"Sub-axis": the Changing Japanese Role in theU.S. Asia-Pacific Security Layout

By Xin Qiang

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"Sub-axis": the Changing Japanese Role in theU.S. Asia-Pacific Security Layout

By Xin Qiang

American Studies, Fudan University

Part One. Foreword

During the cold war, the United States concluded military alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and other Asia-Pacific countries, formed the Asia-Pacific security pattern remarkably featured by the so-called "hub-spoke structure", i.e. the United States serving as the axis, and a series of bilateral alliances as the spokes to support the U.S. security system to contain the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region. In the "hub-spokes structure", the United States is the sole connecting point within this whole system, and maintains close security ties with a number of countries, but between its Asia-Pacific allies, there is little direct security cooperation channels and mechanisms due to various reasons. With this system, the United States formed magnificent strategic pressure on the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region until it eventually won the cold war.

After the end of the cold war, this system continues to be maintained to a large extent, and gradually evolves into the U.S. strategic tool to fend off potential competitors and maintain its Asia-Pacific hegemony. In recent years, with the rapid rise of China, the Obama Administration vigorously implements its "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, on the one hand, strengthens military deployment and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, on the other hand, actively establishes trilateral security cooperation framework represented by U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation, U.S.-Japan-Australia cooperation, U.S.-Japan-Philippine cooperation, U.S.-Japan- India cooperation or "bilaterally".1Through encouraging regional allies and "strategic partner" countries to strengthen horizontal linkages between each other, the "hub-spoke shape" security structure existing in the Asia-Pacific region already begins to increasingly change to "network" structure.2

In this process, the United States, due to financial crisis, has been in economic recession, facing financial constraints and reducing military spending dilemma, so the Obama Administration begins encouraging Japan to take on new responsibilities and new tasks within the framework of U.S.-Japan alliance, and to play a greater role in the Asia-Pacific geo-security strategy. And having been trying to break "the post-war system" and to achieve a "normalized country" over these years, Japan fully cooperates with the U.S. strategic readjustments in order to strengthen Japan’s ability to intervene on regional security agenda.3Under the push by the Obama Administration and the active operation by several Japanese Administrations Cabinets, the Asia-Pacific security pattern featured by the U.S. "single axis" shows a more obvious change, i.e. gradually changed to the "U.S. as the core and Japan secondary" pattern, Japan, to a certain extent, suddenly has become the "sub-axis" next to the United States in the Asia-Pacific geo-security pattern.

The status and role of Japan’s "sub-axis" is mainly reflected in the following three aspects: Firstly, through continuously strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, and using the opportunity to promote development of its military strength, Japan constantly strengthens its "Strategic Autonomy" in the alliance. Secondly, through strengthening bilateral or trilateral security interactions with the United States and other Asia-Pacific allies, making "the U.S. and Japan +1" an important mechanism and platform for the United States and its Asia- Pacific allies to carry out security cooperation. Finally, in order to cooperate with the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy, Japan also takes the initiative to launch strategic security cooperation in various forms with the U.S. "strategic partners", such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. These measures not only upgrade Japan’s function and status in the alliance, but also steadily elevate the level of strategic cooperation with a number of important countries in Asia-Pacific and has further played an increasingly important connecting, supplementing and coordinating role in the Asia-Pacific traditional "hub-spoke security structure", so its influence on the regional security system also grows increasingly

Part Two, Deepening U.S.-Japan Alliance

Since "" signed in September 1951, and with the developing international situation, the U.S.-Japan alliance has experienced a series of changes and adjustments, and is accompanied by the elevated Japanese position and expanding role in the alliance. For example, in April 1996, the two countries signed the "", having "redefined" the U.S.-Japan alliance, and changed the function of the alliance from pure defense against intrusion to intervention in the Asia- Pacific affairs. In September 1997, the two countries issued the "", having once again expanded the scope of activities and functions of the alliance, and established a security guarantee system of mutually coordinate and joint operations.4After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the United States actively encourages Japan to adjust its military action principle of "defense only", and to play a "hub" and "core" role in the U.S. Asia-Pacific military deployment in order to build the U.S.-Japan alliance into a "global alliance" and more effectively cooperate with the U.S global strategy.5Japan took the opportunity to adoptauthorizing the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to send warships to the Indian Ocean, to assist and support the U.S.’s launching attacks on Afghanistan, which broke through the limited military role by the Japanese troops overseas. In May 2003, the heads of the two governments clearly identified the alliance as "the U.S.-Japan alliance of the world", marking that the applicability of the alliance is extended to the whole globe. In January 2004, Japan dispatched the SDF to Iraq at the U.S. request, this is the first time Japan sent troops to the war region since the end of WWII, and is also a major breakthrough in the Japan-U.S. allied relations. In June 2004, Japan passed seven bills including the ", having given Japan the right to participate in the U.S.-led war operations. In July 2004, Japan’s "" claims that the SDF, at the U.S. request, will participate in various international activities, emphasizing that the SDF turns from pure "existence" to "playing an active role internationally", and taking "the participation in international activities" as basic tasks for the SDF service.6In May 2006, the foreign ministers and defense ministers of the two countries "2+2" meeting put forward the concept of "new period for the Japan-U.S. alliance", and states that the alliance has the "global significance", and stresses that the two countries will cooperate "across the globe" including the Asia-Pacific region.7

and the United States over the years hopes Japan to take up more and more extensive responsibilities. In June 2011, after the defense minister and foreign minister "2+2" consultations, the United States and Japan established 18 bilateral, regional and global common strategic objectives, having once again confirmed the strategic intention for the two to "establish a globe-oriented new alliance". In April 2012, the joint statement ofbyissued by Japanese Prime Minister Noda Kahiko and U.S. President Obama during the visit to Washington claims that for decades the U.S.-Japan alliance steadily develops toward the comprehensive partnership, which not only contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, but also makes contributions to peace and stability outside of the region. According to the new changes of the global strategic situation, in the future the two countries will strengthen cooperation in global public domains such as the ocean, space, cyber network and others.8At the subsequent press conference, Obama stated that the statement describes the future pursued by the two countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and in the next few decades helps the two countries build the region. Noda stated that the Japan-U.S. alliance has reached a new height, and the two countries are determined to have shared responsibility and play a role in peace and prosperity not only for the Asia-Pacific region, but also across the globe. The statement landmarks further "globalization" of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the Japanese role and position again get further strengthened in the U.S. global strategy, therefore, the statement also viewed as a strategic declaration for the two countries to try to strengthen the alliance mechanism, and support the Asia-Pacific dominance by two pivots of economy and security.

With strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, their military cooperation has also been significantly upgraded. By working together to make operational plan, share operational intelligence, expand common training, commonly use military bases and build missile defense systems, the U.S.-Japan alliance turns from focusing on defense division of labor to strengthening the military "joint combat capability" and "interoperability", so the pace of their military integration has significantly accelerated.9In July 2012, the two countries reached an agreement on sending Japanese SDF officials permanently stationed in the Pentagon in 2013 for the first time, so as to improve the joint emergency ability of the two countries, previously Japan had already dispatched SDF officers to the U.S. central command in Florida and Hawaii Pacific command, but for the first time to the Ministry of National Defense, the U.S. national defense center. The SDF officials in the Pentagon can attend the routine meetings held at the defense ministry, thus timely helping the two countries to rapidly respond to emergency around Japan.10In September 2012, Leon Paneta, U.S. Secretary of Defense said during his visit to Japan that the second set of reconnaissance ballistic missiles and sea-based X-wave early-warning radar system will be deployed in Southern part of Japan in 2013.11In October 2012, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense A. Carter announced in Washington, DC. Deployment of new stealth fighter F-35 and other sophisticated weapons and equipments in the Kadena base in Okinawa.

During the cold war, the United States set ceilings on Japan's military capacity development and military power usage, but in recent years, in order to assist Japan "effectively respond to regional security threats", with the U.S. help and guidance, one after another many-year "taboo" is broken through, so the SDF capacity-building has a number of "unprecedented" breakthroughs, the Japanese SDF's combat capability has hitherto unparallel elevation, coordination and cooperation between the two military have been significantly strengthened too. For example, in 2012 and 2013, Japanese and the U.S. military exercises with various scales and targets were held twice a year.

Especially in June 2013, Japan sent a team including a helicopter carrier, 250 army men to camp Pendleton, California held for 3 weeks "dawn of lightning" amphibious military exercises with the U.S. Marines. This is not only the participation of the Japanese SDF in this large-scale military exercises for the first time, but also of the Japanese ground forces on the Japanese ships in the overseas exercise for the first time in the post Cold War era , which marks the SDF’s newest and biggest step in expanding its role and task12.

In December 2013, the Abe Administration launched three documents including a ", which is known as the "security three arrows", and clearly state "through the effective use of defense equipments active participating in international cooperation", promoting "common development and production" of weapons equipments, building a "comprehensive defense capability with high effectiveness", establishing "routine warning and monitoring system", "marine functional system" and navy-army-air "all-weather all-dimensional defense system" in order to strengthen the maritime and air control capability. At the same time, Abe also actively promotes the ban-lifting on the right to collective self-defense, and modifies the three principles of arms exports, which marks the constant escalation of Japanese military build-up and fundamental adjustments of its defense policy in a gradual way.

Part Three, Strengthening of Security Cooperation between Japan and the U.S. Asia-Pacific Allies

During the cold war, the United States formed a formal bilateral military alliance with South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan had a few substantive cooperation with these countries in the field of military security. But in recent years, under the U.S. support, Japan vigorously strengthens security cooperation with these countries in attempt to use the U.S.-Japan-South Korea, and the U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral cooperation mechanisms, and joins the United Sates to establish a "open and comprehensive multi-level network based on the international rules", and gradually becomes an increasingly important "connection point" in the U.S. Asia- Pacific Alliance System.13

On the one hand, Japan actively participates in a series of U.S.-led trilateral security cooperation mechanisms, and promotes the establishment of "the U.S.-Japan +1" security cooperation mode. An important feature of U.S. "return" to the Asia-Pacific strategy is to play the role behind the scenes, to develop trilateral cooperation based on traditional bilateral alliance, and promote institutional collaboration between its Asia-Pacific allies. In almost all the U.S.-boosted trilateral security cooperation frameworks, it can be said that Japan is never absent, and works hard together with the United States to promote structuring of a series of the multilateral military cooperation mechanisms with the United States and Japan as the axis. For example, in March 2006, the United States, Japan and Australia launched the first "trilateral security dialogue" mechanism on the basis of U.S.-Australia and U.S.-Japan bilateral security dialogues. In 2007, the three countries had two joint military exercise, and in June 2008 issued a joint statement, which decides to establish an information exchange mechanism, and jointly carry out disaster relief training, humanitarian rescue exercises, etc. In January 2012, the first U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security dialogue was held in Washington, DC. and had in-depth discussions on the regional and global issues such as the DPR Korea issue related to common security interests. In April 2012, during the Sino-Philippines confrontation on the Huangyan island, the U.S.-Philippines twenty-eighth "shoulder to shoulder" annual joint military drill in the South China Sea was held, and the Japanese SDF took part in the exercises for the first time. In June 2012, the United States, Japan and South Korea in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea of China launched the first joint naval drill to strengthen their naval cooperative engagement capability. In July 2012, in response to the so-called "North Korean invasion threat", the three countries announced the establishment of a specialized trilateral security consultation mechanism. In 2011 and 2013, the United States, Japan and Australia held joint military drills in the South China Sea and Guam respectively.

On the other hand, Japan actively deepens the bilateral security relationship with U.S. Asia-Pacific allies. Take Japan-Australia relations as an example, in March 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and Australian Prime Minister Howard in Tokyo signed the "", which is the Japan's second such declaration featured a military alliance and asserts that two countries, in order to respond to "new security challenges and threats", will strengthen consultations on common strategic interests, and carry out close cooperation by holding military exercises, sharing common strategic intelligence, and joint military training.14In June 2007, Japan and Australia's foreign ministers and defense ministers create the "2+2" annual security dialogue mechanism, thus, making Australia the second country to establish similar mechanism with Japan beside the United States. In December 2008, the second "2+2" talks decided to strengthen cooperation on the fleet support and secrets information protection, and provided that as the Japanese SDF carries out maritime security and other activities into the Oceania Sea, Australia has the "responsibility and obligation" to provide information and logistics supply.15In September 2012, the joint statement issued by the 2+2 consultations claimed that the two countries are "natural strategic partners with shared values and interests", and Japan, Australia and the United States will formulate a joint action plan in 2020.16-- As of January 31, 2013,signed between Japan and Australia in May 2010 came into force, which is the second such agreement after the Japan-U.S. signed similar agreement in 1996. According to the agreement, the two sides will provide food, fuel and other logistical support to each other in future actions, indicating the substantial progress made in bilateral defense cooperation.17

Japan’s military ties with the Philippines is also enhanced. In 2012, Japan announced that it would provide 10 patrol boats to the Philippines coast guard, including the provision of training and other logistical support. Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto and Philippines's Defense Minister Voltaire Gazmin signed in Tokyo an agreement on bilateral defense exchanges and cooperation, providing that the Japanese Maritime SDF will have joint training with the Philippines Navy, have information sharing in the field of maritime security, and promote information cooperation in humanitarian rescue. In February 2013, the defense and maritime security officials held the "marine dialogue", and discussed how to deal with the "Ocean threats". In June, the two defense ministers announced they will strengthen defense cooperation, and the Philippines for the first time "permits the Japanese use of Philippines's military facilities".18On July 27th, after talks with Philippine President Aquino III, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated that the two countries "have common fundamental values and many common strategic interests", and Japan provides US$1.1 billion in loans, and uses its ODA to provide 10 patrol boats to the Philippines coast guard and assists in building intelligence communications systems so as to achieve "a wide-ranging marine cooperation"..

Part Four, Elevated Security Cooperation between Japan and U.S. Asia-Pacific "Partner Countries"

In recent years, the United States, in the course of "returning" to Asia-Pacific, not only energetically develops relations with the traditional allies, but also continuously strengthens relations with some "critical states" in the region, and through the military exchanges, personnel training, response to non-traditional security threats and the sale of weapons, and joint military exercises, actively expands the military cooperation with the so-called Asia-Pacific "partner countries" such as India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Cambodia, whereby it looks like a strategic containment of China. For example, in June 2010, the U.S.-India first bilateral "strategic dialogue" was held; in October, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State W. Burns said that with the eastward shift of world economic and strategic focus, the United States views India as "a truly global partner", the U.S.-India relations should "become the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific century".19After 12 year-suspension, the United States resumed military cooperation with Indonesian in July 2010, and signed the "", having laid the foundation for security cooperation. In November, Obama visited Indonesia, and signed a joint statement, having decided to expand cooperation in trade, energy, security and other fields, and to build "a comprehensive partnership"; and in 2012, the two countries held a joint military exercise. Then the United States and Viet Nam come together fast. In August 2010, the two countries’ Navy held the first "non-combat exercises" in the South China Sea, then, in Hanoi the first vice ministerial level dialogue on defense policy was held; and in September 2011, the "" was signed, deciding to expand cooperation on maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In June 2012, Defense Secretary Panetta took the first official visit to Vietnam after the Vietnam War actively explored the establishment of a "strategic partnership" with it.

At the same time, the United States urges Japan to play its advantages in maritime safety, and to help the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and other countries enhance ability for coastal reconnaissance, warning and response to emergencies at sea. In April 2012, the U.S.-Japan "2+2" security consultation issued a joint statement, in which Japan is committed to "promoting regional security" through promoting the "strategic" usage of the official development assistance as well as providing the coastal states with patrol ships, etc.20In fact, for all the U.S. initiatives to rope in Asia-Pacific "strategic partners", Japan has always actively coordinated and participated in. As early as 2010, Japan had defined the ASEAN and the United States, South Korea, Australia as "the most important strategic partners", which occupies an important strategic position in Japan's regional security policy. In recent years, Japan has sent several onshore and offshore SDF officials to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Cambodia to give training and technical guidance to marine medical, marine meteorology, UN peacekeeping operations, etc. so as to get closer ties with ASEAN countries.

Take Japan-Vietnam relationship for an example, in October 2010, during Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan's visit to Viet Nam, the leaders of the two countries issued a, which says the strategic security cooperation will be comprehensively strengthened. In December, the two countries held the first "strategic partner dialogue" in Hanoi, with the discussions around the South China Sea matters. In October 2011, defense ministers of the two countries met in Tokyo, signedand decided to establish a regular defense vice-ministerial dialogue mechanism and carry out military exchange of visits. Then, Japan Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda stated that Japan and Vietnam have formed a strategic partnership, stability and development of Vietnam is vital to the national interests of Japan.21After the two prime ministers meeting during Abe’s visit to Vietnam in January 2013, Abe said that 500 million yen loans to Vietnam would be provided, and the two sides unanimously agreed to "actively promote the political and security cooperation".22In May 2013, the two countries defense officials held bilateral dialogue and consultation with "maritime security" as the theme for the first time in Hanoi.

Particularly worthy of attention is that as the U.S.-India Relations in recent years continuously heats up, Japan also extensively develops increasingly closer bilateral and trilateral security cooperation with India. For example, under the U.S. guidance, as early as in June 2003, the two countries jointly participated in the U.S. Alaska air force exercise. In April 2007, the United States, Japan and India held the first joint military exercise; in April 2009, again the trilateral naval exercise, so their military security cooperation is becoming routine. In December 2011, the trilateral security dialogue was held in Washington for the first time. In October 2012, the third round of the trilateral talks on how to strengthen trilateral maritime security cooperation and policy coordination was held in New Delhi, India.

In addition to the U.S.-Japan collaborative framework, Japan-India bilateral exchanges and cooperation have made a rocketing progress. As early as April 2005, on the occasion of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to India, the two countries announced that they would build a "global partnership", and carry out bilateral cooperation in Asia and the world at large. In December 2006, Japan and India officially announced the establishment of "global strategic partnership", then, the two sides have carried out close cooperation in military, security, political, diplomatic, economic and trade areas. In October 2008, prime ministers of the two countries signed the joint declaration in Tokyo, stating that the two countries based on "shared values and interests", in the future will unfold cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on counter-piracy, safety ensurance of sea lanes, counter-terrorism and disaster prevention issues, which provides institutional guarantee for the two countries to constantly expand and deepen security cooperation.23In July 2010, India and Japan held its first foreign and defense vice minister-level strategic dialogue. In October, during India's Prime Minister Singh's visit to Japan, the two countries issued a joint statement, which states that through bilateral and multilateral military exercises, information sharing, training and dialogue, they strengthen security cooperation, and established the annual joint military drill mechanism.24In June 2012, the two navies held their first joint naval exercises near Tokyo, bringing the bilateral military exchanges to a new level. In November 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Noda and the visiting India Prime Minister Singh reached an agreement to strengthen bilateral maritime cooperation between the Japanese Maritime SDF and the Indian Navy, and further enhance the cooperation relationship between the two authorities in charge of maritime security.

After becoming prime minister again, Abe continues to advocate the establishment of a "sea alliance" by the United States, Japan, India and Australia, attempting to further upgrade Japan-India security cooperation. In March 2013, during the Japan-India seventh strategic dialogue in Tokyo, the two sides confirmed the maritime exercise in 2012 and plan to increase this exercise in the future, Japan generously agreed to provide a total of 290 billion yen loans to support Indian domestic infrastructure construction, and an agreement was unanimously reached on the U.S.-Japan-India bureau-level dialogue mechanism. In May 2013, during India's Prime Minister Singh's visit to Japan, a joint statement was issued, which says that taking into account the changing strategic environment, Japan and India would further consolidate and strengthen their strategic and global partnership; and agree to accelerate the progress of bilateral negotiations on civilian nuclear energy cooperation.25In January 2014, Abe, during participation in India "Republic Day" celebration, announced to provide 200 billion yen low-interest loans to India, and export to India nuclear power equipments and advanced "US-2" aircrafts. In addition, the two sides decide to set up a regular consultation mechanism at national security advisor level, to strengthen the bilateral military security cooperation. Through the above measures, the two countries have made considerable progress in security cooperation in recent years.

Part Five, Conclusion

Since 21stCentury, in the face of China's strong rise and continuously elevated influence in the Asia-Pacific region, Obama, claiming to be "the first Pacific president in U.S. history", actively promotes the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, and tries to create a "more mature security and economic structure" conducive to the United States in the region.26However, hit by the financial crisis, weak U.S. economic recovery and mired in debt crisis, the Obama Administration, feeling powerless and unable to extricate its self, is deeply aware of the fact that it must rely on the support of traditional allies, and vigorously expand multilateral cooperation with strategic partners, and only through the construction of security cooperation network "with multi-nodes" in the Asia-Pacific region, can it effectively maintain its leadership position in the region. Also because of this, the United States actively encourages and supports Japan to play a bigger role in Asian-Pacific security affairs, and hopes that Japan can "share burdens" with it by virtue of its strong comprehensive national strength.

At the same time, Japan’s security strategy principles also take an obvious change. Facing the U.S. strategic adjustments and strength contraction, Japan’s domestic voice questioning the Japan-U.S. alliance reliability is growing. Especially in recent years with the sovereign Islands disputes intensified between China and Japan, and the rapid development of Chinese naval power, Japan’s doubts whether, under the circumstances of outbreak of crisis and even conflict situations between China and Japan, Americans can keep its commitment to Japan’s security protection are growing. Based on this, Japan has tried to "pull the Americans" by strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance on the one hand, and taken the initiative and active involved in security issues in the Asia-Pacific region on the other hand, and served as matchmaking for the U.S. "return" to Asia-Pacific, and expanded its right to discourse and the influence in the regional security affairs. In recent years, while taking advantageous use of a series of U.S.-built trilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms, Japan, also through vigorous bilateral contacts, strengthens strategic cooperative relations with U.S. traditional allies such as South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and with other "partner countries" such as India, Vietnam, Indonesia, thus, suddenly having become the "sub-axis" next to the United States in the Asia-Pacific regional security architecture as well as the important pillar and pusher for U.S.’s shaping new architecture of Asia-Pacific strategy.

However, we should also see that, in the process of U.S.’s implementing "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy in recent years, Japan has played a more and more important role in regional security affairs, but its influence elevation is also faced with many restrictions. Firstly, it is the U.S. constraint. The United States needs Japan to match its "Asia- Pacific rebalancing" strategy, thus encouraging Japan to play a greater role in the regional security field, but having no intention of completely changing the existential "hub-spokes" security architecture. At the same time, the United States has deep suspicions over Japan’s intention of trying to "borrow a boat to go to sea", getting freed from the "post-war system" and U.S. control so as to become a major political and military power. Hence, it will bring under control Japan’s political and military influence in Asia-Pacific, to prevent Japan from disrupting the balance of power status quo and constituting its threat in the end in East Asia.

Secondly, in recent years many Japanese actions are clearly spearheaded at China, so as to balance a rapidly rising China. But, with the rapid growth of China’s economy, economic interdependence between China and Asia-Pacific countries has constantly spiraled up, and China also has become the most important trade partner with Asia-Pacific countries. In order to maintain a stable and friendly relations with China, most Asia-Pacific countries are unwilling to form an Anti-China "quasi-alliance" with the United States and Japan, which may lead to possible splits with China. For example, U.S. ally Australia, having participated in the U.S., Japan, India, and Singapore joint military exercises for several times, but taking into account of China's opposition, decided to withdraw from the five-country joint military drill mechanism in 2007. For instance again, India, having participated in the US-Japan-India naval exercises in 2009 and 2011, but, announced the cancellation of involvement in the similar exercise plan in April 2013 and decided that such exercise "should be maintained in the bilateral scope".27

Finally, since the modern times, Japan had carried out brutal colonial rule and aggressive atrocities over Asia-Pacific neighbors, caused tremendous damage and suffering to their people. But since the end of WWII, Japanese administrations have repeatedly denied, distorted, even beautified its history of aggression, which has aroused strong resentment of its neighbors. For example, Japan and South Korea defense ministers held talks in January 2011, and decided to sign a secret agreement, because of the information leakage, and strong opposing and questioning by the ROK public, the South Korean government was forced to propose to Japan the extension request for the signing, as a result, the agreement is still not signed up to today. Therefore, Japan will be faced with heavy resistance in the course of attempting to play the "sub-axis" role in the Asia-Pacific security architecture.

1. See Zhang Yong, "Obama's Asia-Pacific Less-sides Diplomacy",, No.2, 2012, pp.66-81; Zhu Feng, "The Obama Administration turns to Asia strategy and Sino-U.S. relations",, No.4, 2012, pp.1-7; Wang Junsheng, "Multilateral Security Mechanism In Northeast Asia: Progress and Outlet",, No.12, 2012, pp. 53-75; Henry Kissinger, "Power Shifts," Survival, Vol.52, No. 6, 2010/2011, pp. 205-212; Lanxin Xiang, "China and the 'Pivot'，Survival, Vol.5, 2012, pp.113-128; David Shambaugh, "Coping With a Conflicted China," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.1, 2011, pp.7-27: Suisheng Zhao, "Shaping the Regional Context of China's Rise: How the Obama Administration in Its Engagement with China,", Vol.21, No.75, 2012, pp. 369-390.

2. See Wu Xinbo, "On Obama's Asia-Pacific Strategy",, No.2, 2012, pp. 72-73; Sun Ru, "The Network and Prospect of the U.S. Asia- Pacific Alliance System,, No.4, 2012, pp.39-50. Patrick Cronin, "The Emerging Asia Power Web: The Rise of Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties," Report of Center for a New American Security, June 10, 2013; Shawn Brimley and Ely Ratner, "Smart Shift: A Response to 'The Problem with the Pivot',", Vol. 92, No. 1, 2013, PP. 177-181.

3. See Wu Huaizhong，Japan's Grand Strategy on China, Japanese Studies", No.5, 2012, pp.65-80; LU Yaodong, "Deepen the Alliance Mechanism: Strategic Vision of U.S.-Japan Bilateral Interaction, Japanese Studies", No.3, 2012, pp.3-14; Du Xiaojun, "The Japanese Diplomacy and USA "return to Asia" Strategy, Japan Research, No.1, 2012, pp.93-98; Wu Jinan: "Japan's Diplomatic Strategy In The New Century " Beijing: Shishi press, 2010 edition

4. Chen Xiaowei, "Cooperation And Conflict: A Study of the U.S. Military Alliance System ", Beijing: Military Science Press, 2001, the New Century Edition, p.48.

5. Wu Xinbo, "Pacific not Peaceful", Beijing: Fudan University Press, 2006, pp.143-150.

6. http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho.data/2004/w2004_00.html， march 14, 2014.

7. Lian Degui, "Changing Japan-U.S. Alliance, ", No.6, 2011, p48

8. The White House of US, "United States-Japan Joint Statement: A Shared Visio for the Future," April 30, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/30/united-states-japan-joint-statement-shared-visionfuture.

9. Lu Yaodong, "Deepen the Alliance Mechanism: Strategic Vision of Bilateral Interaction,", No.3 2012, p.4.

10. http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS16001_W2A710C1MM8000/, March 14, 2014.

11. Amaani Lyle, "Dempsey, Japanese Counterpart Bolster Partnership across Domains," August 23, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=117616，

12. Kirk Spitzer, "Japan Sends Its Troops into Uncharted Waters," Time, June 12, 2013,4http://nation.time.com/2013/06/12/japan-sends-its-troops-into-uncharted-waters/，

13. The White House of US, "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Noda of Japan at Joint Press Conference," April 30, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/03/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-noda-japan-joint-press-confer，

14. Liu Xinhua, "The Changing Japan-Australia Relations and its Futures",, No. 6, 2006, pp.11-18.

15. Qu Caiyun, " A Reading on Changing Japan-Australia Security Relations in the Post-cold war,"No.2, 2011, p.15.

16. "Australia and Japan-Cooperating for Peace and Stability: Common Vision and Objectives," September 14, 2012, pp. 1-5.

17. "Japan-Australia ACSA Defense Pact Enters into Effect," January 31, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-01/31/c_132141889.htm，

18. Joseph Santolan, "US and Japan to Establish Military Bases in the Philippines," June 19, 2013,http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/29/phil-j29.html，

19. William Burns, "The United States and India: A Vital Partnership in a Changing World," October 26, 2012, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/10/20121026137992.html#axzz22a91hTh5，

20. US Department of Defense, "Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee," April 26, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15220，

21 .http://www. mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_noda/vietnam1110/pdfs/3.pdf，

22 .http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_abe2/vti_1301/vietnam.html，

23. Prime Minister's Office of India, "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan," October 22, 2008，http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=44047，

24. Cao Xinshou, "The In-depth Background and Impacts on Strengthening Strategic Cooperation by Japan and India," Northeast Asia forum, No. 2, 2011, p.84.

25. Ministry of External Affairs of India, Joint Statement on Prime Minister's Visit to Japan: Strengthening the Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan beyond 60th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations," May 29，2013，http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/21755

26. Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century", p.57. 27. "Fearing China, India Pulls out of War Games, "Hindustan Times, May 13, 2013, Http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/ NewDelhi/Fearing-China-India-pulls-out-of-war-games/Article11059257.aspx,