Witnesses of Tiet efore and After Democratic Reform

Zhang Ning, Huang Weizhong

Astract：At the time when the Tietan Language Class of the Minzu University of China， class of 1954， went to Tiet for their internship from 1958 to 1959， Tiet was experiencing a period of great social upheaval. Under the guidance of the two teachers， Hu Tan and Luosang Duoji， they arrived in Lhasa on the eve of the May 1， 1958， and started their internship. At that time， their internship units included Lhasa No. One Primary School， Lhasa No. Two Primary School， Lhasa Middle School， Tiet Local Cadre School， the Tiet Sports Committee， and so on. However， their internship was interrupted less than half a year after their arrival due to work needs. eginning at that time， they successively participated in a series of work assignments， such as conducting a social and historical investigation of Tiet， identifying prisoners after pacifying the revolt， and assisting democratic reform. Almost everyone was a generalist， and some students were even assigned to stay in Lhasa. It can e said that they witnessed the ups and downs of Tiets history， and their experiences are worth exploring. Therefore， ased on interviews of relevant people， including Hu Tan， Zhang Lan， ian Zhenxun and Liu Renpei， as well as the reminiscences of Lu Liandi and other relevant research articles，? we wrote this article titled A Record of the Internship of the Tietan Language Class of Minzu University of China， Class of 1954， in Tiet .

Key Words：Tiet;democratic reform;the Tietan Language Class;class of 1954;intership

References：

Lu Liandi. wo de xueyu qing （My Passion for the Land of Snow ）. In Chuai Zhenyu，ed. weida de qidian—xinzhongguo minzu dadiaocha jinian wenji （Great Starting Point—A Commemorative Anthology of New Chinas Ethnic Survey）. eijing：zhongguo shehui kexue chuanshe，2007.

Party History Data Collection Committee of Tiet Autonomous Region， Leading Group for Collecting Data on the Party History of the Tiet Military Region， ed. xizang de minzu gaige（Democratic Reform in Tiet）. Lahsa： Xizang renmin chuanshe，1995.

Song Shuhua，Mandu Ertu，ed. zhongguo minzuxue wushinian 1949-1999（Fifty Years of Chinese Ethnology 1949-1999）. eijing：renmin chuanshe，2004.

yonghu guanyu heping jiefang xizang enfa de xieyi（Agreement on the Support of the measures for Peaceful Lieration of Tiet）. In the Peoples Daily， May 27，1951.

Zhu Xiaoming，Zhang Yun，Zhou Yuan，Wang Xiaoin，ed. xizang tongshi·dangdai juan（General History of Tiet·Contemporary Volume[I.]）.eijing：zhongguo zangxue chuanshe，2016.

The Gloal Frontier：Comparative History and the Frontierorderlands Approach in American Foreign Relations

Nathan J.Citino（Author）1; Yuan Jian， Liu Xihong（Translators）2

（1.Department of History， Rice University，Houston ，Texas ，USA;

2.School of Ethnology and Sociology， Minzu University of China，eijing，China）

JOURNAL OF ETHNOLOGY， VOL. 10， NO.2， 27-40， 2019 （CN51-1731/C， in Chinese）

DOI：10.3969/j.issn.1674-9391.2019.02.03

Astract：Historians of American foreign relations would seemingly e well positioned to offer a cuttingedge historical interpretation of Fordlandia to match the rilliance of Sguiglias literary treatment. Persistent calls for methodological innovation， ranging in tone from philippic to jeremiad， have prompted scholars to introduce race， culture， ideology， postmodernism， literary criticism， and gender into their analyses. They have studied nonstate actors and marginalized groups and orrowed from political science， cultural studies， and other disciplines.ut in general， these new approaches to U.S. foreign relations neither challenge the exceptionalist assumptions that have for so long een associated with the field nor provide comparative perspective on the American experience in the world.Recent scholarship on orderlands and frontiers， however， offers historians valuale insights into the nature of cultural encounters and shifting cultural identities， the fringes of states political authority， and the integration of the human and natural resources of peripheral areas into larger systems of economic exchange. Fordlandia serves as a case study of these phenomena， one in which distinctly American notions of Manifest Destiny played an important role， as well as of larger patterns in gloal history that shaped the continental development and overseas expansion of the United States. The diverse group of historians， anthropologists， and area specialists who study orderlands and frontiers do not simply offer scholars of U.S. foreign relations another category of analysis to add to their repertoire. As some historians have already discovered， their approaches point the way toward a transnational history of the United States encompassing oth the unique aspects of the American experience and a gloal， comparative context that enriches our understanding of U.S. history.

Defining “frontier” and “orderland” is a daunting challenge to say the least， given the myriad cases to which scholars have applied these two terms. Frederick Jackson Turner， whose wellknown thesis is a fixture of diplomatic historians lectures， replaced the European concept of frontier as national oundary with his account of the North American frontier as “the meeting point etween savagery and civilization.” Though criticism of Turners ethnocentrism has een nearly universal， and some scholars have questioned his portrayal of the frontier as coming to a close y the 1890s， others have retained his emphasis on cultural encounter within a shifting political geography. In their comparison of the United States and South Africa， for example， Leonard Thompson and Howard Lamar define a frontier “not as a oundary or line， ut as a territory or zone of interpenetration etween two previously distinct societies.” Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron have conceived the North American frontier as “a meeting place of peoples in which geographic and cultural orders were not clearly defined.” Such definitions therefore minimize the importance of the state， whose “sharp edge of sovereignty” had een synonymous with the earlier meaning of “frontier.” Adelman and Aron distinguish the frontier from “orderlands，” which they regard as “contested oundaries etween colonial domains” in North America. Indeed， the term “orderland” can implicitly reinforce the primacy of the state， either y designating the geographic arena for political rivalry among states or y referring to land oth claimed y a state and adjacent to an acknowledged oundary.

Any attempt to hash out an elusive distinction etween “frontiers” and “orderlands” ased upon North American history alone risks on the one hand perpetuating exceptionalist assumptions aout the development of the United States and on the other suggesting that the American experience with frontiers and orderlands is somehow definitive. In this essay， these two concepts are delierately conflated to descrie a road approach to studying relations etween different peoples that regards official diplomacy among sovereign states as only one element in a range of contacts encompassing cultural interaction， economic exchange， human migrations， and environmental transformation. Far from suggesting the irrelevance of the state， the frontierorderlands approach strives for a sophisticated understanding of state power y investigating the degree to which states are successful in expanding their oundaries， imposing their political control over outlying territories， and even defining the identities of those over whom governments claim authority. Such themes， though central to the story of American continental and overseas expansion， were hardly unique to it. In fact， their prevalence across a variety of historical contexts invites comparison and offers a powerful challenge to American exceptionalism.

For those in American foreign relations， it is most profitale to consider the comparative possiilities of the frontierorderlands approach y examining how scholars working in other fields have used it. For U.S. historians， “frontier” and “orderlands” denote particular research specialties. Turner has remained the touchstone for the study of the American frontier West， even as his thesis has sustained successive waves of revision， most recently in the form of a New Western History that has challenged his celeratory account of AngloAmerican settlement and greatly expanded the types of actors and sujects considered part of Westernhistory.Herert E. olton， Turners student， applied his mentors thesis to the parts of northern New Spain incorporated into the territory of the United States and， in the words of one scholar， “virtually created the Spanish orderlands as a field of professional history.”Historians of U.S. foreign relations would do well to uild on comparative themes developed y colleagues working in these two fields – to egin exploring the gloal frontier， as it were， in their own ackyard.

While Turner set regional history in a national context and moved the frontier to the center of American life， these historians connect the West to changes in the capitalist world system and highlight the historical passage of the United States from the economic periphery to the core. These perspectives ring frontier history to the doorstep of the American foreign relations field， which has associated the peripherytocore evolution with expanding foreign interests and with a paradigm shift to a “new” diplomacy， one in which the federal government helped to facilitate overseas economic expansion just as it had shaped the economic and political development of the western frontier. Although diplomatic historians have made productive use of Turners thesis and susequent literature on continental expansion to understand American foreign relations， they have yet to employ a comparative approach to escape emiss exceptionalism in the way that Western historians have to challenge Turners.

Recent scholarship has looked eyond oltons work to the postcolonial United States and Mexico， whose intertwined histories challenge assumptions of sovereignty and independence so central to each countrys national mythology. Andrés Reséndez has reinterpreted the history of the orderlands during the MexicanAmerican War y “paying attention to how the Mexican and the American national projects collided there and how conflicts played out at the local level.” Reséndez examines the use of rituals and political symolism in American and Mexican claims to orderlands territory and explains how local groups responded to such appeals on the asis of selfinterest. Reséndez uses New Mexico as a case study for his approach and shows that while local Spanishspeaking officers and merchants acquiesced in annexation to protect their economic interests， Puelo Indians resisted out of opposition to further land expropriation y Anglos. Colonel Stephen W. Kearny therefore marched into Santa Fe unopposed in 1846， ut soon faced reellion from Taos Puelos. Lisaeth Haass study of California examines the persistence of Native American identities despite conquest y the Spanish in the eighteenth century， the ascendancy of local Californios who defied Mexico City and ostructed Indian emancipation during the period of Mexican independence， and conquest again y the Americans in the midnineteenth century. Rival state uilding enterprises have therefore shaped the history of the orderlands since the retreat of European empires， and scholars are increasingly focusing on how these enterprises

appeared to different local populations.

Certain scholars have comined expertise on the American West and nonU.S. areas into a transnational perspective that situates the United States within the patterns of gloal economic integration. While comparing the American West to other frontiers， these historians regard the North American conquest and the extension of U.S. economic hegemony over peripheral regions of the gloe as elements of a single historical process. William H. McNeill places the frontier at the center of world history y rehailitating Wes Great Frontier concept， though， unlike We， McNeill addresses the experiences of Native Americans y portraying U.S. history as an “extreme case of contact and collision etween societies at different levels of skill.” McNeill regards technological disparities etween cultures as the “principal drive wheel of historical change，” a factor that helps to explain why frontiers are not always the egalitarian settings of Turners thesis. When cashcropping or extractive industries are involved， frontiers are more likely to yield a “social hierarchy steeper than anything familiar in Europe.”Roert Vitalis notes that exceptionalist ideologies justified exploitation of oth the North American mineral frontier of the nineteenth century and the eastern Araian oil frontier of the twentieth， succeeding instances in which U.S. corporations managed extractive enterprises and presided over racial hierarchies. Whereas Manifest Destiny sanctified American expansion into the transMississippi West， Wahhai Islam stamped Gods imprimatur on Saudi custodianship of Araias petroleum， a claim the Saudis advanced with the help of the AraianAmerican Oil Companys pulic relations department and the western novelist Wallace Stegner.Paul Sain has identified similarities among oil frontiers in Alaska， Ecuador， and elsewhere not as parallel case studies， ut as sharing a “direct lineage etween earlier American Wests and later developments” linked y common patterns of corporate expansion， missionary activity， and environmental transformation. For Sain， the story of the West is a transnational epic that cannot e contained within political oundaries， just as frontier history cannot properly e the exclusive domain of either Western or diplomatic historians.

Key Words： America; gloal frontier; foreign relations; comparative

References：

See page 3940 in this journal.

The Expansion of Research on the Types of Chinas Frontiers and

Governance Models in International Perspectives

Xu Fang1，Wu Chuke2

（1.Department of Sociology， School of Law，eihua University， Jilin，132013， Jilin China;

2. Minzu University of China， eijing，100081，China）

JOURNAL OF ETHNOLOGY， VOL. 10， NO.2， 41-48， 2019 （CN51-1731/C， in Chinese）

DOI：10.3969/j.issn.1674-9391.2019.02.04

Astract：Under the guidance of the elt and Road Initiative， Chinas frontier research cannot e conducted y ignoring an international perspective ， and the international perspective should start from two dimensions， i.e. security and development. This means the relationship etween China and its neighoring countries， including oth good and ad aspects; and the level of economic development of countries ordering China， including oth developed and underdeveloped. Within the context of international relations， on the one hand， the degree of development of the ordering countries determines the commercial opportunities that can e provided to various frontier provinces. On the other hand， Chinas relations with neighoring countries have always affected the security and openness of the various frontier provinces. In order to construct a “frontier” for internal and external communication and effectively promote the transformation and upgrading of the social governance of Chinas orderland， this paper theoretically astracts， expands and summarizes the types of Chinas frontier and their governance models. Starting from the internal and external environment， and dimensions of security and development，? and taking into account external international relations， the level of economic development of the ordering countries， the degree of internal social security and the degree of economic development as the asic dimensions for measuring the characteristics of frontiers， this paper classifies 16 types of frontier using the tool of the 4×4 matrix： closed periphery， locked periphery， cooperative periphery， shared periphery， closedrisk， lockedrisk， cooperativerisk， sharedrisk， closedstaile， lockedstaile， cooperativestaile ， sharedstaile， closedcenter ， lockedcenter， cooperativecenter， and sharedcenter types.

1.Closed periphery type. This type of order region has a low degree of development and a low degree of security. It has a poor relationship with the countries ordering the country and the level of economic development of the ordering countries is also relatively low. These areas internal natural environment is poor; infrastructure is ackward; production factors， capital investment， economic development and human capital are all insufficient; they are lacking in external markets and communication channels with external communication， or are in a closed state. As a result， various internal and external economic factors cannot flow and have cooperation， therey creating a negative effect on the level of economic development.

2.locked periphery type. This type of order region has a low degree of development and a low degree of security. It has a poor relationship with the ordering countries， ut the level of economic development of ordering countries is very high. These areas lack various internal development factors， are poor and weak，? and are locked y developed countries. So， they lack external opportunities for economic development.

3.Cooperative periphery type. This type of order region has a low degree of development and a low degree of security. It has good relationships with ordering countries， and the level of economic development of the ordering countries is low.

4.Shared periphery? type. This type of order region has a low degree of development and a low degree of security. It has good relations with ordering countries， and the economic development level of the ordering countries is relatively high.

5.Closedrisk type. This type of order region has a high degree of development and a low degree of security. It has poor relationships with ordering countries， and the? economic development level of the ordering countries is relatively low. Due to aundant natural resources， such as minerals， oil， natural gas， forests and water resources，? resourceased cities or uran agglomerations form in these areas， ringing aout an overall higher level of economic development in the region. At the same time， due to serious internal hierarchical divisions， this type is intertwined with ethnic and religious issues. Concerning external factors， the poor relations with neighoring countries have led to tensions in lockades， confrontations， conflicts and even wars. The separatist forces or religious extremists aroad use internal ethnic， religious， and hierarchical conflicts to create terrorist incidents， causing nontraditional security threats. This kind of internal and external insecurity often leads to a dilemma in economic development， turning economic growth into a “flash in the pan”. In order to maintain economic development， it is necessary to properly handle the relationships etween the countries and deal with the internal contradictions among the people.

6.lockedrisk type. This type of order region has a high degree of development and a low degree of security. It has a poor relationship with the ordering countries， and the economic development level of the ordering countries is relatively high.

7.Cooperativerisk type. This type of order region has a high degree of development and a low degree of security. It has good relations with the ordering countries and the economic development level of the ordering countries is relatively low. Security issues produce a fatal constraint on development.

8.Sharedrisk type. This type of order region has a high degree of development and a low degree of security. It has a good relationship with the countries ordering the country， and the economic development level of the ordering countries is relatively high. Internal security and staility could affect the quality and effectiveness of cooperation. Even if the relationship etween countries is good and the overall economic development of the country is good， the low level of security in the region will create risks for different kinds of cooperation， greatly reduce their effects， and? ring aout high costs for cooperation.

9.Closedstaile type. This type of order region has a low degree of development and a high degree of security. It has a poor relationship with ordering countries， and the level of economic development of the ordering countries is relatively low. In such frontier areas， the natural environment has more restrictive conditions and fewer resources， such as ecologically fragile areas， sparsely populated areas， insufficient or missing economic development factors， insufficient state administrative capacity or low effective investment， ackward transportation facilities and insufficient infrastructure， all of which lead to a low level of economic development. Due to its key geographical location or strategic position in the interstate relations， the states investment in the social staility is very ig.

10.lockedstaile type. This type of order region has a low degree of development and a high degree of security. It has a poor relationship with ordering countries， and the level of economic development of the ordering countries is relatively high.

11.Cooperativestaile type. This type of order region has a low degree of development and a high degree of security. It has good relations with ordering countries， and the level of economic development of the ordering countries is relatively low.

12.Sharedstaile type. This type of order region has a low degree of development and a high degree of security. It has good relations with the ordering countries， and the economic development level of the ordering countries is relatively high.

13.Closedcenter type. This type of order region has a high degree of development and a high degree of security. It has a ad relationship with ordering countries， and the level of economic development of the ordering countries is relatively low.

14.lockedcenter type. This type of order region has a high degree of development and a high degree of security. It has ad relations with ordering countries， and the level of economic development of the ordering countries is relatively high.

15.Cooperativecenter type. This type of order region has a high degree of development and a high degree of security. It has good relations with the ordering countries . The economic development level of the ordering countries is relatively low.

16.Sharedcenter type. This type of order region has a high degree of development and a high degree of security. It has a good relationship with the ordering countries ， and the economic development level of the ordering countries is relatively high.

The sixteen types mentioned aove all are distanced from reality. When any reality is compared with any of the types， the reality is always richer and more vivid. The sixteen types are just a tool for us to understand the reality， and help us to view the status， history and changes of Chinas frontiers dimensionally， stereoscopically， and historically.

The ideal type is the 16th while the other 15 require us to create various conditions， which eventually will enale them to evolve them into the 16th type ， namely “the type with four highs” ， i.e. high economic growth， high social staility， good（high） relations with the neighoring countries， and high economic growth of the ordering countries .? The elt and Road Initiative and the “Community of Human Destiny” concept can create the values and actions of the “SharedCentertype” China frontier on a macro level. However， there will e various changes and twisting paths throughout the actual operation.

y comining international strategy and diplomatic policy， the model for order governance can e classified into six modes： securitycooperation mode， security isolation mode， development cooperation mode， developmentisolation mode， “pendulum” mode and “multiwin sharing” mode.

1. Securitycooperation mode. The main ody of frontier governance adopts the idea of safety as a priority， maintains social staility in the order areas， develops relations with neighoring countries， seeks international cooperation， and then promotes economic development. This model is suitale for areas with sharp internal contradictions， and low social security and staility. It prioritizes security issues， optimizes a series of social security systems and regional security cooperation strategies， constructs a relatively safe internal and external environment， and seeks development and cooperation on the asis of safety.

2.Securityisolation mode. Due to the inaility to reconcile relations with relevant neighoring countries， the frontier governance odies give up improving relations， and even prepare for war. Internally， it prioritizes safety? and maintains? social staility in the order areas. In an isolationist mode， the speed of economic development will slow down. It seeks an internal path open to the frontiers， and uses assistance from the center to share capital， resources， talents， technology and markets in order to complete economic development. This model is conductive to promoting the integration of the order areas with the central areas， and strengthening regional cooperation and internal solidarity within the country.

3. Developmentcooperation model. This model elieves that development is the asolute principle ， so it uses? “development to solve prolems”， strengthens international cooperation， uses all international resources to develop the local economy， continuously improves the living standards of the people，? and resolves ethnic and religious contradictions in the process of development. However， due to the complexity of ethnic and religious issues in the frontier society， this model is only applicale to areas with a stale social foundation.

4. Developmentisolation mode. This model is suitale for the frontier regions where separatist forces are relatively rampant. However， under the isolationist strategy， the development of the economy requires more government investment， higher governance aility， stronger intraregional cooperation， as well as the willingness and aility for communication.

5. “Pendulum” mode. This model reflects a realist way of thinking. The ruling ody will use internal development， security， and external cooperation and isolation as a means of developing the frontier into the “sharedcenter type.” When there are major prolems with internal security， it will take compulsory measures to control social staility. When the situation is stale， it will adopt an “economic supremacy” attitude and strive to develop the economy. Externally， when neighoring countries endanger national security， it will take a series of measures such as isolation， suppression， and lockade to safeguard national interests and never give in. After the national security crisis has passed， it will also work hard to reak the ice and resume cooperation through negotiation and dialogue.

6. “multiwin sharing” mode. This model is generally a longterm national strategy. It refers to the countrys toplevel design for a strategic roadmap for order governance， and implements a “walking with four legs” strategy ased on the frontiers social security， economic development， regional cooperation， and international cooperation.

The aove six models for frontier governance are a theoretical astraction ased on the ideal types of frontiers， and are a general response to the real empirical world. In reality， the choice of governance model will e more diversified， and the considerations will e more limitless and rich， such as international order， national strategies， diplomatic policies， comprehensive strengths， political systems， regional events， natural geographical factors， ethnic and religious cultural factors， economic and social development stages， etc. In order to achieve the goal of uilding a great， prosperous and democratic China， the state will explore different ways and means of governance in different regions in different historical periods. It is the constant exploration， timely corrective action， and old actions that promoted the transformation and upgrading of Chinas order governance model， and the modernization and internationalization of governance capailities.

Key Words： frontier type; order governance model; internal environment; international relations

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