Progress and Limits of Russia-Japan Relations

Wang Haibin

In his first phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 29， 2020， Japan’s new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga expressed his willingness to “develop the overall relationship between Japan and Russia” and “stressed the need to put an end to the Northern Territories issue without leaving it to the next generation.” In response， Putin said that he intended to continue discussing all bilateral issues.1 The two sides also reaffirmed that they would “continue efforts to comprehensively advance Russia-Japan relations for the peoples of the two countries and the entire Asia-Pacific region.”2 Looking ahead to Russia-Japan relations after Suga came to power， it is still necessary to review the relations during the administration of his predecessor Shinzo Abe， who has made positive attempts， so as to better understand the features， cruxes and the future direction of Russia-Japan relations.

Russia-Japan Relations in the Abe Era

To untie the intractable knot in Russia-Japan relations and develop closer ties with Russia， Shinzo Abe has built a distinctive personal relationship with Putin through his flexible diplomacy after he was re-elected as Prime Minister of Japan in 2012. The two sides have promoted bilateral relations through summit diplomacy. However， there are in fact many limits in developing Russia-Japan relations under the appearance of close ties.

Progress in bilateral relations

First， the leaders of Russia and Japan have maintained a high level of interaction. They are leading and promoting close cooperation in various fields to build a strategic partnership. Russia and Japan are geographically close to each other and enjoy broad space for bilateral cooperation in political， diplomatic， security and economic spheres. In recent years， the two countries have shown greater interest and willingness to tap potentials of bilateral relations. The leaders of both sides agreed that “Russia and Japan are natural partners in the Far East region and the world as a whole，”3 and that “Russia-Japan relations hold unlimited potential” and “will dramatically change the region and beyond.”4 Such strategic perceptions have in turn led and driven the development of Russia-Japan relations.

In April 2013， Abe became the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Russia in a decade， marking a thaw of bilateral relations. Since then， RussiaJapan relations have rapidly warmed up. Putin visited Japan in 2016 after 11 years and Japan became the first G7 country he visited after the Ukraine crisis. By preliminary count， Abe met with Putin as many as 27 times since taking office in 2012. With frequent high-level meetings， both sides confirmed their determination to “resume all-round cooperation as friendly neighbors based on mutual trust and benefit，” and to “pursue a strategic partnership.”5 Guided by this strategic goal， Russia and Japan have actively increased mutual exchanges， presenting a new image of active and closer partnership.

Second， Russia and Japan have advanced economic cooperation and territorial negotiations at the same time. To break the shackles of its relations with Russia， Japan proposed a new approach to first consolidate bilateral partnership and mutual trust， and as a spillover effect properly handle the territorial issue. Both sides are encouraged not to be bogged by historical burdens， but look to the future. With such a new approach， Japan intends to break the deadlock of bilateral relations and overcome the two countries’different positions.6 At this point， Japan has basically abandoned its longheld position that politics and economics cannot be separated， and that territorial issues must be resolved first to develop comprehensive cooperation between Russia and Japan. Instead， it has adopted the approach of advancing economic cooperation in parallel with territorial negotiations.

In practice， one of Japan’s representative initiatives to develop economic cooperation with Russia was Abe’s eight-point plan for small and mediumenterprises and practical cooperation in energy， industry， health， agriculture， urban environment， high technology， and people-to-people exchanges. As a show of good faith， the Abe administration appointed Hiroshige Seko， then Minister of Economy， Trade and Industry， as Minister for Economic Cooperation with Russia. In response， Russia appointed Maxim Oreshkin， then Minister of Economic Development， as Special Representative for Trade and Economic Cooperation with Japan. Putin also proposed a transnational sub-state arrangement whereby the free movement of people， goods， services， and investment capital would be allowed for official residents of Sakhalin Oblast and Hokkaido.

Moreover， Russia and Japan have established vice foreign ministeriallevel consultation mechanism to implement the “Southern Kuril Islands”7 economic cooperation plan. In their fifth round of consultation on joint economic activities in April 2019， the two sides focused on “specifying cooperation projects that are currently at an advanced coordination stage to develop corresponding business models，” aiming to “come up truly mutually beneficial plans of practical cooperation.”8 They discussed a special mechanism for joint economic activities on the disputed islands， so that neither would feel their sovereignty threatened. Since then， they have started to promote bilateral cooperation on agriculture， forestry and aquaculture， the Trans-Siberian Railway， and the construction of a liquefied natural gas（LNG） transshipment terminal on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Taken together， these projects have strengthened the connectivity of Russia’s Far East with the Sea of Japan coast of Hokkaido as an economic sphere，9 which is expected to facilitate the signing of a peace treaty.

Third， Russia and Japan have stepped up interactions on security affairs while expanding spheres of cooperation. The two countries attach importance to and promote the synergy of military-security ties with relations in other areas， so that “defense cooperation does not lag behind the development of their political ties.”10 For closer bilateral strategic relations and militarysecurity cooperation， in April 2013 Russia and Japan established the “2+2”Foreign and Defense Ministers’ dialogue mechanism， which Abe viewed as“an important milestone in improving mutual trust and building stronger cooperation in the field of security.”11 The first Russia-Japan “2+2” dialogue was held in November 2013. Despite temporary interruption by the Ukraine crisis， the mechanism was resumed in 2017. Russia is the third country with which Japan has established such a mechanism and Japan is the fifth for Russia， reflecting their common will to deepen strategic relations and military-security cooperation. In practice， the two countries have held mutual visits of warships， joint exercises for air-sea search and rescue operations， naval performances， joint exercises between border troops to cultivate mutual trust. In addition， they have extended bilateral military exercises to the far seas. In January 2020， for the first time， Russia and Japan held anti-piracy naval exercises in the Arabian Sea. Moreover， they are committed to cooperation in handling non-traditional security threats such as drug crimes， cyber theft and money laundering.

Fourth， people-to-people cultural exchanges between Russia and Japan are becoming more active. Leaders of both sides have been promoting people-topeople exchanges to consolidate public support for bilateral ties and enhance mutual understanding. In April 2013， during Abe’s visit to Russia， he and Putin agreed to hold the Year of Russian-Japanese Martial Arts Exchanges for the mutual visit， learning， training and competition among martial arts practitioners. During Putin’s visit to Japan in 2016， the two countries agreed to designate 2018-2019 as the Russia-Japan Exchange Year， which Putin cochaired with Abe during the G20 summit in Osaka in June 2018. During the Russia-Japan Exchange Year， Russia held more than 600 events related to Japanese traditional culture such as Kabuki and Yabusame （horseback archery）， while Japan held exhibitions of paintings at the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts and public performances by the Mariinsky Ballet. Based on the results， the two countries have set 2020-2021 as the Russia-Japan Year of Regional Exchanges. The Russia-Japan people-to-people exchanges are led by governments and implemented by the private sector， enriching bilateral relations and picturing a positive image of bilateral ties.

Fifth， Russia and Japan have reached preliminary consensus on the territorial issue and even a peace treaty. In November 2018， leaders of the two sides agreed to accelerate negotiations based on the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. They established a working mechanism between special representatives on the peace treaty， with then Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in charge， and Japanese Senior Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Takeo Mori and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov as the main negotiators. This means that after years of peace talks， Russia and Japan have finally reached a preliminary consensus， marking a major change in Russia-Japan relations.

Limits to the development of bilateral relations

Abe sought to advance the Russia-Japan relationship through his flexible diplomacy， but until 2020， the relationship was still trapped in a plight or even a deadlock after Abe’s “total settlement of post-war diplomacy.”

First， there is no substantial upgrading of Russia-Japan relations. Despite some progress in recent years， the two sides have made no major breakthroughs in political ties， economic cooperation， or on the territorial issue and the peace treaty， and have witnessed no qualitative shift in the content， nature and level of their bilateral relations. Thus， Russia- Japan relations have not changed fundamentally. Although Putin and Abe put forward the goal of building a strategic partnership during their first meeting in 2013 and resolved to upgrade the level of bilateral relations， the goal was still only a political consensus until 2020 and no landmark document recognized by international law was reached.

Second， Russia and Japan have far more economic initiatives， verbal and written agreements than projects that have been implemented. The truth of Russia-Japan relations in the Abe era is— “there is more talk and less action about Japan’s cooperation with Russia in the Far East.”12 In Japan’s eightpoint plan for its new cooperative approach with Russia， projects that have been agreed upon and implemented are almost those in politically insensitive areas. In the three years since Abe announced the plan， “the bilateral cooperation runs in circles and is even back to square one. The two sides show no interest in each other.”13 In the eyes of Russian experts，“the Japanese now have no urgent need to invest in the disputed islands，”and Japan’s investment proposal is aimed at getting back the “Southern Kuril Islands，” which “will not happen and has in turn hampered the cooperation agenda.”14 Lavrov made it clear that “the agreement reached two years ago on joint economic activities on the Southern Kuril Islands is being implemented， but the five proposed projects are not in critical areas.” “A series of draft agreements have been under discussion for years without any specific progress.”15 A spokesman for the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic also confirmed that large-scale Russia-Japan projects in the Far East are still insufficient for Far Eastern development.

Third， there is still a long way to go for Russia and Japan to agree on the territorial issue and reach a peace treaty. Since the preliminary consensus in 2018， the two sides have failed to agree on the procedures and content of the peace treaty. Russia insists that Japan first recognize Russia’s sovereignty over the “Southern Kuril Islands.” It has repeatedly stressed that Tokyo， rather than Moscow， should take the first step. Russia is willing to work toward a peace resolution provided “Japan’s indisputable recognition of the entirety of results of World War II， including Russia’s sovereignty over the Southern Kuril Islands.”16 Meanwhile， Russia regards the signing of a peace treaty a prerequisite for negotiations on other relevant issues. For Russia， the peace treaty should reflect， recognize and respect the results of World War II and also include an analysis and endorsement of the post-war situation， so as to lead the development of Russia-Japan relations. Japan， however， cannot agree with such claims. Therefore， to date， the two countries have not agreed on the framework or details of their negotiations. Abe had to admit that it is“hard to strike a balance between the two countries’ positions on complex issues.”17

Characteristics of Russia-Japan Relations

Russia-Japan relations in the Abe era in part inherit the legacy of JapanSoviet relations， but are also infused with new substance. The historical and contemporary elements in the bilateral relationship have shaped its distinctive features during this period.

Mutual mistrust

The mutual mistrust between Russia and Japan is rooted in the long history of bilateral interaction and passes on to the Abe era. Historically， Russia started to expand its territory with military force after the establishment of the Principality of Kiev， while Japan sought for overseas expansion following the unification of the Japanese Archipelago. After the Meiji Restoration， Japan joined the ranks of imperial powers and accelerated outward expansion， thus colliding with Russia in Northeast Asia and marking the beginning of their conflicts. In the history of Russia-Japan relations， “elements of rivalry and estrangement outweigh those of tranquility and partnership， which has greatly influenced the way the two countries view each other.”18

For Japan， Russia’s expansion into the Asia-Pacific region in modern times threatened Japan’s security and hindered its invasion into China and the Korean Peninsula. The Soviet Union violated its own commitments by abandoning the 1941 Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact and launching a war against Japan near the end of World War II. Japan’s hostility and mistrust toward the Soviet Union increased because of Soviet occupation of the“Southern Kuril Islands” and the unfair treatment of Japanese prisoners of war， and the Cold War simply made the sentiment worse. This strategic perception， once formed， could hardly disappear and even continue into the Abe era. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis， Western countries led by the US escalated their strategic conflict with Russia and imposed collective sanctions on Russia， in which Japan was involved as a US ally. This has significantly consolidated Japan’s negative strategic perception of Russia. According to a 2018 survey of public opinion in Japan， only 17.7 percent of Japanese respondents are friendly toward Russia， while 78.8 percent consider Russia unfriendly. From 2011 to 2018， the percentage of respondents who expressed dislike or hatred for Russia hovered between 74.8 to 82.9 percent.19 Comments such as “Russia is an enemy” and “Russia cannot be trusted” are popular on Japanese social media.20

In Russia’s point of view， a series of historical experiences led to its mistrust and hostility toward Japan， including the Russian Empire’s crushing defeat in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War and the humiliating signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth， Japan’s invasion of the Russian Far East in 1918 to exert its influence and interfere in the Russian Revolution， and Japan’s containment against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Russian scholar Yuri Tavrovsky believed that Russia has historical scores to settle with Japan.“Starting with the 1904 Japanese sneak attack on the Russian fleet in Lvshun， Japan caused the death of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers and cost Russia a large part of its Far East.”21 After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis， Japan followed the US and joined the Western sanctions against Russia， further deepening Russia’s hostility and mistrust toward Japan. This has also resulted in Russia’s very low favorability toward Japan. According to a survey published in June 2019 by Russia’s Yuri Levada Analytical Center， Japan ranks only 18th in the list of friendly countries， and only 6 percent of Russians consider Japan to be a close friend of Russia.22

The mutual hostility and mistrust have been affecting the relations between Russia and Japan to this day， and led to long-time mutual unfavorability. This is a prominent feature and also a major problem in Russia-Japan relations， which hinders the improvement of their relationship and the signing of a peace treaty.

Instability and vulnerability

Russia-Japan relations during the Abe era went through a tortuous process of thawing， warming， cooling， and again warming. During Abe’s second term in office， he actively developed goodwill in Russia and promoted the thawing and warming of bilateral relations before the Ukraine crisis， to reach a peace treaty over territorial disputes. However， Russia-Japan relations were soon hit by the Ukraine crisis and the Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Japan had to join other Western countries to impose sanctions against Russia under great pressure， leading to the cooling of Russia-Japan relations. Bilateral dialogue and cooperation in various fields were postponed or suspended. Putin’s visit to Japan， scheduled for the fall of 2014， was also postponed. Despite Japan’s efforts to avoid sanctions against Russia and keep them to a minimum， they still triggered Russia’s resentment and countermeasures against Japan. During US presidential transition at the end of 2016， Putin’s visit to Japan finally came to fruition， which marked a turning point and a warming of Russia-Japan relations again.

The tortuous process demonstrates the instability and vulnerability， a prominent feature of Russia-Japan relations. As the internal cause， Russia and Japan do not trust each other. Due to the lack of strategic mutual trust， when facing problems or changes in the external environment， the two sides will adopt hardline stances and assertive policies out of mutual suspicion， which interrupts bilateral dialogue and cooperation. As the external cause， Japan’s foreign strategy is deeply influenced by the United States. Japan cannot decide its Russia policy alone. Russia-Japan relations are greatly influenced by US strategy and policy toward Russia.

For example of an external cause， after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis， the US openly regarded Russia as a major security threat. The Trump administration even positioned Russia as a strategic competitor and implemented a systematic containment policy against Russia. Japan， as a US ally， had to follow the US， which greatly affected the development of RussiaJapan relations. In fact， the Russia-Japan strategic relationship is essentially subject to US strategy， with which Russia is extremely disappointed. The peace treaty between Russia and Japan is a subject of US-Japan talks during Trump’s visit to Japan in May 2019. Lavrov once said， “If Japan’s lack of independence is demonstrated to such an extent， then I have nothing to add.”23

Different expectations of bilateral interactions

In Russia-Japan relations， Japan has shown greater enthusiasm and a more proactive stance than Russia， mainly because Japan has one-way strategic needs for Russia on certain issues， while Russia does not have an irreplaceable strategic need for Japan.

From the Japanese perspective， Japan needs Russia in resolving their territorial disputes and getting rid of its strategic isolation in Northeast Asia. On the one hand， negotiation is the only solution for Japan since it does not actually control the disputed territories. The Abe government showed strong determination to resolve the territorial issue， stating that it is “a duty to future generations” to resolve “the sovereignty of the four northern islands.”24 During his term， Abe repeatedly vowed to settle territorial disputes with Russia.25 On the other hand， Japan needs a better relationship with Russia to change its isolation in Northeast Asia， where Japan has poor relations with its neighbors including North and South Koreas as well as China due to historical and territorial issues. Around 2012， Japan was embroiled in territorial disputes with Russia over the “Northern Territories，” with South Korea over the Dokdo Island （claimed as Takeshima by Japan）， and with China over the Diaoyu Islands at almost the same time， further deepening Japan’s isolation in Northeast Asia. Against this backdrop， the Abe administration made the improvement of Russia-Japan relations an important diplomatic move to change Japan’s isolation in Northeast Asia and to stop the formation of a China-Russia-ROK coalition against Japan over disputed territories， especially taking into account its complex historical issues with China and the ROK and the increasing strategic competition with China. These are the main reasons for Japan’s great enthusiasm for developing relations with Russia.

From the Russian perspective， there is no one-way or absolute strategic need for Russia to develop its relations with Japan. First， Russia actually controls the disputed islands， so it has no real need to resolve the territorial issue. Once making it clear that it has no territorial dispute with Japan，26 Russia need not rush to solve the territorial issue in actual negotiations. “It does not mean that we will solve everything tomorrow if the problem has not been solved for the past 67-68 years，” Putin said when talking about the process of negotiations.27 “There is a long painstaking work ahead of creating conditions for reaching mutually acceptable solutions.”28 This shows different positions between Russia and Japan in dealing with the territorial issue. Second， Russia has better relations with its neighbors in Northeast Asia than Japan and has no urgent strategic need as Japan does. Third， although Russia needs its partnership and cooperation with Japan in implementing its “Turn to the East” strategy， Japan’s value is rather limited and is replaceable. Although Russia’s “Turn to the East” strategy requires friendship and cooperation with the Asia-Pacific countries， Japan is not the only major power besides China. South Korea， India and ASEAN countries are developing rapidly and play an increasingly important role in the region， and Russia has been actively promoting its relations with these countries in recent years. Fourth， Japan is not the only or prominent trading partner for Russia in its Far East. In fact， China and South Korea have closer cooperation with Russia over trade and investment in the region. China has been the top trading partner of Russia in the Russian Far East for many years. In 2015-2019， the Russian Far East received about $33 billion in foreign direct investment， with Chinese investment accounting for 71 percent of the total.29 Therefore， Japan plays a limited role in developing the Russian Far East. Instead， the United States’ Russia policy is the factor that will decide whether Russia’s efforts to weaken Western sanctions will work out. Moreover， as the European Union is Russia’s major trading partner， developing Russia-Japan relations has only limited effects on easing Western sanctions against Russia.

In terms of policy needs and strategic values， Russia holds a oneway and irreplaceable strategic value to Japan in resolving the territorial issue and changing its isolation in Northeast Asia， while Japan plays a limited or replaceable role to Russia in implementing its “Turn to the East”strategy， developing its Far East region and breaking Western sanctions. This fundamentally leads to different diplomatic postures between Russia and Japan.

Different attitudes towards China between Russia and Japan are another main reason for the two countries’ different positions in developing bilateral relations. Since taking office in 2012， the Abe administration actively cooperated with Obama’s strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific and Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy. It even took the initiative to bring Australia， India and some Southeast Asian countries together to contain China. As an important part of its China policy， Japan’s purpose of developing relations with Russia in recent years is to drive a wedge between China and Russia， and if possible，to dismantle the relationship and even build a Japan-Russia alliance against China. “Many countries， including Japan， are worried about China’s move in the South China Sea and the East China Sea，” Abe noted， “I think it is very important to promote Japan’s security cooperation with Russia.”30 Katsuyuki Kawai， Special Advisor for Foreign Affairs to President of the Liberal Democratic Party （LDP）， declared during his stay in the United States that the US should be interested in concluding a treaty between Russia and Japan as this would “strengthen the bloc” against China.”31

Russia has clearly rejected Japan’s attempts to balance China together with Russia. “This is an outrageous statement，” Lavrov responded to Kawai’s remarks， “and we have issued a serious warning about how inappropriate such statements are.”32 “When everything that happens in the relations between our countries is regarded as an attempt to ‘drive a wedge’ into them and divide our positions， it only causes deep regret， because it reflects the‘either with us or against us’ mentality，” Lavrov said， “Russia and China have not made friends to oppose anyone. We are friends because we are neighbors and strategic partners in international affairs.”33 In fact， Russia has made China the primary partner in implementing its “Turn to the East” strategy in recent years. While Russia also strives to develop its relations with other AsiaPacific countries， especially regional powers such as Japan， to avoid its overdependence on a single country， this has not changed Russia’s partnership with China. China is of greater strategic importance to Russia than Japan， in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and especially when the Trump administration identified both China and Russia as strategic competitors and increased US containment of the two countries. Therefore， with China’s friendly policy toward Russia， Russia does not and will not take the initiative to alienate and worsen its relations with China， just to pander to Japan， which Russia considers does not fully control its foreign policy and actually takes orders from the United States.

Prospects of Russia-Japan Relations

The recent shift of political power in Japan has brought Russia-Japan relations into a new era. The future of the bilateral relations is not optimistic， probably with zero breakthrough or even deterioration， but there will not be a decoupling between Russia and Japan either.

Zero breakthrough or even deterioration

While the first phone call between Putin and Suga in September 2020 confirmed their political will of pursuing progress while ensuring stability， it also started a new round of competition between the two sides over the territorial issue. Taro Kono， Japan’s former Defense Minister and the newly appointed Administrative Reform Minister， conducted a remote inspection of the disputed isles on September 27， 2020， claiming Japanese sovereignty over the “Northern Territories.” In response， on September 29 when Putin and Suga had that phone call， the Russian Pacific Fleet released information about military exercises and mortar tests in the Sea of Japan. In early October， Russia held anti-landing drills at the company level and integrated tactical special training on the Kuril Islands. On October 16， Russian Prosecutor-General Igor Krasnov visited the disputed islands， becoming the highest-ranking Russian official doing so since Suga formed his cabinet and prompting diplomatic protests from Japan. This start of RussiaJapan relations in the Suga era indicates a tortuous path for the bilateral relationship. In a new historical period， there may be zero breakthrough or even deterioration of Russia-Japan relations， especially with regard to the territorial issue and peace treaty for several significant reasons.

First， there is a decline of political power pushing Russia-Japan relations forward. The political dynamics in Japan during the Suga era are less conducive to improving Russia-Japan relations than during the Abe era.Diplomatic compromises and major concessions are more likely to happen under a strong leader and a stable government. Abe maintained stability and centralization of power during his long tenure in office. His economic policy， known as “Abenomics，” helped Japan gradually walk out of its “l(fā)ost two decades” and achieve brighter economic success than before， which greatly empowered Abe to push through important reforms and diplomatic compromises or concessions. Despite Abe’s strong hand and determined political will， he ultimately failed to make a breakthrough in Russia-Japan relations even as the settlement of territorial disputes and a peace treaty with Russia were on his political agenda. This explains the difficulty in untying the intractable knot in Russia-Japan relations.

Abe’s resignation will leave a negative impact on the development of Russia-Japan relations. Abe was the “engine” of Japan’s relations with Russia. “Under his leadership we had good relations，”34 former Russian Ambassador to Japan Alexander Panov said. And Abe “supported closer ties between Russia and Japan at least in words and we are not sure that the new Prime Minister will be enthusiastic about improving RussiaJapan relations.”35 Although the Suga administration will continue to push through negotiations toward a consensus on important issues between the two countries， many Japanese scholars believe that “a peace treaty will never be possible if it cannot be achieved during Abe’s term.”36 Some even think that Abe’s failure to resolve the territorial issue may lead to a “slow death” of Russia-Japan relations.37

Domestic political agenda makes it difficult for the Suga cabinet to make major concessions. Suga as the new LDP leader can only serve out the final year of Abe’s term until September 2021 when a new election for party leadership will be held. And Japan’s House of Representatives general election will be held in October 2021. As the COVID-19 resurgence in Japan has hit the domestic economy， Suga’s major tasks are to fight against the pandemic， revive the economy and push for the Tokyo Olympics， which have been postponed until 2021， to be held as scheduled. In addition， Suga is widely seen as lacking diplomatic skills and his political experience is mainly about domestic policy. Seen from his phone calls with foreign leaders， Suga’s diplomacy suggests a continuation of Abe’s influence， with a focus on the US-Japan alliance. Suga also wants a stable relationship with Russia and a fundamental change in Russia-Japan relations is not likely to happen in the near future.

Second， the odds are against making compromises on the territorial issue and the peace treaty in both countries. After Putin and Abe reached a preliminary consensus in 2018， both sides have held a tougher stance toward each other. Since Crimea’s incorporation into Russia， Russia has been strengthening its control over disputed territories and has legislated to exclude any possibility of territorial cession. In April 2020 Putin signed a bill changing the date of the end of World War II from September 2nd to 3rd， which was seen as a move to strengthen Russia’s claim to the disputed islands， because the Soviet Union occupied the Kuril Islands on September 3， 1945. “September 3， 1945 is very important to us when the last battle of World War II was fought on this land， and South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were liberated，” said Valery Limarenko， Governor of Russia’s Sakhalin Region.38 More importantly， Article 67 of the Russian Constitution adopted in July 2020 prohibits the alienation of any part of Russian territory. This was followed by a law signed by Putin in August that equates the undermining of Russia’s territorial integrity， including the cession of any Russian territory， with extremism. To clarify the effect of the constitutional amendment， relevant provisions were engraved on stone monuments in“Yuzhno-Kurilsk” on the Kunashir Island， known as the Kunashiri Island in Japanese. According to Dmitry Medvedev， Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council and former Russian Prime Minister， the constitutional amendment would make negotiations between Russia and Japan easier， because “the conversations should be based on the current constitution， which includes provisions on the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and does not even allow the discussion of any territorial alienation.”39

As the possibility of transferring the disputed islands to Japan has been ruled out by Russia， the door for Russia’s concessions on the territorial issue seems to be closed. Moreover， the majority of the Russian public does not support the transfer. According to a poll conducted by Russian Public Opinion Research Center， 96 percent of the residents of the “Southern Kuril Islands” believe the islands are Russian territory.40 In Russia， 77 percent of the respondents oppose the handover of the islands to Japan.41 It is noteworthy that almost every negotiation between Russia and Japan on the peace treaty and the territorial issue has led to demonstrations in Russia against the handover， leaving little room for compromise by the authorities.

As for Japan， domestic public opinion is not satisfied with the preliminary consensus in 2018. According to the poll， 61.6 percent of the respondents believe that Russia should hand over the “four northern islands” together.42 In this context， Abe returned to the position that Japan has sovereignty over the entire “Northern Territories” in January 2019.43 A statement removed from Japan’s 2019 Diplomatic Bluebook， that “Japan has sovereignty over the Northern Territories，” reappeared in the 2020 Diplomatic Bluebook. Following the first call between Suga and Putin， Japan’s new Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato made a similar statement.44

It is clear that both Russia and Japan are increasingly assertive on the territorial issue. Instead of a breakthrough， the two sides are moving backwards on this issue， which is bound to bring negative impact on RussiaJapan relations during the Suga era.

Third， the development of Russia-Japan relations is limited by the deployment of US missile defense systems in Japan， the possible deployment of short- and intermediate-range missiles， and broader US-Japan cooperation. In recent years， the United States and Japan have been actively cooperating on missile defense. The US has deployed two X-band radars in different areas of Japan in 2006 and 2014 respectively， and is advancing the land-based missile defense system on Japanese territory. Lavrov said that the deployment creates risks for Russia and China when the US declared the two countries as its major competitors， and seriously deteriorates Russia-Japan relations. In fact， in response to US-Japan cooperation on the missile defense system，“Russia has stated more than once that such moves are not helpful to improve regional stability and they will be taken into account in Moscow’s negotiations with Tokyo.”45

In addition， Russia has expressed concern at statements by US senior officials that the United States will first deploy short- and intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region， particularly in Japan and South Korea. In September 2019， Putin noted that if the United States were to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Japan or South Korea under the pretext of dealing with threats from North Korea， this would pose a substantial threat to Russia.46 In fact， Russia also pays attention to the broader US-Japan alliance. Putin once stressed， “There are many questions about the peace treaty. It is no secret. We must look at Japan’s obligations with its partners in the field of defense and security， and the possible impact on Russia-Japan negotiations on the peace treaty.”47 Thus， Russia’s concern about the US-Japan alliance was and will remain a major obstacle to the development of Russia-Japan relations.

Decoupling of relations unlikely

Even if Russia-Japan relations are difficult to make any breakthrough and faced with possible deterioration， the two countries are unlikely to decouple from each other and will maintain contacts and consultations on bilateral issues.

First， a stable bilateral relationship is in line with the geopolitical needs of both Russia and Japan. Western countries led by the US are now curbing Russia and increasing their strategic encirclement of Russia in the EuroAtlantic region， which strengthens Russia’s determination to implement its“Turn to the East” strategy and build stable strategic relations with countries on its eastern front， so as not to be under pressure on both sides. In this context， the improvement of strategic relations with Japan is important for Russia to maintain a stable strategic environment on its eastern front. As for Japan， given the recent deadlock with South Korea over historical issues and little progress in its China diplomacy， developing closer ties with Russia is of strategic value for a better external environment instead of regional isolation. Geopolitically， both Russia and Japan have the basic need and strategic will to stabilize their relations.

Second， both sides are willing to deepen their relations in more areas. For Russia， a close relationship with Japan is an important part of its balanced diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region to avoid over-dependence on a single country. It consolidates its role as a major Eurasian power， enhances its influence in Asia-Pacific and international affairs， stops Japan from fully following the US against Russia， and partially divorces Japan from US strategic deployment in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. Therefore， Russia has adopted a push and pull strategy toward Japan to avoid provoking Japan outright. While warning about and suppressing certain moves by Japan， it is always open to dialogue with Japan.

For Japan， a closer relationship with Russia has important political implications. It helps gain more support from Russia for Japan’s diplomatic goal of permanent membership on the UN Security Council. Japan also attempts to use the growing Russia-Japan relations to hedge against the influence of China-Russia relations. With a relative decline of US power， weakening security commitments from the US and more costs for its allies， Japan needs good relations with other countries to advance its possible independent diplomacy and enhance its security capabilities in the future， and a stable Russia-Japan relationship is a vital part of it. Japan’s moves of breaking constitutional limits and militarizing， if possible， would need Russia’s understanding.

In addition， Russia and Japan have economic complementarities. Russia is a major energy resource exporter and an important market and it needs financial and technical support in implementing its “Turn to the East” policy. Japan is a major economic and technological power and it needs resources and new markets while pulling its economy forward. Both countries have the condition and will to deepen their economic cooperation. This is a deeprooted motivation for deepening Russia-Japan relations in all aspects.

Third， the door for dialogue and cooperation is always open for Russia and Japan to resolve the territorial issue and reduce sanctions. Despite little hope for a territorial settlement， Japan will not easily give up. Putin’s vague statement that he “will open a dialogue on all bilateral issues with Japan” has triggered a wide spectrum of interpretations in Japan. Tokyo believes issues related to the“Northern Territories” are included in the dialogue， and hence is motivated to advance territorial negotiations and cooperation with Russia. Meanwhile， Japan has realized that frequent Western sanctions against Russia have failed to shake Russia’s firm stance on the territorial issue， but rather have somewhat strengthened Russian nationalist sentiment and increased Russia’s control over the disputed islands. Therefore， Japan will continue its friendly policy toward Russia beyond the framework of joint sanctions， thus creating a good atmosphere for resolving the territorial issue. Japan’s goodwill makes it possible to act as a medium between Russia and the West on the gradual easing of Western sanctions against Russia. Against this backdrop， promoting economic cooperation with Japan will benefit the economic development in the Russian Far East and thus mitigate the impact of Western sanctions.

In general， Russia and Japan will continue their dialogue without any meaningful progress for a long time to come. The two countries may explore possible cooperative paths without signing a peace treaty. Despite possible deterioration in Russia-Japan relations， in the short term relations between the two countries will not return to the frozen period with zero high-level dialogue.

Conclusion

As the longest serving Prime Minister in Japan’s history， Shinzo Abe viewed the development of Russia-Japan relations as a major task of his “total settlement of post-war diplomacy，” and actively promoted the thawing and warming of Russia-Japan relations. A preliminary consensus was reached on the basis of bilateral negotiations on the territorial issue， and the agreement on joint economic activities on the disputed islands was partly implemented， guiding the future of Russia-Japan relations in the post-Abe era. However， Abe failed to find a strategic path for the upgrading of Russia-Japan relations and the relations will be faced with even more constraints. Looking to the future， the territorial issue is more likely to turn into an intractable knot in Russia-Japan relations due to unfavorable political atmosphere in both countries. Russia-Japan relations may be drifting toward conflicts without the guarantee of a peace treaty. But at the same time， both Russia and Japan have the political will and realistic interests to deepen bilateral relations， which functions as a brake valve to ensure no decoupling. The future Russia-Japan relations will remain in a lukewarm state.

1 “Japan-Russia Summit Telephone Talk，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， September 29， 2020， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/erp/rss/northern/page6e_000215.html.

2 “Telephone Conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga，” President of Russia， September 29， 2020， http：//kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64110.

3 “Vladimir Putin’s Interview with Nippon TV and Yomiuri Newspaper，” President of Russia， December 13， 2016， http：//kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53455.

4 “Speech by Prime Minister Abe at the Plenary Session of the Eastern Economic Forum，” Prime Minister’s Office of Japan， September 5， 2019， http：//www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/statement/2019/0905eef. html.

5 “Joint Statement by the President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of Japan on the Development of Russia-Japan Partnership，” President of Russia， April 29， 2013， http：//news.kremlin.ru/ ref_notes/1446.

6 Sun Cheng， “Abe’s New Approach to the ‘Northern Territories’ Issue and Its Strategic Considerations，”Japanese Studies， No.2， 2017， p.49.

7 What Japan refers to as the “Northern Territories” is referred to by Russia as the “Southern Kuril Islands.”

8 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks Following Talks with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Kono，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia， May 10， 2019， https：//www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/ news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3639995.

9 Zhang Jianshu，”US-Japan Relations Are Still Roadblock to the Development of Russia-Japan Relations，”CYOL， December 27， 2019， http：//news.cyol.com/yuanchuang/2019-12/27/content_18301120.htm.

10 “Russian Defense Minister Confirms Progress in Russia-Japan Relations，” Sputnik News Chinese， March 20， 2017， http：//sputniknews.cn/politics/201703201022131360/.

11 “Japan-Russia Summit Meeting （Summary），” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， September 5， 2013， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/page4_000169.html.

12 “Russian Expert： Russia-Japan Cooperation in the Far East Not Affected by Abe’s Resignation，”Sputnik News Chinese， August 28， 2020， http：//sputniknews.cn/russia/202008281032049123.

13 Павел Тарасенко， Михаил Коростиков， Елена Черненко Два плюс два？ ничего не решают бездвоих. // Мир перемен. 1 августа 2018 г.， http：//mirperemen.net/2018/08/dva-plyus-dva-nichego-nereshayut-bez-dvoix.

14 Там же.

15 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions at a News Conference Following Talks with Foreign Minister of Japan Taro Kono，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia， January 14， 2019， https：//www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/ id/3472147.

16 “Russian Foreign Minister： Japan Should Recognize Russia’s Sovereignty over the Southern Kuril Islands，” Sputnik News Chinese， February 5， 2019， http：//sputniknews.cn/politics/201902051027577501.

17 “Japan’s Prime Minister Says He Understands Issues Needed to Solve for Peace Treaty with Russia，”Sputnik News Chinese， June 29， 2019， http：//sputniknews.cn/politics/201906291028887729.

18 Li Yonghui， “Estranged Neighbors： Mistrust between Russia and Japan，” Russian， East European & Central Asian Studies， No.2， 2005， p.66.

19 Казакав О. И. Об отношении Японцев к другим странам и россиян к Японии в 2018 году. //Восточная Азия： факты и аналитика. 2019. № 1. C.25.

20 Kyodo News Россия укрепляет прибрежную оборонную мощь на ？северных территориях？ воизбежание нападения - на островах будут развернуты танки. 31 октября 2020 г.， https：//inosmi.ru/ social/20201031/248443257.html.

21 “Russian Expert： Like China， Russia Has Historical Issues to Settle with Japan，” People， January 20， 2014， http：//world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0120/c157278-24169316.html.

22 Казакав О. И. Об отношении Японцев к другим странам и россиян к Японии в 2018 году. //Восточная Азия： факты и аналитика. 2019. № 1. C.33.

23 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview with Vietnam Television and China’s CCTV and Phoenix TV，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia， February 24， 2019， http：//www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/ asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3540803.

24 Синдзо Абэ Сакура непременно зацветет. // Российская газета. 26 апреля 2013.

25 Майнити симбун Ну что， Премьер Абэ уходит？ И оставляет ？северные территории？ в качествепрощального подарка Путину？. 26 августа 2020 г.， https：//inosmi.ru/politic/20200826/248003780.html.

26 “Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister （Sergey Lavrov） and His Answers to Questions from the Mass Media during the Press Conference Summarising the Results of the Negotiations with the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs， Urmas Paet，” February 18， 2014， https：//www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/ asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/76062.

27 “Answers to Media Questions Following Russian-Japanese Talks，” President of Russia， April 29， 2013， http：//president.kremlin.ru/transcripts/18000.

28 “Press Statements Following Talks with Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe，” President of Russia， January 22， 2019， http：//kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59714.

29 “Chinese Investment Accounts for 71% of FDI in Russian Far East in the Last Four Years，” China Economic Net， September 14， 2019， http：//www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201909/14/t20190914_33147022. shtml.

30 Синдзо Абэ Сакура непременно зацветет. // Российская газета. 26 апреля 2013.

31 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions at a News Conference Following Talks with Foreign Minister of Japan Taro Kono，” January 14， 2019.

32 Ibid.

33 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at a News Conference on the Results of Russian Diplomacy in 2018，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia， January 16， 2019， http：//www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3476729.

34 “Ex-Ambassador to Japan： Abe Was the Engine of Relations with Russia，” https：//nsn.fm/policy/etopipets-eks-posol-rf-v-yaponii-ob-otstavke-sidzo-abe.

35 “Russian Expert： Russia-Japan Cooperation in the Far East Not Affected by Abe Resignation，” Sputnik News Chinese， August 28， 2020， http：//sputniknews.cn/russia/202008281032049123.

36 “Japan Intends to Change Negotiation Strategy as Russia-Japan Peace Treaty Talks Could Drag On，”Sputnik News Chinese， February 14， 2019， http：//sputniknews.cn/politics/201902141027660430.

37 Kazuhiko Togo， “Japan-US Relations with Extension to Japan’s Ties to Russia and China，” The Asan Forum， March 19， 2020， http：//www.theasanforum.org/japan-us-relations-with-extension-to-japans-ties-torussia-and-china.

38 “Military Parade to Mark the 75th Anniversary of WWII Conclusion Held in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk，”Sputnik News Chinese， September 3， 2020， http：//sputniknews.cn/society/202009031032078960.

39 “Medvedev Noted the Impact of Constitutional Amendments on Negotiations on the Kuril Islands，”RIA Novosti， September 2， 2020， https：//ria.ru/20200902/kurily-1576619653.html.

40 “Poll： Residents of the Southern Kuril Islands Oppose Territorial Handover to Japan，” Sputnik News Chinese， February 19， 2019， http：//sputniknews.cn/society/201902191027700263.

41 “Poll： 77% of Russians Oppose Handing Over the Kuril Islands to Japan，” Sputnik News Chinese， January 28， 2019， http：//sputniknews.cn/society/201901281027492461.

42 “Poll： More Than 30% of Japanese Think Russia’s Handover of Two of the Southern Kuril Islands Will Suffice，” Sputnik News Chinese， November 21， 2018， http：//sputniknews.cn/society/201811211026894301. 43 “Abe Declares Japan’s Sovereignty over the Entire Southern Kuril Islands，” January 30， 2019， https：// versia.ru/abye-zayavil-o-suverenitete-yaponii-nad-vsemi-yuzhnymi-kurilami.

44 “Japan Claims Full Sovereignty over the Southern Kuril Islands，” September 30， 2020， https：//eadaily. com/ru/news/2020/09/30/yaponiya-zayavila-o-polnom-suverenitete-nad-rossiyskimi-yuzhnymi-kurilami.

45 “Russian Expert： Japan Abandons Deployment of Aegis System for Better Relationships with Russia and China，” Sputnik News Chinese， June 15， 2020， http：//sputniknews.cn/ military/202006151031638533.

46 “Plenary Session of the Eastern Economic Forum，” President of Russia， September 5， 2019， http：// kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61451.

47 “The APEC Summit Concluded in Vietnam，” President of Russia， November 11， 2017， http：//kremlin. ru/events/president/news/56049.