension of nuclear weapons development and complete denuclearization a prerequisite for resuming the inter-Korean dialogue. All of these moves have brought huge uncertainty. China and the ROK have long agreed on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. Bilateral coordination around the nuclear issue is a pillar supporting the China-ROK cooperation. A drastic change by the Yoon Sukyeol administration in the country’s North Korea policy and a tough stance toward Pyongyang will increase tensions on the Peninsula and harm China-ROK cooperation and even bilateral relations.

Second, amid the rise of conservative groups in the ROK, whether Yoon will fulfill his election pledges afater taking office also adds uncertainties to China-ROK relations. While the conservative camp’s victory is directly related to a series of Moon Jae-in’s failed policies, the rise of conservative forces in the ROK is also an important factor. The Pew poll shows that people in the ROK had an increasingly negative perception of China from 2018 to 2021.53“Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey,” Pew Research Center, June 30,2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/06/PG_2021.06.30_Global-Views-China_TOPLINE.pdf.There are more calls for adjusting the ROK’s relations with China and deepening the US-ROK alliance. During the election campaign,Yoon proposed that he would not follow Moon’s “three-no promise” and would seek to join QUAD. Yoon’s campaign team has more experts in American studies, including Cho Tae-yong and Kim Sung-han, than in China studies.54“Outlook for the ROK New Government’s China Policy,” Yonhap News, March 10, 2022, https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20220310001500881?section=politics/index.Therefore, whether Yoon Suk-yeol will fulfill his campaign promises in his China policy will be an essential indicator of future China-ROK relations.

Third, spillover from the Ukraine crisis may put China-ROK relations to a new test. On the one hand, the US has used the conflict to create a seeming confrontation between ideologies and stimulate the Cold War mentality on the Peninsula, which has made values a more important consideration in ROK diplomacy. In his inaugural speech, Yoon mentioned“freedom” 35 times and vowed to defend democracy and the market economy,which are all keywords of his domestic and foreign policies.55“‘Freedom’ Appears 35 Times, ‘Integration’ Not Mentioned in Yoon’s Inauguration Speech,” Kukmin Ilbo, May 11, 2022.Since China and the ROK greatly differ in political systems and ideologies, the return of valuebased diplomacy could amplify such differences and push the ROK to follow the US. On the other hand, the US has hinted that China will be subject to economic sanctions if it provides assistance to Russia. Once the US imposes more sanctions against China, it will certainly ask for the ROK’s participation,which will bring great pressure to China-ROK relations.56“One Month into the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Intensifying Great-Power Game, and the ROK’s Diplomatic Test,” Yonhap News, March 24, 2022, https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20220323003700881.

Despite these uncertainties in the China-ROK relations, a stable bilateral relationship is still possible for the following factors.

First, economic interdependence is still the unbreakable ballast of bilateral relations. Although China and the ROK are competing in the world market and the ROK is intentionally lowering its economic dependence on China, the bilateral trade still exceeded US$300 trillion in 2021. With a trade surplus of $25 billion, forcibly reducing its trade dependence on China will cause unbearable losses to the ROK. Moreover, bilateral economic cooperation still has vast potential, especially with the second phase of FTA negotiations and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) coming into effect. The two countries can upgrade economic cooperation from quantitative growth to quality growth, optimize the business environment, and bring more business opportunities for enterprises in both countries.57Park Han-jin, “Achieving Common Development in Open Cooperation,” People’s Daily, January 18,2022, p.17.Decoupling will be definitely difficult in the short term.

Second, the dominance of progressive parties in the ROK National Assembly will act as checks and balances against the foreign policy of the conservative government. The difference in vote share between Yoon Suk-yeol and Lee Jae-myung was only 0.73 percent, and Yoon himself is not a traditional figure of the People Power Party.58“Poll of the Three Major TV Station in the ROK are Accurate While Other Poll Predications Missed,”Yonhap News Agency, March 10, 2022, https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20220310007300881?section=/election2022/news.Thus, Yoon’s victory does not imply that most people accept the conservative camp’s policies. More importantly, Yoon must deal with a National Assembly where opposition parties still have the majority of seats, and the dominant Democratic Party will impose constraints on Yoon’s internal and external policies. In China-US relations, the Democratic Party tries to coordinate the US-ROK alliance and China-ROK relations and shape a “creative and flexible diplomatic strategy”between China and the US.59“National Interests Come First in ROK-US Alliance,” The Institute for Democracy and Policies,January 18, 2012, https://idp.theminjoo.kr/board/view/archive/968.Especially on sensitive issues such as the THAAD deployment, the Democratic Party opposes being “kidnapped” by the USROK alliance to the detriment of China-ROK relations and the ROK’s security and economic interests.60“THAAD Deployment in the ROK, What Is the Problem?” The Institute for Democracy and Policies,March 30, 2015, http://www.idp.or.kr/library/?mode=view&table=archive&b_idx=107.Therefore, unless the dominance of the Democratic Party reverses in the next National Assembly election in two years, it will be difficult for the ROK to totally toe the US line.

Third, the ROK’s long-standing diplomatic pragmatism will serve as the breakwater for China-ROK relations. The ROK is heavily influenced by the Confucian culture, and pragmatism is a core of Confucian ethics. This has become part of the national psychology.61Sun Junheng, “Features of the ROK’s Confucian Ethics,” Dongjiang Journal, No.1, 2003, pp.41-42.As a result, the ROK’s foreign policy is practical. Whether the conservative or the progressive camp is in power,successive governments believe that tensions with China will do more harm to both sides. Although the Yoon administration is tougher on China than the Moon administration, Yoon’s campaign platform includes plans for dialogue with China. Yoon acknowledges the ROK’s common interests with China on economy and trade as well as the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. Also,experience has shown that what the candidates said during election campaigns does not usually translate into real action afterward. Therefore, Yoon will certainly strengthen the US-ROK alliance but also avoid a significant regression in China-ROK relations based on pragmatic diplomacy.

In a nutshell, instead of continuing the “strategic ambiguity” between China and the US, the ROK’s new president may demonstrate “strategic certainty” in favor of the US. However, given the close connection between the two countries, a tough China policy is not in the ROK’s interests. Yoon’s China policy is expected to be based on pragmatism and mutualism.

Conclusion

With the increasingly intense China-US strategic competition, there is a sharp debate in the ROK over the strategic choice between the two powers.Although the Moon Jae-in administration tried to maintain strategic ambiguity and a balance between China and the US in the past five years,the ROK still faced great pressure to pick sides, which led to its stronger pro-US inclination. Under the presidency of Yoon Suk-yeol from the conservative camp, China-ROK relations may go through a period of “adjustment” or even “restart” in the future, considering the uncertainty of Yoon’s North Korea policy, the rise of conservative groups, and the spillover from the Ukraine crisis. However, given the geographical proximity of China and the ROK, the high interdependence of their economies, the ROK’s tradition of diplomatic pragmatism, and the progressive dominance in the National Assembly, the ROK can hardly fall in line with the US in the short term.At the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, China and the ROK should explore new cooperation growth points in hightech industries, public health, third-party markets, and local government exchanges, while promoting candid exchanges and sincere reconciliation among the younger generations around controversial issues, to build a futureoriented relationship and contribute to peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.