Education and Discipline

Bertrand Russell

Any serious educational theory must consist of two parts： a conception of the ends of life， and a science of psychological dynamics， i.e. of the laws of mental change. Two men who differ as to the ends of life cannot hope to agree about education. The educational machine， throughout Western civilization， is dominated by two ethical theories： that of Christianity， and that of nationalism. These two， when taken seriously， are incompatible， as is becoming evident in Germany. For my part， I hold that， where they differ， Christianity is preferable， but where they agree， both are mistaken. The conception which I should substitute as the purpose of education is civilization， a term which， as I mean it， has a definition which is partly individual， partly social. It consists， in the individual， of both intellectual and moral qualities： intellectually， a certain minimum of general knowledge， technical skill in ones own profession， and a habit of forming opinions on evidence； morally， of impartiality， kindliness， and a modicum of self-control. I should add a quality which is neither moral nor intellectual， but perhaps physiological： zest and joy of life. In communities， civilization demands respect for law， justice as between man and man， purposes not involving permanent injury to any section of the human race， and intelligent adaptation of means to ends.

If these are to be the purpose of education， it is a question for the science of psychology to consider what can be done towards realizing them， and， in particular， what degree of freedom is likely to prove most effective.

On the question of freedom in education there are at present three main schools of thought， deriving partly from differences as to ends and partly from differences in psychological theory. There are those who say that children should be completely free， however bad they may be； there are those who say they should be completely subject to authority， however good they may be； and there are those who say they should be free， but in spite of freedom they should be always good. This last party is larger than it has any logical right to be； children， like adults， will not all be virtuous if they are all free. The belief that liberty will ensure moral perfection is a relic of Rousseauism， and would not survive a study of animals and babies. Those who hold this belief think that education should have no positive purpose， but should merely offer an environment suitable for spontaneous development. I cannot agree with this school， which seems to me too individualistic， and unduly indifferent to the importance of knowledge. We live in communities which require cooperation， and it would be utopian to expect all the necessary cooperation to result from spontaneous impulse. The existence of a large population on a limited area is only possible owing to science and technique； education must， therefore， hand on the necessary minimum of these. The educators who allow most freedom are men whose success depends upon a degree of benevolence， self-control， and trained intelligence which can hardly be generated where every impulse is left unchecked； their merits， therefore， are not likely to be perpetuated if their methods are undiluted. Education， viewed from a social standpoint， must be something more positive than a mere opportunity for growth. It must， of course， provide this， but it must also provide a mental and moral equipment which children cannot acquire entirely for themselves.

The arguments in favour of a great degree of freedom in education are derived not from mans natural goodness， but from the effects of authority， both on those who suffer it and on those who exercise it. Those who are subject to authority become either submissive or rebellious， and each attitude has its drawbacks.

The submissive lose initiative， both in thought and action； moreover， the anger generated by the feeling of being thwarted tends to find an outlet in bullying those who are weaker. That is why tyrannical institutions are self-perpetuating： what a man has suffered from his father he inflicts upon his son， and the humiliations which he remembers having endured at his public school he passes on to “natives" when he becomes an empire-builder. Thus an unduly authoritative education turns the pupils into timid tyrants， incapable of either claiming or tolerating originality in word or deed. The effect upon the educators is even worse： they tend to become sadistic disciplinarians， glad to inspire terror， and content to inspire nothing else. As these men represent knowledge， the pupils acquire a horror of knowledge， which， among the English upper-class， is supposed to be part of human nature， but is really part of the well-grounded hatred of the authoritarian pedagogue.

Rebels， on the other hand， though they may be necessary， can hardly be just to what exists. Moreover， there are many ways of rebelling， and only a small minority of these are wise. Galileo was a rebel and was wise； believers in the flat-earth theory are equally rebels， but are foolish. There is a great danger in the tendency to suppose that opposition to authority is essentially meritorious and that unconventional opinions are bound to be correct： no useful purpose is served by smashing lamp-posts or maintaining Shakespeare to be no poet. Yet this excessive rebelliousness is often the effect that too much authority has on spirited pupils. And when rebels become educators， they sometimes encourage defiance in their pupils， for whom at the same time they are trying to produce a perfect environment， although these two aims are scarcely compatible.

What is wanted is neither submissiveness nor rebellion， but good nature， and general friendliness both to people and to new ideas. These qualities are due in part to physical causes， to which old-fashioned educators paid too little attention； but they are due still more to freedom from the feeling of baffled impotence which arises when vital impulses are thwarted. If the young are to grow into friendly adults， it is necessary， in most cases， that they should feel their environment friendly. This requires that there should be a certain sympathy with the childs important desires， and not merely an attempt to use him for some abstract end such as the glory of God or the greatness of ones country. And， in teaching， every attempt should be made to cause the pupil to feel that it is worth his while to know what is being taught—at least when this is true. When the pupil cooperates willingly， he learns twice as fast and with half the fatigue. All these are valid reasons for a very great degree of freedom.

It is easy， however， to carry the argument too far. It is not desirable that children， in avoiding the vices of the slave， should acquire those of the aristocrat. Consideration for others， not only in great matters， but also in little everyday things， is an essential element in civilization， without which social life would be intolerable. I am not thinking of mere forms of politeness， such as saying “please”and “thank you” ： formal manners are most fully developed among barbarians， and diminish with every advance in culture. I am thinking rather of willingness to take a fair share of necessary work， to be obliging in small ways that save trouble on the balance. Sanity itself is a form of politeness and it is not desirable to give a child a sense of omnipotence， or a belief that adults exist only to minister to the pleasures of the young. And those who disapprove of the existence of the idle rich are hardly consistent if they bring up their children without any sense that work is necessary， and without the habits that make continuous application possible.

There is another consideration to which some advocates of freedom attach too little importance. In a community of children which is left without adult interference there is a tyranny of the stronger， which is likely to be far more brutal than most adult tyranny. If two children of two or three years old are left to play together， they will， after a few fights， discover which is bound to be the victor， and the other will then become a slave. Where the number of children is larger， one or two acquire complete mastery， and the others have far less liberty than they would have if the adults interfered to protect the weaker and less pugnacious. Consideration for others does not， with most children， arise spontaneously， but has to be taught， and can hardly be taught except by the exercise of authority. This is perhaps the most important argument against the abdication of the adults.

I do not think that educators have yet solved the problem of combining the desirable forms of freedom with the necessary minimum of moral training. The right solution， it must be admitted， is often made impossible by parents before the child is brought to an enlightened school. Just as psychoanalysts， from their clinical experience， conclude that we are all mad， so the authorities in modern schools， from their contact with pupils whose parents have made them unmanageable， are disposed to conclude that all children are “difficult”and all parents utterly foolish. Children who have been driven wild by parental tyranny （which often takes the form of solicitous affection） may require a longer or shorter period of complete liberty before they can view any adult without suspicion. But children who have been sensibly handled at home can bear to be checked in minor ways， so long as they feel that they are being helped in the ways that they themselves regard as important. Adults who like children， and are not reduced to a condition of nervous exhaustion by their company， can achieve a great deal in the way of discipline without ceasing to be regarded with friendly feelings by their pupils.

I think modern educational theorists are inclined to attach too much importance to the negative virtue of not interfering with children， and too little to the positive merit of enjoying their company. If you have the sort of liking for children that many people have for horses or dogs， they will be apt to respond to your suggestions， and to accept prohibitions， perhaps with some good-humoured grumbling， but without resentment. It is no use to have the sort of liking that consists in regarding them as a field for valuable social endeavour， or—what amounts to the same thing—as an outlet for power-impulses. No child will be grateful for an interest in him that springs from the thought that he will have a vote to be secured for your party or a body to be sacrificed to king and country. The desirable sort of interest is that which consists in spontaneous pleasure in the presence of children， without any ulterior purpose. Teachers who have this quality will seldom need to interfere with childrens freedom， but will be able to do so， when necessary， without causing psychological damage.

Unfortunately， it is utterly impossible for over-worked teachers to preserve an instinctive liking for children； they are bound to come to feel towards them as the proverbial confectioners apprentice does towards macaroons. I do not think that education ought to be anyones whole profession： it should be undertaken for at most two hours a day by people whose remaining hours are spent away from children. The society of the young is fatiguing， especially when strict discipline is avoided. Fatigue， in the end， produces irritation， which is likely to express itself somehow， whatever theories the harassed teacher may have taught himself or herself to believe. The necessary friendliness cannot be preserved by self-control alone. But where it exists， it should be unnecessary to have rules in advance as to how “naughty” children are to be treated， since impulse is likely to lead to the right decision， and almost any decision will be right if the child feels that you like him. No rules， however wise， are a substitute for affection and tact.

學(xué)習(xí)任務(wù)

1. Explain the contextual meaning of the following words and expressions（highlighted in blue）in English.

（1） conception， dynamics， incompatible， modicum （Para. 1）

（2） derive， relic， unduly， hand on， perpetuate （Para. 3）

（3） initiative， thwart， inflict （Para. 5）

（4） meritorious， defiance （Para. 6）

（5） fatigue （Para. 7）

（6） vice， obliging （Para. 8）

（7） abdication （Para. 9）

（8） disposed， reduced （Para. 10）

（9） apt （Para. 11）

2. Look up the underlined words in your dictionary， examining their multiple meanings. （Note down the meaning of each word in the context， and another meaning that the word often expresses.）

（1） Education and Discipline （title）

（2） Any serious educational theory… （Para. 1）

（3） … be completely subject to authority… （Para. 3）

（4） … would not survive a study of… （Para. 3）

（5） … can hardly be just to… （Para. 6）

（6） … maintaining Shakespeare to be no poet. （Para. 6）

（7） … due in part to physical causes… （Para. 7）

（8） … more to freedom from the feeling of… （Para. 7）

（9） … it is worth his while… （Para. 7）

（10） … only to minister to… （Para. 8）

（11） … can bear to be checked… （Para. 10）

3. Answer the following questions briefly.

（1） How do you understand “[t]wo men who differ as to the ends of life cannot hope to agree about education”？

（2） Why does the author raise the issue of freedom in Paragraph 3？

（3） What are the features of the aristocrat mentioned in Paragraph 8？

*本期學(xué)習(xí)任務(wù)的答案將刊登在《英語學(xué)習(xí)》2020年3月刊，敬請關(guān)注。

參考譯文

教育與規(guī)紀

伯特蘭·羅素

任何嚴肅的教育理論必定由兩個部分組成： 一是指向生活目標的概念，二是關(guān)于人的心理如何運作，即心理變化的規(guī)律。如果人們擁有截然不同的生活目標，就無須妄想他們能對教育問題的看法達成一致。在西方文明的歷史長河中，教育機制一直深受基督教和民族主義這兩種價值觀影響。如果認真剖析這兩種思想，就會發(fā)現(xiàn)它們本質(zhì)互不相容，正如當前德國明顯表現(xiàn)出來的那樣。我認為，兩者如有分歧之處，那么基督教的價值觀相對更加可??；兩者如有達成一致之處，那么雙方的觀點都是謬誤。在此我想要將“教育的目的”這一概念替換成“文明”，而“文明” 的定義包含個體層面和社會層面。在個體層面，“文明”指的是智力和品德：智力包括對必要常識的了解、對職業(yè)專業(yè)技能的掌握以及凡事都依照證據(jù)的思考方式。從社會層面，“文明”包括公正、仁善和基本的自控力。恐怕在這里我還需要加上“文明”的第三個層面，它無關(guān)智力和道德，而是屬于生理層面，即生活中的樂趣和激情。在集體層面，文明要求人們尊重法律，追求人與人之間的公正，避免對任何人帶來持久傷害，具備隨機調(diào)整以達成目的的素質(zhì)。

假如以上就是教育的目標，那么亟待解決的問題就在于：如何實現(xiàn)這些目標？教育過程允許擁有何種程度的自由才能達到最佳效果？為了解決這些問題，我們需要運用心理學(xué)。

在有關(guān)教育應(yīng)當允許何等程度自由的問題上，目前主要有三種思想流派。之所以會產(chǎn)生分歧，部分原因是人們對人生目標有不同的理解，以及人們所運用的心理學(xué)理論不同。有些人認為，無論孩子們多么頑劣，他們都應(yīng)當被給予絕對的自由；有些人則認為，無論孩子們多么聽話，他們都應(yīng)該完全服從管教；還有些人認為，孩子們應(yīng)該被給予自由，而即使對這個自由不加約束，他們也依舊能成為好孩子。持最后一種觀點的人很多，但這個觀點根本不符合邏輯；就像成年人一樣，擁有絕對自由的孩子們不會是盡善盡美的。相信自由能夠帶來道德完善是盧梭主義思想的后遺癥，這種思想會被有關(guān)動物和嬰兒的研究輕易推翻。持有這一觀點的人認為，教育不應(yīng)有任何特殊目的，教育只是為了給受教育者提供適合他們自由發(fā)展的環(huán)境。我不贊同這種觀點。在我看來，這種觀點過分地強調(diào)個體性，漠視知識的重要性。我們生活在需要合作的集體社會中，指望單憑人們自發(fā)的意愿就能帶來所有必要的合作是不切實際的幻想。如果不是因為發(fā)達的科學(xué)技術(shù)，一大群人是無法在有限區(qū)域里共同生存的，因此教育必須考慮到這一現(xiàn)實問題。那些允許最大程度自由的教育者們，他們獲得成功的前提是受教育者擁有一定程度的仁慈、自制力及智力訓(xùn)練，但這些品質(zhì)幾乎不可能在自由放任的環(huán)境中養(yǎng)成。因此，如果這些人所支持的教育方式不加以調(diào)整，他們所具備的優(yōu)點就無法傳承下去。從社會的立場看，教育不僅僅是單純?yōu)榱私o人們提供自由成長的機會。當然，提供成長的機會是必要的，但教育還需要培養(yǎng)兒童的心理和道德素質(zhì)，這些素質(zhì)不可能完全由孩子自行養(yǎng)成。

支持教育過程中應(yīng)保有極大程度自由的思想的出發(fā)點并非是人們的善良天性，而是權(quán)威壓迫的作用。這種權(quán)威對施壓者和受壓迫者都產(chǎn)生影響。那些被權(quán)威壓迫的人，要么變得馴服，要么變得反叛，而這兩種態(tài)度都是存在一定問題的。

馴服者在思想和行動方面都會喪失創(chuàng)造力；而且，他們因受壓迫而引起的憤怒常會通過欺凌更弱者的方式得到發(fā)泄。這就是暴政機制得以維系的原因：一個人會將受父輩壓迫的痛苦同樣地施加給自己的兒女；一個在中學(xué)時受過欺辱的人，長大成為帝國元首后會將同樣的欺辱施加給他的“國民”。這樣一來，過分強調(diào)權(quán)威的教育會將孩子們變成怯懦的暴君，在言行上既不能進行自主原創(chuàng)，又不能容忍別人的創(chuàng)新。教育者們所受到的影響甚至更壞：他們往往會變成施虐狂式的規(guī)訓(xùn)者，樂于散布恐懼，除此之外別無所求。而由于教育者們往往代表了知識權(quán)威，學(xué)生們也越發(fā)會對知識產(chǎn)生恐懼。英國上層社會認為這種恐懼是人性的一部分，但這實際上揭示了人們對權(quán)威教育的普遍仇視。

另一方面，盡管反叛可能是必要的，但公正的反叛者們卻很少。而且反叛的方式有很多，其中只有極少數(shù)是明智的。伽利略反叛且明智；相信地球是個平面的人也反叛，但卻是愚蠢的。認為反抗權(quán)威本質(zhì)上是優(yōu)點、反傳統(tǒng)的觀念必定是正確的思想觀念是十分危險的。諸如砸毀路燈、否認莎士比亞詩人地位之類的反叛行為并不能帶來任何實際益處。這種過分叛逆往往是對富有創(chuàng)造力的學(xué)生施加過多壓迫的惡果。而一旦這些反叛者今后成為教育者，他們有時也會鼓勵學(xué)生藐視權(quán)威，但與此同時他們又想要為學(xué)生創(chuàng)造良好的教育環(huán)境，但這兩個目的通常難以兩全。

我們需要的既不是馴服，也不是反叛，而是優(yōu)秀的品質(zhì)，以及對人和新思想的開放心態(tài)。這種素質(zhì)一方面來自于常被傳統(tǒng)教育家所忽視的身體層面的原因，但更多來源于因為生命的基本沖動受到壓抑而產(chǎn)生無能挫敗感后對自由的渴望。在多數(shù)情形下，為了使孩子成長為友善的人，教育者必須讓孩子覺得自己生活的環(huán)境是友善的；這就要求教育者要理解孩子們基本的愿望，而不僅僅是試圖把孩子們作為實現(xiàn)某種抽象目標的工具，比如獲得上帝的榮耀，或者為國家爭光。而且在教育過程中，至少在這些知識確實值得學(xué)習(xí)時，教育者應(yīng)當盡其所能讓孩子們意識到他們正在學(xué)的知識是有價值的。如果孩子積極配合，學(xué)習(xí)效率就會加倍，疲倦也會減少。以上種種都有力支持了為何教育中應(yīng)當留有足夠自由。

然而，我們很容易矯枉過正。假如孩子們?yōu)榱吮苊怦Z服的奴性，從而染上了貴族的惡習(xí)，就絕非是我們想要看到的。無論在大事還是日常小事上，為他人著想都是文明的基本要素。如果缺少這一素質(zhì)，社會生活就會變得令人難以忍受。我指的不僅是說“請”與“謝謝”這種浮于表面的禮節(jié)。這種道貌岸然的禮節(jié)在野蠻社會中發(fā)展得最為充分，隨著文化的逐漸進步反而變得越來越不必要。我指的是自愿參加一些必要的工作，并且在細枝末節(jié)處約束自己，以免招致不必要的麻煩。理智本身就是一種禮貌，讓孩子覺得自己無所不能，或者讓他們覺得成年人的存在僅僅是為了取悅他們是不對的。而那些認為好吃懶做也能夠致富的人，他們培養(yǎng)出的孩子就會毫無工作是必要的的意識、沒有不斷進取的習(xí)慣，這樣肯定會難以為繼。

某些鼓吹教育自由的人還忽視了一點，那就是在一群沒有大人看管的孩子中，強者會建立起霸權(quán)，這種霸權(quán)可能會比成人世界的霸權(quán)還要殘酷。如果兩個兩、三歲的孩子被放在一起玩耍，在打了幾架后，一個孩子總是能打贏，那另一個孩子就會成為奴隸。當孩子的數(shù)量增加時，其中的一兩個孩子會獲得絕對支配權(quán)，而其余孩子的自由將被大大減少。而如果有成年人介入來保護弱小的孩子，那么弱小的孩子們的自由會更多，并且孩子們也不會那么好斗。對于多數(shù)孩子而言，推己及人并不是與生俱來的美德，而是后天習(xí)得的，往往需要權(quán)威或者是榜樣的作用。這也許是對成人不應(yīng)介入管教孩子這一觀點最好的批駁。

在我看來，教育家們還不知道怎樣將適度的自由與必要的道德規(guī)訓(xùn)結(jié)合起來。我們必須承認，孩子們進入學(xué)校啟蒙之前就已經(jīng)受到父母的負面影響。正如精神分析學(xué)家從臨床研究中得出的結(jié)論：人類通常都是瘋子。現(xiàn)代學(xué)校的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們和那些被家長慣壞的孩子們接觸之后往往會得出這樣的結(jié)論：所有孩子都是“老大難”，而父母們都是十足的蠢貨。父母表面溺愛實則專制的教育方法把孩子們逼得桀驁叛逆，他們或多或少需要一段時間的絕對自由才能不再對成年人充滿猜疑。但是，那些在家中受到悉心關(guān)懷的孩子們能夠忍受一定程度上的約束，只要他們覺得這能讓自己獲益。成年人如果喜愛孩子，同時在陪伴孩子時能不被累得筋疲力盡，就能對孩子們進行卓有成效的約束并且依舊獲得他們的好感。

我認為現(xiàn)代教育理論家傾向于過度重視“不干預(yù)孩子”的消極影響，卻忽視了孩子們和成人相處也會帶來好處。假如你像某些人愛自己的馬或狗一樣關(guān)愛孩子，他們就會樂于聽取你的建議、接受你的約束。即使他們會有些并非惡意的抱怨，但絕不會心懷怨恨。把孩子們視為有價值的社會資源（換句話說，把他們當做當權(quán)者沖動時的犧牲品）絕對毫無益處。如果你只想把孩子培養(yǎng)成某一黨派的附庸，或是預(yù)備為君主和國家犧牲的軀體，孩子們對你不會有任何感激之情。我們對待孩子應(yīng)有的興趣是：和他們在一起時會由衷地感到快樂，不帶任何功利目的。具有這種品質(zhì)的教師很少需要干涉孩子的自由，但必要時也能夠?qū)嵤└深A(yù)，而這種干預(yù)并不會傷害孩子們的心理。

不幸的是，指望操勞過度的教師們能對孩子保持本能的喜愛是完全不現(xiàn)實的。教師們必定對孩子感到厭倦，就如同資深甜點師早就膩煩了甜點的味道。我認為教育不應(yīng)該成為一個人的全職，人們每天從事教育的時間至多兩小時，而在其余時間里他們應(yīng)該遠離孩子們。和一群孩子打交道會使人疲倦，尤其是在沒有嚴肅的紀律約束孩子時。疲倦最終會導(dǎo)致惱怒，無論被煩擾的教師秉持多么完美的教育理論，這種情緒都無可避免。單靠教師的自制力是無法維持教育中必要的友善態(tài)度的。但只要教師保持友善，就無須事先為處理“淘氣”的孩子們制定種種規(guī)則，因為天然的選擇就能導(dǎo)向正確的決定，況且如果孩子們能感覺到你的喜愛，你做出的決定對他們而言都是正確的。無論多么明智的規(guī)定都無法替代教師的關(guān)愛與老練。