Analysis of the Role of U.S. in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism

【Abstract】One of the central functions of WTO is dealing with international trade disputes， and WTO has set up the most functional international dispute settlement mechanism in the world. The United States， in particular， as the worlds largest economy， is the most important constitutor and rules breaker of the WTO rules and one of the most important participants in the dispute settlement mechanism.

【Key words】WTO; dispute settlement mechanism; the United States; hegemony

【作者簡介】米佳（1990-），女，漢族，河北保定人，北京第二外國語學(xué)院，碩士研究生，研究方向：英語語言文學(xué)專業(yè)國際文化貿(mào)易。

1. Introduction

The World Trade Organization （WTO） is the most important global international organization dealing with international frictions between WTO members. “The central feature of the WTO is its dispute settlement mechanism” （Jackson 2000：179）. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism， with its own principles， institutions and procedures， is the basic guarantee for the effective implementation of various WTO agreements. Up to December， 2018， according to the WTO official statistics， the United States has participated in 420 international trade disputes in the World Trade Organization， including 123 cases as the complainant， 151 cases as the respondent， and 146 cases as the third party， and its participation rate ranks first among all WTO members.

As the founder and leader of the multilateral trading system， the United States has always declared its commitment to promoting multilateral trade liberalization. However， the efforts made by the United States to establish a multilateral trading system are ultimately based on the self-interested motives for safeguarding the U.S. hegemony and national interests. This also determines that the attitude of the United States toward the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is always based on its own interests and value judgments.

2. As a Constitutor

The idea of establishing the International Trade Organization （ITO） was put forward at the Bretton Woods Conference held in July 1944， when it was intended to establish an international trade organization together with the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The Havana Charter signed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in 1947 agreed to establish the ITO. Due to the trade protection stances of many countries in the negotiations， and a lack of agreements on trade liberalization in the United States， the ITO was not established because of the opposition of the U.S. Senate. In the same year， the protocol of the GATT， as a temporary contract to promote trade liberalization， was initiated by the United States. Although GATT was not established as an international organization in terms of legal status and organizational structure， it still achieved the mission entrusted to it by the United States. During 1947-1993， the GATT hosted eight rounds of multilateral tariff and trade negotiations. Then on January 1995， the World Trade Organization was finally established. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism， as the pillar of the multilateral trade mechanism， is an indispensable part of the WTO. Since its establishment， the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has made great achievements in resolving international disputes and provides institutional basis for trade disputes between WTO members and the United States.

3. As a Rules Breaker

Undoubtedly， as the representative of the free market economy， the United States markets are much more open and transparent than other countries in the world today. This is also the basis for the United States to accuse China， Japan， the European Union and other countries of not complying with the multilateral trading system.

However， the open market of the United States was not established to respect the multilateral trading system; it was established to serve the national interest of the United States. “The United States tends to be schizophrenic; it wants the benefits of free trade， but also the freedom to act on its own without regard to international restraints” （Bello & Holmer 1994：1103）. It can be seen from history and dispute cases that the United States has never hesitated to undermine the authority of the multilateral trading system as long as it violates the interests of the United States or does not meet the needs of the U.S. domestic politics， even if such authority is created by the United States. Trade protectionism has never faded from the U.S. policy. And the main value of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to the United States is to promote import liberalization and market opening in other countries， and to realize the national interests of the U.S. economy to dominate the world.

The U.S. protectionism also presents a legal and standardized development trend， trying to put a reasonable cloak on protectionism through its law. “Section 301” is the common name of Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. After the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism， in view of the many shortcomings in the process of GATT dealing with disputes， the United States proposed “Section 301” to deal with foreign trade barriers by unilateral standards. The “Section 301” has been opposed by many countries. The core content of the “Section 301” is that the United States unilaterally decides what is fair， and the essence of the “Section 301” is the U.S. national interests as paramountcy. Generally speaking， “Section 301” is a legislative authorization clause for the United States to take unilateral action when the U.S. interests is damaged by other countries who violate the WTO agreements in legislation or administration. And the “Section 301” does have a great effect on the U.S development in the actual operation. The United States uses “Section 301” as a threat to deal with international disputes and it is also a distrust and disdain of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The United States believes that it acts as a “violator” to promote the establishment of more sophisticated international rules.

Over the years， the United States actively sought the status of the world leader. The United States is keeping trying to maintain its dominant position. Although the United States also follows the rules of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to resolve international disputes， it always unilaterally does whatever it wants. The so-called unilateral sanctions， in essence， is to accept an international organizations ruling only based on the benefits of the United States. The United States has always refused to waive the unilateral sanctions such as the “Section 301”. From the perspective of the United States， other countries should abide by the WTO agreements， while the United States cannot comply with the agreements， especially when the situation is not conducive to the interests of the United States， and at the same time uses the “Section 301” to achieve its purpose. The “Section 301” plays a very important role in safeguarding the international interests of the United States. Since the legislative purpose of the “Section 301” is to enhance the benefits of the U.S. national interests， and authorize the U.S. government to take unilateral retaliatory measures， it must in conflict with the WTO agreements which advocate international trade liberalization， and provides equal， fair and non-discrimination trading opportunity.

4. Conclusions

The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is one of the main channels for the U.S. government to maintain its hegemony. To some extent， the WTO trade dispute settlement mechanism has become a perfect weapon for the United States to expand oversea markets. Whats more， since Trump takes office， he has made WTO reform an important policy agenda for the United States. The United States wishes the so-called “fairness” will replace the “freedom”， and the hegemonic position of the United States in the global multilateral trading system will be further established. The unilateralist policies that prioritize the U.S. interests will not disappear. The ability of the United States to participate in WTO disputes has great implications and cautions for China. Therefore， China， as a rival and a learner， should find our restrictions and enhance our ability to handle the WTO disputes in the future.

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