Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi on Yu: Differential Confucian Theories of Yu in Light of the Desire Theory in Contemporary Western Ethics

Liu Yuedi

Abstract： In the terms of Western categorizations of desire， Confuciuss theory of yu （desire） accounts for both its subjective and objective， constituting an integral structure of “desiring benevolence and attaining it，” without a clear choice between good and evil. Menciuss theory of yu， stressing “completing the mind to know ones nature，” is more inclined toward the objective implications of desire. It concerns motivated desire and aims to provide reason for moral actions toward goodness. Xunzi argues that “human nature can be improved through such moral means as ritual，” and his theory basically focuses on subjective and unmotivated desires. Though common human desires are associated with evil， people can be enculturated to good effect by external transformation through ritual and the minds faculty of inclining to goodness. From these different theories there emerge two tendencies： Menciuss top-down model of “good mind—good nature—good emotions，” and Xunzis bottom-up model of “evil emotions—evil nature—good mind.” Early Confucian theories of yu reflect a Chinese “emotion–reason structure，” which trascends the dichotomy of subjective and objective desires and resolves the contradiction between emotionalism and rationalism as well， thus making it possible to return to roots and open a new， integrated approach to such fundamental issues as desire.

Keywords： yu， desire benevolence and attain it， who commands desire is good， human desire shared by all alike

In early Confucian texts， Confucius， Mencius， and Xunzi all dwelt on yu 欲 （desire）， but they each proposed different theories， calling for our discretion when analyzing them. This paper focuses on their theories of yu from the perspective of comparative philosophy. In contemporary Western ethics， the issue of desire has been explored deeply in a brand-new way. The general theoretical logic in its studies is that when we desire X and we believe that we can get X by doing Y， and then we will do Y. However， this analytical philosophical approach is still an instance of rational analysis. In this regard， todays mainstream attempt is to justify internal rational support for desire， which is concerned with the relationship between desire and motivation or motive.

Conceptual Distinction between Motivation and Motive

[Refer to page 81 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]

To the Chinese word dongji 動機， there are in English at least two corresponding words： motivation and motive. Here we make a tentative distinction between them in concept： “motivation” means the intention which causes an act， while “motive” denotes the incentive which actuates an act. The former refers to the intention behind a possible act and the latter， to activating an actual act， so their difference is between the non-actual and the actual in that an internal intention to do something is， after all， not an actual doing of it， and unconscious action is not necessarily in need of conscious intention as its precursor. For the time being， this distinction seems to have become a certain new consensus， though， in China， many general studies of this topic have not made such a distinction within the concept of dongji and consequently lagged behind due to their attachment to the outdated dichotomy of dongji and act.

Having distinguished between the two types of dongji， when we try to match them with types of desire， we find that the value of distinguishing between motivation and motive becomes more salient， which is highly inspirational to us in our attempt to approach emotion from the angle of dongji. For example， in the final analysis， are such emotions as the feeling of compassion， as moral impetus， motivated or actualized？ Probably it involves both at the same time. In this sense， the moral situation of “people suddenly seeing a child about to fall into a well” which Mencius proposes involves potentially intentional desire， for the people intend to save the child. This is a performative action， which aims to realize an act which people intend or desire. But the question is， how on earth can such intention or desire for saving can turn into moral act？ This question has to do with the deep relationship between dongji and desire. In relation to dongji， desire is logically necessary， but its function is yet to be investigated. Here， Thomas Nagel， contemporary American philosopher， gives such a conclusion： “The fact that the presence of a desire is a logically necessary condition （because it is a logical consequence） of a reasons motivating， does not entail that it is a necessary condition of the presence of the reason; and if it is motivated by that reason it cannot be among the reasons conditions.” This conclusion， actually， elevates the position of desire in the moral dongji， and at the same time provides a condition for it. Thus， this suggests that the in-depth relationship between desire and dongji needs requires ultimate distinction and definition.

Classification of Desires： Based on Dongji， Reason， and the Subjective–Objective Dichotomy [82]

Contemporary Western scholars of the philosophy of emotion tend to hold that human emotions are more likely related to motivations rather than motives. Now that motivations and motives have first been distinguished conceptually， how do they match types of human desire？ This involves Nagels basic classification of human desires. Nagel does not agree with David Hume （1711–1776） and his followers， who are of the general opinion that an act must be activated by a desire; rather， Nagel classifies desires into motivated desires and unmotivated desires. He cites an example to illustrate it： Hunger belongs to the unmotivated desires in the sense that the desire which occurs directly in the human body is unmotivated， and when one feels hungry， it is caused by lack of food， but not motivated by it. What then does the motivated desire mean？ If one opens a fridge only to find no food， driven by the feeling of hunger， one will go shopping for food. Such a desire as involves the actors resolution and discretion belongs to motivated desire.

As Nagel considers more comprehensively， “The assumption that a motivating desire underlies every intentional act depends， I believe， on confusion between two sorts of desires， motivated and unmotivated.” In my opinion， this is an important distinction. Informed by the difference between motivated and unmotivated desires， the former corresponding to motivations and the latter to motives. These are the two types of desires defined on the basis of dongji.

The claim that a desire underlies every act is true only if desires are taken to include motivated as well as unmotivated desires， and it is true only in the sense that whatever may be the motivation for someones intentional pursuit of a goal， it becomes in virtue of his pursuit ipso facto appropriate to ascribe to him a desire for that goal.

Therefore， when a desire can activate an act， it must be motivated， and so is a motive. When a desire cannot activate any act， it is unmotivated and so is a motivation， since it cannot turn directly into an action， and this is the fundamental standard for the distinguishing between the two types.

In Nagels famous work The Possibility of Altruism （1979）， he adopts a simpler distinction， namely distinguishing between different types of desires by reference to subjective reason and objective reason. On the basis of this standard， there are simply two types of desires： subjective desires and objective desires. Here Nagel seems to say that subjective desires are defined by personal standpoint and objective desires by impersonal standpoint. As he says， “All of the persons in a situation， and all of the viewpoints， expectations， and conditions of evidence associated with them， fall within a single impersonal conception.” Thus when he refers to “an inability to make practical judgments about other persons in the same sense in which one can make them in ones own case，” this involves the more complicated issue of equality with other persons. In fact， when he clarifies his argumentation for the universality of reason， Nagel is concerned not only with the above-mentioned objective reason， that is， its universality is not subject to person， but also with timeless reason， that is， that universality is not subject to time， and these two aspects can coexist in the same one action.

As regards the classification of desires， Nagels conflict between the subjective and the objective follows Derek Parfits （1942–2017） understanding that “the claims of objectivity are， here， the claims of intersubjectivity.” Nonetheless， this inference involving the person is in fact not wrong. Nagels objectivity is meanwhile a kind of intersubjectivity， for the objective desire is to be realized among the subjects. Regrettably， though， Nagel attributes a certain absolute universality to objective reason， firmly believing that everyone， at their impersonal standpoint， possesses act–activating power， and only in this way can he lay a firmer objective foundation for his so-called “altruism.” This， clearly， serves his ethical argument and The Possibility of Altruism is also a theoretical defense of his proposition that only objective reason can be acceptable. Though to what extent this defense can be effective is still a moot point， Nagels desire classification on the basis of the subjective–objective dichotomy is quite insightful.

Taking in all the above Western arguments， we sum up the types of desire classified on the basis of dongji， reason， and the subjective–objective dichotomy and their correspondences with the types of dongji in the following table.

The purpose of teasing out the desire theories in the Western moral philosophy from the viewpoint of comparative philosophy in the above section is to reflect and review the original texts of Confucianism and， particularly， Confucius， Mencius， and Xunzis theories of yu.

In the received version of the Analects， the Chinese character yu appears 42 times， and in its meaning， it also conveys rich orientations and dimensions. In many places， Confucius uses the character in the sense of “desire，” “wish，” “intend，” and “prefer.” For example， he might say of a given object that “men may not desire to use it，” “the workman， who wishes to do his work well， must first sharpen his tools” （Analects 15：10）， or “Zigong 子貢 （Duanmu Ci 端木賜， 520–456 BCE） intended to do away with the offering of a sheep connected with the inauguration of the first day of each month” （3：17）. Confuciuss use of yu also has to do with speaking. For example he says， “The junzi 君子 （man of noble character） wishes to be slow in his speech and earnest in his conduct” （4：24）， “I would prefer not speaking” （17：19）， and “[Confucius] intended to converse with him” （18：5）. But all these examples are irrelevant to morality.

There are also some passages in the Analects where Confucius uses yu to refer to subjective desires， that is， motivated and reason-following desires. An example is his reference to “pursuing what one desires without being covetous” （20：2）. Confucius opposes inconstant love or hate， and either this love or this hate is related to yu， as illustrated by his saying， “You love a man and wish him to live; you hate him and wish him to die. Having wished him to live， you also wish him to die. This is a case of delusion” （12：10）. When Jikangzi 季康子 （d. 468 BCE）， distressed about the number of thieves in the state， asked him for advice， Confucius said， “If you， sir， were not covetous， though you should reward them to do it， they would not steal” （12：18）. Zhu Xi 朱熹 （1130–1200） annotates that answer from Confucius this way： “It means that if Jikangzi were free of greed and desire， even if he offered rewards to them and encouraged them to steal， they would be conscious of shame and refuse to do it.” This indicates that desire usually is connected with covetousness.

The concept of subjective desire also finds expression in Confuciuss phrase “what the mind （xin 心） desires，” which is of more importance. His well-known saying that “I could follow what my mind desired， without transgressing what was right” （2：4） points to the ultimate realm of moral freedom. However， to ordinary people， such a lofty realm is hardly accessible. So in most cases Confucius talks about desire with an eye to reality. For example， “Riches and honors are what men desire” （4：5）. Here， he affirms the legitimacy of the desire for riches and honors and meanwhile notes that the key to gaining riches and honors is gaining them in the right way. When he says “The junzi does not， even for the space of a single meal， act contrary to benevolence （ren 仁）. In moments of haste， he cleaves to it. In seasons of danger， he cleaves to it” （ibid.）， this refers to a relatively higher level in pursuit of morality. It breaks through the confinement of instinctive desire and meanwhile never deviates from benevolence at any moment. While affirming human desire， Confucius emphasizes the conscious effort to sublimate it. Thus， Qu Boyu 蘧伯玉 “wishes to make his faults few， but he has not yet succeeded” （14：25）， which describes the difficult process of attaining moral sublimation.

There are also some cases in which yu becomes the object of Confuciuss direct denial. They indicate his view of “not desire” （buyu 不欲）. Though “not desire” seems to deny desire， it cannot be understood that simplistically. When Confucius says “not to do to others as you would not desire done to yourself” （12：2）， the point lies in what is the object of that “not desire.” Obviously， the object of the “not desire” is negative， but that of “my mind desired” in the aforementioned phrase “I could follow what my mind desired” is positive. Therefore， the objects in these two examples are not correspondent. This shows precisely that the objects of yu in the Analects may be positive or negative， and even in some contexts whether they are positive or negative is hard to say. Another example is “Zigong said， ‘What I do not desire men to do to me， I also desire not to do to men. The Master said， ‘Ci， you have not attained that” （5：12）. Here， the “not desire” and “desire” are opposite and mutually denying， and whether they refer to positive or negative objects is not clear.

When talking about such a moral quality as firmness， the negative desire and positive firmness are mentioned as a pair of opposites. In the Analects， Confucius is critical of his disciple Shen Cheng 申棖 for possessing desire but not being firm. In his Collected Commentaries on the Analects [論語集注]， Zhu Xi cites Cheng Yi 程頤 （1033–1107） as saying， “If a man has desire， he will be devoid of firmness， and if he is firm， he will not yield to desire.” The interpretation of this point given by Li Zehou 李澤厚 is redolent of Western philosophy. He believes that the “firmness” here refers to the construction of moral will.

Moral will and its power display themselves in perceptual acts and practices， but their connotation lies in “rational cohesion，” that is， reason absolutely dominates and control sensibility （including desire）. This is the foundation for moral reason. Whether it is said as categorical imperative which is external and transcendental or as “manifested intuitive knowledge （liangzhi 良知）” of the internal spirit， it is always characterized by this “firmness.”

In fact， Lis is an over-interpretation， for this interpretation seems more applicable to Menciuss “pursuing goodness （shan 善），” but when concerned with Confucius， it goes too far.

To Confucius， yu is not so strong in appeal to the power of moral will， and this is the very difference between him and Mencius in their theories of yu. Confuciuss “Is benevolence a thing remote？ The moment I desire benevolence， benevolence is at hand” （7：30） is probably the core statement of his “desire for benevolence” （yu ren 欲仁）. But here the yu itself is not clear in regard to its appeal to moral will for doing good and doing away with evil. His “desiring benevolence and securing it” （20：2）， of course， implies knowing the good， and effort in pursuit of loving the good， but it does not possess the performative nature of doing good.

When Confucius， says “Now the man of benevolence， desiring to be established himself， seeks also to establish others; desiring to be enlarged himself， he seeks also to enlarge others” （6：30）， the connection between desire and benevolence lies at the core in that what the person of benevolence desires represents the realm of benevolence lofty and positive， and furthermore， both “desiring to be established himself” and “desiring to be enlarged himself” are for the sake of others. Confucius said only that “I have never seen one who loved virtue （de 德） as he loved beauty” （9：18， 15：13）， which is a statement of an empirical fact， but not only did he never say that “l(fā)oving virtue is like loving beauty，” he also never said that “hating evil is like hating a stench.” The reason is that both loving virtue and hating evil stem from the power of moral will. Wang Yangming 王陽明 （1472–1529） understood intuitive knowledge first as meaning “the sense of right and wrong，” and then he furthered it to “the sense of likes and dislikes，” but this is an inheritance from Mencius.

Menciuss Theory of Yu： ‘Who Commands Desire Is Good [86]

According to the Index of the Mencius [孟子引得]， in the Mencius， there are 95 places where the Chinese character yu 欲 is used. In light of modern desire theory， we find that Mencius is concerned about both subjective and objective desires. “I desire life， and I also desire righteousness （yi 義）. If I cannot keep the two together， I will let life go， and choose righteousness.” （Mencius 6A：10） This means that the reason-providing desire which resorts to moral practice is more valuable than the reason-following desire for life.

In a display of an avalanche-like moral momentum， Mencius expounds the two sides of life and death：

I desire life indeed， but there is that which I desire more than life， and therefore， I will not seek to possess it by any improper ways. I dislike death indeed， but there is that which I dislike more than death， and therefore there are occasions when I will not avoid danger. If among the things which man desires there were nothing which he desired more than life， why should he not use every means by which he could preserve it？ If among the things which man dislikes there were nothing which he disliked more than death， why should he not do everything by which he could avoid danger？ There are cases when men by a certain course might preserve life， and they do not employ it; when by certain things they might avoid danger， and they will not do them. Therefore， men have that which they desire more than life， and that which they dislike more than death. They are not men of distinguished talents and virtue only who have this mental nature. All men have it; what belongs to such men is simply that they do not lose it. （Ibid.）

Life is what people desire and death is what people dislike， but the power of moral emotion renders what people desire more desirable than life and what people dislike more undesirable than death. It is for this reason that a person of virtue never tries to turn to improper ways and avoid danger. To Mencius， this mind beyond life and death is not only owned by sages but should also be possessed by everyone. This indicates that it appeals to a moral universality.

Nevertheless， Mencius， who pursued so high a moral level， does not deny simplistically such basic unmotivated desires of humankind as those for sensual pleasures. He says， “Mens mouths agree in having the same relishes; their ears agree in enjoying the same sounds; their eyes agree in recognizing the same beauty” （6A：7）. Thus， with such low commonality of desires， he argues for the high commonality that everyone has morality， thus forming his manner of perceptual argumentation from the bottom up. In the entire text， Mencius tries to move readers by emotion （qing 情）， and for this purpose he tends to resort to the perceptual power of morality. He always attempts to resolve the problems with yu by virtue. For example， consider this passage：

The possession of beauty is what men desire， and Shun had for his wives the two daughters of Yao，i but this was not sufficient to remove his sorrow. Riches are what men desire， and the kingdom was the rich property of Shun， but this was not sufficient to remove his sorrow. Honors are what men desire， and Shun had the dignity of being sovereign， but this was not sufficient to remove his sorrow. The reason why being the object of mens delight and the possession of beauty， riches， and honors， were not sufficient to remove his sorrow was that it could be removed only by his getting his parents to be in accord with him. （5A：1）

The essential point of Menciuss moral argumentation is his quietly replacing subjective desire with objective desire and turning reason-following desire to reason-providing desire， except that what is followed is instinctive reason and what is provided is moral reason. He makes that turn when he says， “To desire to be honored is the common mind of men. And all men have in themselves that which is truly honorable， only they do not think of it. The honor which men confer is not good honor” （6A：17）. What on earth does his “good honor” mean？ It requires moral sublimation as displayed by laying down ones life for righteousness， so that mens appeal to morality can be as natural as their satisfaction of their physiological desires.

Owing to such a moral requirement， Mencius， indeed， shows a certain tendency to restrain desire （jie yu 節(jié)欲） but not to eradicate desire （jue yu 絕欲）. “To nourish the mind， there is nothing better than to make the desires few. Here is a man whose desires are few—in some things he may not be able to keep his heart， but they will be few. Here is a man whose desires are many—in some things he may be able to keep his heart， but they will be few.” （7B：81） This indicates the dialectical relationship between the mind and yu in Menciuss sense. Even his remark， “l(fā)et a man not do what his own sense of righteousness tells him not to do， and let him not desire what his sense of righteousness tells him not to desire—to act thus is all he has to do” （7A：17）， is often elevated by interpreters as acting against the mind. In Collected Commentaries on the Mencius [孟子集注]， Zhu Xi cites Li Yu 李郁 （1086–1150） as saying，

Not to do and desire something is what everyone has a mind to. However， when private intention stirs yet cannot be restrained with propriety and righteousness， there will be not a few who do what their own sense of righteousness tells them not to do and desire what their sense of righteousness tells them not to desire. If such mind can subdued， then in enlarging the mind for the sense of shame and dislike， righteousness can be inexhaustible. That is why Mencius says it and nothing more.

In fact， the original intention of Mencius comes closer to meaning nothing more than that men shall not do what they should not do and not accept what they should not accept. And there is not necessarily a call for sublimating the mind in all cases.

Unlike Confuciuss concern with the desire for benevolence， Menciuss main moral concern is the desire for goodness （yu shan 欲善）. He believes that “a man who commands desire is what is called a good man” （7B：25）. The “commanding desire” implies a very clear moral orientation， for inside it there must dwell the power of moral will which takes effect. First， knowing what is good and what is not good is the necessary condition for pursuing goodness. Second， turning from knowing to doing requires the impetus for doing goodness. Third， only with the ability to love goodness can the moral realm be elevated step by step. Mencius says，

A man who commands his desire is what is called a good man. He whose goodness is part of himself is what is called a genuine man. He whose goodness has been filled up is what is called beautiful man. He whose completed goodness is brightly displayed is what is called a great man. When this great man exercises a transforming influence， he is what is called a sage. When the sage is beyond our knowledge， he is what is called a spirit-man. （7B：25）

In this upward logical progress from goodness to realness， beautifulness， greatness， and sagehood to spirit， though the desire for goodness lies at the bottom， it serves as the most fundamental impetus， which can be traced back to the Four Beginnings （siduan 四端） of the mind expounded in the Mencius. In the Analects， there is also a collocation of desire and good： “In carrying on your government， why should you use killing at all？ Let your evinced desires be for what is good， and the people will be good” （Analects 12：19）. But here “desires” refers to specific good acts of avoiding killing， so it is quite conceptually different from Menciuss strong appeal to the will toward goodness.

Therefore， the dominant use of yu in the text of the Mencius implies a strong inclination to goodness. This is true of either his saying “I desire to rectify mens minds” （Mencius 3B：9） or his dictum that “if a man can give full development to the mind which makes him shrink from intending to injure others， his benevolence will be more than can be called into practice” （7B：31）. The reason for either is nothing but the desire for goodness.

Xunzis Theory of Yu： ‘Human Desire Shared by All Alike [87]

According to the Index of the Xunzi [荀子引得]， the character yu 欲 appears in the Xunzi 236 times. This is a rather high number as far as pre-Qin classics go， but the concept of the character therein is much thinner. In the Xunzi， yu is not associated indirectly with benevolence， nor directly with goodness， but rather it has to do with evil and emotion. I once noted that， in contrast to evil which has only breadth but not depth， goodness has depth and diversity. Compared with Confuciuss yu and Menciuss yu， Xunzis yu is conceptually simpler and also enters necessarily into connection with human nature （xing 性）， which needs the mind for its normative guidance.

Let us first look at Xunzis logic from nature and emotion to yu. He says，

Nature is a consequence of Heaven. Emotions are the substance of that nature. Desires are the resources of nature. Seeking what is desired is the response of the emotions. When what is desired is judged to be obtainable， it will be pursued. That is a necessary and inescapable part of our essential nature. Judging it possible and leading the way to it is where the intelligence must come into play. Thus， even though one was a mere gatekeeper， one could not get rid of his desires， for they are what nature possesses.

After Menciuss saying that “to enjoy food and delight in colors is nature” （6A：4）， this is also an early thought which affirms the existence and legitimacy of desire. However， Xunzi here does not， as claimed by his interpreters， treat desire as nature， for to link desire with nature requires the intermediate link of emotion， and in addition the mind functions to provide normative guidance to the progression of “nature–emotion–desire.” To put it from the opposite side， according to the developmental logic from desire to emotion and then to nature， it is what Xunzi sees as evil desire that carries with it evil emotion and then evil nature， but good mind causes “evil nature” to be altered. That is to say， desire enables human beings to undergo a transformation of nature and strive toward what is good. This is different from Menciuss “extending nature to the utmost and taking delight in doing what is good.” The difference between them is， at the same time， the very point where they can come into unity.

Despite the conceptual thinness of Xunzis yu， his exposition of the objects involved in subjective desire is considerably rich. In “Contra Physiognomy” [非相]， he affirms empirically the basic levels of humans yu like adequate or ample food and clothing as well as relaxation， believing them to be being inborn desires. On this basis， humans have various desires for both external and internal enjoyment.

It is the essential nature of man that his eyes desire the most intense of colors， his ears the riches of sounds， his mouth the most intense of flavors， his nose the riches of aromas， and his mind the fullest relaxation and repose. Desiring these five limits of intensity is something the essential nature of man cannot escape. （Xunzi， “Of Kings and Hegemons” [王霸]）

Thus Xunzi connects desire and emotion directly. In addition， to him even the spiritual yu is also utilitarian. Being “fond of glory and sick of disgrace” （“Of Honor and Disgrace” [榮辱]）， chasing fame and honor， hankering for power， and grabbing high positions are all objects of “fondness” for Xunzi.

However， this inborn desire of humans can become the impetus for the origination of rites （li 禮） from the opposite side.

How did rites arise？ I say that men are born with desires which， if not satisfied， cannot but lead men to seek to satisfy them. If in seeking to satisfying their desires men observe no measure and apportion things without limits， then it would be impossible for them no to contend over the means to satisfy their desires. Such contention leads to disorder. Disorder leads to poverty. The ancient kings abhorred such disorder; so， they established the regulations contained within ritual and moral principles in order to apportion things， to nurture the desires of men， and to supply the means for their satisfaction. They so fashioned their regulations that desires should not want for the things which satisfy them and goods would not be exhausted by the desires. In this way the two of them， desires and goods， sustained each other over the course of time. This is the origination of rites. Thus， the meaning of rites is to nurture. （“Discourse on Rites” [禮論]）

Thus the interrelation between desires and materials is where rites arose， and thereby rites could regulate by nurturing. To Xunzi， the key to this process is progressing from desires to the Way （dao 道）.

The junzi enjoys obtaining proper instruction; the lesser men enjoy obtaining what they desire. When music is used to guide and regulate the desires， there is enjoyment but no disorder; when it is used for the desires with no thought of guidance， there is delusion but no enjoyment. （“Discourse on Music” [樂論]）

The Way， to sages， begins from the mind： “The sage follows his desires and fulfills his emotions， but having regulated them， he accords with rational principles of order. . . . This is the Way of putting the mind in order” （“Dispelling Blindness” [解蔽]）.

Therefore， to Xunzi， from mind to emotion and then to desire， an association forms so that mind regulates emotion and nurtures desire. “Order and disorder lie in what the mind permits and not with the desires that belong to our essential nature.” （“On the Correct Use of Names”） Though this is said from the angle of the consequentialism of governing a state， its key point lies in the distinction between the positive side of what the mind permits and the negative side of the overflowing desire for emotions. “That the occurrence of desire does not depend on its objects first being obtainable is a quality we receive from nature. That what we seek to satisfy our desires b following after what is possible is what we receive from the mind.” （Ibid.） What the mind in Xunzis sense possesses is mainly the rational connotation of consideration， which means that the perceptualization of the a priori desire demands its selection and governance by depending on the rationalization of the a posteriori mind.

On the whole， Xunzis theory of yu belongs mainly to the subjective desires， that is to say， to the unmotivated desires with no calling for self-reflection， which follows common physiological and psychological desire. As regards this sort of emotion and desire with commonality， Xunzi says，

To be as honored as the Son of Heaven and to be as wealthy by possessing the whole world—this natural human desire is shared by all alike. But if all men give free rein to their desires， the result would be impossible to endure and the material goods of the whole world would be inadequate to satisfy them. Accordingly， the Ancient Kings acted to control them with regulations， rites， and moral principles in order thereby to divide society into classes. （“Of Honor and Disgrace”）

It is by means of rites that Xunzi regulates emotion and desire， rather than aiming for sublimation from the level of yu. By contrast， Mencius replaces objective desire from the inside with the subjective desire， transforming reason-following desire into reason-providing desire. This difference is concerned with the more fundamental difference between Menciuss approach of “thinking about nature in terms of mind” and Xunzis approach of “mind regulating nature and emotion.”

Conclusion： The Emotion–Reason Structure Inherent?in Human Desire [88]

By applying an approach informed by comparative philosophy and drawing on contemporary Western ethics， we have interpreted the theories of yu of Confucius， Mencius， and Xunzi in attempt to find a possible path through the jungle of early Confucian texts. Obviously， in Western ethics the dichotomies of subjective–objective， unmotivated–motivated， and reason-following and reason-providing desires are based on subject–object dualism， and in each of these dichotomies the two sides are split. However， such a split between desires does not exist in Confuciuss theory of yu at all， nor does it play a role in Mencius or Xunzi. Though Mencius always tries to turn subjective desire into objective desire， Xunzi focuses only on subjective desire， which he makes an internal specific differentiation. In my opinion， these dichotomies do nothing but describe the basic tendencies of human desires. In each of them， one type has to do with instinct， with no need of any reason， and the other is subject to moral sublimation. The former， naturally， is dominated by sensibility （though also involving potential reason）， and the latter seems to be dominated by reason （though also imbued with emotion）， thus forming an internal tension between emotion and reason. What the emotion–reason structure which Chinese thought contributes to the world aims for is the original integration and mutual penetration between the two sides.

Confuciuss yu contains a connotation of subjective desire， but his “following what the mind desires” also displays implications of objective desire. Upon examination， we can say that his theory constitutes an integral structure of “desiring benevolence and securing it，” without calling for a clear choice between good and evil. Menciuss yu more often implies objective desire， for his intuitive knowledge and intuitive ability （liangneng 良能） resort to the moral will of desiring in order to do what is the good. Xunzis yu is basically subjective in connotation. Though the desires shared by all humans connect with evil， they can be refined by external transformation through rites and awareness of the minds capacity for good. Generally speaking， the yu that Mencius expounds is motivated desire， and it is the objective desire which should provide reason for moral actin in pursuit of goodness. The yu that Xunzi dwells on is unmotivated desire， and it is the subjective desire which causes the moral act toward evil and therefore is reason-following desire. Confucius falls between them， as his concept of yu， though not transcendentally attaining a realm free of good and evil， does not give a clear direction in regard to good and evil. Stemming from such plural possibilities are the Mencian and Xunzian tendencies toward good and evil desires： Menciuss top-down model of “good mind—good nature—good emotions” and Xunzis bottom-up model of “evil emotions—evil nature—good mind.”

Early Confucian theories of yu reflected a Chinese wisdom paradigm with their own emotion–reason structure. This structure not only goes beyond the dualism of subjective and objective desires but also resolves the contradiction between emotionalism and rationalism as well， thus making it possible to return to the root and develop a new， integrated approach to such fundamental issues as human desire.

Bibliography of Cited Translations

Knoblock， John， trans. Xunzi [荀子] （Chinese–English version）. 2 vols. Library of Chinese Classics [大中華文庫]. Changsha： Hunan Peoples Publishing House; Beijing： Foreign Languages Press， 1999.

Legge， James， trans. Analects. http：//ctext.org/analects， accessed August 15， 2021.

———. Mencius. https：//ctext.org/mengzi， accessed August 15， 2021.

Translated by Wang Xiaonong