China's Nuclear Policy : Basic Logic and Prospect

By Fan Jishe

China's Nuclear Policy : Basic Logic and Prospect

By Fan Jishe

CPAPD Council Member, Director and Researcher,Office of Strategy, American Studies , CASS

States usually adjust their military strength according to the changes of external security environment and national strength, while for nuclear states, this means that nuclear forces will increase or decrease and the nuclear policy will be adjusted accordingly. The scale and configuration of nuclear forces and nuclear policy of both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and of both the United States and Russia in the post-Cold War have undertaken very significant and even dramatic changes, having adapted their adjustments to changes in the international security environment. After the end of the Cold War, Britain and France -- two nuclear-weapon states – have also made obvious adjustments for their nuclear policies. But this practice does not seem to apply to China, or at least in the past half century, the changes of the international situation and the improvement of China's overall national strength have not produced significant impact on China's nuclear forces and policy. However, at present and in the foreseeable future, relatively complex changes of the external security environment facing China is likely to emerge. First, the U.S. National Security Strategy report released in December 2017 defined China as a "revisionist power" and listed as the primary security challenge facing the United States.1In the following years the released Nuclear Posture Review report proposes a China's "tailored" nuclear strategy, and has significantly adjusted the U.S. nuclear strategy.2The Sino-U.S. strategic competition has become normal in the context of American foreign strategy linguistically. Secondly, the United States and other countries have begun increasing input for capacity-building in missile defense systems and cooperation, what level of missile defense capability will be developed in the future and whether it will generate a significant impact on nuclear relations among various countries is difficult to know, however, after the abolition of the ABM Treaty, there will be no such international agreement available to restrict or affect the development direction of missile defense capability-building. Thirdly, emerging technologies such as cyber network, outer space, rapid global strike capabilities or development, deployment and employment of advanced conventional weaponsmay affect nuclear deterrence, and further impact nuclear relations among various nuclear states and their nuclear strategies. Whether such changing security environment and development of military forces will have an impact on China's nuclear forces and policy, we also need to take them into serious consideration.

China conducted its first nuclear test in October 1964, and in more than half a century since then, China's external security environment has undergone many remarkable changes, such as the deterioration of China-USSR relations, the easing of China-.U.S relations, the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, so the relations among various countries enter the post-Cold War era. The changes of China itself in the same period are also remarkable, such as China's reform and opening up, gradual emergence from relative isolation from the international community, getting slowly integrated into the existing international order and has become a participant, builder and contributor for the existing international system.3Nowadays China has become a very important player in the international arena and an important pole in the international order, and China has also developed from an economically weak country to the second largest economy in the world. The contents of China’s official documents concerning nuclear policy are mainly embodied in a series of white papers on national defense, comparing relevant contents of the white papers on national defense and the Government Statement after China's first nuclear test reveal the core elements of China's nuclear policy are not significantly adjusted.4The weight of the nuclear issue in China's relations with other countries is polar apart, comparing the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and between the United States and Russia in the post-Cold War, and China does not regularly review its nuclear policies and issue nuclear strategies either like some other nuclear-have countries. Therefore, the "sense of existence" of nuclear issue in China's security strategy is not obvious, and other countries concern about China's nuclear forces and nuclear policies is not high either. However, with China's rapid development and adjustments of domestic and foreign policies, will China's nuclear forces and nuclear policy also be an integral part of the adjustments and changes?

Only by returning to history can better understanding of the future trend of China's nuclear forces and nuclear policy be gained. What are differences of China’s nuclear forces and nuclear policy from those of the other four nuclear powers? Why can China's nuclear forces and nuclear policy maintain long-term stability with little change? What is the inherent logic of development of China's nuclear forces and nuclear policy? If China's nuclear policy has shown some minor adjustments and changes, what are their main manifestations? With growth of China's national strength and continuous changes in the external security environment, will China make adjustments of its nuclear forces and nuclear policy accordingly? This paper will come up with its understanding of the basic logic and historical evolution of China's nuclear policy based on historical documents, and try to give a preliminary reading of some relevant issues.

I. The Uniqueness of China's Nuclear Policy

According to the definition of the Article IX of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”,5i.e. the United States, the Soviet Union (Russia inherited the international rights and obligations of the Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War), China, Britain and France. Among the five nuclear-weapon states, China's nuclear forces-building process and the continuity of its nuclear policy are significantly different from other four nuclear-weapon states. In the perspectives of the nuclear deterrent policy, development policy, deployment policy and employment policy, etc., China's practice is also different than that of the medium-sized nuclear-weapon states such as Britain and France, and is more significantly distinct from those of nuclear superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- during the Cold War as well as the United States and Russia in the post-Cold War.

First, China's declared nuclear policy is significantly different from that of the other four nuclear-weapon states, and has very strong continuity and stability. China issued a Government Statement immediately after its first nuclear test, which contains the core element of China's nuclear policy so far, i.e. never be the first to use nuclear weapons. According to the Statement, China develops nuclear weapons because it is "facing the growing nuclear threat of the United States" and it is for "breaking" the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers", for defense and for protection of the Chinese people from the threat of a nuclear war launched by the United States". After China has possessed nuclear weapons, "the policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat is not working well, and the possibility of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons has also increased. Therefore, China has made unconditional commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons, i.e. at any time and under any circumstances China will never be the first to use nuclear weapons ".6China's commitment to unconditional no-first use of nuclear weapons is tantamount to providing all non-nuclear States with negative security assurance.7China, at the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978, reiterated this negative security assurance. China has further confirmed this commitment by signing additional protocols to treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones.8In 1995, China issued the Government Statement providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones, which is further confirmed in the UN Security Council Resolution 984. 9

At different times, other nuclear-weapon States have also made commitments not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and provided negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zone, which are subject to various conditions and are subsequently adjusted continuously. For instance, the negative security assurance is provided only to non-nuclear States that do not align themselves with nuclear states, or only to signatories that comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.10In all five nuclear-weapon States, only China's No-First-Use and negative security assurance are unconditional andhighly continuous. Despite dramatic changes in the international security situation since then, China's policy principles remain firm, and no adjustment is made because of the changes of its national strength and external security environment.

China's policy stance on nuclear disarmament is also highly consistent. On October 16, 1964 in its Government Statement, China advocated "discussing the issue of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons" and proposed the corresponding steps to be taken.11This is basically what is later written into Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and China adheres to this position so far. On April 5, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama in Prague delivered a speech advocating reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies and cutting the huge number of nuclear arsenals, and promoting the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons.12Thus, President Barack Obama won the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, but his policy initiatives are not significantly different from the contents of the Chinese Government Statement nearly half a century ago, which reflects the farsighted vision of the older generation of Chinese leaders on the nuclear issue.

Second, China is significantly different than the major powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) regarding the number of nuclear tests. From the year 1945 when the United States conducted its first nuclear test to the year 1996 when various countries reached the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the five nuclear-weapon states had conducted about 2,050 nuclear tests, of which the United States conducted 1,030 tests, the Soviet Union (Russia) conducted 715 nuclear tests, France had 210 tests, Britain and China each had 45 tests.13Compared with that of the United States, the Soviet Union (Russia) and France, the number of China’s nuclear tests is trifling. Through nuclear tests, various countries can have the principles of nuclear weapons examined, nuclear weapons improved, nuclear weapons finalized and, nuclear weapon security and nuclear weapon explosion effect verified, so the importance of the number of nuclear tests on the verifications and scale of nuclear arsenals is pointless to belabor. Considering that China has faced a very severe external security environment, and maintained a very small nuclear arsenal, China does not necessarily have to exercise restraint on nuclear testing. For all that, immediately following a nuclear test on 29 July 1996, China issued a Government Statement announcing the moratorium on nuclear testing beginning with 30 July 1996.14China participates in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty negotiations and becomes a signatory of the Treaty, although the Treaty has not yet entered into force, however, China adheres to its commitment to testing moratorium.

Third, China's nuclear weapons development and deployment policies are significantly different from those of the United States, and the Soviet Union (Russia) and other countries as well. Having carried out frequent nuclear tests first, and then developed different types of warheads and different means of delivery, and expanded the size of nuclear arsenals, and extensively deployed nuclear weapons, this is roughly the route to develop and deploy nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia), the two nuclear superpowers. Britain and France basically follow the same development and deployment logic. The United States had conducted 1030 nuclear tests and developed nuclear weapons of various types and yields, developed means of delivery such as Land-based (land-based mobile) missiles, strategic bombers, nuclear submarines and others. Its nuclear warheads reached maximum number of 31,000 in 1967, while the nuclear warheads of the Soviet Union was over 40,000 in 1986 at its peak, France and the Britain each had more than 500 at the peak.15- Even though the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the United States and Russia after the end of the Cold War carried out several rounds of nuclear weapons reduction, the United States and Russia still possess the largest number of nuclear warheads. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook, by early 2018, the United States has still deployed 1,750 warheads in the first place, and 4,700 other nuclear warheads in stock or waited to be disassembled, totaled 6450 nuclear warheads. Russia has 1,600 warheads deployed, and 5,250 other nuclear warheads in stock or waited to be disassembled, totaled 6,850 nuclear warheads.16

China has never disclosed the number of its nuclear warheads, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook, by the beginning of 2018, China may possess about 280 nuclear warheads.17Compared with nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, China's nuclear arsenal is very small indeed. In addition, China's stockpiles of weapons-grade nuclear materials are also not comparable to those of the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia), which also determines that China's nuclear weapons potential is limited. During the Cold War, the two nuclear superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union had developed and deployed various types of nuclear weapons, but China had not chosen to do so. Currently, the United States and Russia have 1,750 and 1,600 nuclear weapons on combat duty respectively, while according to the definition by the United States and Russia, China has 0 nuclear weapon on combat duty. Both the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) have mature Trinity nuclear strike capabilities of considerable scale. After the first successful nuclear test 50 years ago, China still relies mainly on land-based missiles to maintain its nuclear deterrent capability. According to the China Military and Security Development Report (2018) the U.S. Defense Department recently released, China’s possession of 4 nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles is considered as China's sea-based nuclear deterrence.18

Nowadays more than two decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia still deploy a large number of nuclear weapons and maintain a very high level of alert. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union deployed nuclear weapons to other countries. After the end of the Cold War, it is believed that the United States still has non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in the European allied countries. According to the standards and calculation methods of the arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as between the United States and Russia, the number of nuclear weapons on combat duty in China is zero, and there are also some people who believe that China maintains a very low level of alert due to the separate storage of nuclear warheads from launch vehicles.

II. The Basic Logic of China's Nuclear Policy

Mao Zedong and other leaders' perceptions of nuclear weapons came into being in the 1940s to 1960s, and this recognition is mainly related to the relationship between weapon and war, the forms of warfare that China may get involved in, and the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy, and China's nuclear policy incubates from this recognition.

The Second World War, especially the protracted War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression shaped the Chinese leadership's understanding of the relationship between weapon and war, and included, of course, the preliminary understanding of nuclear weapons. China believes that a war can be distinguished between a just war and a unjust war, an unjust war will inevitably face double opposition at home and abroad, and there is no country that can win an unjust war, and that the will of the people determines the outcome of the war. On August 6, 1946, Mao Zedong said, in a conversation with Anna Louis Strong, an American journalist, that "The atomic bomb is a paper tiger used by the American reactionaries to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it is not." Mao Zedong also mentioned in the conversation the case of the overthrow of the Russian Tsar and the defeat of the German, Italian and Japanese fascists as well as the struggles between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang in China.19During the Initial period of the founding of the People's Republic of China, Chairman Mao's comments and China’s official documents repeatedly expounded these views.20Although Chairman Mao also believed that the atomic bomb was a weapon of mass slaughter, but he believed that the winner or loser of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new type of weapons. Chairman Mao also pointed out in a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Nehru in 1954 that since ancient times, "although weapons have changed, yet, there is no fundamental difference apart from the increase in the number of people killed."21This is the starting point of China's understanding of the role of nuclear weapons, for this reason the older generation of Chinese leaders call nuclear weapons a paper tiger, which is not enough to decide the victory or defeat of a war.

At the beginning of the Cold War, the Korean War broke out, the China-U.S. engagement in the Korean battlefield operations and the outcome of the Korean War had strengthened the above understanding. Both China and the United States were deeply involved in the military conflicts that broke out on the Korean Peninsula in June 1950, some other countries were also involved in this large-scale local war to varying degrees after the end of the Second World War. After many campaigns, the parties involved in the war eventually stabilized the front in its basic status before the war, and the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in the end. Although the United States first dropped its nuclear weapon on August 6, 1945 over Hiroshima, which immediately leveled Hiroshima, and accelerated the end of the Pacific War. The United States also threatened to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War, but ultimately it did not use nuclear weapons to gain the campaigns and warfare advantage. Nuclear weapons did not scare China and China further believes that nuclear weapons are not the weapons to be used rashly, and the success or failure of a war certainly is not decided by one or two "new weapons". Chairman Mao, in the 1950s and 1960s in his conversations on war, diplomacy and international relations, mentioned on several occasions classifications of socialist countries, countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the Western countries as well as the middle zone, and concluded that a war is very unlikely to break out between China and the United States.

Equally important is China's believes that future war in which China may get involved is likely to be similar to the Second World War with ground warfare in dominance, and China is confident of winning such a war. China has a huge population, vast landmass and abundant resources, which enable China to win large-scale war. China can mobilize the whole nation, make full use of the rear to fight a protracted war, and plan retreating temporarily as it is necessary to do so, and the enemy will eventually get "drowned in the vast ocean of people's war". Chairman Mao believes that It is man who decides the victory or defeat of the war, and it depends on who holds the weapon, and what the best interests the soldiers who hold the weapon think, and who is good at fighting battles; in both world wars, the defenders won and those aggressors lost.22Mao Zedong and other leaders of the older generation believe that the conventional weapons are comparably more important than nuclear weapons in this form of war.

On the one hand, China believes that nuclear weapons are "paper tigers". On the other hand, China also recognizes that if China does not possess nuclear weapons while other countries have them, then the atomic bombs are "real tigers, iron tigers, and man-eating tigers", China will still be threatened and blackmailed. Chairman Mao said at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on 25 April 1956, that We still don't have an atomic bomb yet, and are bullied and surrounded by the enemy, ... If we are not to be bullied, we can't do without it."23China met with the U.S. nuclear blackmail during the Korean War and Taiwan Straits crisis, and it is these threats and blackmail that had strengthened China's determination to develop nuclear ability of its own. After China's first successful nuclear test, Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out in the message sent to participants in the test that the successful test was "a powerful blow to the policy of nuclear monopoly and blackmail of the United States".24

For China, nuclear weapons are "paper tigers" and cannot be rashly used, but it also needs to possess nuclear weapons so as to break the "nuclear monopoly" and prevent "nuclear blackmail". In short, China believes that nuclear weapons can only be used for defensive purpose. Despite this, China dose not develop a capability exceeding the minimum requirement for nuclear retaliation. It is based on this understanding that China's nuclear policy, nuclear forces development and deployment policies do not duplicate the nuclear development path of the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, China has not built a huge nuclear arsenal and deployed diversified nuclear weapon systems or nuclear war winning capabilities. Of course, China did make great efforts to ensure that the retaliatory strike capability is credible, effective and favorable. China’s R & D of nuclear weapons was accompanied by the missile R & D and testing, and in 1966 a combined test of missiles with A Bomb was conducted. The development of airplane and submarine was also considered, but the development speed and basic conception were distinct from those of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.25China believes that maintaining a nuclear counterattack force capable of preventing major nuclear powers from using nuclear weapons against China is enough.

Based on this philosophy, China has developed its nuclear policy. Considering the particularity of nuclear weapons that are not suitable for battlefield operations, China chooses to follow the principle of No-First-Use of nuclear weapons and provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones, while calling for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. For China in other words, nuclear weapons are political tools rather than military weapons. They can neither be used to win war in battlefield operations, nor can be used to win an arms race in peacetime, so the sole purpose of developing nuclear weapons is to prevent other countries from using nuclear weapons against China.

Keeping fewer but advanced is the principle for China to build nuclear forces. Considering that nuclear weapons exist as deterrence and retaliatory tools, so China has not invested heavily in the acquisition of large quantities of nuclear weapons. Chairman Mao, in a conversation with Marshal Montgomery of the British Army in 1961, said that this thing (nuclear weapon) is not be used. The more they are build, the less likely a nuclear war becomes ….. This thing is to frighten, is expensive and useless. In 1964, Chairman Mao said to some foreign guests that our country may produce a small number of nuclear weapons in the future, but is not ready use them.26For him, more or less number of nuclear weapons is unimportant. Premier Zhou Enlai made several directives on the development of nuclear weapons, and pointed out in 1969 on the production planning of national defense industry that in the development of sophisticated weapons, we should win an enemy by quality, quantity should not be too big, too big quantity on the contrary is a burden. Meeting with participants for the Meeting of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission Planning on 22 October 1970, he also put forth the basic principle of China's development of nuclear forces, i.e. We must have a certain quantity, quality and variety.27What China needs is the counterattack means to respond to attack by nuclear weapons,28and China never uses the so-called "assured destruction capability" in the West as a criterion for determining nuclear arsenals scale.29

China has taken a different route in developing nuclear weapons, and the history proves that China's leaders are rational and pragmatic. For China, nuclear weapons are only used for deterrence and retaliation purposes, and China has achieved this goal with very limited nuclear forces. The development thinking of China's nuclear forces and the logic of nuclear policy in the Cold War environment is feasible and effective, which assured prevention of China from nuclear blackmails and nuclear threats by other major nuclear powers.

On 14 June 1956, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhe De and other leaders of the Party and Government meet scientists for planning the National Science and Technology Development Program.

III. Continuation and fine-tuning of China's nuclear policy

In the past several decades, China's nuclear policy has maintained significant continuity and stability, which is relatively rare among nuclear-weapon states. The continuity of China's nuclear policy is mainly reflected in the following, such as the nuclear weapons only used for defensive purposes, commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons as well as maintenance of smaller nuclear arsenal and non-participation in nuclear arms race and so on. Although China's nuclear policy is maintained with significant continuity and stability, it is also met with questions to varying degrees by foreign officials and experts and scholars in different period. Some people think that China's previous restraints of nuclear forces and nuclear policy are not resulted from an self-conscious choice, but forced to do so due to resource and technological capacity constraints. While having accumulated enough resources and technology, China will naturally change its nuclear policy. According to these experts and scholars, if China behaves the same as those rising big powers in the past, then it will not endure absolute disadvantage in nuclear weapons forever."30In the analysis of the trend of China’s nuclear policy, this argument frequently appears. Its basic logic is: if resources and technology permit, China will follow the lead of the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) and make major adjustments to its nuclear policy. Even showing worried about changes in China's nuclear capabilities, some others believe that China may expand its nuclear arsenal rapidly in the short term to narrow down the gap in the number of nuclear weapons with the United States and Russia. Still others are concerned about changes in China's nuclear policy intentions, and worried about whether China will change its commitment to the no-first use of nuclear weapons.

Why hasn't China changed its nuclear policy as predicted by foreign experts and scholars? The reason is that China's policy choices are not wrong, but those experts and scholars have used the wrong paradigm to analyze China's nuclear policy. However, China is neither the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, nor the United States and Russia in the post-Cold War. So China's nuclear forces and nuclear policy options are naturally different from those of the two countries.

China believes that nuclear weapons should not be used rashly, and that nuclear weapons could only be used for defensive and retaliatory purposes, therefore, China's commitment to no-first use and maintenance of a smaller nuclear arsenal are both a philosophical recognition of China's nuclear policy and also the basic principle guiding China's nuclear policy, which determine the continuity and stability of China's nuclear policy, thus it is unlikely that China will significantly adjust its nuclear policy in the short term. Since China believes that nuclear weapons are a political weapon rather than a military tool for battlefield use, which makes China's nuclear policy more like a guiding principle, rather than an operational rule for a battlefield to win. Unlike the United States, Russia and other countries, China has never defined its security relations with other countries from the nuclear perspective, and has even tried to desalinate the nuclear factor in its foreign policy. The United States and other nuclear weapon-states regularly review their nuclear policies and adjust their nuclear strategies, while China has never issued a nuclear policy review report. China's development thinking of nuclear forces is different from that of the United States, the Soviet Union (Russia) and other countries. Hence, applying the logical thinking of developing nuclear forces of those countries will inevitably lead to inaccurate interpretations of China's nuclear policy, and will often result in misjudgments. Of course, there are occasionally some Chinese experts and scholars who come up with personal analyses somewhat different from official policy, but this in no way means that China's nuclear policy has made or will make important adjustments or changes. The most authoritative information of China's nuclear policy comes from official documents, rather than from the works of experts and scholars.

The no-first use of nuclear weapons is one of the core elements of China's nuclear policy, but questions by many foreign officials and specialists about the credibility of China's commitment have never stopped. Since 1998, in almost all the White Paper of China's National Defense, China repeatedly reiterates its policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that the outside world constantly raises questions, yet they do not want China to abandon this commitment from the bottom of their hearts. This contradictory mentality after the publication of the White Paper "The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces" is completely exposed.31The State Council Information Office of China issued in April 2013 The White Paper on The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces, which does not reiterate China's long-standing commitment of its no-first use of nuclear weapons, which triggered questions from the outside world whether China would adjust its nuclear policy. James Action, Nuclear Policy Program co-director, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said in a New York Times article that the white paper does not contain the content of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, thus bringing about policy ambiguity. … having released a signal for policy readjustment.32In fact, although the White Paper does not mention the commitment to no- first use of nuclear weapons, which does not mean that China has abandoned the policy. This is because, unlike previous comprehensive white papers, this white paper is not a systematic document of briefing on China's national defense policy or national defense strategy, but a special document explaining how China will employ its military forces. If one reads the white paper between the lines carefully, it's not difficult to find that China still Keeps the commitment to the no- first use of nuclear weapons.33

China maintains its nuclear weapons arsenal on a much smaller scale, but this still can not dispel the conjecture of foreign officials and experts and scholar on the size of China's nuclear forces. Since China has never publicly disclosed the exact number of nuclear weapons it possesses, this has led to the extreme and unrealistic speculation of foreign experts and scholars China has to face. For example, Asian Arms Control Project of the Georgetown University Dr. Philip Karber and his team speculated that China had already manufactured about 3,000 nuclear warheads, ten times the general estimate.34While, another American expert Hans M. Kristensen concluded on the basis of analysis of his compiled information that China had not produced enough weapon-grade fissile materials to manufacture 3,000 war heads, neither had enough means of delivery to launch them.35

China has several reasons for not publicizing the number of its nuclear weapons. Firstly, both China's understanding of the role of nuclear weapons and the way of managing security relations among various nations belong to the same logic, i.e. intending to weaken the role of nuclear weapons. secondly, China keeps a smaller scale of nuclear arsenal, and the ambiguity of the scale of nuclear forces, which can increase uncertainty of a potential counterpart’s nuclear attack in nuclear warfare scenario, and will enhance the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence. Thirdly, it is precisely because of smaller nuclear forces that China needs to ensure the viability of its nuclear forces. For this reason, China built simple underground tunnel defenses where missiles can be launched, prevented, stored, and commanded as well as life is possiple,36which provides an opportunity to foreign experts for endless imagination and incredible speculation.

While maintaining the continuity and stability of its nuclear policy, China has also made policy adjustments in line with the changes in China's relations with other countries and the overall changes in its foreign policy. Firstly, China's full integration into the existing international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes will inevitably bear the corresponding obligations and is bound by these institutional arrangements. China was once excluded from most international forums, institutions and organizations, but nowadays, China has fully integrated into the international community and become a participant, builder and defender of various international mechanisms. In the nuclear perspective, China has signed all the treaties and conventions recognized by the international community, played a vital role in the field of non-proliferation, and made great contributions to international non-proliferation efforts. China's efforts include, but are not limited to its accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency and to the United Nations various disarmament forums, signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, participation in negotiations and signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Test Treaty, promotion of the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and participation in discussions of the drat Treaty Banning Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and other Explosive Devices and safeguarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and so on. Although the number of China’s nuclear tests is very much limited, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty does not enter into force, yet China had scrupulously abided by its test moratorium commitment. China's participation in the negotiations on the Treaty Banning Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and other Explosive Devicesalso means that the fissile material for nuclear weapons China possesses is much less than that of the United States and Russia, if other countries stop producing nuclear weapons materials, China is also willing to respond to the demands of the international community.

Secondly, over the past two decades, China has increased its nuclear transparency in a gradual manner. In the year 1995, China issued its first white paper on nuclear issues -- China's Arms Control and Disarmament, which expounded China's nuclear policy.37Since the year 1998, the Chinese Government has issued a white paper on China's national defense about every two years, each of which mentions nuclear issues. For example, in the White Paper of China's National Defense 2006, China systematically reiterates the main contents of its nuclear policy, including adherence to the principle of self-defense and limited development, and building up simple and effective nuclear forces to meet the needs of national security, maintaining the strategic deterrent role of nuclear forces, and having no nuclear arms race with any country, and developing a command and control system.38In the White Paper on the Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces, China gives a briefing on the mission and composition of the Second Artillery Force, as well as the thinking and objectives of China's nuclear forces building.39In the white paper "China's Military Strategy" published in 2015, the section of "Armed Forces Construction and Development" describes the basic policy for the development of the Second Artillery.40In December 2015, the Second Artillery Force was officially named the Chinese People's Liberation Army Rocket Army.

Military Parade is another way to improve nuclear transparency. Every five or ten years, China conducts military parade, during which some new military equipments will be displayed, including nuclear force. In the military parade in September 2015, China showed several ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, which may not be new to foreign experts and scholars who study China. There is no difference between development of China's missile force and China's national defense white paper’s descriptions, and the military parade can prove whether foreign experts and scholars have made correct assumption on China's nuclear forces. However, foreign experts and scholars may not be able to correctly understand the message conveyed by China’s military parade. As displaying its new or old military equipments, China's purpose is not to show off its armed forces, but to enhance the pride of Chinese people in the military achievements. Equally important is that China showcases its military strength during the parade, which is not meant to threaten other countries either, nor to provoke an arms race with other countries, but just to send a message to some countries that a rising China will no longer be threatened or ordered about as several decades ago.41

From the perspective of nuclear transparency, China emphasizes that transparency of strategic intentions is more important than transparency of strategic capabilities. China may not be as transparent in military capabilities as others would like, but that doesn't mean that China's military strength is stronger than that of other nuclear states such as the United States and Russia, or China intends to undermine regional security system. In addition, nuclear transparency should be an independent process, and to what extent it depends on a country's comfort on the issue, and should not be subjected to the demands of other countries. The transparency of some nuclear states is higher, either because domestic political processes promotes proactive transparency, or because of treaty or agreement obligations, China has not signed a similar treaty or agreement with any other country. therefore, it does not undertake corresponding obligations, and naturally should not bear the pressure of nuclear transparency from any other country.

Thirdly, China is also committed to improving the safety, reliability and viability of nuclear counterattack capabilities and enhancing the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Over the past few decades, China believes that a smaller nuclear arsenal can protect China from nuclear strikes and be able to launch nuclear counterattack. China is open to accept asymmetric nuclear deterrence and vulnerability, but only if China can ensure its own credible nuclear counterattack capability. China repeatedly states that It does not engage in nuclear arms race with any country, and therefore sticks to the development principle of "a certain quantity, quality and verity", is not determined to seek equal quantity with other major nuclear states, but instead keeps its nuclear forces at the lowest level necessary to maintain national security.Only with credible nuclear counterattack capability, can China more confidently abide by its commitment to the no-first use of nuclear weapons.

IV. Prospect for China’s nuclear policy

In the foreseeable future, whether China will make a major adjustment on its nuclear policy? Currently it seems that it is unlikely. There are two main reasons as follows. Firstly, after the end of the Cold War, China has learnt a lesson from the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and will not take the beaten track. Secondly, China’s economic interdependence with various countries in the world becomes stronger and stronger, China’s relations with major nuclear states is overall stable, a peaceful and stable international environment conforms to the national interests of China. Certainly, there are some negative factors such as whether the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy ca be continuously reduced, whether the international nuclear disarmament can keep the momentum, whether the U.S. missile defense systems will expand further, and the possible impact of development and deployment of new advanced conventional military equipments, etc. Therefore, complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons have a long way to go. May various countries in the world work together to strive for the goal of nuclear free world.

(edited excerpts of the article in Foreign Affairs Review No. 5, 2018)

1. The White House，，December 2017，p. 25，https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905. pdf.

2. Department of Defense,， February 2018， pp. 31-32， https: / /dod. defense. gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.

3. Xi Jinping, Speech in Washington State, USA, Xinhua, 22 September 2015. http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-09/23/c_ 1116656143.htm.

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6. ."China's Successful Explosion of its First Atomic Bomb".

7. Negative Security Assurance refers to the commitment of nuclear-weapon States under any or certain conditions not useing or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. See Liu Huaqiu's Handbook on Arms Control and Disarmament, National Defense Industry Publishing House, 2000, PP. 395-396.

8. The relevant additional protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones signed by China, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_ 673085/zzjg_ 673183/jks_ 674633/ty_ 674661/t228262. shtml.

9. "United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995)", United Nations, Security Council, April 11, 1995, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol = S/RES/984 (1995).

10. See Department of Defense,April 2010, P. viii; Department of Defense,, February 2018, P. 21.

11. ."China's Successful Explosion of its First Atomic Bomb".

12. President Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered", Prague, April 5, 2009, https:/obamawhitehouse. archives. gov / the - Ppress - office / remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered.

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14. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, People's Daily, 30 July 1996, p.1.

15. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris，“Nuclear Notebook: Nuclear Arsenals of the World”，，https: / /thebulletin. org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia.

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17. Ibid.

18. Department of Defense，，August 2018，p. 29.

19. Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Volume IV), People's Publishing House, 1991, PP. 1194-1195.

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21. Edited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and the Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee : Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong, P. 170.

22. Ibid., PP. 170-171.

23. Jiangbian Jiatuo, Li Juezhuan, China Tibetology Press, 2004, PP. 221, 437.

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29. See Li Bin and Hu Gaochen, The Effectiveness of China's Nuclear Deterrence from the Perspective of the United States,, No. 5, 2018, pp. 21-41.

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31. The State Council Information Office of China: The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces, April 2013, http://www.scio.gov. cn/ztk/dtzt/2013/03/4/Document/1312894/1312894. htm.

32. James Acton，“Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons?”，April 18, 2013,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/opinion/is-china-changing-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons. html; Rachel Dennis J. Blasko，“The 2013 Defense White Paper in Perspective”，，Vol. 13，Issue 9，April 25，2013.

33. After James Acton’s article in the New York Times, M. Taylor Fravel and Gregory Kulacki discussed with him about his idea, then James Acton responds, See Rachel Oswald，“China's New Defense Paper Causes Stir Over No-First-Use Nuke Policy”，April 24，2013，http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/chinas-new-defense-white-paper-causes-stir-over-questions-no-first-use-policy; James Acton，“Debating China's No-First-Use Commitment: James Acton Responds”，Carnegie Endowment for International Peace，April 22，2013， https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/22/debating-china-s-no-first-use-commitment-james-acton-responds-pub-51583.

34. Phillip A. Karber，“Strategic Implications of China's Underground Great Wall”，September 26，2011，http: / /www. fas. org/nuke/guide/china/Karber_ UndergroundFacilities-Full_ 2011_ reduced. pdf.

35. Hans M. Kristensen，“No，China Does Not Have 3，000 Nuclear Weapons”，F(xiàn)ederation of AmericanScientists，December 3，2011，https: / /fas. org/blogs/security/2011 /12 /chinanukes/.

36. Anatoly Karlin，“China's True Nuclear Power”，June 28，2012，http: / /akarlin. com/2012 /06 /chinas-true-nuclear-power/.

37. State Council Information Office: China's Arms Control and Disarmament, November 1995, http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/1995/Document/307994/307994.htm.

38. State Council Information Office: China's National Defense in 2006, December 2006, http://www.scio.gov.cn/Zfbps/ndhf/2006/Document/307878/307878_ 1. htm.

39. State Council Information Office: The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces.

40. State Council Information Office: China's Military Strategy, May 2015, http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2015/Document/1435161/1435161. htm.

41. Fan Jishe，“China's Military Parade: Get the Message Right”，September 11，2015，http: / /www. china. org. cn/opinion/2015-09 /11 /content_ 36559721. htm.