中非兄弟情

文/馬克·力文（Mark Levine，美） 譯/史聰一

在歷經(jīng)了一年的象牙塔生活后，我搬離了曾經(jīng)的校園，住進(jìn)了北京的一條胡同。在這里，狹窄的胡同與四合院所構(gòu)成的社區(qū)遐邇聞名，并有許多上了年紀(jì)的人世居于此。每當(dāng)在胡同中漫步，無論走到何處，這些年長(zhǎng)的人們都會(huì)向我致以問候，并親切地詢問我來自何方。

我回答道：“南非?！?/p>

毋庸置疑，他們對(duì)我的回答報(bào)以微笑，并親切地稱呼我為“非洲兄弟”。

上述內(nèi)容的演講者、來自南非開普敦的魯佑羅·斯雅克（Luyolo Sijake，中文名為天佑）于2013年初次踏足中國(guó)大地。此后，在2016—2018年的兩年時(shí)間里，天佑在北京大學(xué)（燕京學(xué)堂）攻讀碩士學(xué)位，主修“中國(guó)學(xué)”，專業(yè)方向?yàn)榻?jīng)濟(jì)與管理。目前，他供職于一家跨國(guó)咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)，協(xié)助中國(guó)公司拓展國(guó)際業(yè)務(wù)，也幫助各國(guó)公司尋求在中國(guó)與亞洲發(fā)展業(yè)務(wù)。天佑表示：“我原計(jì)劃在中國(guó)繼續(xù)工作一年，但現(xiàn)在則希望重返非洲——或許不是南非，而是非洲其他國(guó)家，旨在幫助中國(guó)與非洲各國(guó)拓展交集?！?/p>

父親的越野車叫“周恩來”

我與天佑邂逅于2018年的6月。彼時(shí)，新組建的中央廣播電視總臺(tái)旗下的“China Plus”，為紀(jì)念南非共和國(guó)與中華人民共和國(guó)建交20周年，正在組織一次特別的活動(dòng)，名為“我的中國(guó)—南非故事”，來自中國(guó)和南非的友人們將分別講述他們的故事。我負(fù)責(zé)瀏覽每位發(fā)言者的演講稿，并為他們的演講提供建議。在完成錄制后的一個(gè)月，整個(gè)系列節(jié)目在南非國(guó)家電視臺(tái)上播放。之后，完整的視頻也被上傳至“China Plus”的官方網(wǎng)站。

正是通過這個(gè)節(jié)目，我第一次見到了天佑，并了解了他的故事。我發(fā)現(xiàn)了天佑對(duì)“遺產(chǎn)”這一詞的運(yùn)用，以及對(duì)“父輩”的提及?！爱?dāng)我的父親在15歲那年加入非洲人民大會(huì)（非國(guó)大）起，他便加入了反抗種族隔離制度的大軍。兩三年后，父親被提名加入非國(guó)大的軍事組織‘民族之矛’，并接受訓(xùn)練。他曾前往坦桑尼亞與其他非洲國(guó)家，以及非洲之外的國(guó)家進(jìn)行訓(xùn)練?！?/p>

“有時(shí)，父親會(huì)與同志們相聚一堂，共同追憶其所經(jīng)歷的往事。隨著他們走向年邁，這些故事或?qū)⑹鞯膽n心常伴其左右，于是我便開始用拍攝記錄這一切，其中一件事便是他們所駕駛的車輛遭到破壞：這是一輛全地形越野車，有人在后軸上做了手腳，造成了后軸脫落。隨后，父親便提出要請(qǐng)修理工人對(duì)‘周恩來’進(jìn)行修復(fù)?！?/p>

“‘周恩來’？當(dāng)聽到新中國(guó)第一位總理的名字被提及，我著實(shí)感到驚訝，并且對(duì)其與父親的車子有何關(guān)聯(lián)而感到困惑。父親解釋道：在反對(duì)種族主義政府的抗?fàn)幹?，周恩來代表中?guó)，成為支持我們反抗的前鋒力量。作為那次援助的一部分，中國(guó)方面提供了大批量的此類運(yùn)輸工具。但遺憾的是，沒有人能夠叫出這些車輛的名字，因?yàn)樗ㄒ坏臉?biāo)識(shí)便是無人知曉含義的漢字。所以，這些車輛便被命名為‘周恩來’。”

接著，天佑解釋道：“后來父親被俘，被關(guān)押至南非的羅本島內(nèi)。在推翻種族主義政府后，父親得以釋放，并加入軍隊(duì)：這也使他有機(jī)會(huì)數(shù)次前往中國(guó)。時(shí)至今日，父親仍會(huì)談及那些曾在中國(guó)度過的溫情歲月?！?/p>

或許，這可能僅是兩國(guó)“兄弟情誼”的一個(gè)側(cè)面，但卻不是唯一的一面。

1949年10月1日中華人民共和國(guó)宣布成立。直至1971年，聯(lián)合國(guó)通過了第2738號(hào)決議，中華人民共和國(guó)才被得以承認(rèn)，正式成為在聯(lián)合國(guó)代表中國(guó)的唯一合法代表，并被允許在聯(lián)合國(guó)大會(huì)與安全理事會(huì)享有其合法地位。而距此約十年前，也就是1963年的年底，周恩來總理已對(duì)10個(gè)非洲國(guó)家進(jìn)行了國(guó)事訪問，并提出了中國(guó)支援非洲國(guó)家（及阿拉伯國(guó)家）的5項(xiàng)基本原則。

基于中國(guó)對(duì)非洲國(guó)家具有歷史性意義的援助，在聯(lián)合國(guó)第2738號(hào)決議中投出贊成票的76個(gè)國(guó)家中，非洲國(guó)家的數(shù)量便達(dá)到了26個(gè)！因此，所有中國(guó)人都明白中國(guó)與南非之間的緊密聯(lián)系，并能夠迅速地回憶起毛主席曾經(jīng)常掛在嘴邊的一個(gè)詞：“非洲兄弟”。這也能夠解釋：為何時(shí)至今日，天佑仍然能夠聽到這個(gè)詞。

西方對(duì)中國(guó)在非投資的批判

伊恩·古德拉姆（Ian Goodrum）是一位在中國(guó)日?qǐng)?bào)網(wǎng)工作的美國(guó)人。在緊鄰北京故宮的中山公園音樂堂外，我與伊恩有了第一次見面。當(dāng)時(shí)，我們都參加了2018年的中央民族樂團(tuán)五一（國(guó)際勞動(dòng)節(jié)）音樂會(huì)，由國(guó)家外國(guó)專家局為外國(guó)專家所舉辦。

“China Plus”組織的“我的中國(guó)—南非故事”活動(dòng)現(xiàn)場(chǎng)

我們開始中非間關(guān)系的討論，尤其是關(guān)于西方對(duì)中非關(guān)系的批判，包括美國(guó)前國(guó)務(wù)卿雷克斯·蒂勒森（Rex Tillerson）在2018年對(duì)中非關(guān)系的一些負(fù)面評(píng)論。伊恩說：“很多外國(guó)人并不明白這些批評(píng)基于意識(shí)形態(tài)，而非基于事實(shí)。”他給我推薦了一些書，包括黛博拉·布羅蒂加姆（Deborah Brautigam）的一些作品，她是約翰·霍普金斯大學(xué)高級(jí)國(guó)際研究學(xué)院（SAIS）的教授。

2015年，布羅蒂加姆在《外交政策》雜志上發(fā)表了一篇文章，彼時(shí)正值習(xí)近平主席剛剛結(jié)束對(duì)非洲各國(guó)的國(guó)事訪問。她注意到，習(xí)主席承諾將會(huì)“發(fā)展中非關(guān)系”，以實(shí)現(xiàn)互利的伙伴關(guān)系，并承諾將用三年時(shí)間向非洲的發(fā)展促進(jìn)項(xiàng)目提供600億美元。在一篇名為《中國(guó)在非洲投資的五大誤區(qū)》中，布羅蒂加姆指出：“媒體不斷在重復(fù)關(guān)于中國(guó)參與非洲投資的五個(gè)最危險(xiǎn)、也是最頑固的誤區(qū)。”在此僅舉三例。

一、中國(guó)只希望榨取非洲的自然資源。布羅蒂加姆指出：盡管非洲豐富的自然資源對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)具有吸引力，但對(duì)西方企業(yè)來講目標(biāo)并無二致。二、2015年7月奧巴馬總統(tǒng)曾警告許多非洲大使，不要雇用外國(guó)勞工參與基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的建設(shè)。雖然未提及中國(guó)，但每個(gè)人都心知肚明，他指的便是中國(guó)勞工——這已成為老生常談的誤區(qū)。布羅蒂加姆說，在一小部分石油產(chǎn)量豐富的國(guó)家，中國(guó)的建筑公司本可以聘用自己國(guó)家的人，但是基于她本人與其他人的調(diào)查表明：在大多數(shù)非洲國(guó)家，大部分的勞工仍然雇用自當(dāng)?shù)亍Ｈ?、認(rèn)為中國(guó)正在尋求對(duì)非洲大陸進(jìn)行土地控制，甚至有說法稱中國(guó)有意將本國(guó)人派往非洲大陸，為中國(guó)本土種植糧食。為此，布羅蒂加姆對(duì)中國(guó)在非洲十幾個(gè)國(guó)家進(jìn)行農(nóng)業(yè)投資的60個(gè)報(bào)道進(jìn)行了為期3年的調(diào)查，發(fā)現(xiàn)這種說法并不成立。起初，她發(fā)現(xiàn)中國(guó)實(shí)際上只獲得了70萬公頃的土地，而不是有些批判言論中所提到的1500萬公頃。但是，她也確實(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)有少部分中國(guó)人在非洲種地，但那也不過是向當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)進(jìn)行售賣的農(nóng)作物而已。

2018年12月，作者(左)、傅涵（右）與郝歌在尼日利亞大使館，郝歌是一位尼日利亞歌手，在中國(guó)家喻戶曉

非洲學(xué)生為什么選擇在中國(guó)而不是美國(guó)學(xué)習(xí)？

對(duì)于天佑而言，以他為縮影的在華非洲留學(xué)生并非個(gè)例。

2017年我認(rèn)識(shí)了來自坦桑尼亞的扎卡里亞·米格托（Zakaria Migeto），他是一位社會(huì)學(xué)博士，同我一樣，居住在中央民族大學(xué)的公寓樓里。2018年8月，我在上樓回家的途中恰巧遇到了正要出門的扎卡里亞。他說：“我最近正在撰寫關(guān)于中非的歷史關(guān)系。你知道坦贊鐵路嗎？當(dāng)時(shí)的新中國(guó)仍舊一貧如洗，但卻為我們與贊比亞免費(fèi)修建了這條鐵路。”坦贊鐵路聯(lián)通了坦桑尼亞和贊比亞，意在為地處內(nèi)陸的贊比亞打通通向出?？诘慕煌}，以此打破經(jīng)濟(jì)上對(duì)南非、羅得西亞（今津巴布韋）種族主義政權(quán)的依賴。

之前，我已經(jīng)認(rèn)識(shí)了一些在中央民族大學(xué)學(xué)習(xí)的塞拉利昂或其他非洲國(guó)家的留學(xué)生。實(shí)際上，在中國(guó)的各個(gè)大學(xué)，非洲學(xué)生在國(guó)際學(xué)生中的比例已經(jīng)從2003年的2%增長(zhǎng)到現(xiàn)在的13%。該數(shù)據(jù)來自2017年6月美國(guó)有線電視新聞網(wǎng)絡(luò)（CNN）網(wǎng)站上的一篇文章《非洲學(xué)生為什么選擇在中國(guó)而不是美國(guó)學(xué)習(xí)》。

在不到15年的時(shí)間里，非洲在華留學(xué)生的數(shù)量增長(zhǎng)了26倍——從2003年的不到2000人，增長(zhǎng)到2015年的將近5萬人。

聯(lián)合國(guó)教科文組織統(tǒng)計(jì)研究所的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，每年到美國(guó)和英國(guó)學(xué)習(xí)的非洲學(xué)生人數(shù)在4萬人左右。而在2014年，到中國(guó)學(xué)習(xí)的非洲學(xué)生人數(shù)超過了英國(guó)和美國(guó)，成為非洲學(xué)生出國(guó)學(xué)習(xí)的第二大目的國(guó)，僅位列法國(guó)之后，后者每年的非洲留學(xué)生人數(shù)超過95000人。

坦白地講，某些非洲留學(xué)生來華是因?yàn)橹袊?guó)相對(duì)廉價(jià)的學(xué)費(fèi)，或是寄希望于日后能夠在中國(guó)建立潛在的商業(yè)往來。但除此之外，在2015年中非合作高峰論壇上，中國(guó)承諾在2018年將會(huì)為3萬名非洲留學(xué)生提供獎(jiǎng)學(xué)金，這非常關(guān)鍵。

中國(guó)向國(guó)際學(xué)生提供各類不同的獎(jiǎng)學(xué)金。扎卡里亞所參與的項(xiàng)目便是7個(gè)中國(guó)政府獎(jiǎng)學(xué)金中的一種。此外，還有“一帶一路”獎(jiǎng)學(xué)金，以及其他各種形式的獎(jiǎng)學(xué)金。而當(dāng)初天佑來到中國(guó)，就是通過參加漢語橋大賽贏得了獎(jiǎng)學(xué)金（包括機(jī)票）。

中國(guó)的簽證制度決定了大多數(shù)留學(xué)生在完成學(xué)業(yè)后不能繼續(xù)留在中國(guó)。這也意味著中國(guó)正在為非洲培養(yǎng)一代學(xué)生。因此，與去法國(guó)、美國(guó)或英國(guó)的學(xué)生不同，來中國(guó)留學(xué)的非洲學(xué)生更有可能回到他們的祖國(guó)，并帶去他們所接受的新興教育與技能。

2018年9月初，中非合作論壇在北京舉辦。南非總統(tǒng)西里爾·拉馬福薩是這次會(huì)議的聯(lián)合主席，我第一次見他還是在近30年前，在加利福尼亞的帕羅奧多。他在發(fā)言中說，中國(guó)不但沒有在非洲采用殖民的方式，而且還幫助了非洲大陸的發(fā)展。他說，“中國(guó)是非洲國(guó)家值得信賴的伙伴，將幫助非洲實(shí)現(xiàn)非洲聯(lián)盟《2063年議程》”，這個(gè)議程是指導(dǎo)非洲實(shí)現(xiàn)五十年發(fā)展的框架。

（馬克·力文：1948年出生于美國(guó)洛杉磯，社會(huì)學(xué)博士、專欄作家、鄉(xiāng)村音樂人，現(xiàn)任中央民族大學(xué)教授。2005年來中國(guó)，創(chuàng)作了許多反映中國(guó)的歌曲，并與傅涵成立“秀外慧中”音樂組合，2014年獲中國(guó)政府友誼獎(jiǎng)。）

After studying for a year in Beijing I moved off campus and into a hutong. Many elderly Chinese are longtime residents of these neighborhoods known for their narrow alleys and courtyard homes.Walking around the hutong I am greeted by these seniors who ask where I come from.

I answer “Nan fei.” (South Africa)

Without exception this brings a smile and the warm greeting “Fei zhou xiong di” (African brother).

The speaker is Luyolo Sijake who first came to China from Cape Town, South Africa in 2013. From 2016-2018 he studied for a Master’s Degree in China Studies with a concentration on Economics and Management at Peking University. He is currently working for a cross-border advisory organization assisting both Chinese companies interested in working in other countries and foreign companies seeking to establish themselves in China and Asia. “I am planning to stay in China for another year but I want to return to Africa, probably outside of South Africa, to help expand the connections between China and other countries in Africa.”

My father’ vehicle called “Zhou Enlai”

I first meet Luyolo in June 2018. China Plus, a website of China Media Group, is organizing a special activity in honor of 20 years of diplomatic relations between the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China. It’s called “My China– South Africa Story”and both Chinese and South African people will tell their stories. I coach them, reviewing each of the speakers’ texts and offering some suggestions for improvement.The entire series is broadcast on South African national television about one month after taping. It is uploaded on the China Plus site shortly thereafter.

It is through this program that I first meet and hear Luyolo’s story. I learn that Luyolo’s use of the word “l(fā)egacy” andreference to “my father’s generation” are more than just figures of speech. “When he was 15 my father joined the African National Congress (ANC) and became part of the fight against the apartheid regime. After two or three years he was nominated to join armed forces training of the ANC’s military wing,Umkhonto weSizwe, ‘Spear of the Nation.’ This took him to Tanzania and many other countries for training both inside and outside of Africa.”

“Sometimes my father and his comrades would get together and reminisce about their experiences. They are getting older and being afraid that these stories will be lost, I started to film them.One of their stories was when the all-terrain vehicle they were driving in was sabotaged. Someone had damaged the rear axle and it came off. My father then referred to needing to send for a mechanic to fix the ‘Zhou Enlai.’”

“Zhou Enlai? I was surprised to hear reference to China’s first Prime Minister and didn’t understand his connection to my father’s vehicle. My father explained that during the struggle against the racist government, Zhou Enlai spearheaded Chinese support for our struggle. As part of this aid, China provided a large number of these vehicles. But, no one knew what to call them because the only markings were Chinese characters that no one could read. So they called them Zhou Enlais.”

Luyolo continues by explaining that later “my father was captured and imprisoned on Robben Island. Upon release after the defeat of the apartheid government, he joined the army and had a chance to come to China several times. He still talks about the warmth he felt when he was here.”

While this may be one side of the “brotherly” connection, it is not the only one.

The People’s Republic of China was founded on October 1,1949. It was not until 1971 with the passing of United Nations Resolution 2738 that the PRC was recognized as the only legitimate representative of China and allowed its rightful places in both the General Assembly and the Security Council.Nearly a decade earlier at the end of 1963, Premier Zhou Enlai visited 10 African countries and laid out five principles of China’s support for African (and Arab) nations.

As a result of this historic support for African countries, of the 76 countries voting in favor of Resolution 2738, 26 of them came from Africa! All Chinese are aware of the close relations between China and South Africa and are quick to recall the phrase “African brother” that was often spoken by Mao Zedong and that Luyolo continues to hear today.

Western Criticisms about Chinese investment in Africa

Ian Goodrum, is American who works at chinadaily.com, the website for the main English-language newspaper in China. I first meet Ian outside of the theater in Sun Yatsen Park adjacent to Beijing’s Forbidden City. We had both just attended the annual (2018) May Day (International Labor Day) concert by the Chinese National Orchestra for foreign experts sponsored by the State Administration for Foreign Experts Affairs.

We later meet and exchange some of our U.S. and China experiences. I tell him of my recent conversation with Luyolo Sijake and his “African Brother” story. This leads us to a discussion of China – Africa relations and, speci fi cally, western criticisms of China’s relations with Africa including the 2018 criticisms of China’s relations with African by then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.

Ian says, “too many people outside of China don’t understand that these ‘criticisms’ are based on ideology not on facts.” He recommends a number of items for me to read including some pieces by Deborah Brautigam, a professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Her 2015 article inForeign Policymagazine, with reference to President Xi’s just completed visit to Africa, notes that Xi promised a “l(fā)ift in China-Africa relations” to promote amutually beneficial partnership and announced a commitment of $60 billion over three years for development projects in Africa. In her piece titled “5 Myths About Chinese Investment in Africa” she discusses “five of the most dangerous — and persistent — myths about Chinese engagement in Africa that are reliably recycled by the press.” Let’s look at three of them.

Myth 1: China only wants to extract Africa’s natural resources. Brautigam notes with while Africa’s extensive array natural resources are a draw for China, they are no less so for western companies. .

Myth 2: In July 2015 President Obama cautions an assembly of African ambassadors against building infrastructure with foreign labor. Without mentioning China everyone knew his reference to the time-worn myths. Brautigam notes that while in a small group of largely oil-rich countries Chinese construction fi rms are allowed to bring their own workers,her own and other’s research, however, shows that in most of Africa, the vast majority of workers are local hires.

Myth 3: Argues that China is in pursuit of control over African land. This claim even suggests that it is China’s intent to send Chinese peasants to grow food for China in Africa. Brautigam’s own 3-year investigation into 60 stories about Chinese agricultural investments in more than a dozen countries found no support for this argument. To begin with she found that Chinese had, in fact, acquired only 700,000 acres instead of the 15 million that some critics claimed. She did, however, find that there were a few dozen Chinese who were growing crops FOR LOCAL MARKETS.

Why African students are ditching the US for China

Luyolo Sijake is not alone as an African student in China.

In 2017 I got to know Zakaria Migeto, a doctoral student in sociology from Tanzania who lives in my apartment building at MUC. In August 2018 I saw him leaving our building as I was coming in. “I am currently writing about the historic relations between China and Africa.” Zakaria quickly said, “Do you know about Tazara? China built it for free at a time that China was still quite poor.” Tazara is a railway line from Tanzania-Zambia built to connect the landlocked Zambia to the sea which allowed it to break its economic dependence on the racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia.

In the past I have gotten to know other African students fromSierra Leone and other countries studying at MUC. In fact, in colleges and universities across China, African students, which in 2003 represented only 2% of the international student body now make up13%.These figures are presented in a June 2017 article on the CNN website entitled “Why African students are ditching the US for China” which also reports that

In less than 15 years the African student body has grown 26-fold --from just under 2,000 in 2003 to almost 50,000 in 2015.

According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, the US and UK host around 40,000 African students a year. China surpassed this number in 2014, making it the second most popular destination for African students studying abroad, after France which hosts just over 95,000 students.”

Some African students are simply attracted by the low cost of Chinese education or the opportunity to make potential business contacts in China, but beyond that in the 2015 summit on the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation committed to make 30,000 scholarships to Africans by 2018.

There are a variety of different scholarships. Zakaria is here through one of seven programs under the umbrella of Chinese Government Scholarship. In addition there are also the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) scholarships and even more. Luyolo came through another path, he entered the 13th Hanyu Qiao competition won a scholarship (including airfare).

Due to Chinese visa rules, most international students cannot stay in China after their education is complete. This prevents brain-drain and means that China is educating a generation of African students who - unlike their counterparts in France, the US or UK - are more likely to return home and bring their new education and skills with them.

The 2018 FOCAC (Forum on China Africa Cooperation) was held in early September in Beijing. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who I first met nearly 30 years ago in Palo Alto, Calfornia, was co-chair of the 2018 meeting. He argued that instead of acting in a colonialist fashion in Africa, China has helped development on the African continent. In his conference speech, Ramaphosa says “China is a reliable partner with African countries to realize the African Union Agenda 2063,” the strategic framework guiding Africa’s 50-year plan for development.