Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests in the New Era:China’s Concept and Practice

Xu Ping

As China is ushering in a new era of national development， the global environment is becoming increasingly volatile. Faced with a complex situation in the adjacent maritime waters， the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China （CPC）， with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core， has put forward a farsighted and important strategic plan to transform China into a maritime power， including a series of concepts and practices specifically intended to safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests in the new era. A comprehensive analysis and summary of these concepts and practices will not only clarify what these rights and interests are， but it also bears theoretical and practical significance to correctly understand the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and the Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy， and better safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.

Theoretical Foundation of Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests in the New Era

Since its 18th National Congress， the Communist Party of China， under the leadership of Comrade Xi Jinping， has accurately grasped the laws and trends of international maritime politics， and summarized domestic and international experience in the protection of maritime rights and interests. China’s concept of safeguarding maritime rights and interests in the new era takes into account both the missions of China’s maritime rights protection and the national development strategy， and coordinates internal and international imperatives. The strategy is in line with the trend of the times and China’s national interests， and hence is highly relevant and utmost forward-looking.

The development of international maritime politics

In the modern times， all great powers that ever ruled the world have dominated the oceans to achieve power and fortune， based on their business boom and industrial advantage. From the end of the 15th century to the middle of the 17th century， relying on their maritime supremacy， Portugal， Spain， and the Netherlands successively rose to be the world’s predominant commercial empires. Subsequent history shows us that the United Kingdom， France， the United States， and Japan have also built up strong maritime fleets to penetrate the oceans and gradually become regional or even global powers.

In the 21st century， the world has entered an era of comprehensive and effective utilization of the maritime sphere， prompting all countries to increasingly focus on making use of the oceans to develop their economies and expand their strategic interests. Xi Jinping has proven his keen grasp of the trend of world history and his insights into the development of international maritime politics， pointing out that throughout the history of the world economy， an obvious development trajectory is from the inland to the ocean， from the ocean to the world， and towards prosperity，1 and that the ocean-oriented path is significant in a nation’s development.2 Xi understands how crucial the ocean is to national development in the 21st century. “The ocean now plays an even more important role in the country’s economic development pattern as well as the process of opening up to the world. It has a more prominent position in safeguarding national sovereignty， security and development interests， becomes more influential in the national construction of ecological civilization， and achieves a rising status in international political， economic， military and technological competition.”3 This appreciation of the ocean’s importance has naturally increased the significance of safeguarding and expanding the country’s maritime rights and interests.

Chinese ideas on sea power in modern times

Traditionally， China attached a higher priority to its land area rather than to the ocean， which was regarded only as a natural barrier against foreign invasion. Thus， any development and utilization of the ocean has long been limited to the immediate benefits from fishing， salt-making， and as a convenient means for transport. During the Ming Dynasty， as a result of Zheng He’s voyages to the West and the nation’s actions to defend against Japanese pirates， China’s awareness of sea power began to take root. Zheng He emphasized： “In pursuing prosperity， our country shall not disregard the importance of the ocean. It generates wealth， but also incubates dangers. Thus， once the Nanyang （Southeast Asia） is seized by another king， China will be in jeopardy.” Also， military generals of the Ming Dynasty on the frontline against Japanese pirates， such as Yu Dayou， Qi Jiguang and Hu Zongxian， introduced national defense ideas such as “fighting the enemy from the sea” and “defending the ocean， strengthening coastal defense， and safeguarding the city，” which suggests a growing awareness for the need of generating stronger naval capabilities.

Nevertheless， in the years after the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras of the Qing Dynasty， the border defense of China was still abruptly shattered by the invasion of Western colonial powers from the ocean. In response to the maritime threat posed by the Western colonialists， China was forced to engage more with the sea rather than turn its back on it. During that time， a number of visionary Chinese thinkers have realized the crucial importance of developing sea power for the pursuit of overall national strength. Wei Yuan， as an outstanding representative of the first intellectuals in modern China to“open their eyes and understand the world，” proposed to establish a new-type navy， develop manufacturing and shipping industries， cultivate the Southeast Asian region and establish governorship of outlying prefectures there， and advance people’s maritime awareness.4 Starting with Wei Yuan， many Chinese officials in favor of Westernization， such as Li Hongzhang， Shen Baozhen and Ding Richang， advocated vigorous development of the navy to foster sovereign defense. Zhang Zhidong even suggested that for China， development demands the ocean which cannot be safeguarded without a proper navy.

After a disastrous defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War， a new concept of sea power was born in China. In 1903， Liang Qichao published an article entitled “On the Pacific Sea Power and China’s Future，” stating： “Striving for national sea power is a prerequisite for manifesting our strength in the world.” In 1905， the Oriental Magazine reprinted an article published by the Eastern Times， titled “Revitalizing the Navy，” in which the author wrote：“Since the 19th century， the trend of sea power competition generated in the Atlantic Ocean has gradually shifted into the Pacific Ocean， and ambitious countries are struggling against each other around the central point of northern Pacific Ocean. Thus， the Oriental fleets of these countries are rushing into the region.… The relative power of the fleets will determine the ultimate settlement of the sea power competition in which China is the absolute focus.”5

At that point a number of policy-making officials had also realized the critical importance of fighting for greater sea power. In 1907， Yao Xiguang， who was in charge of drawing up plans of rebuilding the navy for the Qing government， pointed out that “the coastline of China extends across seven provinces. Without naval control， our sea power shall be lost.”6 In the following year， he outlined in the preface of his Discussion on Building the Navy， “The world is interconnected by the sea. If we are lacking the capability of reaching far waters， we shall be unable to defend ourselves in near oceans.” And he campaigned for the purchase of cruisers as a means to cover long distances at sea.7

As another insightful proponent of greater control over the seas in the early 20th century， Sun Yat-sen， the remarkable forerunner of China’s democratic revolution， declared： “Since the world changed fundamentally， the power of a nation has been generally determined by its power over the sea rather than on the land， which means one having stronger sea power shall achieve advantages in the competition of national strength.… The Pacific issue is in essence one about global sea power.… The future Pacific issue is essential to the survival of the Chinese nation and the destiny of our nation-state. China is the focus of the Pacific Ocean， and thus striving for sea power in the Pacific is striving for access to China. Whoever holds this portal will have the majesty and treasure of this region. As ambitious nations are fighting for controlling us， how can we cover our eyes and care nothing？”8 Sun Yat-sen had conducted detailed studies of the maritime competition among world powers at the time. His analysis concluded： “The navy is the foundation of prosperity and strength. That is why the British and Americans commonly say that the one who dominates the ocean controls the world trade， the global wealth， and thus the entire world.”9 Guided by this understanding， Sun Yat-sen put forward the idea of comprehensively utilizing the ocean， fighting for sea power and strengthening naval building. These proposals should then be incorporated into the overall national development strategy in an effort to control the ocean through naval development， and enhance China’s national strength by vigorously utilizing the ocean.

In the course of modern Chinese history it has been proven beyond doubt that a nation’s maritime rights， as well as its national sovereignty， security and development interests are in jeopardy without the support of strong sea power. Although the Chinese people have increasingly come to realize the importance of sea power in this period， China has been unable to sufficiently protect its maritime rights and interests， let alone implement the progressive ideas on sea power， due to internal and external frictions， poverty and other weaknesses. But the vision of becoming a fully viable sea power has undoubtedly influenced generations of Chinese who have continued to dream of revitalizing China.

Ideological continuity of safeguarding maritime rights and interests in New China

Based on the legacy and continuity of strategic thought by successive generations of the CPC leadership， China’s concept of safeguarding maritime rights and interests in the new era accurately grasps the general development trend in the new era and the specific development direction of global maritime strategy， in conjunction with the country’s situation concerning maritime rights protection.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China， successive generations of leaders have attached great importance to the construction of China’s maritime power and the protection of its maritime rights and interests. On January 1， 1950， Mao Zedong wrote an inscription for the inaugural issue of the People’s Navy： “We must build a navy that can safeguard our coastal defenses and effectively resist possible imperialist aggression.”10 In 1951， Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhou Enlai issued a statement in response to the United States-led drafting of a peace treaty with Japan that undermined China’s sovereign interests. He wrote：“The inviolable sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over Nanwei Island and the Xisha Islands， regardless of whether or not the United States and the United Kingdom have relevant provisions on the draft peace treaty with Japan， are not affected in any way.”11 In 1958， in accordance with international documents including the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea adopted at the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea， and taking into account China’s own national conditions， Mao proposed a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and convened international law experts to study territorial waters and other issues.12 On September 4， 1958， the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress approved the Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea. In 1974， in accordance with Mao Zedong’s instructions， the Chinese Navy launched a self-defense counterattack against the South Vietnamese forces that had invaded the Xisha Islands and retook the occupied islands and reefs， restoring China’s territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.

In the era of reform and opening-up， Deng Xiaoping defined China’s marine development strategy from the perspective of accelerating domestic economic construction. He pointed out： “The ocean is not a moat. At present， countries in the world are vying to lay heavier stress on the ocean in areas including science and technology， economic development and deterrence strategies. We have to take it seriously. In the path of moving forward to prosperity， China must embrace the world as well as the ocean.”13 In terms of military security， Deng put forward the strategic concept of offshore defense. He stressed that China’s coastal defense forces “must be stronger and improve their capabilities.”14 He added： “We don’t need too much power， but it has to be refined with truly advanced technologies.”15 For the aspect of economic development in his maritime strategy， Deng Xiaoping proposed a policy of “opening up coastal areas， developing offshore resources and exploiting the open sea.”

In order to achieve the above goals， Deng Xiaoping approved a major program of “clarifying China’s maritime territories， marching into the development of the Pacific， Indian and Atlantic Oceans， and set our foot on the Antarctica，” thus laying the foundation for China’s maritime development beyond the coastal waters. Faced with an array of deep-rooted territorial disputes， Deng made a series of new proposals that would put aside old disagreements and seek common development. His approach not only eased tensions and won China a favorable international environment for reform and opening-up and economic construction， but it also became China’s primary policy to resolve the Diaoyu Islands dispute in the East China Sea and the territorial issues in the South China Sea.

Although Deng Xiaoping emphasized the absolute necessity of a peaceful environment for building a stronger domestic economy， he would never compromise on safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. He stressed that “sovereignty is not an issue that can be discussed，”16 and further declared： “We will never invade an inch of land of other countries， at the same time， we have no tolerance for any violation upon our sacred territories， territorial waters and airspace.”17 On March 14， 1988， in order to repel Vietnam’s provocative actions and demonstrate China’s determination to safeguard its sovereignty， the Chinese Navy was forced to fight back in self-defense， inflicting severe damage to many Vietnamese warships， and successively regaining Yongshu Reef， Chigua Reef， Huayang Reef， Dongmen Reef， Nanxun Reef and Zhubi Reef.

In the 1990s， Jiang Zemin defined the issue of maritime security from the vantage point of national development and national rights and interests. He believed that maritime security not only refers to traditional security such as military and political security， but also includes non-traditional fields such as the security of the maritime economy and culture， marine scientific and technological security， and marine ecological security. Jiang proposed to enhance China’s comprehensive management capabilities of marine resources， and improve maritime laws and regulations， emphasizing that “we must understand the ocean from a strategic perspective and strengthen the nation’s awareness of the ocean.”18

In the 21st century， Hu Jintao followed the development concept of creating a harmony of interests on the ocean. He argued： “Promoting the construction of a harmonious ocean is an important part of building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.”19 In addition to emphasizing the need for a vigorous development of the marine economy， he also urged that China should build defense capabilities in the open sea， and， “strive to forge a powerful People’s Navy that meets the requirement of fulfilling our military’s historical missions in the new century.”20

International practices of safeguarding maritime rights and interests

The protection of maritime rights and interests is closely related to the expansion of sea power， as the world’s major maritime countries are all actively maintaining and expanding their maritime rights and interests. Since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea （UNCLOS） came into effect， countries have spent more and more efforts on studying and interpreting relevant provisions in order to obtain a legal underpinning for their respective maritime claims. Global competition is especially noticeable in the pursuit of so-called “residual rights，” which are rights that have not been expressly stipulated or prohibited by modern law of the sea， or UNCLOS.21 As a product of compromise， mutual concessions and consensus in negotiations， the international law of the sea inevitably contains some gray areas and is evolving dynamically. However， certain countries take advantage of these ambiguous elements to actively expand their maritime rights and interests. In the 21st century， more than 20 countries have seized the opportunity and successively issued maritime strategies and policies to strengthen their control and utilization of the ocean. It is noteworthy that although some countries use the ambiguities of relevant UNCLOS provisions to challenge China’s maritime claims， these developments also provide new ideas for safeguarding maritime rights and interests.

Contemporary Context of Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests in the New Era

Great ideas cannot be separated from the specific era from which they have emerged. Thus， China’s concept of safeguarding maritime rights and interests in the new era is the product of an accurate comprehension of both the trend of the times and China’s own development stage.

International maritime competition and cooperation in the new era

With the deepening of people’s understanding， utilization and protection of the ocean， the ability by nations to control the maritime domain and gain dominance over marine affairs has increasingly become the object of competition among countries， and has thus turned into an important factor that can determine the rise or decline of comprehensive national power in the 21st century. Therefore， the 21st century is referred to as the maritime century， in which the ocean is considered the new arena of international strategic competition. Although the navies of major powers are still conducting military exercises as if in preparation of large-scale wars， and are competing in a fierce arms race， nuclear deterrence among major powers has significantly constrained the outbreak of hot wars. It is now increasingly difficult to change the status quo by military means. Achieving military hegemony on the sea is no longer the main objective of any current and future navy.22 In addition， with the evolution of international politics and economic globalization， the main role of maritime military forces is deterrence rather than actual combat. Deterrence， maritime control， power projection， and maritime defense are the main functions of any future maritime power. A Chinese scholar put it this way： “In today’s world， the struggles between nations over maritime rights and interests are increasingly showing some new features. The competition for controlling the ocean is primarily in pursuit of economic interests rather than serving military objectives. The fight for marine regions and maritime channels of strategic importance in the past has transformed into contention around the sovereignty of islands， the jurisdiction over certain waters as well as the control of marine resources. And the actors of maritime struggles have changed from big powers to coastal countries， especially developing countries， which have been unprecedentedly involved in securing their national maritime rights and interests.”23 Although the struggles for maritime rights and interests may still lead to conflicts and even wars， more can be settled by peaceful negotiations and consultations. Judging by the practice of international maritime politics in recent years， despite various tensions involving the territorial claims and disputes of some countries， there have erupted almost no large-scale armed conflicts， proving that peaceful settlement or reconciliation of maritime disputes is feasible.

The ocean is an essential element in the healthy development of countries and the global economy， and maritime cooperation has become an international trend. In the process of developing and utilizing the ocean， problems such as large gaps in the level of development and unbalanced capabilities between countries have become apparent， which require cooperation in capital， technology， markets， and talents to achieve complementary advantages. The vast majority of developing countries urgently need relevant support from industrialized nations in the area of ocean development and utilization， to compensate for their technological weakness and financial shortage. In addition， non-traditional maritime security challenges are posing a threat to the potential development and utilization of marine resources. In the era of globalization， a single country on its own would be unable to resolve all the complex challenges that arise with natural disasters， piracy， and organized crimes at sea. In fact， the international community has demonstrated a spirit of cooperation in response to the Somalian piracy and to the Indian Ocean tsunami， fostering a general trend for enhanced cooperation among countries.

The current international maritime system is evolving from one of mere coexistence to one featuring cooperation. First， the prevailing international maritime order focuses more on economic activities and market principles， suggesting a noticeable shift from just balancing political relations between countries towards an expansion of economic relations. By way of example， the establishment and evolution of the international seabed development system reflects a crucial， albeit difficult， beginning of joint resources exploitation by developed and developing countries； in addition， the open seas fishery agreement has also witnessed significant improvement， especially the achieved cooperation between countries in terms of their obligations to protect natural habitats. Second， the norms of maritime cooperation are gradually unified and systemized. Today’s maritime cooperation norms have not only involved almost all aspects of ocean-related issues， but， through the formulation and implementation of UNCLOS principles and rules， have become more standardized and systemized. In view of this general trend， China， in safeguarding its due maritime rights and interests， should always strive to resolve disputes through negotiation and consultation and thereby create a favorable environment for maritime cooperation.

Rising pressure on China to safeguard maritime rights and interests in neighboring waters

Due to a decline in national power and a lack of maritime awareness in recent modern history， many China’s islands and reefs have been occupied by foreign countries， many of which have not yet been recovered. At the same time， China and some neighboring countries have conflicting claims over exclusive economic zones and continental shelves， resulting in several maritime delimitation disputes. In the East China Sea， there is an issue between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands and the delimitation of the continental shelf. In the South China Sea， China and some ASEAN countries have considerable disagreements concerning the territorial sovereignty of related islands and reefs and maritime delimitation. In the second decade of the 21st century， some of China’s neighboring countries， taking advantage of the United States’ “Pivot to Asia” strategy， have been consolidating or expanding their illegal occupation of Chinese islands and reefs in an attempt to permanently “l(fā)egitimize” their occupation. China has no choice but to resolutely fight back against any infringement on its territorial integrity. However， some Western countries such as the United States have been manipulating international public opinion by misinterpreting the “rules-based international order” and portraying China’s legitimate actions to secure its maritime rights and interests as“expansionism” and “endangering freedom of navigation.” Also， some neighboring countries are worried about China’s potential use of force in resolving maritime disputes， and have doubts whether China might follow the old path of regional hegemony. Therefore， the activities related to the protection of maritime rights and interests have become a major issue affecting China’s diplomatic relations with both neighboring countries and other major powers.

As a result of interventions by the United States， the disputes over the sovereignty of islands and reefs and over maritime rights and interests between China and its neighboring countries have escalated into fierce competition for sea power， and for control of the maritime order and regional security architecture between China and the US in the West Pacific. In order to prevent China from challenging its hegemonic interests， the US has on the one hand strengthened its forward military presence in the AsiaPacific to “deter” China in terms of military strength； and on the other hand， it is constantly attacking China’s maritime positions to suppress its influence on the building of international maritime institutions. In recent years， the US has actively promoted the construction of naval bases and military installations in the West Pacific， frequently conducted “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea， and used arms sales， military assistance， and joint exercises to enhance the joint combat capabilities of its Asia-Pacific allies and partners. The US has not only heavily interfered in the maritime disputes between China and its neighboring countries， but also deliberately incited these countries to take a hard line against China. This has strongly affected the management and resolution of disputes， subverted China’s maritime rights and interests protection efforts， undermined cooperation between China and its neighboring countries， and created unwarranted obstacles for the promotion and construction of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

China’s maritime power strategy and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

At its 18th National Congress， the CPC proposed to transform China into a maritime power. The 19th CPC National Congress reaffirmed the target of pursuing coordinated land and marine development and stepping up efforts to build China into a strong maritime country. This strategy is a direct manifestation of the CPC central leadership to attach great importance to maritime affairs. Therefore， the protection of maritime rights and interests naturally rises to the level of a national objective.

The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is a major initiative delivered by President Xi Jinping during his visit to Indonesia in October 2013. According to the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road， released in March 2015， “The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route， and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.” The document further states that “the Initiative will focus on jointly building smooth， secure and efficient transport routes connecting major sea ports along the Belt and Road.”24 In June 2017， the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic Administration issued the Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative， outlining the principles of Belt and Road maritime cooperation： “Leveraging the ocean as the basis for enhancing common welfare， with the theme of sharing a blue space and developing the blue economy， China encourages countries along the [21st Century Maritime Silk] Road to align their strategies， further all-around and pragmatic cooperation， and to jointly build unobstructed， safe and efficient maritime transport channels. Together we will build platforms for maritime cooperation and develop the Blue Partnership.”25

The proposal and implementation of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road has a twofold impact on China’s protection of maritime rights and interests. First， the construction of the Road requires China to uphold a high degree of political trust and reliable interactions with countries along the routes， which poses challenges for China when it is trying to ensure stability of relations with other claimants when safeguarding its own maritime claims. Second， the construction of the Road will create closer ties in the fields of economy， trade， culture and people-to-people exchanges with countries along the routes， producing favorable conditions for easing tensions and promoting negotiations and consultations to resolve disputes.

China’s Concept of Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests in the New Era

China’s concept of safeguarding maritime rights and interests in the new era explicitly underscores the relevance of maritime rights protection in the grand strategy of building China into a strong maritime nation， the dialectical relationship between maritime rights protection and related issues， as well as the principles， tactics and approaches for maritime rights protection.

Significant component of China’s maritime power strategy

Safeguarding maritime rights and interests is a prime objective and mission for a nation which desires to become a strong maritime country. Effective maintenance and expansion of maritime rights and interests is a prerequisite for a maritime power. The report of the 18th CPC National Congress listed four key measures for building a maritime power， which are enhancing capacity for exploiting marine resources， developing the marine economy， protecting the marine ecological environment， and resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests. On July 30， 2013， when Xi Jinping presided over the 8th collective study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee， which focused on building China into a maritime power， he emphasized that the transformation of China into a strong maritime country is a crucial part of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics， and hence it is necessary to further understand and manage the ocean. Defending maritime rights and interests can be regarded as part of “managing the ocean” and a logical requirement of building a strong maritime country. The launch of a maritime power strategy gives renewed strategic importance to China’s protection of maritime rights and interests.

Dialectical relationship between safeguarding maritime rights and interests and related issues

Safeguarding marine rights and interests involves issues of all aspects. The promotion of marine rights and interests must therefore take a comprehensive approach and coordinate all related issues.

Coordination between land and marine development should be further pursued. China’s power equally extends to its continental and oceanic parts， and neither one should be preferred at the expense of the other. Therefore， in the process of protecting maritime rights and interests， landbased security and defense construction cannot be neglected. Maintaining good relations with land-based countries will also help China concentrate its efforts on addressing maritime disputes. In addition， by highlighting its successful settlement of land border disputes and taking advantage of the cherished stability on the land， China can demonstrate to the world that it is abiding by international law， showing respect to and treating all neighboring countries equally， and is seeking fair and reasonable solutions to disputes through negotiations. This will greatly enhance the international community’s understanding of China’s positions， strengthen the confidence of relevant countries in resolving disputes with China through negotiations， and create a favorable external environment for China to properly handle all yet unresolved maritime issues.26 In order to forge good relations with its land neighbors， China attaches great importance to the construction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and actively promotes the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt. As one of China’s major neighbors， India has some complex territorial disputes with China. In recent years， it has been occasionally making some tricky moves in the South China Sea， seeking to influence the China-India land border disputes and the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to their favor. Despite all this， President Xi Jinping took a long-term view and maintained active contact with India even after the two countries’ border standoff at Donglang， eventually resulting in the Wuhan meeting between the two leaders which restored stability between China and India. Since then， India has shown more restraint concerning the meddling in South China Sea affairs and participation in the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Although the Sino-Indian border has seen a flare-up of tensions since the skirmishes in the Galwan Valley region in June 2020， the two sides have launched multiple rounds of communication and negotiations to enhance mutual understanding and prevent further escalation.

The relationship between safeguarding rights and interests and maintaining stability should be properly observed. Xi Jinping pointed out the necessity of transforming the protection of the country’s maritime rights and interests into a more coordinated and comprehensive approach， by striving to “coordinate the two overarching imperatives of guaranteeing stability and protecting our rights， while upholding our sovereignty， security and development interests.”27 Although China has always resolutely stood up for its territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests， it has nevertheless insisted on resolving disputes through peaceful negotiations. In 2015， China and the ROK launched bilateral negotiations on maritime delimitation， where China demonstrated that it is interested in resolving any disputes with its neighboring countries through sincere negotiations. After President Duterte of the Philippines took office in 2016， he abandoned the confrontational approach of the previous government in relations with China. China responded positively and the South China Sea issue was brought back to the track of dialogue and negotiation. At present， China has launched a hotline for senior diplomatic officials in the event of maritime emergencies with ASEAN countries， and has established bilateral consultation mechanisms on maritime issues with Vietnam， the Philippines， and Malaysia. This has provided the necessary foundation for crisis management and control in the South China Sea.

The relationship between rights protection and cooperation must be handled correctly. As Xi Jinping pointed out， China should promote mutually beneficial and friendly cooperation and seek to expand the convergence of interests with other countries under the principle of“sovereignty belongs to China， disputes can be shelved， and we can pursue joint development.”28 Although few neighboring countries have responded to China’s offer of “joint development，” China has never given up on its efforts. On April 5， 2013， during the visit of Brunei’s Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah to China， the two countries issued a joint statement on supporting companies of both sides to jointly explore and exploit offshore oil and gas resources under the principle of mutual respect， equality and mutual benefit. In October of the same year， during Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Vietnam， China and Vietnam reached consensus on the establishment of a working group to discuss joint maritime development. The two countries agreed to speed up work of the bilateral group on the waters outside the mouth of the Beibu Gulf ， and strive to make substantial progress in joint development of the area. Since the normalization of their ties in 2016， China and the Philippines have established a bilateral consultation mechanism on the South China Sea and carried out large-scale joint maritime development projects in areas such as offshore oil and gas exploration and extraction. In November 2018， China and the Philippines signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperative oil and gas development. Although the memorandum is not a binding agreement on oil and gas development， it expresses the political will of the two countries to take their cooperation to a new stage.

Offshore waters and far seas have to be coordinated. China’s maritime rights and interests are not confined only to waters under its own jurisdiction， but they also extend to regions under the jurisdiction of other countries， to international seabed areas and the open seas， according to international law. Therefore， China must actively expand and safeguard its rights and interests in “new frontiers” such as the polar regions and the deep sea. Coordinating offshore waters and far seas refers to attaching importance to related rights and interests in maritime regions not under Chinese jurisdiction； it also refers to strengthening the capability to acquire and protect the rights and interests in those areas or regions. This requires the improvement of technology and ocean delivery capabilities. As the white paper on China’s military strategy， released in May 2015， pointed out： “The seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace， lasting stability and sustainable development of China. The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned， and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests， safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests， protect the security of strategic SLOCs [sea lines of communication] and overseas interests， and participate in international maritime cooperation， so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.”29

Awareness， strategies and approaches of maritime rights protection

The determination and confidence of maritime rights protection should be strengthened. When talking about the South China Sea issue， Xi Jinping made it clear that the South China Sea islands and reefs have been Chinese territory since ancient times. “They are left to us by our ancestors. The Chinese people will not allow anyone to infringe on China’s sovereignty and related rights and interests in the South China Sea，” he said in a written interview with Reuters in September 2015.30 On July 18， 2016， Admiral Wu Shengli， then Commander of China’s PLA Navy， unequivocally stated in a meeting with his counterpart Admiral John Richardson， then US Chief of Naval Operations， that China would never make any concessions on its sovereign rights and interests in the South China Sea， which belong to its core interests and bear on the governing foundation of China’s ruling party and on the security and stability of the Chinese nation.31

The bottom line has to be kept with a sober awareness of the complexity and the long-term nature of the struggle for maritime rights and interests. Xi Jinping has stressed the importance of improving capabilities of maritime rights protection to deal with various complex situations and safeguard China’s maritime interests.32 China has to adopt a comprehensive approach， stick to bottom-line thinking， elaborate its plans of action， and strengthen maritime military and law enforcement support to make full preparations for the most complex and severe struggles. Earlier in December 2012， Xi also pointed out during his inspection of the Guangzhou Military Area Command： “We must fully recognize the severe challenges facing China’s maritime security， enhance our awareness of potential threats and our sense of mission， and make specific preparations for the military struggle to safeguard maritime rights and interests.”33

The principle of peaceful settlement of disputes should always be upheld. “China is committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation， and opposes the willful use or threat of force，” Xi said.34 Any territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea should be peacefully resolved by parties directly concerned through friendly consultations and negotiations in accordance with bilateral agreements and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea （DOC）. In August 2014， Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed a “dual-track approach” for dealing with the South China Sea issue， where respective disputes would be peacefully resolved by countries directly concerned through amicable consultations and negotiations， while China and ASEAN countries would jointly guarantee regional peace and stability. In July 2016， while expressing China’s firm commitment to safeguarding its territorial sovereignty， Admiral Wu Shengli also stressed： “We will never give up our efforts to peacefully resolve the South China Sea issue. Despite the current negative factors， we will continue to settle disputes peacefully through negotiations and consultations and manage crises through rules and mechanisms.”35

Disputes must be managed and settled through rules and mechanisms. Due to their complexity and sensitivity， some maritime disputes are difficult to be fundamentally solved in a short period of time. Therefore， the leading policy consideration for all parties involved should be to prevent any maritime incidents and the escalation of conflicts. In recent years， China has been making every effort to stabilize the maritime situation and avoid accidental clashes. Since the Japanese government’s so-called “nationalization” of China’s Diaoyu Islands in 2012， there have been extremely tense circumstances in the East China Sea between the two countries， causing political relations to plunge to its lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties. Nevertheless， China is still actively promoting joint efforts with Japan to prevent further escalation. In November 2014， China and Japan reached a four-point consensus， which established a crisis management mechanism of dialogues and consultations to prevent further deterioration of relations and avoid unexpected incidents. In June 2018， after several rounds of talks， the two countries officially launched the maritime and air liaison mechanism and started discussing maritime cooperation. On the South China Sea issue， China has called on ASEAN countries to fully and effectively implement the DOC， and has actively promoted the consultations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea （COC）. Thanks to the concerted efforts of all parties， China and ASEAN countries agreed on the Single Draft Negotiating Text of the COC in August 2018. In November of the same year， Premier Li Keqiang said at the 21st China-ASEAN summit in Singapore that China is ready to work with ASEAN countries to complete the consultations on the COC in the next three years.

Any external interference has to be resolutely rejected. In recent history， interference and aggressive foreign intervention by major powers outside the region have compounded the complexity of maritime rights protection in China’s proximity. Since the 18th CPC National Congress， China has firmly opposed any interference or intervention by outside forces in its maritime disputes with neighboring countries， and advocated that such disputes should be settled through consultation exclusively by the parties concerned. Particularly on the South China Sea issue， China has strongly promoted the “dual-track approach” and the COC consultations， both of which oppose the interference by countries outside the region and are widely supported and recognized by neighboring countries and the international community.

Theoretical Value and Practical Significance of the Chinese Concept

China’s concept of safeguarding maritime rights and interests in the new era absorbs the essence of traditional Chinese strategic thought， inherits and develops Marxism-Leninism and relevant ideas of several generations of New China’s central leadership， while innovating as it evolves over time. It not only develops and transcends the traditional thinking on safeguarding maritime rights and interests， but also serves as a realistic and far-reaching guiding principle to conduct current and future maritime rights protection.

Theoretical value

The Chinese concept of safeguarding maritime rights and interests in the new era has contributed to the theoretical discourse of adhering to the path of peaceful development. Peace on the seas and oceans requires the joint effort of all countries. Although China made the strategic choice to take the path of peaceful development， that course also depends on the policy choices of other countries. World peace can be maintained only if everyone meets each other half way. President Xi Jinping stressed that China should follow the path of peaceful development， but so should other countries as well. At present， with disruptive factors in international politics on the rise， geopolitical worldviews making a comeback， and the unilateralist tendency of the United States intensifying， it is essential for people from all over the world to unite and fight against such negative factors. In the field of nontraditional maritime security， besides such threats as piracy， maritime terrorism and transnational crimes at sea， the world is also confronted with the challenge of rising populism in Western countries and their unwillingness to shoulder international responsibilities. In this context， cooperation and shared involvement of all countries for building a peace order on the seas and oceans are particularly important.

It has enriched and refined the idea of “shelving differences and seeking joint development.” Xi inherited Deng Xiaoping’s proposition of “shelving differences and seeking joint development，” while clearly demonstrating his firm determination to safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty. Some of China’s neighboring countries have reacted negatively to the proposal of “joint development，” instead seeking cooperation with partners outside the region. In order to change this situation， China， guided by its concept of safeguarding maritime rights and interests in the new era， has embarked on independent efforts to promote joint development. In July 2019， China’s survey vessel Haiyang Dizhi 8 （Ocean Geology No.8） entered the waters near Wan’an Tan of the Nansha Islands for exploration operations. In the East China Sea， notwithstanding Japan’s repeated protests and harassment， China successfully continued oil and gas development in waters under its jurisdiction， forcing Japan to push actively for the resumption of negotiations on joint development of oil and gas fields in the East China Sea.

The Chinese concept， which proposes the building of a maritime community with a shared future， has transcended traditional sea power ideas. In his speech at the 8th collective study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee， Xi Jinping said： “How will China build itself into a strong maritime country？ This issue is of great concern not only to us but also to the international community. We will never go down the outdated path of colonization and plundering that great powers used to practice in history. That path runs counter to the general trend of world peace and development， and even less serves the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. We are committed to the development path that enriches and strengthens China by the sea and with the sea， one which features harmony between man and the sea and win-win cooperation， with a view to building China into a maritime power through peace， development， cooperation and win-win practice.”36 Xi set forth in the speech that China’s path to becoming a strong maritime country is different from the habitual one， and is in tune with the general wellbeing of the Chinese people and the world. While resolutely safeguarding its maritime rights and interests， China has also upheld the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind all throughout its efforts to build its strength on the oceans. On June 20， 2014， Premier Li Keqiang addressed the China-Greece Maritime Cooperation Forum in Athens with a speech entitled “Strive to Build a Sea of Peace， Cooperation and Harmony，” in which he expounded China’s viewpoints on maritime affairs. He pledged that “China is willing to work with other countries to enhance economic development， deepen international cooperation and promote world peace by developing marine undertakings in a bid to build a peaceful， cooperative and harmonious sea.”37 In March 2015，President Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech at the annual Boao Forum for Asia， proposing that Asian countries “increase maritime connectivity， speed up institution building for marine cooperation in Asia， and step up cooperation in marine economy， environmental protection， disaster management and fishery.” “This way， we could turn the seas of Asia into seas of peace， friendship and cooperation for Asian countries.”38 In April 2019， when Xi met with the heads of foreign delegations invited to attend the multinational naval events commemorating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy， he raised the concept of building a maritime community with a shared future for the first time. He explained： “The blue planet we human beings live on is not divided into isolated islands by the ocean. Instead， it is bound together by the ocean into a community of shared future where people of all countries share common security. Nations should consult with each other more often rather than willfully resort to threat or use of force. On top of that， countries should adhere to consultation on the basis of equality， improve crisis communication mechanisms， and strengthen regional security cooperation to properly handle maritime disputes.”39 The concept of maritime development and governance implied in the speeches by the above-mentioned Chinese leaders has demonstrated to the outside world that China’s primary goal is the establishment of an open， inclusive， peaceful and cooperative global maritime order. The oceans are the common heritage of mankind， and the challenges involved are the common challenges facing all of humanity. The building of a maritime community with a shared future serves the common interests of mankind and conforms to the trend of human development.

A dynamic balance has been struck between safeguarding rights and interests and maintaining stability. To protect China’s maritime rights means to safeguard its own legitimate interests， but it does not intrinsically contradict the maintaining of good relations with neighboring countries and securing regional stability. In reality， however， due to the rise of nationalism and the interference of external powers， rights protection often leads to deteriorating relations and an increase of regional tensions. To solve this paradox， instead of facing the dilemma of whether to prioritize the protection of rights and interests or the maintenance of stability， Xi Jinping handled this predicament with a skillful methodology of dialectical unity and positive dynamic balance.40 This means that China would make its policy choice of struggle or cooperation according to the maritime situation and the evolving bilateral relations with the countries in dispute. In this way， not only have China’s rights and interests been ensured to the maximum extent， but its relations with the Philippines， Japan， Vietnam and other countries have taken a turn for the better as well.

The connotation and extension of safeguarding maritime rights and interests

have expanded greatly. Scientific progress and economic globalization have shifted the boundaries of national interests beyond those of traditional geography. Deep sea， polar regions， cyberspace， outer space and other fields are becoming increasingly essential to national security and development interests. Major powers have engaged in overt or covert competition for the rights and interests as well as the security of these “new frontiers.” The formulation of rules and norms in these areas has become an increasingly important concern for global governance， in which China has been a significant factor as a major power. Xi Jinping has taken a forward-looking approach and extended the scope of maritime rights protection to the deep sea and the polar regions， widening the narrow concept of restricting maritime rights protection merely to offshore waters and disputed islands and reefs. “We need to increase our participation in rules-making in emerging areas such as the cyberspace， polar regions， deep sea and outer space，” he stated.41 “We need to uphold the principles of peace， sovereignty， mutual benefit and shared governance， and make deep sea， polar regions， outer space and the Internet new frontiers for cooperation， rather than an arena for mutual competition，” he said in his speech at the United Nations Office in Geneva.42 Xi’s statement not only identified the key objectives of China’s participation in the governance of global commons， but also expanded the scope of maritime rights protection and the direction of future efforts.

Practical significance

Under the guidance of its concept of safeguarding maritime rights and interests in the new era， the Chinese government has resolutely fought against acts of interference by neighboring and external countries since 2012. Remarkable achievements have been made in the implementation of innovative measures for the protection of rights and interests.

The construction of systems and mechanisms for maritime rights protection has been improved. In his speech at the fifth National Conference on Work Relating to Border and Coastal Defense， Xi Jinping stressed that the institutional problems that restrict border and coastal defense work be resolved in the spirit of reform and innovation.43 To strengthen the unified management and overall coordination of maritime rights protection， in late 2012， the CPC Central Committee set up the Office of Central Leading Group for Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests， which assumed main responsibility for the protection of overseas rights and interests. In July 2013， the State Council reorganized the State Oceanic Administration， and integrated personnel and responsibilities of the China Marine Surveillance，the maritime branch of the Border Security Force under the Ministry of Public Security， the Fishery Law Enforcement of the Ministry of Agriculture， and the Maritime Anti-Smuggling Police of the General Administration of Customs. The establishment of the China Coast Guard ended the formerly decentralized structure of maritime law enforcement. In March 2018， according to the plan of the CPC Central Committee on deepening reform of Party and government institutions， the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs was transformed into the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and the tasks of maritime rights protection was incorporated into the overall diplomatic work for the convenience of unified planning and deployment. The Central Leading Group for Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests was dissolved， and all its responsibilities were transferred to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and its office， under which the Office for Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests was set up. In June 2018， in accordance with the above-mentioned plan and the plan for reforming the armed police force， both approved by the CPC Central Committee， the Coast Guard was reorganized and put under the leadership and command of the Chinese Armed Police Force. The duties of the CCG are to safeguard maritime rights and conduct law enforcement in a unified way. The reform and reorganization of the structure related to maritime affairs is of great significance to the integration of internal resources and the improvement of rights protection efficiency.

The administrative and legislative aspects of rights protection have been strengthened. Exercising administrative and legislative jurisdiction over disputed islands， reefs and waters is an essential means for a government to assert its sovereignty over these domains. Faced with a situation where China lagged behind its neighbors， the State Council approved on June 21， 2012， the establishment of prefecture-level Sansha City with jurisdiction over Xisha， Nansha and Zhongsha Islands and their surrounding waters. Xi Jinping instructed： “We must do a good job in administrative building， infrastructure construction， environmental protection and improving people’s livelihood in Sansha City， and fulfill the important mission of safeguarding rights and interests， maintaining stability， and protecting and exploring the South China Sea invested by the central government.”44 On September 10， 2012， in accordance with its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone， the Chinese government announced the baselines of the territorial seas of Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands， and reaffirmed China’s maritime rights and interests concerning relevant waters. The domestic legislation has not only verified the Chinese government’s jurisdiction over the islands and sea areas， but also provided relevant authorities with a legal basis for law enforcement. On February 26， 2016， the 19th session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress passed the Law on Exploration for and Exploitation of Resources in the Deep Seabed Area. The law promotes the reasonable， safe and orderly control over the scientific exploration for and exploitation of resources in China’s deep seabed area. It is also conducive for contractors conducting exploration and exploitation operations in the deep seabed area to fully implement their contracts， while strengthening environmental protection and promoting the sustainable use of resources in this area. In April 2020， in order to further regulate the use of place names， the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Civil Affairs published the standard names of some islands and reefs and seafloor geographical entities in the South China Sea.

China’s presence in the disputed waters has been regularized. Since 2007， the China Marine Surveillance has been carrying out regular law enforcement patrols to safeguard rights and interests in the whole sea area belonging to China. However， in the early stages， due to the limited number of law enforcement vessels， personnel and specific policies， the frequency of patrols in some sensitive sea areas was insufficient. After the confrontation between China and the Philippines over Huangyan Island and the Japanese government’s “nationalization” of the Diaoyu Islands in 2012， the Chinese government stepped up patrols in the relevant waters.China has since then maintained effective and regular patrols over the waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands， safeguarding national sovereignty and effectively disrupting Japan’s long-standing activities for “unilateral control” over the area. In the waters around Huangyan Island， Ren’ai Reef， Nankang Ansha， Tiexian Reef and other waters coveted by foreign parties in the Nansha Islands， China Coast Guard vessels have realized effective control and have kept a strict watch to prevent further encroachment by relevant countries.

Infrastructure construction on the Nansha Islands has been promoted to establish forward bases for safeguarding maritime rights and interests. In order to improve the living conditions of people stationed on the Nansha Islands and provide more public goods to the international community， China has carried out large-scale reclamation of the sea and has built airports on Yongshu Reef， Zhubi Reef and Meiji Reef since early 2014. The new airports will facilitate personnel exchanges， emergency assistance and medical aid on the Nansha Islands， and serve as a hub for flights over the South China Sea. China has been building five large lighthouses on Nansha islands and reefs. In addition， China has built four light beacons on Jinqing Island， Kuangzai Shazhou of Lingyang Reef， Nan Shazhou， and Beijiao Reef on the Xisha Islands. It has also set up four automatic identification system（AIS） base stations on Yongxing Island， Dongdao Island， Chenhang Island and Zhongjian Island， realizing complete signal coverage in key waters of the Xisha Islands. Additionally， China has launched the navigational telex（NAVTEX） broadcasting service， which realized the coverage of signals in Xisha and Zhongsha waters. China’s expansion and renovation of the islands and reefs in the South China Sea will strengthen its maritime territorial control and expand the strategic depth of national defense. In peacetime， it can exert a deterrent effect on relevant countries and regions. In times of war， the reconstruction of the islands and reefs can enhance military capabilities in various aspects and to different degrees. Provided the requirements of water depth， wind shelter and site logistics are satisfactory， the expanded network of islands and reefs in the South China Sea can play a variety of roles during wartime， including a provision of forces and firepower， logistics， intelligence， surveillance and reconnaissance （ISR）， and force projection.45

China has won a legal and public opinion battle concerning its rights in the South China Sea. In the struggle for safeguarding maritime rights and interests， some of China’s neighboring claimants， but especially the United States and other Western countries， often criticize China for not complying with the international law and accuse China of undermining the rules-based international order. It is important to refute these false accusations voiced by neighboring and external countries and defend China’s reputation if maritime rights and interests are to be successfully safeguarded. In January 2013， in disregard of the objections by the Chinese government， the Philippines unilaterally initiated arbitration on the South China Sea disputes between the two countries. The Chinese government solemnly declared that it would neither accept nor participate in the arbitration. At the same time， China fought a legal and public opinion battle with the Philippines and its supporters in the international arena. On December 7， 2014， the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was authorized to release the Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines. The Position Paper reiterated China’s firm standpoint that the Chinese government would neither accept nor participate in the arbitration， and elaborated at length on the legal basis for its position that the Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over this case. In July 2016， the Arbitral Tribunal issued its so-called arbitration award， which attempted to deny China its rightful territorial claims and maritime rights in the South China Sea. In the face of this political provocation under the guise of upholding the law， China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement， declaring that the award was null and void and had no binding force， and that China would neither accept nor recognize it. The Chinese government issued the Statement on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea， reaffirming China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. Xi Jinping and other members of the central leadership outlined China’s steadfast position on various bilateral and multilateral occasions and in personal meetings with different parties. China’s righteous position won recognition and support from nearly 120 countries and over 240 political parties.46 The Foreign Ministry， together with other Chinese government agencies， presented the case from different perspectives and angles， and provided its legal basis and reasoning. These efforts fully exposed the Arbitral Tribunal’s illegal acts of willfully overstepping and abusing its mandate， and they thwarted the political attempt of certain countries and forces to suppress and discredit China. After China had achieved this decisive diplomatic victory， only the United States， Japan and a few other countries still referred to the South China Sea arbitration case. Today， the award amounts to nothing more than a meaningless piece of paper.

China’s rights in the deep-sea and polar regions have been expanded. In July 2013， the International Seabed Authority （ISA） approved the application of China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association on the exploration for cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts in the West Pacific Ocean， making China the first country in the world to conduct exclusive exploration of mining areas for all three major international seabed mineral resources. In July 2015， the ISA approved the application of China Minmetals Corporation on the exploration for polymetallic nodule resources in the East Pacific Ocean. In July 2019， the ISA approved another polymetallic nodule exploration application submitted by Beijing Pioneer Hi-Tech Development Company in the international seabed area of the West Pacific Ocean. China has become the country with the highest number of exclusive exploration and priority mining rights in the international seabed area. In addition， China has actively participated in negotiations and consultations on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction （BBNJ）. In January 2018， the State Council Information Office published a white paper on China’s Arctic policy， pointing out that China is an active participant， builder and contributor in Arctic affairs. “On the basis of the principles of ‘respect， cooperation， win-win result and sustainability’， China， as a responsible major country， is ready to cooperate with all relevant parties to seize the historic opportunity in the development of the Arctic， to address the challenges brought by the changes in the region， jointly understand， protect， develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic.”47

In summary， since entering the new era， under the guidance of the new concept of safeguarding maritime rights and interests， the Chinese government has taken a series of measures， which effectively defends the national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests， strengthens China’s presence in the disputed waters， deters the ambition of relevant countries to encroach or interfere， and changes China’s position in territorial disputes over islands and reefs from passive to active. A new pattern of maritime interaction with neighboring countries and major powers outside the region is taking shape. At the same time， China is actively participating in the formulation of new rules in the deep sea and polar regions to safeguard and expand its legitimate rights and interests. The concept and practice of China’s maritime rights protection in the new era is epitome of the tremendous strength of the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era， and lays a solid foundation for accelerating the building of a strong maritime country and realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.

1 Xi Jinping， Being Practical and Marching Forward—Reflections on Promoting Zhejiang’s New Development， Party School of the Communist Party of China Central Committee Publishing House， 2014.

2 Liu Xinhua， Pang Geping， Xie Zhenhua， and Wang Yunna， “Keep in Mind General Secretary’s Instruction and Compose a New Chapter of the Silk Road—General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Visit to Guangxi Arouses Warm Response in the Province，” People’s Daily， April 23， 2017.

3 “Xi Jinping’s Speech on the 8th Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee，” People’s Daily， August 1， 2013， p.1.

4 Wang Hongbin， The Costal Defense of Late Qing Dynasty： A Study on Ideology and Institutions， Commercial Press， 2005， p.31.

5 “Revitalizing the Navy，” Oriental Magazine， No.10， 1905， p.327.

6 Zhang Xia et al.， Historical Records of the Navy in Late Qing Dynasty， China Ocean Press， 1982， p.800.

7 Ibid.， pp. 798-799.

8 Collected Works of Sun Yat-sen， Zhonghua Book Company， 1985， p.119.

9 “Sun Yat-sen’s Conception of the Navy，” Maritime Affairs， No.2， 1933， p.89.

10 Zhang Xusan， The Dictionary of the Navy， Shanghai Lexicographic Publishing House， 1993， p.1355.

11 “The Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhou Enlai’s Statement on the US-UK Draft Peace Treaty with Japan and the San Francisco Conference，” People， June 27， 2016， http：//world.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0627/ c1002-28481582.html.

12 Ni Zhengyu， Working in The Hague with Simplicity and Calmness， Law Press China， 1999， pp.150-155， quoted form Jia Yu and Zhang Xiaoyi， “The Maritime Strategic Thinking of Mao Zedong， Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping，” Journal of Boundary and Ocean Studies， No.3， 2018， p.8.

13 “Deng Xiaoping’s Remarks on His Visit to Guided Missile Destroyer No.105 on August 2， 1979，”China Ocean News， April 25， 1997.

14 Selected Remarks of Deng Xiaoping on Military Building in the New Era， Bayi Press， 1993， p.57.

15 Zhang Wei， National Maritime Security， Haichao Press， 2008， p.445.

16 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping， Vol.3， People’s Publishing House， 1993， p.12.

17 Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee， Selected Important Documents since the 12th CPC National Congress， Vol.2， Central Party Literature Press， 2011， p.212.

18 “Sailing Forward in the Spring Wind： Chronicle of Jiang Zemin’s Concern on the Modernization of the People’s Navy，” People’s Daily， May 29， 1999， p.1.

19 “Hu Jintao Meets with Heads of Naval Delegations from 29 Nations： Fighting against Common Threat and Jointly Construct the Ocean of Harmony，” People’s Daily， April 24， 2009， p.1.

20 “Hu Jintao Meets with Delegates of the 10th Party Congress of the Navy，” PLA Daily， December 28， 2006， p.1.

21 Zhou Zhonghai， “The Residual Rights in the Law of Sea，” Journal of CUPL， No.9， 2004， p.175.

22 Hu Bo， “Trends of International Maritime Politics and China’s Strategic Choices，” China International Studies， No.3， 2017， p.125.

23 Zhao Chengguo， “The Fundamental Elements in China’s Construction of a Sea Power，” in Qu Jinliang， ed.， Studies on China’s Maritime Culture， Vol.3， China Ocean Press， 2002， p.9.

24 National Development and Reform Commission， Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce， Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road， March 2015， https：//en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201503/t20150330_1193900.html.

25 National Development and Reform Commission and State Oceanic Administration， The Maritime Cooperation Plan of the Belt and Road Initiative， June 20， 2017， http：//www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/20/c_136380414.htm.

26 Hai Min， “China’s Boundary and Ocean Issues and the Boundary and Ocean Diplomacy with Chinese Characters，” Journal of Boundary and Ocean Studies， No.6， 2018， p.14.

27 “Xi Jinping： Further Take Care of the Ocean， Understand the Ocean， and Manage the Ocean， and Promote the Construction of Building China into a Strong Maritime Country with Continuous Achievements，” Xinhua， July 31， 2013， http：//news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-07/31/c_116762285.htm.

28 “Xi Jinping： Further Take Care of the Ocean， Understand the Ocean， and Manage the Ocean， and Promote the Construction of Building China into a Strong Maritime Country with Continuous Achievements.”

29 “China’s Military Strategy，” May 27， 2015， http：//english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/ content_281475115610833.htm.

30 “Exclusive Q&A with Chinese President Xi Jinping，” Reuters， October 18， 2015， https：//www.reuters. com/article/us-china-britain-xi-q-a-idUSKCN0SC03920151018 .

31 “Wu Shengli Meets with US Chief of Naval Operations and Exchanges Views on the South China Sea Issue，” People’s Daily， July 19， 2016， p.21.

32 “Xi Jinping： Further Take Care of the Ocean， Understand the Ocean， and Manage the Ocean， and Promote the Construction of Building China into a Strong Maritime Country with Continuous Achievements.”

33 Jia Yu and Zhang Xiaoyi， “The Maritime Strategic Thinking of Mao Zedong， Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping，” p.12.

34 “Xi Jinping Attends the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs and Delivers an Important Address，” CPC News， November 30， 2014， http：//cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1130/c64094-26119225.html.

35 “Wu Shengli Meets with US Chief of Naval Operations and Exchanges Views on the South China Sea Issue.”

36 “Xi Jinping： Further Take Care of the Ocean， Understand the Ocean， and Manage the Ocean， and Promote the Construction of Building China into a Strong Maritime Country with Continuous Achievements.”

37 Li Keqiang， “Strive to Build a Sea of Peace， Cooperation and Harmony，” People’s Daily， June 21， 2014.

38 “Towards a Community of Common Destiny and A New Future for Asia： Keynote Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2015，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China， March 29， 2015， https：//www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1250690.shtml.

39 “On the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Navy， Xi Jinping Proposes for the First Time to Build a Maritime Community with a Shared Future，” CPC News， April 23， 2019， http：//cpc.people.com. cn/n1/2019/0423/c164113-31045369.html.

40 Hai Min， “China’s Boundary and Ocean Issues and the Boundary and Ocean Diplomacy with Chinese Characters，” p.14.

41 “Xi Jinping： Strengthen Cooperation to Reform the Global Governance System and Work Together to Advance the Noble Cause of Peace and Development of Mankind，” Xinhua， September 28， 2016， http：// www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-09/28/c_1119641652.htm.

42 “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind： Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping at the United Nations Office at Geneva，” Xinhua， January 19， 2017， http：//www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/19/c_135994707.htm.

43 “Xi Jinping： Build Solid Border and Coastal Defense，” Xinhua， June 27， 2014， http：//news.xinhuanet. com/politics/2014-06/27/c_1111357748.htm.

44 “General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Visit to Hainan，” Nanhai Daily， April 13， 2013， p.1.

45 Qi Haotian， “Report on Nansha Islands and Reefs Construction： Let China Become a Clairvoyant，”Phoenix， April 14， 2016， http：//pit.ifeng.com/dacankao/qianliyan2/1.shtml.

46 “Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Opening of the Symposium on International Developments and China’s Diplomacy in 2016，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China， December 3， 2016， https：//www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1421722.shtml.

47 State Council Information Office of China， “China’s Arctic Policy，” January 2018， http：//english.www. gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.