In Search of Consolation尋找慰藉

安德魯·斯塔克

For each of us， life will end at some point. Should that unavoidable fact affect the way we live？ If so， in what way？ 我們每個人的生命都會在某個時刻終結(jié)。這一既定事實會影響我們的生活嗎？如果會，又能如何影響呢？

The relationship between a person and his death， said the Greek thinker Epicurus， is a strange one. It is roughly akin1， if we may leap forward a couple of millennia， to the relationship between Superman and Clark Kent2. Whenever one is present， the other is nowhere to be seen. As long as a person is alive， his death has not yet happened. And of course once his death occurs， he is no longer around. Since no one will ever encounter his own demise， Epicurus concluded， it should cause him no concern.

Shelly Kagan’s “Death” furnishes a lucid3 guide to a range of philosophical claims of this sort， such as whether we can know what it’s like to be dead or why life is valuable in the first place. But Mr. Kagan continually returns to one matter that looms over4 all others： whether， for anyone who rejects religious notions of an afterlife， there are ways of consoling oneself about the inevitability of death. He takes no definitive position on this question. Rather his aim—the book is based on a popular Yale philosophy course that Mr. Kagan teaches—is to probe the positions on offer. And in his pages we find two consolations， apart from that of Epicurus.

The first one Mr. Kagan associates with is Buddhism， though it has been advanced as well by Western philosophers such as Schopenhauer. It urges us to cast off our selfish preoccupations5. To hold on to our self-focused projects and attachments is to court suffering whenever they end in disappointment. Far better to abandon any concern with our self， existing instead moment by moment， shorn of any concern for past or future. And since our self is the very thing that we are supposed to lose when we die， death will then become a nonevent， not worth fretting over6.

The other consolation that emerges in Mr. Kagan’s book comes from existentialism7， and it flips the Buddhist consolation on its ear. Existentialists value the individual self， with its own projects and aims. They argue that our death， in particular our constant knowledge that we are moving ever closer to it， is precisely what makes each of us his own unique person. Aware that time does not stretch out limitlessly， we feel an urgency to get started in the world， to make hard choices about what’s important and thus to carve out the narrative arc8 of our singular lives. Death compels us to craft a life-story that resembles a “resolved chord” or “melody，” as Sartre put it. Only with death always looming can we have a self—can we exist as identifiable9 individuals in the first place.

For existentialists and Buddhists， though in different ways， the relationship between the self and death seems more like the “Late Night” relationship between David Letterman and Paul Shaffer. One will be present if the other is too. You can be a full-fledged10 self， existentialists say， only if your death is ever present in your life. If you can manage to make yourself disappear， Buddhists say， then death will as well.

Mr. Kagan sees value in both positions， though he implicitly11 acknowledges that their paths to consolation are hazardous12. Anyone who seeks the Buddhist-style consolation is going to lead a life that， at its end， risks leaving him bereft of13 any feeling of accomplishment. And anyone who tries for an existentialist consolation—leading a chock-a-block life because mortality has concentrated his mind—will feel the loss of something of great value when it ends. “Don’t cry because it’s over; smile because it happened，” said the great existentialist Dr. Seuss. But anyone who can smile because it happened is going to have to cry because it’s over.

Which brings us back to Epicurus. For as long as we exist， the philosopher argued， our death must remain absent. But what would it take to live a life in which death truly wasn’t present to us—not just logically， as Epicurus suggests， but psychologically， internally？ We would live， as Freud believed most in fact do live， not really believing that we will die—believing， as Mr. Kagan notes of Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich， that death is something that happens to other people. Most of us， like Ivan， go merrily along taking on new projects， forming new relationships and scheming new schemes to promote ourselves socially， even though death could interrupt us at any moment. Instead of arriving at one completed narrative， we often risk leaving—to our ultimate sadness—many uncompleted ones. Truly living as if death is absent as long as we are alive is unlikely to console us.

Or take Epicurus’ other claim： once death comes， we will no longer be alive to worry about it. What kind of life would we have to live to be consoled by this idea？ Obviously not Ivan’s. His life， in a real way， continues on after he is dead. What tears at him is the thought that so much of what would otherwise comprise his life—his children， his friends， his projects—will go on to flourish or flounder14 without him： without his being there to enjoy or assist.

The only way that we can avoid that prospect is to follow the advice of the poet H?lderlin （cited by Mr. Kagan）： aim for a “single summer” of intense joy and then， having experienced the heights of what life has to offer， recognize that “more is not needed.” Life’s meaning would be derived from a single moment， and one could then wait in serenity15 for the end. Fine if you can do it. For most， it would be a tedious16 living death.

Mr. Kagan’s book shows， ultimately， that there is no single， all-purpose17 consolation for death. What we do have is the freedom to choose our own consolation by living our life in a particular way， knowing that， in doing so， we will deprive ourselves of all the others.

古希臘思想家伊壁鳩魯認為，人與其死亡之間關(guān)系奇特。如果以幾千年后的現(xiàn)代視角來看，這一關(guān)系大概類似于氪星之子超人與地球人克拉克·肯特之間的關(guān)系。一方存在，另一方便不見蹤影。只要人活著，死亡就尚未來臨。當然，一旦死亡來臨，人也就不再存在。伊壁鳩魯認定，沒人會活著與自己的死亡相遇，因此死亡不會令人恐懼。

謝利·卡根在其《死亡哲學(xué)》一書中就此類哲思提供了明白易懂的導(dǎo)覽，例如我們能否知道死亡是什么樣，或者生命為何從一開始就如此珍貴。然而卡根教授不斷回到一個困擾所有人的問題：那些不相信有關(guān)來生的宗教信條的人，面對必然到來的死亡，是否有辦法慰藉自己?？ǜ]有明確答復(fù)這個問題。他想做的是探討現(xiàn)有的那些立場。除了伊壁鳩魯?shù)南順分髁x，這本書還探討了另兩種慰藉方法。此書是依據(jù)卡根在耶魯大學(xué)開設(shè)的頗受歡迎的哲學(xué)課撰寫的。

卡根提到的第一種是佛教，而叔本華等西方哲學(xué)家也提到過。佛教敦促我們拋棄私心雜念。如果堅持以自我為中心待人處事，一旦結(jié)果令人失望，就會招致痛苦。最好放棄關(guān)注自我，而專注于活在當下，不念過去，無謂將來。既然死亡來臨時，本該消逝的就是我們的自我，那么死亡也就沒有什么大不了，不值得為此煩惱。

卡根教授書里提到的另一種慰藉源自存在主義，它跟佛教的慰藉完全不同。存在主義者重視個體的自我，以及個體自身的事務(wù)和目標。他們認為，正是人的死亡——特別是不斷認識到自己離死亡越來越近——讓每個人成為獨一無二的個體。明白時間并非無窮無盡，我們就會急迫地開始人世的打拼、艱難抉擇事物的輕重，從而打造我們自己的人生軌跡。正如法國哲學(xué)家薩特所說，死亡迫使我們譜寫出一段如“鏗鏘和弦”或“旋律”般的生命故事。正因為死亡總是步步進逼，我們才能擁有自我——才能從一開始就作為與眾不同的個體存在。

對存在主義者和佛教徒來說，雖然觀點各異，但都認為自我與死亡的關(guān)系似乎更像美國午夜聊天節(jié)目《深夜秀》中的大衛(wèi)·萊特曼和保羅·謝弗。只要一方存在，另一方也會存在。存在主義者認為，只有生命中出現(xiàn)死亡，你才能擁有成熟的自我。佛教徒則認為，如果你能讓自己消失，死亡同樣可以。

卡根教授認為兩種觀點都有可取之處，但也含蓄地指出以它們的方式尋求慰藉的危險性。任何尋求佛教式慰藉的人都可能終其一生毫無成就感。而那些尋求存在主義慰藉的人，由于死亡縈繞于心而過著爭分奪秒的窒息生活，生命終結(jié)時會覺得悵然若失寶貴之物。著名的存在主義者蘇斯博士說過：“不要因為已結(jié)束而哭泣，要因為經(jīng)歷過而微笑。”但任何會因經(jīng)歷過而微笑的人都必會在結(jié)束時哭泣。

這將我們帶回伊壁鳩魯?shù)挠^點。這位哲學(xué)家認為，只要人存活于世，死亡必然缺席。但倘若死亡并非真正來臨——真正的死亡不僅指伊壁鳩魯所言的邏輯上的死亡，還指心理即內(nèi)在的死亡——要如何度過一生？我們會活著，正如弗洛伊德所認為的，大多數(shù)人實際上會好好活著，并不真正相信自己會死，卡根教授在提到托爾斯泰筆下的人物伊凡·伊里奇時也寫道，人們認為死亡總是發(fā)生在別人身上。我們大多數(shù)人都像伊凡一樣，會開心地開始新工作、結(jié)交新朋友、制訂新計劃，以期獲得更高的社會地位，即便死亡可能隨時降臨，破壞這一切。我們往往無法擁有完滿的人生，總是冒險留下很多缺憾——這是最令人悲哀的。只要活著，就像死亡并不存在那樣好好生活，這似乎并不能帶給我們慰藉。

或者，看看伊壁鳩魯?shù)牧硪粋€觀點：一旦死亡來臨，我們就不再會活著為死亡擔(dān)憂。如果接受這種慰藉，我們的生活得是什么樣？顯然不是伊凡那樣的。在他死后，他的生活實際上仍不停歇。令他撕裂般痛苦的是這樣一種想法：生前生活的種種——孩子、朋友和事業(yè)——在他死后仍將延續(xù)，或榮或衰，都與他無關(guān)，他既無法分享快樂，也無法施以援手。

為避免這種情況，我們只能遵從詩人弗里德里?！ず蔂柕铝值慕ㄗh（卡根教授引用了他的詩句）：盡情享受“一夏”的歡樂，在體驗人生的高潮后，便會感悟“別無他求”。人生真諦就得自某一時刻，之后便可靜待終結(jié)。如果能做到，就太好了。對大多數(shù)人而言，生活單調(diào)乏味，生不如死。

卡根教授的書最終傳達了這樣一個觀點：對于死亡，沒有單一、普適的慰藉。我們擁有的是選擇的自由，以自己的方式過自己的日子，以此選擇適合自己的慰藉，并知曉如此一來就將放棄其他所有選項。