THINKING ON THE “RENORMALIZATION”O(jiān)F CHINA-JAPAN RELATIONS

HU LINGYUAN

Professor of the Center for Japanese Studies at Fudan University and the Chief Expert of Collaborative Innovation Center for Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations

HONG WEIMIN

Associate Professor of the Japanese Department of Shanghai Business School

Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the 25thAsia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting, which was held on Nov. 11th, 2017 in Vietnam. Xi pointed out that “this year marks the 45thanniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, and next year will mark the 40thanniversary of the signing of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The two sides should, bearing in mind the fundamental interests of the two peoples, correctly grasp the general direction of peace,friendship and cooperation, and work to enable the bilateral relations to keep improving and developing for the better through unremitting efforts and accumulating positive factors.” Xi stressed that “to improve China-Japan ties, the key is mutual trust”. On Nov. 13th, 2017,Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during a series of leaders’ meetings with ASEAN. Li expressed that “the current China-Japan relations have shown some positive changes, but sensitive factors still exist. This year marks the 45thanniversary of the normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations, and next year marks the 40thanniversary of the signing of the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship. It is hoped that Japan could act in the spirit of taking history as a mirror and looking into the future, meet China halfway, promote bilateral relations to overcome difficulties and challenges, and keep up the momentum for improvement in China-Japan relations, so as to achieve new development.” In view of the above,the Kyodo News Agency believes that“Abe’s unprecedented meetings with Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang in such a short time show a sign of the improvement of the bilateral relations”.

China-Japan relations have been at a low ebb since the Japanese government cooked up the “island purchase”scheme in 2012 and remained so after Abe was back in power for his second term as prime minister. The meetings between leaders of China and Japan on the sidelines of international conferences affirmed the recent improvement of the bilateral relationship and signified the willingness to further the relations. As pointed by international media, China-Japan relations show signs of “warming up”. But the relations remain delicate. As President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe started their new stints almost at the same time, whether China-Japan relations would embrace dramatic or fundamental improvement has become the current focus of concern.

Two Transitional Periods in Postwar China-Japan Relations

Due to differences in perspectives,the academic circles failed to reach consensus on the periodization of the development of post-war China-Japan relations. If we make a division from a broader perspective based on the reality of the development of China-Japan relations, the period from Japan’s defeat and surrender in 1945 and the normalization of diplomatic ties between China and Japan in 1972 can be regarded as the first “transitional period” in China-Japan relations. This nearly three-decade period witnessed dramatic and complicated changes in both global situation and domestic political landscapes in China and Japan, whose relations grew into maturity from “transitional” to “normal”. The greatest demand for the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan was Japan’s renouncement of the “state relations” with the government of the Republic of China ruled by Kuomintang and recognition of the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate regime that represents China, so as to guarantee the normal exchanges between the peoples of the two countries thereafter.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe almost begin their new terms almost at the same time. It has become a focus of wide attention whether there will be a major or fundamental improvement in China-Japan relations.President Xi Jinping met at request in Hamburg with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, on July.8, 2017.

During the nearly twenty years from the normalization of diplomatic ties in 1972 to the end of the Cold War in early 1990s, such interruptions as Japanese leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine,Japanese political dignitaries’ “indiscreet remarks” on historical issues and textbook controversies occurred, but failed to undermine the foundation and impose any impacts on the overall situation of China-Japan relations in a real sense. This period represents an unforgettable “honeymoon”, witnessing rapid development and constant deepening of economic ties between China and Japan as well as the closer bonds between the peoples of the two countries.

However, as the Cold War drew to a close, the “1995 System”, which had served as the backbone to long-term political stability in Japan, collapsed, and a drama of quick turnover of “ten prime ministers within ten years” was staged.With the burst of bubble economy, the post-war economic miracle in which the Japanese took pride came to an end and Japan was thus got into the hobble of the “l(fā)ost decade” or even the “l(fā)ost two decades”. Meanwhile, triggered by the subway sarin attack, the confidence in Japan’s social security collapsed and the Japanese society was trapped in anxiety.The overwhelming “triple challenges”in politics, economy and society threw the Japanese in a suffocating mood of despair. In the same period, China embarked on a fast track of economic development. Faced with such situation and especially the development trend,some Japanese elites and right-wing politicians became laden with anxiety that China’s growing into power might put Japan in an adverse and passive situation. In response to the challenge, they joined hands with the United States which deems China as a potential rival,to work on redefining Japan-US alliance and began to take a host of measures in security and defense. Such measures as shifting the long-practiced “purely defensive defense” strategy to allowing the exercise of the right of collective selfdefense have been taken, in an attempt to take bilateral military actions or do so with close allies in the Asia Pacific region and even in the world. The action to establish military alliance network with the hidden intention to counterbalance China is all too visible to many.The fact that China’s GDP surpassed that of Japan in 2010 made Japanese rightwing politicians even more disturbed and uneasy. As a result, the “boat collision incident” in the same year and the “island buying scheme” were plotted, as a measure to stimulate and instigate sensation within Japan, hype the “China Threat Theory” and drag the United States into the territorial sovereignty disputes between China and Japan. China-Japan relations thus plunged to hit the rock bottom since the war.

We may conclude that from the end of the Cold War to China’s overtaking Japan in economic prowess in 2010, the balance of comprehensive national power between China and Japan came to a historic “turning point”. Ever since this “turning point”, China-Japan relations have plummeted into an abyss,officially embarking on a low-speed running period. Based on the abovementioned, we may take the nearly twenty-year period from the early 1990s to 2010 as the second transitional period since the end of World War II. The first transitional period towards the normalization of diplomatic ties, despite of many obstacles, moved in a generally upward direction; but unfortunately,the second transitional period towards a low running period of China-Japan relations, despite of the issuance of the third and fourth political documents between China and Japan, showed a generally downward trend.

In the past seven years from 2010 till now, the relations between China and Japan have been at a low point. Here comes the question whether the recent interaction between the leaders of China and Japan as mentioned above can bring about fundamental improvement in the bilateral relations and thus lift the relations out of the low ebb and deliver “renormalization”. To answer this question, the first step is to keep a close eye on Japan’s 48thgeneral election of members of the House of Representatives which took place recently, because the platform of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by Abe will definitely find its way into the domestic and foreign policies after the election success.

The Impact of Japan’s 48th House of Representatives Election on China-Japan Relations

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced on Sept. 25th, 2017 to dissolve the House of Representatives for a snap election, causing uproar in the Japanese political circle and triggering tremendous reaction from the public.Caught by surprise and ill-prepared, the Japanese political parties sprung into campaign, which came to a close over a dozen of day later. The LDP secured 283 seats, a simple majority, and thus gained dominance in the House of Representatives, which enjoys superiority over the House of Councilors and is conditioned to enable easier pass of the bills submitted to the National Diet. The seats also earn LDP the so-called “supermajority”to control the 17 standing committees in the House of Representatives to secure the smooth running of the lower house.With the 29 seats received by LDP’s junior coalition partner, Komeito, the ruling coalition retained a two-thirds majority in the 465-member lower house.This resounding victory will make it possible not only to re-adopt bills rejected by the House of Councilors in the House of Representatives, but also, in theory, to realize Abe’s long-held ambition to push for a revision of the nation’s pacifist constitution. In rivalry with the coalition, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), the largest opposition with only 55 seats, cannot effectively contain the LDP. The LDP was also in power from 1955 to 1993, but the opposition led by the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) provided effective counterbalance to keep the strength and power well balanced.But this election failed to alter Japan’s recent political landscape featuring “one strong ruling party versus weak oppositions”. Instead, the weakening position of the opposition parties as a whole opens the door for the Abe administration to “do whatever at its will”.

Abe, in all the five so-called national elections since 2012, advocated campaign policies that weighed economic and livelihood issues over political topics. But after election victory, he equally pushed for both economic and political agenda, or rather in a reversed order in terms of priority. This is not difficult to see from Abe’s moves on such major issues as allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Therefore, the conventional formula, which is to ostensibly emphasize Abenomics but covertly prioritize his ambition to amend the constitution in his last term of office, will continue to be used in the face of the Japanese citizens.

However, the revision of Japan’s pacifist constitution is not an easy job.Facing pressure from within and outside Japan, Abe has actually shifted his proposal from revising the constitution to merely mentioning the presence of the Self-Defense Forces, without changing Article 9 of the constitution. In the political landscape formed after this election, with a two-thirds majority in both houses of the National Diet, Abe is conditioned to push ahead with constitutional revision, but he also needs over 50% of public support to push it through. Therefore, after reelection as Prime Minister on Nov. 1st, 2017, Abe employed the strategy of “coordinated constitutional revision” to coordinate with Komeito, his coalition partner which takes a cautious stance over the constitutional revision but opens to adding a clause. Since other political parties have their concrete proposals to add clauses to the constitution, it is not difficult to reach a two-thirds majority after coordinating with the Party of Hope(PH) that supports the revision from the start and with the Nippon Ishin no Kai (NIK) that approves adding new clauses to the constitution. As to winning public support, Abe will take the opportunity of U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to Japan to play up the threats of North Korea and the “China Treat Theory” that has been overtly or covertly instilled into the Japanese for a long time, with the purpose of maximally unsettling the nerves of the public and inducing them to vote for the constitutional revision. The constitutional revision, whether it is changing or adding clauses, remains a matter of Japan’s internal affair. But Abe’s attitude toward history gives people reasons to doubt whether Japan can keep in mind the misery and suffering it caused in China and other countries or adhere to the path of peaceful development. In this sense, by revising or adding clauses to the constitution, Abe not only adds uncertainly to the security and stability in China and even the whole region, but may not necessarily bring glad tidings to the Japanese.

To fulfill his campaign pledge, Abe has to produce achievements in economy and people’s livelihood. Although Japan’s recent economic indicators such as the stock market have shown strong performance, the growth strategy,standing as the pillar of Abenomics, has failed to make a real breakthrough and the short-term effects of quantitative easing and fiscal stimulus have been fading away. In the face of sluggish growth, developing military enterprises is undoubtedly one of the options for the Abe administration, which drove away from the country’s three principles of arms exports. Given that Abenomics has not delivered universal benefits, it is no small challenge for Abe to raise the consumption tax once again in 2018.In addition, hefty government borrowing has posed a latent danger. Abe’s victory in the five successive nationalist elections, to a large extent, owes to the public’s diminished but still remaining expectation for Abenomics. But Abe,with mediocre performance, will inevitably endure growing pressure as time goes on. Producing a basically satisfying economic outcome is a grave challenge in his new term. In this respect, Abe is actually keen to strengthen economic cooperation with China.

On the diplomatic front, Abe has actively continued his efforts to tighten the Japan-US alliance, but he seems to have yet to find an effective way to deal with the Trump administration. Nor has his administration broken the diplomatic stalemate against China. But Abe led the government and LDP dignitaries to attend a ceremony marking the 45thanniversary of the normalization of Japan-China relations at the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo. He also emphasized the intention to improve the bilateral relations in the aforementioned meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. He made the diplomatic moves because of a rapidly growing China in recent years with its Belt and Road Initiative hailed across the world and its growing power harder to be contained as well as unpredictable U.S policy toward East Asia. Modest improvement in its relations with China will give Japan more diplomatic space. However, the Abe administration pursues diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the terrestrial globe and has recently joined hands with the United States, India and Australia to push for the Indo-Pacific strategy. Its strategy and mindset to rival China on all fronts are unlikely to change in a short period of time.

“Renormalization” of China-Japan Relations

The most significant core achievement of the normalization of the diplomatic ties between China and Japan in 1972 was Japan’s formal recognition of the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate government representing China. Because of the Cold War,this “normalization” process took a long transitional period of over 20 years from the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. After the diplomatic relations were normalized, especially after the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan in 1978, China-Japanese bilateral relations entered the honeymoon period. In the same year, the Third Plenary Session of the 11thCentral Committee of the Communist Party of China made the decision to implement the policy of reform and opening up, strive to achieve four modernizations in agriculture, industry,science and technology and military and “enrich” the Chinese people. Since the normalization of diplomatic relations, especially in the 20 years from 1978 to the end of the Cold War, China and Japan had taken a path of win-win cooperation and common prosperity.

After the Cold War ended, while Japan suffered profound political,economic and social traumas, China’s economy has entered the fast lane of development after years of accumulation. In the process from “growing rich” to “becoming strong”, China’s development “nurtured” the post-bubble Japan, by giving Japan a free ride on its express train of economic development to get out of the “l(fā)ost decade” or even“l(fā)ost two decades” after the burst of the bubble economy. But at the same time,Japan found it uncomfortable to accept a “stronger” China, so it gradually deepened its strategic doubts and chose to join hands with the United States to delay China’s pace of “becoming strong”,finally dragging post-war China-Japan relations to the lowest point. This process lasted around 20 years. Therefore,the so-called “renormalization” is a situation that Japan can truly accept“stronger” Chinese people. Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has gradually despised China from the heart, including Chinese culture, social system and value system that it had admired. With the contempt of China deep down to the bone, Japan found it is not so easy to recognize a poor and weak China that stood up and even more so when it was faced with a China that not only stood up but grew rich and even became“strong”.

In fact, the pattern of strong Japan and weak China that has been formed since modern times is not the norm in the history of East Asia. From a greater span of history, the so-called “renormalization” of China-Japan relations is the process of returning to the normal international pattern of East Asia and the re-recognition and acceptance of the pattern by Japan. But currently, without a clear understanding of the basic logic and development trend of the situation in East Asia, the Abe administration is still stubbornly committed to “restoring a strong Japan”. Therefore, although China-Japan relations currently show signs of recovery and there is possibility of moving upward from the stagnant low level to middle level, the relations remain fragile. For example, Abe’s relentless push for constitutional revision that has possessed realistic possibility will surely unsettle the fragile nerves of the sensitive China-Japan relations and deepen their strategic misgivings. As mentioned above, while Abe pledged to improve the bilateral relations during recent meetings with Chinese leaders,he has also vigorously pushed forward the alliance of the United States, Japan,India and Australia and advocated the“Indo-Pacific Strategy” that targets China, showing obvious intentions to build a network to counterbalance China.Therefore, there is still a long way to go in the efforts to improve the relations between China and Japan.