Five Years of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation:Progress,Challenges and Deepening Paths

Ma Jie

The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation （LMC） is the first new subregional cooperation mechanism jointly established by the six countries in the Lancang-Mekong basin. It is an integral part of China-ASEAN cooperation and an essential platform for extensive consultation and joint contribution under the Belt and Road Initiative（BRI）. In the five years since its establishment， the LMC has produced fruitful results in mechanism building， pragmatic cooperation， and the building of a community with a shared future. Several early projects have achieved remarkable results， and their leading role in sub-regional and even regional cooperation has become an increasingly prominent feature. It is important to comprehensively summarize the progress and experience of the LMC and analyze the challenges ahead to deepen the cooperation and promote the building of a community with a shared future in the region.

Progress of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation

On March 23， 2016， the six Lancang-Mekong countries held their first leaders’ meeting in Hainan Province， to implement the LancangMekong sub-regional cooperation initiative proposed by the 17th ChinaASEAN Leaders’ Meeting. They passed the Sanya Declaration， marking the official start of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism.In the past five years， the LMC has withstood the test of global and regional changes in the COVID-19 pandemic. It has maintained a high-level development trend， continuously improved its degree of institutionalization， and steadily advanced pragmatic cooperation in various priority areas. The Lancang-Mekong culture of equality， sincerity， mutual assistance and affinity has become increasingly popular. As one of the most dynamic emerging cooperation mechanisms in the sub-region， the LMC has moved from rapid expansion to a period of comprehensive development and has become a model of sub-regional cooperation in the BRI construction.

Continuous improvement of mechanism-building

The LMC has been continuously improving its cooperation architecture since its inception. Soon after its establishment， a “3+5”cooperation framework was established， with political and security issues， economic and sustainable development， and cultural and people-to-people exchanges as the three pillars， and connectivity， production capacity， cross-border economic cooperation， water resources， and agriculture and poverty reduction as the five key priority areas. The second LMC leaders’meeting in 2018 issued the Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation （2018-2022） and the Phnom Penh Declaration， actively broadening the areas of cooperation and forming a “3+5+X” cooperation framework on the basis of the original structure.1 Six joint working groups have been established under the LMC mechanism. Plans for various priority areas have been completed one after another under the Five-Year Plan of Action. In 2018， China proposed the building of the LancangMekong Economic Development Belt， which was unanimously welcomed by all countries and was included in the Phnom Penh Declaration. At the fourth LMC foreign ministers’ meeting， the six parties agreed to discuss specific plans for joint construction.

At the most recent sixth LMC foreign ministers’ meeting in June 2021， the countries adopted the Joint Statement on Enhancing Sustainable Development Cooperation of the Lancang-Mekong Countries， the Initiative on Deepening Cooperation among Local Governments of Lancang-Mekong Countries， the Joint Statement on Deepening Cooperation on Traditional Medicine within the Framework of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation， among documents. China also proposed formulating the Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation （2023-2027） as one of the critical tasks in the next phase. These plans serve as guiding documents to promote relevant cooperation， advance project implementation， and support sub-regional development.

The platform for Lancang-Mekong cooperation has also been gradually diversified. After five years of development， the LMC has formed a multidimensional cooperation platform composed of joint working groups， cooperation centers， and non-governmental exchange mechanisms. The joint working groups comprise leading officials and experts from the six countries in relevant fields， and hold one or more meetings every year to promote information sharing and full consultation， lay the foundation for the leaders’and foreign ministers’ meetings， and effectively integrate the fragmented forms of cooperation in the past.

Highlights of cooperation in priority areas

In the past five years， pragmatic cooperation in the LMC’s five priority areas has progressed steadily with fruitful results.

First， connectivity in the Lancang-Mekong region has been greatly improved. The Vientiane Declaration adopted at the third LMC leaders’meeting vowed to reinforce trade， investment， power connectivity， cooperation on industry， science and technology， innovation， infrastructure， transportation facility， and aviation， road， rail linkages， tourism and people-to-people linkages. With the joint efforts of the six countries， railway projects in the Lancang-Mekong sub-region have been launched one after another， air routes have extended in all directions，and a comprehensive road network is gradually taking shape， making the prospect of a “one-day living circle” within touch. As a significant symbol of interconnectivity， railway construction is particularly worthy of attention. Currently， the China-Laos railway is progressing rapidly and will open soon， and construction of the China-Thailand railway（Bangkok-Nong Khai） is also advancing steadily. With consensus reached on the construction of the connecting line between ChinaLaos and China-Thailand railways， the central route of the Trans-Asian Railway is on the horizon. In addition， in recent years， the content of connectivity in the Lancang-Mekong region has been further broadened， focusing on both “hard connectivity” and “soft connectivity”2 as well as coordination in economic， trade， financial， technological， and educational fields.

Second， production capacity cooperation provides a key impetus for the socio-economic growth of Lancang-Mekong countries. With the Joint Statement on Production Capacity Cooperation among LancangMekong Countries at the first LMC leaders’ meeting， China has supported more than 40 major projects， such as the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port and Industrial Park in Myanmar and the Vinh Tan Coal-fired Power Plant in Vietnam， in the past five years through its special loan for international capacity and equipment manufacturing cooperation， preferential loans for foreign aid， and preferential export buyers’ credit. Chinese enterprises have actively participated in the construction of the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone， the Rayong Industrial Zone， and the Saisetta Comprehensive Development Zone. Through its “multi-nation， multi-park” plan， China has promoted cooperation in investment， employment， capacity building， and technological innovation， and created a great deal of tax revenue and employment opportunities for the host countries.

Textile and garment is the core industry for Lancang-Mekong production capacity cooperation. In 2019， textile and garment business associations of the six countries held the first LMC Textile and Apparel Summit， issued the Joint Statement on Production Capacity Cooperation of Textile and Garment Industry among Lancang-Mekong Countries， and launched the long-term cooperation mechanism of the Lancang-Mekong Textile and Garment Industry Dialogue， thus kicking off all-round cooperation. The LMC Production Capacity and Investment Promotion Alliance and the Capacity Cooperation Fund are under intensive preparation. The six countries hope to use capacity cooperation as a starting point to make essential contributions to promoting the industrial transformation of Lancang-Mekong countries and building a complete sub-regional industrial and value chain.

Third， the Lancang-Mekong cross-border economic cooperation has been continuously enriched. The six countries have vigorously promoted cross-border cooperation in regional power trade， e-commerce， economic and technical cooperation， industrial parks， cross-border economic cooperation zones， and trade and investment facilitation. The construction of cross- border or border economic cooperation zones has been accelerated and upgraded， such as the Dongxing-Mang Cai， Pingxiang-Dong Dang， HekouLao Cai， and Long Bang-Tra Linh ports between China and Vietnam， the Mohan-Bo Ding port between China and Laos， and the Ruili-Muse and Lincang-Chinshwehaw ports between China and Myanmar. The six countries have also established a series of new mechanisms and new platforms for cross-border economic cooperation to fully tap the trade potential among them. Moreover， the expansion and upgrading of China’s domestic pilot free trade zones has provided new momentum for LancangMekong cross-border cooperation. Due to their close ties with the Mekong countries， the pilot free trade zones in Guangxi and Yunnan have made it a priority to experiment cross-border economic cooperation with ASEAN. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic， China has established fast tracks for bilateral personnel exchanges and green lanes for emergency supplies with Laos， Cambodia and Myanmar， and has actively promoted discussions on the construction of the Lancang-Mekong fast-track and green-lane network.3 These mechanisms are still expected to work after the pandemic is over.

Fourth， the Lancang-Mekong institutional cooperation on water resources has reached a new height. The LMC is born out of water. It established the first platform for water resources cooperation joined by all of the six countries in the river basin， and has made significant progress in water policy formulation， flood prevention and disaster relief， personnel training， and technology promotion. China has repeatedly provided emergency water replenishing to meet the needs of the Mekong countries. It has stepped up the implementation of cooperation projects on dam safety， rural water supply， and green hydro-power. It has also provided more than 1，000 exchange training opportunities for water conservancy talents in the Mekong countries. In 2020 alone， 22 rural water supply demonstration projects have been completed in Laos.

In 2019， the first Ministerial Meeting of Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation was held in Beijing， marking first among the LMC priority areas to be upgraded to the ministerial level. Through the Joint Statement of the Ministerial Meeting of Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation and the List of Proposed Projects on Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation， the Lancang-Mekong countries committed to indepth cooperation in water resources and green development， integrated water resources management and climate change adaptation， water sector production capacity cooperation， rural water conservancy and livelihood improvement， sustainable hydropower development and energy security， and transboundary river cooperation and information sharing. It was also decided at the meeting to convene the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Forum regularly. In addition， China announced the sharing of the Lancang River’s annual hydrological information with the five Mekong countries and officially launched the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Information Sharing Platform on November 30， 2020. At the sixth LMC foreign ministers’ meeting in June 2021， the six countries reached a broad consensus on the next step of water resources cooperation. They expressed their support for China to host the second Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Forum and Vietnam to host the second Ministerial Meeting of Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation. The six countries also committed to strengthening pragmatic cooperation， fully promoting the construction of information sharing platforms， and enhancing the sustainable development and management capabilities of the water resources sector.

Fifth， the Lancang-Mekong cooperation in agriculture and poverty reduction has benefited thousands of households. The Lancang-Mekong agricultural cooperation took the Village Chiefs’ Forum as the starting point to strengthen agricultural and rural policy dialogues. With the support of the Lancang-Mekong Special Fund， a series of projects have been implemented， and the LMC Bumper Harvest projects are progressing steadily. Based on their broad consensus， the six countries have achieved gratifying results in the four areas of policy dialogue， industrial development and enhancement， investment and trade promotion， and capacity building. Significant progress has been made in the construction of the Lancang-Mekong agricultural cooperation platform.

In January 2020， the Lancang-Mekong Agricultural Technology Extension and Information Exchange Platform was put into trial operation. The platforms for joint green crops prevention and control， cooperation among agricultural scientific research institutions， smart agriculture monitoring， and veterinary medicine and vaccine cooperation have since been established one after another， which have played an essential role in promoting Lancang-Mekong agricultural information sharing， scientific and technological exchanges， and technology promotion. Chinese enterprises have also set up agricultural cooperation demonstration zones in Cambodia and Laos to build production， processing and logistics bases for rice， rubber， fruits and vegetables， and livestock products.

In terms of poverty reduction， China put forward a non-paper on LMC poverty reduction cooperation at the first leaders’ meeting， promoted the implementation of the Cooperation Initiative on Poverty Reduction in East Asia， and has successively established demonstration sites for poverty reduction cooperation in countries such as Cambodia， Laos， and Myanmar. These demonstration projects have improved the infrastructure conditions and public service levels of the villages where they are located， enhanced their self-development capabilities， and promoted poverty reduction and development in the Mekong countries.

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic， cooperation in public health and the digital economy has also received extensive attention. Based on their rich experience in public health cooperation， the six countries have supported each other and overcome difficulties together during the pandemic. Long before the pandemic， they had carried out various types of cooperation on infectious disease prevention and control， which can be traced to the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance in November 2001. Since the LMC’s launch， public health has been included in the “3+5+X” framework and the Five-Year Plan of Action. Substantial progress has been made in establishing joint prevention and control of and response to cross-border infectious diseases through relevant platforms. At the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak， the six countries held a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss the establishment of a joint response mechanism for major public health emergencies， focusing on coordinated actions and the joint fight against the pandemic. At a difficult time when China was fighting the coronavirus， the governments and people of the Mekong countries quickly extended their help to China by donating money and supplies. When the pandemic was later raging in the Mekong countries， China also provided assistance within its capacity， sending teams of anti-epidemic medical experts to Cambodia， Laos and Myanmar and assisting the five countries with a large amount of medical supplies. During the third LMC leaders’meeting， Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced that it would set up a special fund for public health under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Special Fund framework to provide materials and technical support to the Mekong countries， and promised to give them priority access to China’s COVID-19 vaccines.

In recent years， the Lancang-Mekong countries have successfully introduced digital development strategies and extensively cooperated in infrastructure， platform construction， market expansion， and digital content. Companies such as Huawei and ZTE have undertaken the design and construction of domestic and cross-border communication infrastructure in multiple Mekong countries， such as the MalaysiaCambodia-Thailand undersea cable system. In 2020， Huawei signed 5G project contracts with telecom companies in Thailand and the Philippines， and successfully tested the first 5G international video call between China and Thailand.4 Leading Chinese digital economy companies such as Alibaba， JD.com， and Tencent have accelerated their deployment in the digital economy market of Mekong countries through equity investment and acquisitions. Cross-border trade characterized by e-commerce platforms has developed rapidly. The digital payment platforms invested by these Chinese companies have covered major Southeast Asian markets such as Myanmar， Thailand and Vietnam， and many of them have over 100 million users.5

The pandemic has accelerated the social and economic digitization in various countries， and the importance of the digital economy in subregional cooperation has become increasingly prominent. In November 2020， the 23rd China-ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting adopted the Initiative on Building the China-ASEAN Partnership on Digital Economy. Aiming at creating a digital economy partnership of mutual trust， mutual benefit， inclusiveness， innovation， and win-win outcomes， the initiative calls for more cooperation in digital technology for pandemic prevention and control， digital infrastructure， digital transformation of industries， smart cities， cyberspace， and cybersecurity. In this context， China has repeatedly proposed strengthening experience sharing with Mekong countries， accelerating the construction of digital infrastructure， actively cultivating future-oriented new industries and new business formats， and promoting the coordinated development of the real economy and the digital economy， which is welcomed by all parties. China has also actively shared its experience in building the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone， launched cloud computing innovation centers in Laos， Myanmar， and Cambodia， and carried out innovative projects on satellite remote sensing and big data platforms， which has effectively promoted regional industrial upgrading and modern smart cities.

Closer relations among Lancang-Mekong countries

In the past five years， with the continuous advancement of LMC， the relations among the Lancang-Mekong countries have also become closer. In the Vientiane Declaration， all parties agreed to enhance the partnership on political and security cooperation， the partnership on economic and sustainable development cooperation， the partnership on social， cultural and people-to-people exchanges， and the partnership on LMC cooperation mechanism to achieve shared prosperity.

Political exchanges among the Lancang-Mekong countries have become closer， and the concept of a community with a shared future is deeply rooted in the people’s hearts. The LMC demonstrates China’s pursuit of neighborhood diplomacy featuring amity， sincerity， mutual benefit and inclusiveness， and its good faith in providing regional public goods. With a superior position in the upstream and a far more significant economic scale， China has taken the initiative to handle the differences with other regional countries in interests and preferences through the multilateral institutional framework of the LMC， which is guided by extensive consultation， joint contribution and shared benefits， and has effectively strengthened the confidence of countries in the sub-region.6

Strategic alignment of the Lancang-Mekong countries has been continuously strengthened. The frequent inter-governmental exchanges， especially high-level exchange visits， have increased mutual trust and friendship between all parties. According to incomplete statistics， from 2015 to 2019， there were more than 20 high-level exchange visits between China and the Mekong countries each year， and nearly 30 in the year 2019. The Lancang-Mekong region is also the best starting point for pioneering a community with a shared future for mankind. In the Sanya Declaration， leaders of the six countries firmly committed to building the LancangMekong community with a shared future for peace and prosperity， the first regional community of its kind to be officially recognized by relevant countries. At the bilateral level， China has also established communities of shared future with Vietnam， Laos， Cambodia， and Myanmar respectively， demonstrating the deep foundation of this concept in the Lancang-Mekong region.

Trade and economic cooperation among the Lancang-Mekong countries has continued to improve， and the integration of their interests has further deepened. The trade volume between China and the Mekong countries rose from US$193 billion in 2016 to $286 billion in 2019， with an average annual growth rate of 13.9 percent. Despite the pandemic’s impact in 2020， the trade volume between China and the Mekong countries still bucked the trend and reached $323 billion， accounting for 47.2 percent of China’s total imports and exports to ASEAN. Among the Mekong countries， the trade volume with Vietnam has increased the most. China has become the largest trading partner of Vietnam， Cambodia， Myanmar and Thailand， and Laos’s secondlargest trading partner， while Vietnam has surged to China’s fourth-largest trading country. China’s investment in the Mekong countries has also steadily increased. The investment stock has risen from $24 billion in 2016 to $33 billion in 2019， with an average annual growth rate of 11.3 percent. China has become the largest source of investment for Cambodia， Laos， Myanmar and Thailand. The rapid growth of trade and investment has promoted the continuous expansion of common interests between China and the five Mekong countries and the deepening of their economic interdependence.

People-to-people and cultural exchanges among Lancang-Mekong countries have become more frequent， and the level of people-to-people bonds has been continuously improved. China has long been the largest source of tourists in the tourism market of the five Mekong countries. Since 2016， the scale of personnel exchanges in the Lancang-Mekong countries has expanded. The number of Chinese tourists to the five Mekong countries has increased rapidly， from about 13.08 million in 2016 to 21.65 million in 2019. Thailand is the most popular destination for Chinese tourists， followed by Vietnam. The number of tourists in Mekong countries going to China has also steadily increased. According to data from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of China， the number of tourists entering China reached 145 million in 2019， a year-on-year increase of 2.9 percent. Among the major international tourist markets， Myanmar and Vietnam ranked first and second （including the number of border residents visiting China）， and Thailand ranked 12th. In 2019， there were more than 50 million mutual visits between China and the Mekong countries. China has also set up a Lancang-Mekong vocational education and training base to tap the potential of human resources in the region effectively. Chinese government scholarships have funded more than 30，000 students from the five Mekong countries to study in China in the past five years. The Lancang-Mekong vocational education and training base has trained more than 40，000 migrant workers in Yunnan， and a project to improve coffee production and quality in Lancang-Mekong region has trained more than 11，000 Myanmar coffee farmers.

Challenges in Deepening Cooperation

Though with significant progress， deepening the LMC still faces many constraints. Among them are the unsolved problems with the mechanism itself and its member states， changes in the regional situation， and the new challenges brought about by major powers outside the region.

Diverse interests and motivations among regional countries

Countries in the sub-region generally welcome the Lancang-Mekong cooperation and hope to use the strengths of all parties to promote the prosperity and sustainable development of each country and the entire subregion. However， due to differences in geographical locations， development strategies， and foreign policies， interests of these countries sometimes diverge. For example， in terms of water resources development and protection， Laos， located in the middle and upper reaches of the Mekong River， pays more attention to hydropower development， hoping to become the battery of IndoChina Peninsula to drive its economic growth， and has already launched some large-scale hydropower projects. Among the countries in the middle and lower reaches of the Mekong River， Thailand is committed to both agricultural irrigation and hydropower development； Vietnam focuses on ensuring agricultural irrigation water sources and sediment flow in the Mekong Delta； Cambodia emphasizes the maintenance of the Tonle Sap fishery. The contradictions surrounding the construction of main-stream and tributary hydropower stations have been around for a long time in various countries， and it is not easy to reach a compromise in the short term. At the same time， the Mekong countries are all developing countries， and their economic structure， resource endowments， and comparative advantages have certain similarities and competitive aspects. There is asymmetry in key areas， project selection， resource input， and technical standards.

The multiple sets of diplomatic relations between the Lancang-Mekong countries are more subtle， which may cause misgivings of relevant member states about the further deepening of LMC. The South China Sea dispute has always been a destabilizing factor in the relationship between China and Vietnam. On this issue， Western countries have been encouraging Vietnam to imitate the Philippines and initiate a so-called South China Sea arbitration.7 Due to the South China Sea issue， the Vietnamese people also have some prejudice against China ， and their trust in China is relatively low among the Southeast Asian countries. Therefore， Vietnam has been paying attention to diversifying partnerships in the economic field， signing multiple free trade agreements to increase its economic autonomy； in terms of security， it has been approaching the United States and its allies and playing the weak on the South China Sea issue， trying to gain more international sympathy and support. In the LMC， Vietnam focuses more on practical cooperation projects in specific areas of its concern， such as hydrological information sharing and cross-border trade facilitation of agricultural products， and emphasizes the fairness and inclusiveness of cooperation， but has reservations about comprehensive and in-depth cooperation.8 There are also potential historical grievances and realistic conflicts among the Mekong countries. In addition， the balance of power among the Mekong countries has changed rapidly in recent years. Vietnam’s rapid rise and its ambition to gradually play a key role of leadership and mediation on issues and platforms concerning its interests may break the existing balance and bring greater uncertainty to subregional cooperation.

Some Mekong countries still harbor misgivings about China’s growing influence. Currently， among the Mekong countries， Cambodia， Laos， and Myanmar are the most enthusiastic about the LMC and host the most projects. The Prayut government in Thailand is relatively friendly to China， but the country is an ally of the United States and is being cozied up to by the US and Japan. Besides， as the most economically developed country in the Mekong sub-region for a long time， Thailand is accustomed to and hopes to continue playing a leading role in sub-regional cooperation. Vietnam is the most vigilant about China’s influence and has participated least in LMC projects. As Lancang-Mekong collaboration enters its fifth year， not many“l(fā)ow-hanging fruits”9 have been left， and cooperation in priority areas is gradually entering the deep water zone. Countries are not equally motivated to cooperate， and the difficulty of collaboration may increase.

Foreign policy uncertainty due to socio-economic transformation

The Mekong countries generally face multiple kinds of pressure including leadership changes， democratic transition， and ethnic and religious conflicts. Many Mekong countries have entered a new round of political leadership changes in the past two years， which brings about more uncertainties regarding their foreign policies. Myanmar is co-chair of the LMC and coordinator of China-ASEAN relations in 2021. However， since the beginning of 2021， the political situation in Myanmar has again found itself in turmoil. The Myanmar military has taken over state power， detained politicians of the National League for Democracy （NLD）， and disbanded the NLD on the grounds of election fraud. On the other hand， NLD members have spontaneously established the Myanmar Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw （CRPH）. In April， the CRPH announced the establishment of the National Unity Government and the People’s National Defense Forces nationwide. Protests in Myanmar have continued to escalate， ethnic local armed groups have expressed dissatisfaction with the military， conflicts in some areas have flared up， and casualties and property losses are still on the rise. Western countries have announced a series of sanctions against the Myanmar military， while Western media has discredited China’s support for the Myanmar military， which triggered suspicion and fear among the Myanmar people about China. Dozens of Chinese companies in Myanmar were attacked and damaged. Given that the domestic situation in Myanmar continues to deteriorate and international mediation will not be effective in the short term， Myanmar’s ability to participate in sub-regional cooperation will be weakened， which brings specific difficulties to the LMC.

In， Vietnam， the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam has successfully held its 13th National Congress. While the country will maintain its diplomacy of balancing between different major powers and try to address the changing international situation with policy continuity， it will be more proactive and seek greater influence. According to its Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son， in the new era， Vietnam’s approach to multilateral mechanisms and the international order will transform from active participation to gradual shaping， and the country will more actively engage in multilateral defense and security cooperation. In this process， Vietnam will shrewdly and naturally link its national interests with regional and global interests to ensure that the international community supports its interests and at the same time play a more prominent role.10 As the US-Vietnam comprehensive partnership has been heating up in recent years， pro-US forces have continued to develop in Vietnam， which may lead to convergence of the two side’s views on more issues in the future， and affect Vietnam’s willingness to further participate in the LMC.

Moreover， the pandemic has magnified the inherent contradictions of various countries and even caused social unrest. In Thailand， there have been many large-scale anti-government demonstrations， some of which even targeted the emperor. Street demonstrations in the country are unlikely to die down anytime soon. In addition， some LMC projects， due to their large scale， huge investment and long cycle， can be easy targets of domestic political struggles where different interest groups have varied demands. Provoked by Western countries and non-governmental organizations supported by them， prejudice against some of China’s projects is emerging among the people of Mekong countries， which has resulted in several protests that caused substantial economic losses. All this may impact relevant bilateral relations and the broader Lancang-Mekong multilateral cooperation.

US confrontational competition with China in the region

In recent years， the Mekong sub-region has become a new entry point for the United States to expand its regional influence. In addition to continuing its efforts in traditional areas such as security and governance， the US has also been increasing investment in economic fields such as infrastructure and energy. At the macro level， the US Indo-Pacific strategy has gradually taken shape. Based on the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development （BUILD） Act， the US International Development Finance Corporation （DFC） was established with a capital scale of US$60 billion. The US and its allies have also launched the Blue Dot Network to create a global “Michelin Guide”11 in the field of infrastructure and maintain the United States’ leading position in the formulation of international rules and standards. The US has also pushed the G7 to launch the Build Back Better World infrastructure plan to strengthen strategic competition with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Specifically， in the Mekong sub-region， the US has continuously increased the number of DFC representatives in the Mekong countries. In September 2020， the Lower Mekong Initiative （LMI） was upgraded to the Mekong-US Partnership to broaden the areas of cooperation and build a wide range of partnerships and coalitions under the framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy， which would compete directly with China. The US has also incorporated the agendas for Mekong sub-regional cooperation into the US-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral mechanism （Quad） and invited Vietnam to participate in regular meetings of the “Quad Plus.”12 In January 2021， the US and Vietnam jointly convened 17 Friends of the Lower Mekong （FLM） for policy dialogue. India， the Mekong River Commission， and Brunei （as the ASEAN chair） participated for the first time.13

At the bilateral level， the United States and Japan initiated the Japan-US Mekong Power Partnership （JUMPP）， hoping to further intervene in the Mekong energy field. The US and South Korea have conducted technical cooperation to strengthen the drought and flood prediction capacity in the Mekong River Basin. The US and India have strengthened coordination on the Mekong countries’ infrastructure development and focused on promoting east-west connectivity. The US and Singapore have continued to carry out the Third Country Training Program to provide multi-field training for officials and experts from Southeast Asian countries.

The United States has also stepped up its focus on the Mekong subregion and its efforts to stigmatize China on Track II occasions. The Stimson Center alone has established five projects directly related to the Mekong subregion with the support of the US State Department. In this way， the Center has helped collect information for the United States’ Mekong diplomacy， provide policy recommendations， and conduct policy mobilization and publicity. On the other hand， it has repeatedly issued reports and commentaries that take a negative tone towards China to undermine the relationship between China and the Mekong countries.

Since coming to power， the Biden administration has inherited the Quad， the Mekong-US partnership， the Friends of the Lower Mekong， and other mechanisms established during the Trump era. On the other hand， more emphasis is placed on uniting allies and partners， planning and advancing a multilateral framework based on Western values， with China as the main competitor or even a threat， in the hope of firmly building a consensus on comprehensive strategic competition with China in the region and beyond.

For this reason， the United States has focused on Mekong water resources as a target of politicization， trying to create a rift in the LMC and gain more space for its ambitious intervention. The US State Department has strongly supported think tanks and non-governmental organizations such as the Stimson Center， the East-West Center， and Eyes on Earth to release so-called scientific monitoring reports and commentaries on the water quantity and quality of the Mekong River from time to time. Imitating the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative of the Center for Strategic and International Studies （CSIS）， the Mekong Dam Monitor project was launched， which uses data to provoke contradictions between upstream and downstream countries， and specifically targets China.

Although many parties have questioned the scientific nature and the reliability of these so-called reports and data， senior US officials have repeatedly cited them on bilateral and multilateral occasions. They falsely claimed that China’s upstream dams are the main reason for the decrease in water volume of the Mekong River and the environmental deterioration in the basin. They condemned China for its opaque and irresponsible use of water resources， attempting to make the Mekong River issue another South China Sea issue and taint China’s regional and international image. At the same time， the United States has packaged itself as the true partner of the Mekong countries， promoting American values and related initiatives. For example， the US State Department launched the Mekong Water Data Initiative and has repeatedly emphasized good governance， transparency， and participation by all parties in the governance of cross-border rivers in the Mekong-US partnership.

Congestion of mechanisms leads to intensified competition

There are now more than ten sub-regional cooperation mechanisms in the Lancang-Mekong sub-region， and the level of cooperation is constantly improving. The members and areas of the various mechanisms are largely overlapping， but their coordination is insufficient and collaboration is fragmented， which is not conducive to the maximum use of resources. Though all mechanisms have come to recognize the importance of strengthening coordination， it is difficult to reach a consensus on the critical issue of who will be the coordinator. In addition to China and the United States， extra-regional countries such as Japan， Australia， India， and South Korea have also stepped up their involvement in the Mekong region. Japan and South Korea have upgraded their respective Mekong cooperation mechanisms to the summit level. Most of these countries hope to highlight their autonomy in collaboration with the Mekong sub-region and are unwilling to choose sides between China and the United States.

Countries in the region are also increasingly inclined to explore a third way outside of China and the United States， and at the same time have actively restarted existing cooperation platforms， hoping to grasp the dominant power in sub-regional cooperation and achieve a balance of power that is more beneficial to them. During its ASEAN rotating presidency， Vietnam vigorously promoted ASEAN sub-regional development cooperation， hoping that ASEAN would coordinate various sub-regional mechanisms.14 Thailand has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy（ACMECS） in sub-regional cooperation， and pushed China， the United States， Japan， South Korea and India to become its dialogue partners and provide support for the ACMECS Fund. At present， ASEAN and the ACMECS are the most neutral and most likely to be accepted by all parties as coordinators of sub-regional cooperation mechanisms. Still， their role is limited to serving as a platform for soft coordination. Moreover， ASEAN has not yet expressed a strong will in the matter， and Vietnam may be reluctant to accept the ACMECS due to its fundamentally Thai attributes.

Restrictions brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic

The pandemic may bring about two effects on the member countries’participation in the LMC. First， the intensity of investment may weaken. Since its launch， the LMC has been highly dependent on China’s input. However， because of the pandemic， the sovereign credit risk of the Mekong countries has grown， increasing the risk for China’s overseas investment and financing. The conventional model featuring large state-owned enterprises， large funds and large-scale financing may be infeasible in the short term. The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Special Fund will also expire in recent years， but there is still no follow-up plan. Many Mekong economies have been heavily affected by the pandemic： while government revenue shrinks sharply， expenditure has increased due to epidemic control and additional economic stimulus， which puts greater strain on their finance. The existing projects may face financial pressure， and the financing of new projects is subject to even more difficulties. Second， the pandemic has made many countries more inwardlooking， barricading regular exchange of people and flow of goods across the border. At present， the pandemic is still escalating in many Mekong countries. The resulting problems such as impeded supply chains， slower growth of crossborder investment， and difficulties in carrying out some projects will continue to hinder the pace of Lancang-Mekong cooperation.

Approaches to Deepening Cooperation

Under the superimposed influence of profound changes unseen in a century， a rare pandemic， and the intensification of China-US competition， LancangMekong cooperation is facing multiple challenges. In the future， on the basis of enhancing anti-pandemic cooperation and jointly promoting postpandemic recovery， the LMC needs to develop new ideas， forge ahead， and continuously deepen the content and expand the areas of cooperation， to inject more vitality into sub-regional and regional development and prosperity， and open up another Golden Five Years of Lancang-Mekong cooperation.

Strengthening top-level design and conceptual construction

The Lancang-Mekong countries should sort out the outcomes of their cooperation over the five years， and establish databases of LMC demonstration cases， projects and experts. Based on a summary of cooperation experience， a five-year LMC progress report can be completed and actively publicized. By closely aligning the new situation in regional and sub-regional cooperation with their latest development plans， the Lancang-Mekong countries should accelerate the formulation of the second FiveYear Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation to further strengthen strategic coordination and interest convergence， and point out the direction for future cooperation.

Efforts should be made to integrate cooperation consensus and plans at the bilateral level into the multilateral LMC mechanism， and incorporate the construction of China-Myanmar and ChinaLaos economic corridors into the broader Lancang-Mekong Economic Development Belt. The level of cooperation in the LMC’s five priority areas can be elevated as appropriate. While strengthening coordination and interaction among the priority areas and giving full play to their synergistic effect， the Lancang-Mekong countries can leverage the areas with greater consensus and more remarkable progress to accelerate cooperation process in the fields facing greater difficulties. Based on shared interests and consensus， the countries can explore the establishment of an LMC international secretariat to “jointly design， formulate and comply with regional norms that are both normative and flexible.”15 The international secretariat can play the dual role of coordinating the six countries internally and coordinating exchanges and cooperation with other mechanisms or countries outside the region.

In this process， the countries can focus on the construction of a Lancang-Mekong development concept to lead sustainable development in the sub-region. At present， many problems facing the Lancang-Mekong region are still development problems in essence， and they need to be resolved through development. However， a one-sided emphasis on economic growth should also be avoided. The China-ASEAN Year of Sustainable Development Cooperation in 2021 should be used as an opportunity to effectively implement the Joint Statement on Enhancing Sustainable Development Cooperation of the Lancang-Mekong Countries. Based on the cultural traditions， development status and future of the Lancang-Mekong countries， a people-oriented， green， efficient and innovative LancangMekong development concept aimed at shared prosperity can be forged to strengthen regional countries’ control and autonomy over development issues.

Upholding openness and inclusiveness with more coordination and cooperation with other sub-regional stakeholders

The LMC needs to strengthen ties with China-ASEAN （10+1） and other cooperation mechanisms. Focusing on implementation of the ChinaASEAN Strategic Partnership Vision 2030 and the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity （2021-2025）， the LMC should align its “3+5+X”cooperation framework more with the three pillars of the ASEAN Community and the China-ASEAN “2+7” cooperation framework，16 support ASEAN to narrow the development gap between and within member states， and support ASEAN integration， to help build a higher level of China-ASEAN strategic partnership.

In specific areas， the Lancang-Mekong connectivity cooperation plan can work in line with the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025. On poverty reduction， in further implementing the Cooperation Initiative on Poverty Reduction in East Asia， the role of pilot villages in Cambodia， Laos， and Myanmar can be given full play. In the field of economy and trade， cooperation among the Lancang-Mekong countries can be sped up with more pilot projects under the framework of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. It is necessary to accelerate the construction of a “single window”17 in Lancang-Mekong international trade， promote cross-field coordination and cooperation between the customs， taxation， auditing， foreign exchange， quarantine and other relevant departments of the six countries， and facilitate the exchange of data and information， mutual recognition of rules and standards， and mutual assistance in inspection and supervision. The Lancang-Mekong countries can also explore a comprehensive operation platform for multimodal transport， and jointly set up a white list or negative list， to simplify the inspection process and substantially promote trade facilitation.

The LMC should accelerate its synergy with the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor （ILSTC）， and promote multi-level policy dialogue with the ILSTC at an appropriate time. By relying on existing platforms， such as the ILSTC senior officials’ meeting， the LMC senior cfficials’ meeting and various joint working groups， a regular coordination mechanism between the two can be gradually established. With innovation in the patterns and specific paths of synergy， a “3+X” framework can be explored， which consists of three priority areas of trade， connectivity and production capacity， as highlighted in the Co-chairs’ Statement on Cooperation of Synergizing the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor of the thrid LMC leaders’ meeting， as well as multiple adjustable areas encouraged for synergy， including the digital economy， human resources， and small-， medium- and microsized enterprises. Specific synergy plans can be formulated and refined as appropriate.

In terms of trade， given the importance of agricultural product export for the Mekong countries， more attention can be given to this area in the LMC-ILSTC synergy， by encouraging the development of LancangMekong cold chain， cross-border e-commerce and other characteristic logistics， exploring more trade routes for Lancang-Mekong agricultural products， and providing more support for private sector investment. The Mekong countries can be encouraged to trade more with China’s central and western regions through the ILSTC and develop business with other Eurasian countries through a combination of the ILSTC and the China-Europe Railway Express. Following the idea of promoting trade with corridors， gathering industries with trade， and promoting comprehensive development with industries， the supply chain and industrial chain should be further expanded and improved to promote sub-regional integrated economic development.

With regard to other regional and sub-regional cooperation mechanisms， an approach combining institutional competition and cooperation， instead of simply competition， is needed to facilitate complementary development and achieve win-win or multi-win. For instance， the LMC can enhance cooperation on transportation and economic corridor construction with the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program （GMS） and advance exchanges and cooperation with the Mekong River Commission on water resources development and protection.18 Towards countries outside the region， the LMC can also adopt a flexible and differentiated attitude and selectively cooperate with relevant mechanisms or countries in specific areas. Priority can be given to third-party market cooperation with ASEAN countries， such as Singapore， or “10+3” countries， such as Japan and South Korea， in the Mekong region. Taking climate change as a starting point， the LMC can explore the possibility of carrying out relevant cooperation projects with the United States and Europe in the sub-region under the Paris Agreement framework and gradually expand cooperation to other areas.

Enriching cooperation and fostering new growth points

The digital economy has been a hot spot in recent years. By strengthening cooperation in this regard， the Lancang-Mekong countries can jointly open up a Lancang-Mekong digital silk road， and support the construction of pilot ASEAN smart cities.19 They can promote the digital transformation of traditional industries and the application of 5G technology， while focusing on development of new service formats such as intelligent logistics， online tourism， mobile payment， and sharing economy. They can explore a Lancang-Mekong cross-border e-commerce platform to incubate e-commerce enterprises in the sub-region. A LancangMekong digital economy industrial alliance can also be established， to build a platform for joint scientific research， and enhance the long-term competitiveness of the sub-region.

During the pandemic， the Lancang-Mekong countries should pay attention to sub-regional public health cooperation， actively implement the Joint Statement on Deepening Cooperation on Traditional Medicine， accelerate the implementation of public health projects under the LMC Special Fund， and strengthen cooperation on material and technical support and COVID-19 vaccine. In addition， an information notification and joint response mechanism for major public health emergencies needs to be put in place， and cooperation on early warning against infectious diseases should be enhanced. The six countries should well implement programs such as the tropical diseases prevention and control initiative， healthy heart initiative and LMC herbal medicines campaign， and continue to conduct training on malaria， cardiovascular diseases and traditional Chinese acupuncture. Assistance should be given to those underdeveloped Mekong countries to help them improve their medical and health infrastructure， strengthen training of public health personnel， and facilitate the production capacity cooperation of medical enterprises， thus consolidating the foundation for the Lancang-Mekong health community. Moreover， small- and medium-sized enterprises， transportation and logistics， maritime cooperation， and many non-traditional security fields also have the potential to become new driving forces for the LMC.

To lay a solid foundation for in-depth Lancang-Mekong cooperation， the construction of a supporting system is equally important. First， countries in the sub-region should enhance financial cooperation and work to create a three-dimensional and all-round financial support system. While making full use of the government concessional loans and preferential export buyers’ credits under the LMC framework as well as the LMC Special Fund， they can give play to the role of the China-ASEAN Interbank Association， the China-ASEAN infrastructure special loan， and other development partners. The construction of the Lancang-Mekong currency stability system， investment and financing system， and credit system should be advanced to improve the sustainability of investment and financing. The LMC should also explore the establishment of a long-term， stable， sustainable， and diversified financing system among its member states， such as the creation of a Lancang-Mekong development fund， and actively seek support from financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank， the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank， the Silk Road Fund， and the World Bank. At the same time， market resources can be mobilized to develop new models such as public-private partnerships.

Second， cooperation should be strengthened on human resources development. In the early stage， countries in the sub-region can prioritize vocational skills training， rely on the Lancang-Mekong Vocational Education Training Center， and focus on the skills they urgently need. Professional technical schools in the sub-region should be encouraged to go global and cultivate talents for the market. With a view to improving the Mekong countries’ operational and governance capabilities， more attention should be given to teaching applicable techniques and cultivating endogenous dynamics.

The third is to establish and enhance a social support system. The level of cooperation between Lancang-Mekong think tanks and academic communities should be elevated， and in-depth collaboration between trade promotion agencies and business associations in the sub-region should be encouraged. By giving play to the role of the private sector and nongovernmental organizations， a stable and effective mechanism for sharing interests that involves diverse stakeholders can be set up. Besides， exchanges between media and youth of the Lancang-Mekong countries should be promoted to strengthen people-to-people bonds and enhance the awareness of community.

Motivating endogenous momentum at the local level

While local development depends on overall planning at the national level， national planning is unlikely to take root without implementation at the local level. Under the guidance of the Initiative on Deepening Cooperation among Local Governments of Lancang-Mekong Countries， the Forum on Lancang-Mekong Local Government Cooperation can be held at an appropriate time. At the same time， a list of areas and projects for intended cooperation among local governments of Lancang-Mekong countries can be made and continuously updated to promote local governments of the six countries to give full play to their respective advantages in the LMC. Fullly leveraging the encouragement policies of various countries for border development， social and economic exchanges and interconnectivity in border provinces should be stepped up to build a new highland for opening-up along the border.

In addition， through synergy with the ILSTC and other mechanisms， the LMC should work to create a new economic artery connecting the domestic provinces of the six countries and actively seek strategic cooperation with the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macau Greater Bay Area， the Yangtze River Delta and the Chengdu-Chongqing Urban Agglomeration of China， and the Eastern Economic Corridor of Thailand. By stimulating the understanding， interest and investment in the LMC among the economically developed provinces of the six countries and strengthening domestic coordination， the LMC will be energized with more momentum. By establishing sister cities and inter-provincial friendly relationships， a Lancang-Mekong local government cooperation network can be created to encourage more targeted alignment of cooperative projects to local needs. In the process， the role of local state-owned enterprises and small- and medium-sized enterprises should be valued. Local governments should be encouraged to introduce supporting measures to protect and stimulate the enthusiasm of small enterprises and help them adapt to local conditions in a flexible manner.

1 The “3+5+X” cooperation framework refers to the three pillars， the five key priority areas， and the cooperation in broader areas such as digital economy， environmental protection， customs and youth.

2 Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed “hard connectivity” of infrastructure and “soft connectivity” of rules and standards in an effort to build a closer partnership for connectivity.

3 On June 8， 2021， Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out in the Sixth LMC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting that China and other countries along Lancang-Mekong Rver have accelerated the contruciton of a network for fast tracks and green lanes.

4 “Somkid Welcomes Huawei 5G， Deepens Cooperation to Boost 5G AI Eco-innovation，” Bangkok Post， October 23， 2019， https：//www.bangkokpost.com/business/1777994/somkid-welcomes-huawei-5g-deepenscooperation-to-boost-5g-ai-eco-innovation.

5 Jiang Zhida and Wang Rui， “China-ASEAN Digital Belt and Road： Progress and Challenges，” Pacific Journal， Vol.28， No.9， 2020， pp.83-85.

6 Zhu Jiejin and Hayati Nufus， “Institutional Design of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation，” Foreign Affairs Review， No.3， 2020， pp.45-68.

7 Wu Shicun， “South China Sea： Expect More Instability in 2021 as the US Encourages ‘Lawfare’and Conflict，” South China Morning Post， January 23， 2021， https：//www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/ article/3118715/south-china-sea-expect-more-instability-2021-us-encourages-lawfare.

8 “Vietnam Calls for Inclusive Mekong–Lancang Cooperation，” VNA， December 17， 2018， https：// en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnam-calls-for-inclusive-mekong-lancang-cooperation/143700.vnp.

9 “Low-hanging fruits” refer to fruits on lower parts of a tree that’s easier to grab. In the LMC， “l(fā)owhanging fruits” refer to the cooperation in the five priority areas.

10 Bui Thanh Son， “Summarizing Foreign Affairs under the 12th Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party and Vietnam’s Foreign Policy Orientations in the New Period.”

11 The Blue Dot Network will have a rating system for infrastructure projects internationally， like the Michelin Guide for rating restaurants.

12 The “Quad Plus” framework includes the Republic of Korea， New Zealand， Vietnam， Israel and Brazil alongside the Quad nations.

13 Ambassador Atul Keshap， “Opening Remarks at the Indo-Pacific Conference on Strengthening Transboundary River Governance，” US Department of State， February 25， 2021， https：//www.state.gov/ opening-remarks-at-the-indo-pacific-conference-on-strengthening-transboundary-river-governance.

14 Le Hai Binh and To Minh Thu， “Why the Mekong Matters to ASEAN： A Perspective from Vietnam，”ISEAS， July 17， 2020， https：//www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_77. pdf； “ASEAN Forum on Sub-regional Development Opens，” VNA， July 14， 2020， https：//en.vietnamplus. vn/asean-forum-on-subregional-development-opens.

15 Lu Guangsheng and Nie Jiao， “The Dynamic Mechanism of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation： A Nexus of Interest， Responsibilities， and Norms” Global Review， No.1， 2021， pp.110-129.

16 The ASEAN Community is comprised of three pillars， namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community， ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The China-ASEAN“2+7” cooperation framework proposed by China in 2013 emphasizes a two-point political consensus， namely enhancing strategic trust and promoting economic cooperation， and seven cooperation fields including trade facilitation， interconnectivity and security exchanges， among others.

17 Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi once noted that China should speed up the development of the “single window” for international trade to enable information sharing on platforms built together.

18 Lu Guangsheng and Jin Zhen， “Beyond the Congestion of Institutions： An Analysis of the Development Path of the LMC Mechanism，” World Economics and Politics， No.7， 2020， pp.97-119.

19 The ASEAN Smart Cities Network is a collaborative platform where cities from the ten ASEAN member states work towards the common goal of smart and sustainable urban development.