THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE DURING TRUMP AEVDOMLIUNTISIOTNR,A FTRIOICNT:ION AND IMPLICATION

YANG BOJIANG

Research Fellow, Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Science

MU JIAN

From University of International Relations

Since President Trump took office in the White House in January 2017, the relationship between the United States and its Eurasian allies has been at odds from time to time. But indepth study shows that the US-Japan alliance is generally going from strength to strength compared with the US-Europe relationship, which is determined by the special geopolitical strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In the face of drastic shifts in the international power landscape, the Trump administration has made no disruptive changes to America's Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific in Obama era. Instead, it has followed the traditional alliance strategy and made Japan its pivot for achieving its strategic objectives in the region. Meanwhile, the US and Japan have seen their differences and frictions exacerbated and hard to iron out in the short term by Trump's unilateralism and transactional foreign policy and practices. Although such exacerbation will not break the general trend of the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, it will restrict how fast, deep and broad the al-

liance can go. Such a situation provides a new perspective for China to unfold its multilateral strategy. The development of US-Japan alliance brings profound and complicated influence to US' Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific strategy, and further enhance the dual structure in regional and international affairs. Meanwhile, more and more interactions continue to come about between China and the US and Japan, bringing China into new territory in terms of its dealing with the US-Japan alliance.

THE EVER-STRENGTHENED US-JAPAN ALLIANCE

Japan is the most important ally of the US in Asia-Pacific. The establishment and enhancement of such an alliance has a great bearing on the US' Asia-Pacific strategy regarding how to lay it out and act on it. Since Donald Trump came to power, he has followed the traditional alliance strategy and regards the US-Japan alliance as the main way to achieve the strategic objectives in the region in the face of drastic shifts in the landscape of international power. On the whole, the US-Japan alliance is in the process of strengthening.

1. Strategic Coordination at Global and Regional Levels

Trump has pushed for military and security cooperation with Japan since coming to power, and Abe Shinzo has repeatedly expressed the willingness to strengthen its alliance with the US. Both sides have agreed to continue to strengthen the alliance framework. In February 2017, the US and Japan held their first summit meeting since Trump took office and issued a joint statement, affirming that the US and Japan are “important mutual allies”, that “the US-Japan alliance is the basis for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific”, and that “the bonds and friendly relations between the US and Japan run very deep”. Japan's official documents such as 2017 and 2018 editions of Diplomacy Blue Paper and Defense White Paper as well as Abe's parliament speeches all reiterated that “the Japan-US alliance is a common asset for stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and the world”. In December 2018, Japan's new Defense Outline Plan stressed that “the Japan-US alliance is in line with Japan's own defense system and will continue to be the foundation for Japan's security”. Since Trump came to power, the USJapan summit, the Security Assurance Consultation Committee, i.e. the 2+2 (Foreign Ministers plus Defense Ministers) meeting, and various high-level diplomacy and defense consultations have occurred more often and the communication mechanisms in ever better shape. Between July 2017 and June 2018, the US-Japan high-level talks, including telephone talks, reached 36 times, according to the 2018 edition of Japan's

During US Vice President Michael Pence's visit to Japan, the two sides pledged US$ 70 billion in aid for infrastructure construction in the Indo-Pacif ic region. The picture shows Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo (right) and US Vice President Michael Pence attending a press conference in Tokyo, Japan on November 13th, 2018.

Defense White Paper. Through frequent dialogues and communication, the US and Japan have known each other better regarding respective interests and major issues, and strengthened the basis for political relations and alliance.

Building on that, the two countries continue to strengthen strategic consensus and coordination at global and regional levels. In November 2017, Trump accepted Japan's proposal to present Indo-Pacific strategy on his first trip to the Asia-Pacific region since taking office. Since then, the US-Japan regional strategic coordination has expanded rapidly to the Indo-Pacific region which has gradually become a focus for the two countries. Even though the two have their own particular emphases on how to move forward with it, with the Japanese side even changing the term Indo-Pacific Strategy to Indo-Pacific region Concept in August 2018,they see eye to eye on the overall guidelines for strengthening their strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. In September 2018, Abe visited the US and both sides reaffirmed to jointly promote the Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly in terms of cooperation to assist developing countries in Indio-Pacific. In November of the same year, US Vice President Mike Pence visited Japan and both sides announced to provide US$70 billion in aid for infrastructure development in the region. In addition to bilateral cooperation, US and Japan also join hands in multilateral strategic coordination with India and Australia. During the 2018 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit and Group of 20 (G20) Summit, Japan, the US and Australia as well as Japan, the US and India held trilateral meetings and issued joint statements announcing that they would jointly advance the Indo-Pacific Strategy and strengthen cooperation in “quality infrastructure projects”, regional economic development and maritime security support.

2. Military and Security Cooperation

Security cooperation is the cornerstone of the US-Japan alliance. In April 2015, the US and Japan released a new edition of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, which expanded the scope of their coordinated operations, provided institutional support for security cooperation between the two sides at global and regional levels and in “new” areas, pushed the alliance to be “the alliance in the world” and established all-round security cooperative relations. Pace has been picked up towards deeper security cooperation since Trump came to power. The US encourages Japan to enhance its military capabilities, play a more important role in regional security and gives it more room for military development. In December 2017, the Trump administration released the United States National Security Strategy Report, asking its allies to do the same as the US does in defense and military development, in order to “achieve modernization, acquire necessary capabilities, improve operational readiness, and expand military personnel”. In December 2018, Japan introduced a new version of its

Outline Plan for Defense and its Medium-term Defense Force Readiness Plan, stressing that Japan “attaches particular importance to its cooperation with the United States in aero and cyber space” , and planning to establish Sky, Net and Power Command and cooperate with the US Army in this regard as well as in the research, development and application of electromagnetic weapons for advanced fighter aircrafts. Propelled by strategic policies of both sides, the US and Japan have already kick started cooperation in aerospace, network and electromagnetic waves, pushing beyond the scope of regional military alliance and towards a global strategic alliance with all-around cooperation.

Entering the 21st century, the US and Japan have been improving the coordination mechanism of alliance to ensure effective communication and coordination throughout joint operations. For the purpose of the institutionalization of military security cooperation, in recent years the US and Japan have set up military coordination mechanism, which is composed of the alliance coordination group, the coordination stations for joint operation and the coordination stations for military forces. In keeping with this momentum, the 2+2 Talk in August 2017 decided that the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation would be implemented as soon as possible, so as to strengthen cooperation in intelligence sharing, reconnaissance, monitoring and military exercises. The deepening of the institutionalization of military security cooperation has pushed forward the process of military integration between the two, as well as the capability for coordinated operations. Meanwhile, the US and Japan are also actively exploring models for security cooperation with other countries, including such multilateral mechanisms as the US-Japan-X and the USJapan-India-Australia Security Dialogue (QUAD) with a view to integrating the internal and external mechanisms and creating a network of military security cooperation.

US-Japan military exercises and arms deals have increased markedly since Trump came to office. In November 2018, the two countries held “Keen Sword” 2019 joint military exercises, the so-called “the largest military exercise in Japan and its neighboring region ever”, with nearly 60,000 people from both sides participating in it. It was carried out in air, sea and amphibious battle platforms, fully demonstrating the all-around, multi-tiered, dimensional and in-depth military cooperation of the alliance. At the same time, the US-Japan arms trade is frequent and involves numerous sophisticated weaponries. In January 2018, the US announced an arms sales agreement with Japan involving Standard-3 missiles worth US$130 million. It was the first US export of the product, in order to boost the security and defense capabilities of Japan as its main ally, and to “sustain political stability and economic development in the Asia-Pacific region”. Japan has also stepped up efforts to build up and equip its military by actively buying advanced weapons from the US. Its modified helicopter carrier, Izumo, can carry 8 US' F35B short-distance/vertical take-off and landing stealth aircraft in theory. The Abe administration is also considering buying another 100 F35 fighters at more than one trillion yen, following the introduction of 42 F35A fighters from the US.

3. China Orientation

The strategic coordination between the US and Japan at the Asia-Pacific level has largely revolved around China's Belt and Road Initiative, viewed by the two as a “direct challenge” to regional security order and their influence in the region. The two countries use the Indian-Pacific strategy to win over regional countries and hedge against the growing regional influence of China. Following the 2015 revision of the Offical Development Assistance (ODA) framework, the replacement of “development assistance” with “development cooperation”, and the scaling up of aid to Southeast Asia, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono paid a special visit in 2018 to Indian Ocean countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the prevention of the emergence of an “extreme tilt” towards China. In the context of the East China Sea disputes between China and Japan and China's operation to safeguard its maritime rights, the leadership in the US and Japan issued a joint statement after talks in February 2017, reaffirming that Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty is applicable to the Diaoyu Islands. The new version of Japan's Defense Plan Outline and the Defense White Paper have devoted much text to exaggerating the “threat” posed to Japan by China's growing military force, emphasized its Southwest Defense policy and clearly viewed China as a key defense target. Japanese media revealed that the Japanese government has been considering the use of unmanned submarine vehicles in the East China Sea to enhance the surveillance capability against Chinese submarines. On the South China Sea issue, the US and Japan have been actively engaged in it, continuously strengthening security and military cooperation with the Philippines, Vietnam and other claimant countries, as well as

The Trump administration follows “America f irst” and pragmatism, and pursues unilateralism and transactional foreign policy. It would maximize its self-interests at the expense of the interests of Japan and other allies.bringing in India and Australia for joint intervention and the internationalization of the issue. Since Trump came to power, Japan has actively followed the US in its freedom of navigation operations at the South China Sea. In 2018, the two sides held joint military exercises in sensitive waters, under the disguise of “guaranteeing freedom of navigation at the South China Sea” while in fact serving the purpose of deterring China's construction of islands and reefs.

MOUNTING FRICTIONS WITHIN THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE

The Trump administration follows “America first” and pragmatism, and pursues unilateralism and transactional foreign policy. It would maximize its self-interests at the expense of the interests of Japan and other allies. Its policy orientation, diplomatic approach and zero-sum thinking flared up internal frictions within the alliance, leading to a rise in conflict of interests and policy differences between the US and Japan in trade, defense, the building of international order and others.

1. Bilateral Trade

Japan for long has trade surplus with the US, especially with about 40% of its auto export flowing to the US. Trump has been strongly dissatisfied with Japan's trade policies towards the US, accusing the Japanese government of manipulating its exchange rate. Trade has become the most difficult issue between the two sides. To appease the American side, Japan quickly pledged to invest 150 billion dollars in US infrastructure projects over a 10-year period, creating 700000 jobs and an infrastructure market of US$450 billion in the US. But the trade imbalance has not eased, with Japan's trade surplus with the US rising by 3.1% to 7.04 trillion yen in 2017, according to Japanese Finance Ministry. In March 2018, the US imposed tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum products under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, and Japan was not exempted from it like other US allies such as Australia. Instead, the US has maintained a highpressure stance on Japan, threatening to raise tariffs on imported cars to 20% in the future. Under pressure from the US side, the US-Japan Summit reached an agreement in September 2018 on holding bilateral negotiations on trade in goods, which are expected to start in the spring of 2019. Japan has been looking to multilateral trade framework through which it can constrain the US and has made every effort to avoid entering into “one-on-one” bilateral negotiations with it. Although eventually Japan was forced to agree on bilateral negotiations, it maintained that the negotiations should be limited to trade in goods for the protection of the maximum interests of its own industries. The US side insists that the negotiations cover not only trade in goods, but also investment and services. The US and Japan are deeply divided in such areas as automobile, agricultural products and e-commerce. It is difficult to resolve the frictions in short term, and the economic and trade disputes may become perpetual.

2. Defense Security

Even the cooperation in the field of military security has been constantly strengthening, the US and Japan have been at odds with each other over the issue of “compulsory military purchase” and the cost-sharing for US forces stationed in Japan. Japan's purchases of US arms have increased year by year since Abe resumed power in 2012 and accelerated security strategy transformation. After Trump came to power, he further demanded that Japan increase its purchases of US arms and adopted a policy of linking arms sales to trade, an attempt to “create more jobs” in the US and allow Japan to reduce its trade surplus to the US while itself “becomes safer”. The US-Japan arms deal under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program has increased dramatically, with the US taking the lead entirely in its hands. It can unilaterally change the price and delivery time, and the lifetime maintenance of arms and equipment is entrusted to it. This means that Japan will continue to pay more and more for arms purchased from the US in the future, unable to manage costs or accumulate technology. An example in case is the Improved Ship borne Interceptor Missile Standard-3Block 2A that Japan promised to buy from the US after the US-Japan Summit in November 2017. According to Japan's Ministry of Defense, the price of the missile was 16 percent higher than the original estimate even during the mass-production phase (2017-2024).The US' blatant policy of forced purchase has provoked a backlash from Japanese society, and is accused of being “coercive” and overpriced for its arms sales to Japan. The Japanese government fears that putting the interests of the US' military industry above Japan's security imperatives and that being forced to purchase sophisticated US weapons under US pressure could have adverse domestic political consequences. In addition, Trump has demanded from the campaign period that the Japanese government pay the full cost of US troops in Japan, accusing Japan of failing to meet its responsibilities as an ally on the issue. In response to the request of the Trump administration, Japan maintained that Japan and the US must share properly and that it should not bear the full burden unilaterally, as Japan already has the highest proportion and amount of funding for the US military presence. But under US pressure, Japan paid for US troops stationed in Japan 789.7 billion yen in 2017, up 25.5 billion yen from the previous year.

3. Stance on Rebuilding International Order

The gap between Japan and the US is widening around how to build a new international order, how to respond to globalization and what kind of international trading system to build. Trump rejected liberal trade principles and declared a “permanent exit” from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement(TPP), while shelving the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement(TTIP) negotiations and withdrawing from a number of international organizations and agreements. Such practices have inflicted a severe blow to Japan, a country that has benefited from multilateral free trade system, established itself as a trading nation and adopted the TPP as the cornerstone of Abenomics policy. Although the TPP undermines Japanese agriculture to certain degree, it can boost foreign direct investment into Japan, opening up new sources of growth for Japanese economy. After the withdrawal of the US from the TPP, Japan insisted on promoting the “TPP of 11 nation” and changed its name to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP). In March 2018, final agreement was reached on the CPTPP, which entered into force at the end of the year. The differences between US and Japan over the policies of multilateral trading system originate from the conflict of interests and extend to the field of China policy. The US and Japan share the same understanding of and interests in the socalled “China threat”. While they are in pace with each other to a high extent on China policy in geopolitics and security, their differences are mainly manifested in economy and trade. Trump administration is trying to force China to back down with a hard line policy and is even willing to take the initiative to start a trade war. Japan wants to strengthen cooperation with China to boost its domestic economy. Since 2017 beginning, Japan gave up its previous negative, wait-and-see or even resistant approach to the Belt and Road Initiative, and adopted a limited cooperation policy instead. In 2018, China and Japan successfully exchanged visits by prime ministers, reached a consensus on “third-party market cooperation” and signed more than 50 project agreements.

THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATION OF US-JAPAN ALLIANCE

Against the background of the drastic change of international power landscape, the mutual strategic need between US and Japan is no less than at any other time in history, and hard to be replaced by third parties. The US needs Japan to be a regional strategic pivot, and Japan's sense of security can only be obtained from the US. The Trump administration's change in Obama's Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is not subversive, and the intra-regional alliance system remains the backbone of the US regional strategy with Japan the top US ally in the region and an important support for the US to lead regional order. To strengthen the US-Japan alliance system is an important way for the Trump administration to implement its new regional strategy. Precisely because of the withdrawal from the TPP, America's reliance on the alliance will not to be weakened but only to be strengthened in order to maintain full and effective regional participation and dominance. As a matter of fact, the US military presence in Japan has risen since Trump assumed power compared with that during Obama administration. In the one-year period from 2016 to 2017, the number rose from 38,000 to 44,000. At the same time, the frictions and differences between the US and Japan have also risen. In the short term, the conflict of interests between the two sides in certain fields is difficult to be eliminated, which will not stand in the way of the general trend of the US-Japan alliance, but will restrict the strengthening pace, depth and breadth of the alliance. Such developments hall bring complexity to China's international strategic environment, especially the surrounding security environment, and also new situation for China to deal with the alliance.

1. Strengthened Dual Structure of International Relations in Asia-Pacific

It is an important part of the USJapan alliance cooperation to strengthen security cooperation with regional countries and build security networks under the US-Japan+ model. Through joint military exercises and military aid, the two countries have been in close contact with regional countries, seeking to contain China by expanding the “circle of friends” and guiding them to taking side. On China's part, it regards economic diplomacy as the basic path to improve peripheral relations and enhance regional cooperation. Since the international financial crisis

The Trump administration's change in Obama's Rebalance to the Asia-Pacif ic is not subversive, and the intra-regional alliance system remains the backbone of the US regional strategy with Japan the top US ally in the region and an important support for the US to lead regional order.in 2008, China has more and more economic and trade engagements with its neighboring countries, and the share it takes in the foreign trade of many countries, especially in Southeast Asia, has been increasing. From 2001 to 2015, China's total trade with Southeast Asian countries rose more than tenfold from US$41.591 billion to $468.401 billion, and these countries' dependence on China's market continue to rise. The continued strengthening of the US-Japan alliance will no doubt deepen the dual structure of international relations in the Asia-Pacific, i.e., the divergence between economic ties and security ties. Regional countries depend on China economically and the US and Japan for security, which is obviously unfavorable to regional integration and development, optimization of security environment and reconstruction of long-term order. Meanwhile, the dual structure also exists in the China policy of the US and Japan, in particular, it will greatly sway Japan's international strategic behaviors. Japan feels pressure from China's rise and continues to strengthen security cooperation with the US to seek “security” and “peace of mind”. Yet its small domestic market cannot accommodate its enormous manufacturing capacity, and closer cooperation with China is the one and only way to maintain economic growth and achieve long-term prosperity. To this end, Japan seeks to weaken the restriction of dual structure, trying to profit both ways from China and the US. Since Trump came to power, the Abe administration has stepped up its strategic autonomy while accelerating Japan's military integration with the US, as illustrated by its “third-party market cooperation” with China while relying on the US to resist China.

2. Rising Interactions between the US-Japan Alliance and China

On the one hand, the US-Japan alliance will remain the most direct and important external factor affecting China's strategic security environment. The strengthening of the alliance will inevitably affect the security situation in the Asia-Pacific and India-Pacific, bringing to China considerable external pressure. On the other hand, with China's growing overall strength, China's influence on the US-Japan relations has more and more become a major external driving force that affects the direction of the alliance. Since the 2008 international financial crisis, the US and Japan have “common sense of pressure” in the face of China's rise, as China is identified as a “challenger” to the regional order and “China threat” needs to be dealt with through strengthening their alliance. In October 2018, The US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report entitled

Unprecedented Importance: Updating the US-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century (the Fourth Armitage Report) , which stated that the US and Japan are facing growing threats to regional security and prosperity in the 21st century, mainly from China and North Korea, and that America needs a strong and confident Japan, and Japan needs a positive and constructive America. The report represents the basic views of the American strategic scholars (especially pro-Japanese strategists such as Armitage) on the US-Japan alliance and the challenges it faces from China, and also reflects the trend of the strategic coordination between the two countries. Clearly, American strategic community has seen China as the biggest external driving force to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. Likewise, the “worries” expressed by Japanese strategic scholars about the direction of the Japan-US alliance are also directly related to the “China factor”. For example, the policy report in March 2017 of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, a think-tank under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, stressed that “efforts to maintain Japan-US coordination on strategies regarding China is the foundation of Japan's engagement with the United States”, “to avoid differences and unnecessary friction between Japan and the US in different areas, there is still a need for ongoing consultation and harmonization with the US on China awareness and policy”. This is in fact a reflection of the rising influence of Chinese factors on the alliance.

3. China's Dealing with the USJapan Alliance

Different from the cold war era featured by bloc confrontations, The strategic rivalry between China and the US-Japan alliance is carried out under new background and subjective and objective conditions with the further development of globalization, profound changes in international relations, China's approach to the center of the world stage and pursuit of the path of peaceful development. The rivalry will be there for long and become more tortuous. Under the new circumstances, China should not only be able to see the enormous external pressure caused by the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, maintain strategic alertness, but also pay full attention to and make good use of its increasing real and potential influence, actively explore policy paths and specific methods to exert influence and guidance; not only should it have sufficient strategic selfconfidence and determination, but also be flexible and proactive, and not miss any strategic and tactical opportunities to advance multilateral game play and defend its interests. For example, the easing of China-Japan relations since 2017 —a ease of dependence on the US from the Japanese perspective, and a relief of pressure from the US-Japan alliance from the Chinese perspective— is a successful international strategic operation. It is a good case in accurately understanding and properly dealing with the complicated situation in which the US-Japan alliance is strengthened while the differences are on the rise. In the long run, China should take economic cooperation as its basic path, adopt multi-pronged approach of diplomacy and security, and continuously enhance common interests with its neighbors, including Japan, to ensure more and more mutual benefit and support, and to deepen the dual structure between the US and Japan, so that it can weaken the consensus in their China strategy and ease pressure of its rising from the US-Japan alliance.