《中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)史·語(yǔ)言與邏輯》選譯（二）

李約瑟 譯注/陳國(guó)華 盧培培

【譯者言】我在2020年發(fā)表的“詩(shī)歌翻譯的五個(gè)公設(shè)、三個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和一個(gè)原則：以《再別康橋》的英譯為例”這篇文章里，提出“可以從原文和譯文的語(yǔ)言、原文和譯文的真值、原文和譯文的美學(xué)價(jià)值這三方面來(lái)比較和判斷譯文的優(yōu)劣”“語(yǔ)言標(biāo)準(zhǔn)首先指譯者須按照原作的語(yǔ)言系統(tǒng)來(lái)解讀作品，解讀的結(jié)果須說(shuō)得通;其次指譯者須按譯作的語(yǔ)言系統(tǒng)（包括規(guī)則和習(xí)慣）來(lái)構(gòu)造譯文”。這里說(shuō)的“規(guī)則”，即文法規(guī)則;“習(xí)慣”，即行文習(xí)慣。拿我最近遇到的一個(gè)中譯英案例來(lái)說(shuō)，“乘2022冬季奧運(yùn)會(huì)的東風(fēng)”最好譯成riding the waves of the 2022 Winter Olympic Games，才符合英文行文習(xí)慣;否則譯成riding the east wind of the 2022 Winter Olympic Games，會(huì)讓英語(yǔ)讀者讀起來(lái)覺(jué)得怪怪的。但將 “東風(fēng)”改成waves，似乎有違真值標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，即譯文和原文須“在語(yǔ)義或所指上相符，相符為真，不相符為假”。不用說(shuō)，“東風(fēng)”和waves，無(wú)論在詞義上還是在所指上，都是兩碼事。

本期譯注的文本里有一個(gè)類(lèi)似的例子，但這一次我的處理方式卻不同。原文里有這樣一句話： Twice the Chinese appear to have been interested in explicit logic for its own sake. 在幾周前的翻譯課上，我為學(xué)生提供的參考譯文將這句話譯為“先后有兩次，中國(guó)人似乎都對(duì)顯性邏輯本身產(chǎn)生了興趣”?？墒亲罱淮畏g課，我讓學(xué)生翻譯亨利·紐曼《大學(xué)之道》（The Idea of a University）的選段，紐曼兩次提到求知的目的，一次是the pursuit of Knowledge for its own sake，另一次是“Knowledge is … an end sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake”。紐曼的闡述讓我對(duì)for its own sake有了更深刻的理解，于是我把李約瑟的話改譯成“先后有兩次，中國(guó)人似乎都因?yàn)轱@性邏輯本身的緣故而對(duì)之產(chǎn)生了興趣”。

我的學(xué)生盧培培在修訂和補(bǔ)充這篇譯注時(shí)，看到我對(duì)原先譯文的修訂，向我提出了一個(gè)令我難以用一言?xún)烧Z(yǔ)回答的質(zhì)疑：為什么“乘東風(fēng)”可以變通地譯成更符合英文表達(dá)習(xí)慣的riding the waves，而interested in explicit logic for its own sake卻不能變通地譯成更符合中文表達(dá)習(xí)慣的“對(duì)顯性邏輯本身產(chǎn)生了興趣”？

對(duì)于這個(gè)問(wèn)題，我將在下一期文章里回答。

FOREWORD （II）

In what had originally been thought of as a slim Volume 6 we now have or shall soon have several volumes1 on such subjects as botany and agriculture with their related studies and technol-ogies， to be followed by contributions2 on things medical and pharmaceutical.

All these were reasonably3 specific and objective. But now， in Volume 7， we return to that most proper4 study of mankind， namely human speech and thought processes， as5 they occurred in China.

I had originally arranged6 with the distinguished logician， Janusz Chmielewski7 of Warsaw University， to write a part of Section 49 in the seventh volume of Science and Civilisation in China， covering Chinese language and Chinese logic， as we then expressed it8. But by September 1983 he had made it clear to us that his own failing eyesight， the illness of his wife， and the sheer physical difficulties9 of living in Poland at that time， made it impossible for him to go beyond10 the first two chapters which he had by then written. This was but the first of many setbacks we received in the writing of Volume 7. Janusz Chmielewski did， however11， recommend that the work should be entrusted to Christoph Harbsmeier. We gratefully followed up this suggestion. Christoph went to see Janusz， and a smooth and cordial handover was arranged12， which the author of this volume refers to on p. 1. We were very sorry that Janusz was unable to bring to a successful conclusion the work to which he had devoted much precious time， but are most grateful to him for ensuring its continuation in the hands of his gifted pupil13.

Christoph Harbsmeier， in writing on Language and Logic in Traditional China， has given us a contribution which is not only erudite in its ability to draw together East and West14， but also stimulating and entertaining. He feels that what logic amounts to is the history of the philosophy of science， and that this should be recognised as central to the intellectual scheme15 in Science and Civilisation in China.

In the pages16 which follow the reader will find many common preconceptions challenged. Early Chinese17， for example， was an isolating18， but not an isolated language. Literary Chinese19 was no vague and poetic language unsuitable for science， provided it was used by a competent scientific thinker. Nor were the Chinese uninterested in logic， explicit or implicit. Twice the Chinese appear to have been interested in explicit logic for its own sake20， once in the Mohist School， and once again with the Chinese Buddhist commentators21， in whose logical minds the ambiguities of Sanskrit were resolved when translated into Chinese. But the Chinese were always more interested in the truth on which assumptions were based than on the verbal machinery for developing these assumptions. Explicit logic did not therefore have that continuously sustained interest which it has received in the West.

Many readers will be anxious to know how Chinese compares for clarity with， say， classical Greek， and will turn to Section （c， 6） on ‘Complexity’， where translations from Plato’s works into Literary Chinese by skilled translators are compared. It would be wrong of me here， however， to anticipate22 the author’s findings.

Granted that Literary Chinese was capable of expressing scientific ideas， what actually happened when it was so used？ This， as the Americans would say， is a whole new ball-game23 for which the reader will have to await a subsequent volume24.

Joseph Needham

Cambridge

9 May 1994

前言（下）

在最初認(rèn)為會(huì)是薄薄的第6卷里，我們已有或很快就會(huì)有幾冊(cè)闡述植物學(xué)、農(nóng)學(xué)及其相關(guān)研究和技術(shù)的書(shū)問(wèn)世，隨后幾冊(cè)闡述醫(yī)學(xué)和藥學(xué)。

所有這些都比較具體和客觀。但在第7卷中，我們回歸到對(duì)人類(lèi)最理所當(dāng)然的研究上，研究人類(lèi)的言語(yǔ)和思想過(guò)程，看它在中國(guó)是怎樣發(fā)生的。

我原本與華沙大學(xué)杰出的邏輯學(xué)家雅努什·赫米耶萊夫斯基商定，由他在《中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)史》第7卷中撰寫(xiě)第49節(jié)的部分內(nèi)容，涵蓋中國(guó)語(yǔ)言和中國(guó)邏輯，就像我們當(dāng)初說(shuō)的那樣。但到了1983年9月，他明確向我們表示，自己視力下降，妻子患病，加上波蘭當(dāng)時(shí)的生活條件十分惡劣，使他無(wú)法在已完成前兩章的基礎(chǔ)上繼續(xù)往下寫(xiě)。這只是我們編寫(xiě)第7卷時(shí)所遇眾多挫折中的第一個(gè)。好在雅努什·赫米耶萊夫斯基提議將這項(xiàng)工作托付給何莫邪。我們心存感激，落實(shí)了這一建議。何莫邪見(jiàn)了雅努什·赫米耶萊夫斯基，二人順利友好地做出了交接安排（本冊(cè)作者在第1頁(yè)提到這一點(diǎn)）。對(duì)于雅努什·赫米耶萊夫斯基無(wú)法完成這項(xiàng)他投入了大量寶貴時(shí)間的工作，我們深感惋惜，同時(shí)我們又對(duì)他感激涕零，因?yàn)樗_保這項(xiàng)工作得以在他這位天分極高的弟子那里繼續(xù)下去。

何莫邪撰寫(xiě)《傳統(tǒng)中國(guó)的語(yǔ)言與邏輯》，成功牽手東西雙方，不僅展現(xiàn)了他的深厚功力和淵博知識(shí)，而且還讓我們深受啟發(fā)，饒有興趣。他認(rèn)為，邏輯學(xué)說(shuō)到底就是科學(xué)哲學(xué)史，而這一點(diǎn)應(yīng)該被視為《中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)史》思想架構(gòu)的核心。

在后面的篇章中，讀者會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)許多先入為主的常見(jiàn)觀念受到挑戰(zhàn)。例如，早期華夏語(yǔ)言雖是孤立語(yǔ)，卻并非一門(mén)被孤立的語(yǔ)言。文言文并不是一種語(yǔ)義模糊、適合詩(shī)歌卻不適合科學(xué)的語(yǔ)言，一切全看是否有一個(gè)有能力、懂科學(xué)的思想家來(lái)駕馭它。中國(guó)人也并非對(duì)邏輯（無(wú)論顯性或隱性）不感興趣。先后有兩次，中國(guó)人似乎都因?yàn)轱@性邏輯本身的緣故而對(duì)之產(chǎn)生了興趣，一次是戰(zhàn)國(guó)時(shí)期的墨家，另一次是漢唐時(shí)期的佛經(jīng)譯注家。在這些譯注家富有邏輯的頭腦里，梵文的歧義在中文譯本中得以澄清。但中國(guó)人更感興趣的總是各種假定所依據(jù)的真理，而不是用來(lái)建立這些假定的言語(yǔ)機(jī)制，因此顯性邏輯在中國(guó)沒(méi)有像它在西方那樣受到持續(xù)不斷的關(guān)注。

許多讀者會(huì)急于知道中文與其他語(yǔ)言（比如說(shuō)古典希臘文）相比，清晰度如何，他們可以馬上翻到本書(shū)闡述“復(fù)雜性”的第（c， 6）節(jié)，這一節(jié)對(duì)翻譯高手用文言文翻譯的柏拉圖著作與原文做了對(duì)比。不過(guò)，我如果在這里劇透作者的發(fā)現(xiàn)，那可就是我的不是了。

既然文言文能夠表達(dá)各種科學(xué)觀念，當(dāng)人們這樣使用文言文時(shí)，實(shí)際情況又如何呢？用美國(guó)人的話說(shuō)，這可是“一項(xiàng)全新的球類(lèi)運(yùn)動(dòng)”。讀者欲知后事如何，只好且聽(tīng)下冊(cè)分解。

李約瑟

劍橋

1994年5月9日