The Problem with Pro fits

譯/房彥昊

Big firms in the United States have never had it so good.Time for more competition. 美國(guó)的大公司迎來(lái)了前所未有的好時(shí)光。是時(shí)候引入更多競(jìng)爭(zhēng)了。

America used to be the land of opportunity and optimism. Now opportunity is seen as the preserve of the elite: two-thirds of Americans believe the economy is rigged in favour of vested interests.

[2] The campaigns have found plenty of things to blame, from free-trade deals to the recklessness of Wall Street. But one problem with American capitalism has been overlooked: a corrosive lack of competition. The naughty secret of American firms is that life at home is much easier: their returns on equity are 40% higher in the United States than they are abroad. Aggregate domestic profits are at near-record levels relative to GDP. America is meant to be a temple of free enterprise. It isn’t.

Borne by the USA

[3] High profits might be a sign of brilliant innovations or wise long-term investments, were it not for the fact that they are also suspiciously persistent.A very profitable American firm has an 80% chance of being that way ten years later. In the 1990s the odds were only about 50%. Some companies are capable of sustained excellence, but most would expect to see their profits competed away. Today, incumbents find it easier to make hay for longer.

美利堅(jiān)曾經(jīng)是一塊充滿機(jī)會(huì)與樂(lè)觀精神的土地。如今，機(jī)會(huì)被當(dāng)作只是留給精英的：三分之二的美國(guó)人認(rèn)為，經(jīng)濟(jì)受到操控，為各種既得利益者謀利。

[2]從自由貿(mào)易條約到膽大妄為的華爾街，競(jìng)選活動(dòng)把槍口對(duì)準(zhǔn)了很多問(wèn)題，卻忽略了美國(guó)資本主義的一個(gè)問(wèn)題——市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)嚴(yán)重缺失。美國(guó)公司有個(gè)歪門兒秘密，那就是國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)太好混了：美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)的股本回報(bào)率比國(guó)外高出40%。國(guó)內(nèi)利潤(rùn)總和占國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的比例接近歷史最高水平。美利堅(jiān)本該是崇尚自由企業(yè)精神的圣地，現(xiàn)在可不是了。

美國(guó)的負(fù)擔(dān)

[3]高額利潤(rùn)或許是高度創(chuàng)新或明智的長(zhǎng)期投資帶來(lái)的，但持久的高利潤(rùn)是有問(wèn)題的。一家美國(guó)企業(yè)10年后仍然能保持高度盈利的概率有80%，而在1990年代，這樣的幾率只有約50%。一些公司有能力一直保持優(yōu)秀，但大部分公司的利潤(rùn)會(huì)在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中日益減少。如今，在位企業(yè)發(fā)現(xiàn)，想更長(zhǎng)久地抓機(jī)會(huì)賺大錢比之前還要容易。

[4] You might think that voters would be happy that their employers are thriving. But if they are not reinvested, or spent by shareholders, high profits can dampen demand. The excess cash generated domestically by American firms beyond their investment budgets is running at $800 billion a year, or 4% of GDP. The tax system encourages them to park foreign profits abroad. Abnormally high pro fits can worsen inequality if they are the result of persistently high prices or depressed wages. Were America’s firms to cut prices so that their pro fits were at historically normal levels, consumers’ bills might be 2%lower. If steep earnings are not luring in new entrants, that may mean that firms are abusing monopoly positions, or using lobbying to stifle competition. The game may indeed be rigged.

[5] One response to the age of hyperprofitability would be simply to wait.Creative destruction takes time: previous episodes of peak pro fits—for example, in the late 1960s—ended abruptly.Silicon Valley’s evangelicals believe that a new era of big data, blockchains and robots is about to munch away the fat margins of corporate America. In the past six months the earnings of listed firms have dipped a little, as cheap oil has hit energy firms and a strong dollar has hurt multinationals.

[4]也許你會(huì)認(rèn)為，選民樂(lè)意看到他們的雇主表現(xiàn)強(qiáng)勁?？墒?，如果未用于再投資或由股東花掉，高利潤(rùn)則可能削弱需求。每年，美國(guó)企業(yè)本土創(chuàng)收的現(xiàn)金超過(guò)投資預(yù)算近8000億美元，約為國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的4%?，F(xiàn)有的稅收制度鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)將海外利潤(rùn)留在國(guó)外。持續(xù)的高物價(jià)或低工資導(dǎo)致的非正常高利潤(rùn)可能加劇不平等。假設(shè)美國(guó)企業(yè)降低價(jià)格使利潤(rùn)維持在歷史正常水平，那么消費(fèi)者賬單上的數(shù)額就可能減少2%。如果高額利潤(rùn)沒(méi)有吸引新公司進(jìn)入行業(yè)，那可能意味著在位企業(yè)濫用其壟斷力量，或者進(jìn)行游說(shuō)來(lái)扼殺競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。這可能真的是被操縱的游戲。

[5]對(duì)利潤(rùn)率超高時(shí)代的一種應(yīng)對(duì)辦法就是等待。非常規(guī)的破壞需要時(shí)間：歷史上的幾個(gè)利潤(rùn)頂峰期——比如1960年代末——結(jié)束得都很突然。硅谷的福音信徒認(rèn)為，以大數(shù)據(jù)、區(qū)塊鏈和機(jī)器人為標(biāo)志的新時(shí)代將耗掉侵蝕美國(guó)企業(yè)帝國(guó)的豐厚利潤(rùn)。過(guò)去6個(gè)月，能源公司收入稍有降低，而跨國(guó)公司受制于強(qiáng)勢(shì)美元，導(dǎo)致上市公司收益略減。

[6] Unfortunately the signs are that incumbent firms are becoming more entrenched, not less. A tenth of the economy is at the mercy of a handful of firms—from dog food and batteries to airlines, telecoms and credit cards. A $10 trillion wave of mergers since 2008 has raised levels of concentration further.American firms involved in such deals have promised to cut costs by $150 billion or more, which would add a tenth to overall pro fits. Few plan to pass the gains on to consumers.

[7] Getting bigger is not the only way to squish competitors. As the mesh of regulation has got denser since the 2007-08 financial crisis, the task of navigating bureaucratic waters has become more central to firms’ success. Lobbying spending has risen by a third in the past decade, to $3 billion. A mastery of patent rules has become essential in health care and technology, America’s two most pro fitable industries. And new regulations do not just fence big banks in: they keep rivals out.

[6]很不幸，種種跡象表明，在位公司的地位正變得愈加穩(wěn)固，而非削弱。經(jīng)濟(jì)命脈的十分之一掌握在少數(shù)幾家公司手中——范圍涵蓋廣泛，從寵物食品和電池，到航空、電信和信用卡。2008年開(kāi)始掀起一波規(guī)模達(dá)10萬(wàn)億美元的合并潮，進(jìn)一步加深了行業(yè)集中程度。牽涉其中的美國(guó)企業(yè)承諾削減1500億美元或更多成本，總利潤(rùn)會(huì)因而增加十分之一?？墒菦](méi)有幾家公司計(jì)劃將此間收益?zhèn)鬟f給消費(fèi)者。

[7]兼并擴(kuò)充并不是排擠對(duì)手的唯一方法。2007年至2008年金融危機(jī)之后，監(jiān)管力度加大，順利通過(guò)層層官僚關(guān)卡對(duì)企業(yè)獲得成功變得更加重要。過(guò)去10年，行業(yè)游說(shuō)花銷升至30億美元，增長(zhǎng)了三分之一。醫(yī)療保健和科技是美國(guó)利潤(rùn)最高的兩個(gè)行業(yè)，對(duì)它們來(lái)說(shuō)，精通專利規(guī)則變得異常重要。而新的監(jiān)管措施不單單約束大銀行，還會(huì)擋住競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。

[8] Having limited working capital and fewer resources, small companies struggle with all the forms, lobbying and red tape. This is one reason why the rate of small-company creation in America has been running at its lowest levels since the 1970s. The ability of large firms to enter new markets and take on lazy incumbents has been muted by an orthodoxy among institutional investors that companies should focus on one activity and keep margins high. Warren Buffett, an investor, says he likes companies with “moats” that protect them from competition. America Inc has dug a giant defensive ditch around itself.

[9] Most of the remedies dangled by politicians to solve America’s economic woes would make things worse. Higher taxes would deter investment. Jumps in minimum wages would discourage hiring. Protectionism would give yet more shelter to dominant firms. Better to unleash a wave of competition.

[10] The first step is to take aim at cosseted incumbents. Modernising the antitrust apparatus would help. Mergers that lead to high market share and too much pricing power still need to be policed. But firms can extract rents in many ways. Copyright and patent laws should be loosened to prevent incumbents milking old discoveries. Big tech platforms such as Google and Facebook need to be watched closely: they might not be rent-extracting monopolies yet,but investors value them as if they will be one day. The role of giant fund managers with crossholdings in rival firms needs careful examination, too.

[8]小型公司營(yíng)運(yùn)資金有限，資源較少，掙扎在各種表面文章、游說(shuō)活動(dòng)和繁文縟節(jié)之間。這也解釋了為什么當(dāng)今美國(guó)小型公司創(chuàng)立數(shù)量是1970年代以來(lái)最低的。一些觀念正統(tǒng)的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者認(rèn)為，公司應(yīng)當(dāng)專注于一項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)并保持高利潤(rùn)，這種觀念減弱了大公司進(jìn)入新市場(chǎng)和挑戰(zhàn)在位公司的能力。投資者沃倫·巴菲特說(shuō)，他喜歡投資那些依靠“壁壘”阻擋競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的公司。美利堅(jiān)商業(yè)帝國(guó)已經(jīng)在自己周圍挖了一道深深的防御溝。

[9]政客們展示出的解決美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)困局的大部分舉措會(huì)讓局面更糟。增加稅收會(huì)嚇走投資。提高最低工資會(huì)減少雇傭。保護(hù)主義會(huì)給壟斷公司提供更多的庇護(hù)。最好掀起一波競(jìng)爭(zhēng)吧。

[10]第一步，瞄準(zhǔn)那些被寵護(hù)的在位公司?，F(xiàn)代化更新反壟斷機(jī)構(gòu)會(huì)有所幫助。那些導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)份額過(guò)大及定價(jià)權(quán)過(guò)多的合并仍須審查。然而公司還有許多辦法謀取租金。應(yīng)當(dāng)放松版權(quán)及專利法以防止在位企業(yè)繼續(xù)利用舊發(fā)明攫取高利潤(rùn)。必須對(duì)谷歌和臉書這樣的大型技術(shù)平臺(tái)加強(qiáng)監(jiān)查：它們現(xiàn)在也許還不是謀取租金的壟斷者，但投資者相信它們終有一天會(huì)變成壟斷者。同時(shí)，還需要仔細(xì)審查手握幾家競(jìng)爭(zhēng)企業(yè)股份的巨型基金經(jīng)理。

Set them free

[11] The second step is to make life easier for startups and small firms. Concerns about the expansion of red tape and of the regulatory state must be recognised as a problem, not dismissed as the mad rambling of anti-government Tea Partiers. The burden placed on small firms by laws like Obamacare has been material. The rules shackling banks have led them to cut back on serving less profitable smaller customers. The pernicious spread of occupational licensing has stifled startups. Some 29% of professions,including hairstylists and most medical workers, require permits, up from 5% in the 1950s.

[12] A blast of competition would mean more disruption for some: firms in the S&P 500 employ about one in ten Americans. But it would create new jobs, encourage more investment and help lower prices. Above all, it would bring about a fairer kind of capitalism.That would lift Americans’ spirits as well as their economy. ■

給予自由

[11]第二步，為初創(chuàng)及小型企業(yè)提供更寬松的環(huán)境。必須意識(shí)到，繁瑣程序和監(jiān)管的增加是一個(gè)問(wèn)題，而絕不是反政府茶黨的瘋狂囈語(yǔ)。諸如奧巴馬醫(yī)改這樣的法規(guī)加給小公司的負(fù)擔(dān)已經(jīng)造成了重大影響。銀行受規(guī)則束縛，減少了對(duì)利潤(rùn)較低的小客戶的服務(wù)。職業(yè)許可制度的惡性擴(kuò)張扼殺了創(chuàng)業(yè)。約29%的職業(yè)人士，包括發(fā)型師及大多數(shù)醫(yī)務(wù)工作者，需要執(zhí)業(yè)許可，1950年代只有5%需要。

[12]一大波競(jìng)爭(zhēng)會(huì)對(duì)某些公司造成更多破壞：標(biāo)普500指數(shù)中的那些公司雇用了十分之一的美國(guó)人口。但競(jìng)爭(zhēng)將創(chuàng)造新的就業(yè)，鼓勵(lì)更多投資，并促使降價(jià)。最重要的是，它會(huì)帶來(lái)更加公平的資本主義。這不僅會(huì)拉抬美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)，還可以提升美國(guó)精神。 □