Japan’s Diplomacy toward China from the Perspective of Regionalism

Cai Liang

In recent years， a major practice of regionalism in Japan’s diplomacy has undoubtedly been its proposal and implementation of the “IndoPacific” concept. The term “Indo-Pacific” is not only a spatial concept that combines the respective natural and geographical regions of the two oceans， but it is also a new cross-domain discourse structure and to a geat extent a geopolitical construct.1 In the new environment characterized by the changing international order， Japan has been deeply concerned about China’s rise in contrast to the United States’ relative decline， worrying that China would dominate the construction of future Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific order through its Belt and Road Initiative. As the traditional geopolitical mindset still prevails， Japan has developed a regional strategy for the Indo-Pacific.2

The concept has very specific objectives： by building a “free， open and inclusive” regional structure， Japan intends to ensure that the rules-based international order （including the rule of law）， freedom of navigation， peaceful resolution of disputes， and free trade represent the means to deliver regional public goods. In this way， a secure and prosperous “Indo-Pacific” that also guarantees Japan’s own national security and economic interests will be achieved.3 With its connotations gradually expanded and balanced， the concept has now covered broad areas including security， politics， and the economy.

Japan’s “Indo-Pacific”： From Conception to Action

China’s rise and America’s decline may arguably be the most influential factor in the changes of the international system. Japan’s standpoint in this matter originates from its identity with the Western bloc and positioning of a Western country accordingly. Therefore， Japan is paying much attention to the impact of the shift upon itself. Particularly， it is concerned that the power transfer caused by China’s rise and America’s decline is developing in a direction that is beneficial to China. It is also worried that this transfer will lead to an imbalance of the original power order in East Asia. Fundamentally， Japan considers itself an important ally of the United States and one of the various regional power centers， and thus believes that it should play a guiding role in maintaining the liberal international order dominated by the US.

Furthermore， the Indo-Pacific is undoubtedly the region where China-US strategic competition is the most intense. In the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait， military conflict between the two sides is even more likely. At the same time， from an economic perspective， this region has become one of the world’s most active centers of economic development and a vital engine for the global economy. This complex situation has led to a paradoxical phenomenon in the region， depending on the US for security while depending on China for the economy. It has also led countries to find ways to avoid choosing sides between the two major powers.

Amid the growing China-US competition， it is the opinion of Japanese scholars that playing an important role in shaping the foundation for stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific is a diplomatic choice that best suits Japan’s national interests.4 As demonstrated by Japan’s diplomatic practice in recent years， the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy， which was initiated by Japan and then supported by the United States， is the most important approach to implementing the above-mentioned strategic response.

The Indo-Pacific strategy involves comprehensive diplomatic efforts， covering multiple fields including politics， security， and the economy. Politically， Japan is seeking to promote and implement values such as freedom， democracy， and the rule of law for the Indo-Pacific. In terms of security， Japan is concerned about whether the maritime order， based on the rule of law， freedom of navigation and the safety of maritime routes， can be maintained and strengthened， since it regards the maritime order as key to securing peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. In economics and trade， Japan advocates a multilateral architecture and the free trade order to support the economic prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.5

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy was proposed by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development （TICAD） held in Nairobi in August 2016. However， the general idea and related preparations can be said to have a longer history. As early as 2006， just before starting his first term， Abe put forward the concept of a Japan-US-Australia-India security dialogue. He proposed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy first in his speech to the Indian Parliament on August 22， 2007， emphasizing that “the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form.”6 Abe also declared in his speech that Japan and India， as democratic maritime nations with the same way of thinking， should “carry out the pursuit of freedom and prosperity in the region.” After he took office for a second time， Abe also proposed the concept of “Democratic Security Diamond，” which encompasses Japan， the US， Australia and India， and emphasized that the four countries must build a network of relations across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific to ensure security and prosperity.7

It should be pointed out that there are two main external motives which have turned this conception into action. First， Japan believes that China is resorting to force to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Japan stresses that this situation seriously threatens Japan’s freedom of navigation， undermines navigation safety in the waters， and poses a serious challenge to the international order and the system of international legal norms.8 With the continuous implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative， Japan is worried that China is using its comprehensive national power to build a China-dominated regional order in areas along the routes， and is even constructing military bases through Belt and Road cooperation.9 Second， Japan has always maintained that the Japan-US alliance is the cornerstone of the region’s stability and prosperity. While the US wants to strengthen its own direct presence in the Indo-Pacific region， its ability to project power is， objectively speaking， no longer sufficient， due to its declining overall national strength. Thus it clearly hopes that Japan can play a more active role， so that the Indo-Pacific， Europe and the US can unite under the banner of a liberal international order.10 In this context， it becomes apparent why， when Abe formally proposed the Indo-Pacific strategy in 2016， he not only emphasized the need to “make this stretch that is from Asia to Africa a main artery for growth and prosperity，” but also highlighted the wish to “make the seas that connect the two continents into peaceful seas that are governed by the rule of law，” arguing that this principle should become the policy basis of the 21st century world order.11

After Donald Trump became US President， unilateralism and trade protectionism， characterized by “America First，” led to increasing uncertainty in US foreign strategy. Abe needed to improve relations with China as a “Plan B” in response to the “Trump shock” on the one hand. On the other， he had to alter his Indo-Pacific strategy from one based especially on the strengthening of defense and security partnerships in the region， into one which focused more on building a comprehensive and balanced regional order. In other words， this new concept would highlight mutual benefits and public goods， such as openness and freedom， economic cooperation and development coordination. It was imperative in historical terms that on November 6， 2018， Abe used his meeting with then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to formally announce a shift from “strategy” to “vision.”

This shift did not fundamentally change Japan’s established goals， but it has significantly softened the emphasis on geopolitical competition and deterrence， and instead highlighted the importance of the construction of economic and trade rules. Japan hoped that competition and cooperation between China and Japan could be incorporated into a Japan-led framework.12

The most prominent feature of the succeeding Yoshihide Suga cabinet has arguably been to inherit Abe’s policies， and Suga’s Indo-Pacific approach has reflected a similarly strong policy continuity.13 But it must be pointed out that the shift from conception to action in Japan’s apporach to the Indo-Pacific was closely associated with Abe’s strong political leadership and diplomatic impetus. Suga obviously does not have Abe’s strong ability to control， and his foundation of government is not stable enough to allow him to devote his efforts to the Indo-Pacific in the same way as Abe. If the Indo-Pacific strategy of the Abe period was showing at least some trace of Japan’s diplomatic autonomy with “a firm stance despite its soft appearance” in its relations with the US， then Japan’s role in the Suga era is very likely to decline and become only an important attachment to the USdominated Indo-Pacific strategy.

Multi-Dimensional Hedging： Japan’s Construction of a MultiLevel Security System

Japan applies a distinct hedging approach in the Indo-Pacific to address China’s rise. It adopts balancing and cooperation simultaneously to prevent potential security threats from the target country while also forestalling a scenario in which bilateral relations develop into fierce and damaging confrontation.14

Looking from its diplomatic practice to promote the Indo-Pacific concept in recent years， Japan apparently cares most about the security aspect. Japan seeks to build， through multi-dimensional hedging， a multilevel security system targeting China. This system is mainly characterized by a continuously expanding multilateral and multi-level structure with the Japan-US alliance at the core， and the Japan-US-AustraliaIndia cooperation mechanism as the main pillar. On the one hand， the arrangement demonstrates the spillover effects of the structural function of Japan-US alliance， that is， based on Japan and the United States， other countries can be absorbed to expand the security system and ensure common interests. On the other hand， it reflects that America’s hegemony is declining， and that Japan is even more unable to implement its IndoPacific vision on its own. Therefore， what Japan emphasizes is to “work together with countries with which we share fundamental values such as freedom， democracy， human rights， and the rule of law，” and to “work hand-in-hand with countries such as ASEAN members， Australia， and India to ensure the peace and prosperity of Asia and the region stretching from the Pacific Rim to the Indian Ocean.”15

From Japan’s perspective， a country to be included in this multilevel security system should meet two requirements. First， the choice of the country must serve Japan’s own strategic needs. Second， it must also be an ally or partner of the United States. Generally speaking， Japan’s arrangement puts its alliance with the US at the primary level of the security system， and regional powers and nodal countries with important geopolitical significance are positioned on other layers. In particular， the Japan-India and Japan-Australia parterships constitute the second layer， while the multilateral strategic alliance between Japan， the US， Australia and India makes up the backbone of the Indo-Pacific vision. ASEAN countries， mainly coastal states of the South China Sea such as Vietnam， the Philippines and Indonesia， constitute the third layer. Located on the fourth layer are the United Kingdom， France， Germany， the European Union and other regional countries.16 Notably， the construction of this multi-level security system， under the banner of establishing joint maritime security capabilities， also serves as a justification for Japan’s intensive defense cooperation with other countries， which involves exporting weapons and equipment， training defense-related personnel in other countries， and offering “rear support” via Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.

As Japan’s historical development since the end of the Cold War shows， its various actions to enhance domestic military strength and to repeatedly break the restrictions on its military have always been inextricably linked to the strengthening of the Japan-US security alliance system. This system has usually been reinforced each time when Japan and the United States got together for a major international event： there they issue joint declarations， alter defense policies， draft national defense program guidelines， cooperate to formulate defense documents， and promote the revision and improvement of Japan’s domestic security policies and legal systems， thereby continuously elaborating and deepening this system. So far， the two sides have established a mechanism to conduct seamless cooperation between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the US military. For example， the Self-Defense Forces are allowed to provide “equipment defense” for US warships that conduct security surveillance activities. In the field of global cooperation， Japan and the United States can also jointly provide rear support to multinational forces that settle international disputes， provide post-conflict humanitarian support， and protect the safety of maritime communication lines.

The four-nation cooperation mechanism between Japan， the US， Australia and India is the backbone of the Indo-Pacific concept. The most conspicuous institutional arrangements are the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue （Quad） and the Malabar joint maritime military exercise. The initiation and further development of the strategic cooperation between the four countries is inseparably linked to Abe’s personal advocacy and advancement. In May 2007， following Abe’s proposal， the four countries held their first senior official-level “fourparty security dialogue” during the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting to promote the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific， but the dialogue did not last long. In August 2017， Japan again took the initiative and proposed to the United States to convene a four-nation strategic dialogue at the summit level. On November 12 of the same year， the Japanese delegation hosted a separate director-general-level four-party meeting in Manila during the series of foreign ministers’ meetings on East Asian cooperation. Seven topics were under discussion， including Asian rules and order， freedom of navigation， enhanced connectivity， maritime security， and the urgently needed cooperation on building a free， open， prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.17 On March 12， 2021， the four countries held the first virtual summit meeting. In addition to COVID-19 vaccine cooperation， they mainly discussed maritime security， freedom of navigation and other traditional security issues.18 Evidently， the main goal of the four-nation mechanism is to establish a new multilateral security framework to set international rules for the Indo-Pacific region. The Malabar military exercise was first initiated by the United States and India in 1992. Since Japan and Australia became permanent partners in 2015 and 2020 respectively，19 the four-nation joint military exercise has gradually turned into a regular feature. This exercise will become a practical step to complement the Quad and to expand the security component of the Indo-Pacific concept.

It should also be noted that the formation of the four-nation mechanism involves upgrading not only the three pairs of bilateral cooperation between Japan and US， Japan and Australia， and Japan and India， but also the three sets of trilateral cooperation， namely Japan-USAustralia， Japan-US-India， and Japan-Australia-India. The complex process of bilateral cooperation upgrading and multilateral cooperation networking eventually leads to the four-nation mechanism. Moreover， the upgrading of bilateral relations and the networking of multilateral mechanisms generally run parallel and are mutually complementary.

Whether Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy can effectively be implemented depends largely on whether it can incorporate the United States and rely on their alliance， that is， accommodate the Japanese Indo-Pacific vision with the US version of Indo-Pacific strategy to prompt more American presence and contributions in the region. As the practice of the past few years indicates， Japan has largely achieved this goal. The next steps would be to deepen the two sets of bilateral relations， between Japan and Australia and between Japan and India， and to jointly adopt comprehensive political， security and economic measures that would underscore the effort to shape the regional system and rules together. Japan and Australia have had rather close relations for a long time. As early as 2007， the two countries issued a joint declaration on security cooperation and established a “2+2” dialogue mechanism with the participation of the heads of diplomatic and defense departments. The most notable development is that Japan and Australia reached in principle agreement on bilateral defense cooperation on November 17， 2020， which will enable their two militaries to cooperate more closely. According to the Reciprocal Access Agreement， the two militaries are allowed to visit each other’s countries and participate in training and joint operations， allowing for more joint training and rapid military support in crisis situations. In addition， the agreement clarifies the issue of criminal jurisdiction regarding the visiting troops.20 For Japan， it is the first such agreement since the Status of Forces Agreement signed with the United States in 1960. As a result of the agreement， the relationship between Japan and Australia has been upgraded to a “quasi-alliance.”

As early as 2014， Japan and India raised their bilateral relations to the level of special global strategic partnership. On December 12 of the following year， the two countries issued a joint statement that will serve as a guidepost for the “new era in Japan-India relations.” These developments were examples of how Japan tested its Indo-Pacific strategy with India. After Japan officially unveiled its Indo-Pacific strategy， India consequently became the first target country. Against this background， the two sides issued a joint statement on November 11， 2016， agreeing to jointly advance the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy proposed by Abe， and pledging to continually strengthen their security and economic cooperation in the region. On this basis， the two countries established a “2+2” dialogue mechanism on November 30， 2019， with the participation of their foreign and defense ministers.21

At the same time， Japan is actively promoting the upgrading of three sets of trilateral cooperation mechanisms： Japan-US-Australia， Japan-USIndia， and Japan-Australia-India. As early as 2006， Japan， the US and Australia established a ministerial-level strategic dialogue mechanism，22 and the first trilateral summit was held in the following year. On November 13， 2017， leaders of the three countries met in Manila to discuss as a leading issue how to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region.23 Though starting later and being much less institutionalized than Japan-US-Australia collaboration， the Japan-US-India trilateral cooperation mechanism has developed rapidly due to the deterioration of China-India relations in recent years and increased Japanese and US attempts to woo India. The year 2015 marked a watershed. Before that there were only dialogues at the vice-ministerial level， but after that they were upgraded to a foreign ministers’ meeting mechanism. The three parties agreed to cooperate closely in areas such as maritime security， regional connectivity and joint disaster relief. In 2018， the three countries held their first summit meeting.24 Furthermore， it should be noted that， driven by their shared Indo-Pacific outlook and centered around the Japan-US alliance， the Japan-US-Australia and Japan-USIndia constellations have also institutionalized their joint military exercises besides establishing their respective trilateral security dialogue mechanisms. In contrast， the Japan-Australia-India mechanism is the weakest among the three relationships. It was not until 2015 that the three parties held their first vice-ministerial consultations， without forming a concrete working mechanism. On December 13， 2017， the three parties held the fourth vice-ministerial consultation， and agreed to maintain cooperation to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific order based on the rule of law.25

After upgrading the three pairs of bilateral cooperation and the three sets of trilateral mechanisms， Japan next sought to build a network among the four states and establish a four-nation cooperation mechanism. The main institutional arrangements for this new type of cooperation are the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Malabar naval exercise. It is noteworthy that， in addition to workinglevel quadrilateral meetings， the four countries have also launched consultations on the level of foreign ministers. The meeting mechanism was further institutionalized at the second meeting of Quad foreign ministers in October 2020.26 On February 18， 2021， foreign ministers of the four states held telephone discussions on how to improve cooperation under the framework of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”In addition to cooperation in areas such as high-quality infrastructure construction， maritime security， counter-terrorism， cyber security， humanitarian aid， disaster relief， and personnel training， they also agreed to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN and Europe. Moreover， the four states assessed China’s legitimate actions to preserve stability and maritime rights in the East and South China Seas as “unilateral and forceful attempts to change the status quo，” and expressed their strong opposition.27

The pivotal strategic position of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific region has become a major factor for Japan to regard ASEAN as an important partner in its Indo-Pacific strategy. About 80 percent of Japan’s imports and exports pass ASEAN waters. Therefore， Japan pays utmost attention to the strategic location of the South China Sea， perceiving it as a vital issue for Japan’s national destiny.28 Additionally， the South China Sea is not only a key area for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests， but also an important nexus to implement the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative， deepen China-ASEAN cooperation， and build a closer community with a shared future. Accordingly， Japan has maintained that strengthening cooperation with ASEAN countries is key to implementing its Indo-Pacific concept. As Prime Minister Suga put it：“ASEAN will be absolutely critical key and also a partner for realizing the‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ that Japan is promoting. Japan， as an IndoPacific nation， will resolutely demonstrate both domestically and overseas the determination it has to contribute to the peace and prosperity of this region.”29

Apart from generally bolstering ties with ASEAN， Japan has paid specific attention to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific，30 with which it has sought to synergize.31 Japan has also spared no effort to promote bilateral security cooperation with Vietnam， the Philippines， Indonesia and Malaysia， which involves joint drills， professional training， port calls by Japanese warships， and sales of defense equipment. In 2014， Japan promulgated the “three principles of defense equipment transfer”to replace the “three principles of arms exports” which had been in place for 47 years， thus significantly relaxing export restrictions on Japanese weapons and related military technologies. In practice， the export of defense equipment requires Japan to sign formal agreements with the buyer countries to recognize the relevant transfer principles. At present， Japan has signed defense equipment and technology transfer agreements with the Philippines， Malaysia， Vietnam and Indonesia. On this basis， Japan signed a deal with Vietnam on July 28， 2020， to provide Vietnam with six coast guard patrol boats worth US$345 million and strengthen its maritime security forces. In August of the same year， Japan signed a US$103.5 million contract with the Philippines， supplying a large number of radar stations to the Philippines， which marked Japan’s first export of complete defense products since 2014.32 In March 2021， Japan signed a contract with Indonesia for the delivery of eight frigates.

Under the pretext of openness， Japan has consistently sought to enlist Western powers like the UK， France and Germany， who are also willing to engage in the Indo-Pacific region， as a strategic backup of its Indo-Pacific concept. For example， in his policy speech to the Diet on October 4， 2019， Abe declared that， while upholding the Japan-US alliance as the linchpin， Japan “will join hands with the UK， France， Australia， India， and other countries with which we share fundamental values and bring about a free and open Indo-Pacific.”33 From the EU’s perspective， its policy document in October 2018， “Connecting Europe and Asia： Building Blocks for an EU Strategy，” has underlined closer ties with Asia as a strategic objective. Supported by the dual framework of the Economic Partnership Agreement（EPA） and the Strategic Partnership Agreement （SPA）， Japan and the EU agreed to strengthen cooperation on all issues of global concern. Therefore， it is not surprising that much of Japan’s Indo-Pacific outlook overlaps with Europe’s connectivity strategy. As Shinzo Abe told the Europa Connectivity Forum on September 27， 2019， Japan and Europe should build on the SPA to promote sustainable connectivity and enhance cooperation in quality infrastructure construction.34 In terms of military， Europe’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific is mainly reflected in the interference by major powers such as the UK， France and Germany in the South China Sea.

In the context of Brexit， the UK put forward the concept of “Global Britain，” a strategic vision aimed at increasing its global influence. According to this concept， the UK will play a greater role in the security of the Indo-Pacific region and will enhance its security cooperation with Japan. With the convergence of Japan’s Indo-Pacific vision and the UK’s “Global Britain” concept， security cooperation between the two countries have placed growing emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region. Since both countries regard Indo-Pacific security a top priority of their bilateral strategic cooperation， they have maintained high-level security consultations， established multiple security cooperation mechanisms， and conducted frequent exchanges with an emphasis on the “rules-based international order.” In addition， the UK’s carrier strike group， spearheaded by HMS Queen Elizabeth， will visit Japan and participate in joint military exercises with the US military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces， and cruise in waters off the Okinawa Islands.

Institutional Balancing： Characteristics of Japan’s Economic and Trade Policy towards China

In contrast to the US Indo-Pacific strategy which focuses mainly on security， Japan’s Indo-Pacific concept relies on soft balancing， which is mainly embodied in its institutional design in the economic and trade field. Generally speaking， Japan intends to establish a rules-based regional order with the principles of freedom and openness， and stage a compatible competition with China by means of institutional balancing， in order to dictate the rules in its economic competition and cooperation with China.

Japan’s foreign policy orientation is essentially based on its two most important bilateral ties， with the United States and with China， while its global outreach has been consistent with its national interests. Whether Japan positions itself as a “quasi-great power” or a “middle power，” hard power alone is not enough for Japan to safeguard its national interests. An even more unrealistic scenario for Japan would be to resort to mere values and ideologies for the same purpose. Only by institutional balancing can Japan best advance its national interests.

With the rise of China， an accelerating shift in regional power structure， increasing strategic uncertainty and deepening economic interdependence， Japan is witnessing a profound transformation of the Indo-Pacific region， which is mainly driven by major powers.35 Japan regards the Belt and Road Initiative as China’s hallmark institutional design to accelerate the transformation and reconstruction of the regional order. The huge infrastructure demand in the Indo-Pacific region is widely acknowledged. Japan intends to play a leading role in coordinating high-quality projects and bring in its rich experience in investment and financing. Accordingly， it emphasizes that the IndoPacific region’s economic development must be in accordance with the high-quality rules of the 21st century， to create a free and fair economic zone. The term “high quality” advocated by Japan involves an emphasis on adherence to international standards， openness， transparency， indiscrimination， environmental and social responsibility， and fiscal soundness.36

In terms of economic cooperation， however， Japan has conceded that there is ample space for aligning its Indo-Pacific concept with the Belt and Road Initiative. In this context， the two countries could advance cooperation， seek win-win outcomes， and coexist despite competition. This attitude reflects the pragmatism in Japan’s economic policy consideration towards China. Nevertheless， Japan remains concerned that China will gain a too dominant position when other countries rush to share China’s economic benefits. In response， Japan has adopted an approach of engagement and coordination， sparing no effort to urge China to abide by international law， while trying to regulate and rein in China’s behavior in bilateral cooperation. It has been a policy objective of Japan to make the Belt and Road Initiative “harmless” and guide China’s actions in the process of cooperation.

Given this， Japan has attached great importance to an institutional counterbalance to the Belt and Road Initiative through the Indo-Pacific concept， looking for areas where the two institutions can synergize with each other in their compatible competition. Viewed from this perspective， the third-party market cooperation between China and Japan is the most important nominal institutional synergy between the Indo-Pacific concept and the Belt and Road Initiative.

As is widely known， in 2017， the Japanese government began to take a more positive stance towards the Belt and Road Initiative， although some concerns continued to persist in Japan. In addition， there are worries that the US will impose pressure on Japan if there is closer China-Japan cooperation. Japan has thus refused to “join” the China-led Belt and Road Initiative， and rather wishes to cooperate with China on an equal footing. For this reason， the Japanese government has put emphasis on the term of “third-party market cooperation，” which demonstrates the substantive nature of the cooperation pattern without being constrained by the symbolic meaning of a particular name.

To accelerate the coordination of markets and infrastructure projects of common interest in the countries along the routes of the Belt and Road Initiative， and to complement each other in areas with competitive edges， China and Japan have decided to set up a joint public-private committee with a view to advancing third-party cooperation under their high-level economic dialogue. This involves setting up a cross-departmental working mechanism for promoting third-party market cooperation between the two countries， and organizing the China-Japan Third-Party Market Cooperation Forum in collaboration with business circles. In September 2018， the joint public-private committee held its first meeting in Beijing. During Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China in the following month， the first ChinaJapan Third-Party Market Cooperation Forum was held in Beijing， where the two sides signed 52 cooperation agreements worth over US$18 billion， covering a wide range of fields such as infrastructure， logistics， information technology， finance and energy.37

In April 2019， during the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation， China and Japan further deepened their cooperation in the fields of finance， science and technology， investment， and culture. For example， members of the Belt and Road Bankers Roundtable （BRBR）， including Japan’s Mizuho Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China， jointly issued the Belt and Road Green Financial Index to push for green Belt and Road financial cooperation； Japan’s Financial Services Agency （FSA） and Certified Public Accountants and Auditing Oversight Board （CPAAOB） signed auditing supervision cooperation documents with the Ministry of Finance of China to strengthen relevant cooperation across the border； the Ministry of Education， Culture， Sports， Science and Technology of Japan signed cooperation documents for innovation in science and technology with the Ministry of Science and Technology of China.38

Third-party market cooperation between China and Japan not only serves the national interests of the two countries， but also benefits multilateralism， the free trade system and the open world economy. However， by clinging to a mentality of regulating and constraining China， Japan often sets limitations to cooperation through the use of such rhetoric as “l(fā)ack of transparency and openness，” or “the Belt and Road Initiative has overburdened recipient countries with debt and reduced their financial soundness.” In addition to the constant emphasis on its careful selection of cooperation projects， Japan has also made it a prerequisite to ensure financial integrity， openness， transparency， and economic rationalization of the recipient countries. Moreover， utilizing the privilege of hosting the Osaka G20 summit in 2019， Japan facilitated the G20’s endorsement of a set of principles for investment in infrastructure projects in developing countries， including “openness” in infrastructure utilization， “transparency” in choosing construction units， the “economic efficiency” in building facilities for long-term use， and“financial integrity” with regard to a country’s ability to meet its financial obligations.39 At the seventh TICAD convened in late August 2019， Japan went further to criticize China publicly for pursuing “debt-trap diplomacy” in Africa. The Yokohama Declaration， which was announced after the conference， identified three priorities in the joint efforts of Japan and African countries to accelerate economic transformation and improve business environment： realizing a free， fair， non-discriminatory， transparent， predictable and stable trade and investment environment， keeping open markets， and ensuring a level playing field to foster an enabling business environment.40

Meanwhile， Japan is actively promoting international cooperation in quality infrastructure building in the Indo-Pacific region， particularly by forging “quality infrastructure partnerships” with pivotal regional powers. It even claims to be constructing a criss-crossing “matrix” designed to better promote free market economy. Examples include the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor co-initiated by India， the Blue Dot Network co-launched by the US and Australia， and cooperation with the EU in sustainable connectivity and quality infrastructure.

Conclusion

The China-Japan relationship is one the most complex bilateral relationships in the world. The existence of historical issues， territorial disputes， and mutual trust deficits means that structural security dilemma between the two countries will remain for a long time to come. However， China and Japan are two important neighbors and countries with great influence in the region and the world. Therefore， differences between the two countries should be handled with varying degrees of urgency and on a case-by-case basis.

While getting well prepared for the discord in bilateral relations arising from Japan’s implementation of the Indo-Pacific concept， China should also seek strategic opportunities to promote cooperation between the two countries. As for the recent statements and actions of the Suga government that undermine the basic norms of international relations and violate the basic spirit of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship， China should draw a red line and warn Japan whenever it harms China’s core interests such as territorial sovereignty， while at the same time leveraging the existing dialogue platforms to manage the security crisis caused by the flare-up of conflicts and prevent the situation from escalating further.

Drawing a red line on contradictions， however， does not exclude cooperation； on the contrary， the two countries should adhere to cooperation in areas of common interest. China needs to follow Japan’s moves in the fields of economy， regional cooperation and climate change， explore the space for cooperation between the two sides in specific areas， and make every effort to expand practical bilateral exchanges. Only in this way can the bilateral relations continue on the right track and avoid stagnation， decline， or the trap of so-called great-power confrontation. And only in this way can the two countries jointly contribute to peace and development in the region and the world.

1 Xu Wansheng and Ji Shilun， “The Evolution of China-Japan Security Relations from the Perspective of‘Regions’，” Japanese Studies， No.1， 2020， pp.94-114.

2 Wu Huaizhong， “Japan’s Regionalism Strategy and the Process of Asian Cooperation after the Cold War，” Japanese Studies， No.3， 2020， p.12.

3 Kei Koga， “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question： Countering China of Shaping a New Regional Order？”International Affairs， Vol.96， Issue 1， January 2020， pp.49-73.

4 Hiroyuki Suzuki， “Japan’s Leadership Role in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific，” October 23， 2020， https：// csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/201023_Suzuki_Japan%27s_Leadership_in_ Indo-Pacific_1.pdf.

5 “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond，” Cabinet Secretariat of Japan， https：//www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/pdf/2019boueikeikaku_e.pdf； “Sailing on the Indo-Pacific Ocean， Finding Opportunities for Prosperity，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/files/000407643. pdf.

6 “Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe， Prime Minister of Japan， at the Parliament of the Republic of India‘Confluence of the Two Seas’，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， August 22， 2007， https：//www.mofa. go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html.

7 Shinzo Abe， “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond，” http：//www.project-syndicate.org/Commentary/astrategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe.

8 National Institute for Defense Studies， “East Asian Strategic Review 2020，” http：//www.nids.mod.go.jp/ english/publication/east-asian/e2020.html.

9 Yoshihide Suga， Preparation for Politicians， Bungeishunju， 2020， p.236； Ministry of Defense of Japan，“Defense of Japan 2020，” https：//www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp_2020.html.

10 Nobukatsu Kanehara， Lessons of History： The Reasons of Japan’s Failure and Future National Strategy， Shinchosha Publishing， Co.， Ltd， 2020， pp. 192， 196.

11 “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， August 27， 2016， https：//www. mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.

12 Yuichi Hosoya， “FOIP 2.0： The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy，” Asia Pacific Review， Vol.26， No.1， 2019， pp.18-28； Nicholas Szechenyi and Yuichi Hosoya， Working Toward a Free and Open Indo-Pacific， Carnegie Endowment for International Peace， October 2019， pp.1-3.

13 It needs to be pointed out that the Suga cabinet has more often used the term “free and open IndoPacific，” without clarifying whether it was a strategy or a vision. However， in English the term has been described as an initiative， which shows that its basic meaning remains unchanged. See “Policy Speech by the Prime Minister to the 203rd Session of the Diet，” October 26， 2020， https：//japan.kantei.go.jp/99_suga/ statement/202010/_00006.html.

14 Nick Bisley， Building Asia’s Security， International Institute for Strategic Studies， London， 2009， p. 94.

15 “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 193rd Session of the Diet，” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet， January 20， 2017， https：//japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201701/1221105_11567. html； Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， Diplomatic Bluebook 2020， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ other/bluebook/2020/html/index.html.

16 Lu Wei， “Leadership， Balance of Power and the New Choice of Japanese Alliance Strategy，” Japanese Studies， No.1， 2020， pp.14-44.

17 “Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， November 12， 2017， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001789.html.

18 “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement： ‘The Spirit of the Quad’，” The White House， https：//www.whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/.

19 Japan and Australia already participated in the military exercise for the first time in 2007， but at that time they did not express their intentions to become permanent partners.

20 “Japan-Australia Leaders’Meeting Joint Statement，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， November 17， 2020， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100116180.pdf.

21 “Joint Statement of First Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， November 30， 2019， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/files/000544338.pdf.

22 The trilateral dialogue between the three countries began at the level of senior officials in 2002. It was upgraded to the ministerial level in 2006. At the sixth meeting in 2016， a decision was made to make the meeting an annual event.

23 “President Trump’s Meeting with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull of Australia and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan，” US Embassy and Consulates in Australia， November 13， 2017， https：//au.usembassy. gov/readout-president-trumps-meeting-prime-minister-malcolm-turnbull-australia-prime-minister-shinzoabe-japan.

24 “Japan-U.S.-India Summit Meeting，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， November 30， 2018， https：// www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000969.html.

25 “4th India-Australia-Japan Trilateral Dialogue，” Ministry of External Affairs of India， December 13， 2017.

26 “The Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers’ Meeting，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， October 6， 2020， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press6e_000244.html.

27 “Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers’ Telephone Meeting，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， February 18， 2021， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press3e_000172.html.

28 Kohara Masahiro， Japan’s National Interests， Kodansha Gendai Shinsho， 2018， pp.227 & 248.

29 “Press Conference on the Visit to Vietnam and Indonesia，” October 18， 2020， https：//japan.kantei. go.jp/99_suga/actions/202010/_00016.html.

30 The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific was released on June 23， 2019 at the 34th ASEAN Summit. It stresses sustainable， inclusive and constructive synergy and cooperation with the Indo-Pacific concept.

31 On March 12， 2021， leaders of Japan， the US， Australia and India during the first Quad summit reaffirmed their strong support for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. See “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement： ‘The Spirit of the Quad’，” The White House， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad.

32 National Institute for Defense Studies， East Asian Strategic Review 2020， http：//www.nids.mod. go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/index.html； “Transfer of the Air Surveillance Radar Systems to the Philippines，” Embassy of Japan in the Philippines， August 28， 2020， https：//www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_ en/11_000001_00188.html. https：//www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_008714.html.

33 “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 200th Session of the Diet，” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet， October 4， 2019， https：//japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/201910/_00008.html.

34 “Japan and the EU： The Strong and Steady Pillars Supporting Many Bridges– Keynote Speech by the Prime Minister at the Europa Connectivity Forum，” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet， September 27， 2019， https：//japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201909/_00003.html.

35 He Kai， “Role Conceptions， Order Transition and Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific： A New Theoretical Framework，” Australian Journal of International Affairs， Vol.72， No.2， 2018， pp.92-109.

36 Hiroyuki Suzuki， “Japan’s Leadership Role in a Multipolar Indo-Pacific，” October 23， 2020， https：// csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/201023_Suzuki_Japan%27s_Leadership_in_ Indo-Pacific_1.pdf.

37 “Projects Signed at the First China-Japan Third-Party Market Cooperation Forum，” Ministry of Commerce of China， October 28， 2018， http：//www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/201810/20181002800324. shtml.

38 “Outcomes of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation，” Xinhua， April 28， 2019， http：//www.xinhuanet.com//world/2019-04/28/c_1124425293.htm.

39 “G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment，” https：//www.mof.go.jp/english/policy/ international_policy/convention/g20/annex6_1.pdf.

40 “Yokohama Declaration 2019，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan， https：//www.mofa.go.jp/region/ africa/ticad/ticad7/pdf/yokohama_declaration_en.pdf.