Motives of the Japanese Democratic Government’s“Nationalization”of the Diaoyu Islands

Zhai Xin

On April 16, 2012, in a speech delivered at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative American think tank, Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara announced that the Japanese government was planning to purchase the Diaoyu Islands(known as“Senkaku Islands”in Japanese). The announcement triggered a public outcry around the world, with the loudest cries emanating from the Chinese public. Ishihara stated that by the end of June the Tokyo Metropolitan government would advertise in American newspapers regarding the purchase of the Diaoyu Islands, falling in the lead-up to the opening ceremony of the London Olympic Games. On July 7, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, who remained silent due to concerns over protests from the Chinese side, openly declared Japan’s plan to nationalize the Diaoyu Islands. The Noda government’s decision became the decisive factor leading to a sharp turn in the Sino-Japanese relationship. To go a step further, one might even say that the government’s decision threatens to alter the overall situation in the entire Asia-Pacific region.

I.Motives of the Democratic Government’s“Nationalization”Policy

The Japanese Democratic government proposed“nationalizing”the Diaoyu Islands mainly as a response to the following domestic and international factors.

1. Enhancing control over the Diaoyu Islands and continuing the policy of not allowing anyone to visit the islands

The Diaoyu Islands are a group of uninhabited islands with a total area of 6.3 square kilometers. Altogether they consist of five islands larger than 0.8 square kilometers in size and other surrounding reefs. From the late 1960s until the early 1970s,territorial disputes over these islands became unresolved diplomatic issues because the People’s Republic of China,Chinese Taipei and Japan all claimed sovereignty over them.The Japanese side claims that it exercised administration over the Diaoyu Islands since the end of the 19th century, but only the Chiwei Yu island (known as“Taisho-jima”in Japanese) was“nationalized,”while others were historically“privately owned.”Since the normalization of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972, all Japanese governments under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have declared ownership of the Diaoyu Islands as an official position. However, Japan roughly abided by the bilateral agreements reached between the PRC and Japan, meaning that it would not allow either foreigners or Japanese citizens to visit the islands so long as both countries shelved their sovereignty disputes. On this rule, no exceptions were made, whether to Japanese Diet members, local congress members or executive leaders of Japanese local autonomous bodies.

The Democratic government in turn basically inherited policies adopted by the LDP administrations. For example,then Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan turned down Ishigaki mayor Yoshitaka Nakayama’s request to enshrine the dead on the islands. Following the same rule, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda also prevented Shintaro Ishihara from visiting the islands under the title of Member of the House of Representatives.However, since four major islands of the Diaoyu Islands historically have been privately owned, there were cases in which some Japanese citizens and organizations landed on the islands, evading loose patrols in the process. Therefore, in order to impose unified management and tighter control, the Japanese government decided in 2002 to lease the islands from their“owner”who is now living in the Saitama Prefecture. The lease agreement was due to expire by the end of March 2013.

Another issue is that the“island owner”has not quite embraced the political agenda of the Democratic Party (DPJ)but identified more with Shintaro Ishihara in terms of social and political views. As a result, he made it clear that he would not sell the islands to the government, placing great pressure on the DPJ administration concerning the possibility of not being able to re-lease the islands.

On the other hand, although Ishihara issued a high-profile promise that the Tokyo Metropolitan government would re-sell the islands to the central government before the Japanese government declared its“nationalization”policy, his promise appeared deceptive due to differing views expressed on different occasions. Ishihara once critically said that“it would be meaningless if the central government bought the islands but did nothing further.”Meanwhile, Ishihara stated that he decided to purchase the Diaoyu Islands in order to construct buildings, docking facilities and lighthouses on the land, marking lighthouses in nautical charts while planning to explore the rich reserve of sea creatures in the long-run,especially looking for quality marine products near the Diaoyu Islands. We can therefore deduce that if Ishihara bought the islands, more people would pay frequent visits there, making the Japanese government’s prohibition ineffective. Because of this,most members of the Noda Cabinet insisted not to over-provoke China and opposed the Tokyo Metropolitan government’s involvement in the issue. Moreover, just as Ishihara wrote in his newly published book,“the Diaoyu Islands issue will surely be increasingly salient and become a key issue in the Japan-US-China wrestling.”He decided to purchase the Islands not merely to safeguard Japan’s territorial interests, but also to provoke international disputes via the Diaoyu Islands issue in the future, thus realizing his strategic goal of binding the U.S. to Japan while containing China. When elaborating on his intention to advertise in American newspapers, Ishihara emphasized that“It is not difficult for the Diaoyu Islands issue to become a factor that determines the future of the whole Pacific Ocean.”In such a case, if Ishihara successfully bought the Islands, the situation would be out of control and Ishihara would have his finger on the trigger of Sino-Japanese relations.However, the Japanese public opinion did not seem to pay necessary attention to Ishihara’s disruptive move. On the contrary, the Japanese people were overwhelmingly supportive of him under the influence of nationalistic sentiment advocating“those who purchase the Islands are heroes and those who take tough positions are right.”For instance, according to an Internet survey conducted on April 17 by Yahoo Japan, Japan’s largest web portal, over 80% of Japanese citizens supported Ishihara’s islands-purchasing plan. This is one major factor forcing the Noda administration to“nationalize”the Islands so that Ishihara’s dominant role in the Island purchasing issue could be changed. One official from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that“l(fā)etting the central government,rather than the Tokyo Governor, purchase the Diaoyu Islands may not be the best for Japan-China relations, but it may be the best option other than that.”

2. Increasing rates of public support and getting out of the governmental crisis

Of course, it is not fair to assert that the Noda administration adopted its“nationalization”policy only aiming to put out the fire in Sino-Japanese relations. In fact, the primary goal of the Noda Cabinet’s“nationalization”move was to reverse the public’s severe distrust of the Democratic administration while helping the incumbent government properly solve the political and administrative problems that were piling so high; the DPJ was thus worried about whether it could maintain its position as the ruling party in the coming general election. The approval rating of the Noda administration was over 60% in August 2011, but its disapproval rating has risen to over 60% in recent times. According to the unwritten rule in Japanese politics,the Prime Minister should resign once the approval rating of his cabinet is lower than 20%. The Noda Cabinet’s approval rating is now hovering around 25%, and they are facing difficult times. As shown below, there are several reasons contributing to the weak political foundation of the Noda administration.First, there are various factions in the Democratic Party and the Party’s leaders are unable to unite the Party; instead, factional contradiction has become more intense within the Party. For example, regarding issues like whether Japan should join talks on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), raising the consumption tax and abandoning all nuclear power plants, factional disputes within the DPJ may not any end in the foreseeable future.Former Secretary General of the DPJ, Ichiro Ozawa led over 50 party members to oppose their own Party and even defected from his Party at a critical moment in Diet voting.

In addition, the DPJ has been facing competition from opposition parties, especially from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The LDP, which has criticized the DPJ for“being immature”and“l(fā)acking a consistent policy towards China,”has a glorious history of leading the Japanese people out of war and building Japan into a rich and strong world power. Relying on such a political legacy, the Liberal Democrats certainly would not miss a good opportunity to nit-pick the Democrats as they are in a tight corner due to the Diaoyu Islands dispute in order to create a chance for the LDP to regain its ruling position.Therefore, in the beginning of the crisis, the LDP changed its original policy and stated clearly that it would“nationalize”the Senkaku Islands and“pursue human habitation on the Islands and effective exploration of the waters”in its campaign program drafted for the coming election of the House of Representatives.For the LDP, this was a card it could play to convince the public to accuse the DPJ of being too weak on foreign affairs.

Moreover, the Democratic Party is under great political pressure due to a lack of public trust. The Democrats are fully aware that they were able to defeat the LDP and win the general election three years ago mainly because they won the trust of the people who were unsatisfied with the LDP because of its overblown and detached sense of historical pride. If the Democratic Party repeats the mistakes of the LDP, it would follow the LDP’s footsteps and go wrong again. Meanwhile, since over 80% of the Japanese citizens take a hostile attitude towards China right now, Prime Minister Noda and the Democratic government, which have often been condemned as“the nation’s traitors”and accused of“kowtowing to China”by the media,would naturally take a tough position on the Diaoyu Islands issue. For them, this is but an effective means to divert public attention away from their bad governing record and increase the DPJ’s public support level while preventing the opposition parties from making further accusations. The most convenient way for the DPJ to show such toughness, is probably to declare its“nationalization”policy as disputes over the Diaoyu Islands have become extremely intense. According to the latest opinion poll conducted by the mainstream Japanese media, 65% of respondents supported the“nationalization”policy. This high rate of support demonstrates that the Democratic government has won in the first tactical battle to realize its political objectives.

3. Preventing local governments from“controlling the central government from below”and capturing the dominant role in national governance

The recent rise of Japan’s local political forces has garnered considerable attention. As public self-administrative bodies,the Todofuken of Japan not only involves freely in political affairs of the central government but also frequently accuses it of wrongdoing on domestic and foreign affairs. Shintaro Ishihara, mayor of Osaka Toru Hashimoto and mayor of Nagoya Takashi Kawamura are all representatives of such local political forces. In the Japanese academia, there are also people actively promoting the“Doshusei,”thus acknowledging and endorsing the rise of local political power. The proposal of“Doshusei”is not something new in Japanese public opinion, but it seems to have been“rekindled”recently. The essence of the proposal stresses a reorganization of the power distribution system in the whole nation, not merely a general discussion of central-local government relations, or a reduction in Japan’s 47 prefectures to 9 to 13 circuits and states. To quote the business strategist Kenichi Ohmae, the“Doshusei”proposal essentially seeks to grant local authorities substantial autonomy in administrating national affairs, with the exception of foreign and national defense issues. Meanwhile, when the country is in trouble, if the majority of the people view the central government as losing control, local authorities can steer the vessel of the nation and sail to safety. The“Doshusei”proposal does not have majority of Japanese support, and most Japanese people only hope to accomplish a decentralization of power and enhancement of local self-governance. In order to win public identification with their political views and policies, local prominent figures spare no efforts to stir up disputes over sensitive diplomatic issues, thus not only provoking public discontent with the central government but also enhancing their own prominence in national politics. For example, Kawamura denied the Nanjing Massacre and Ishihara preached the purchase of the Diaoyu Islands for the same purpose. One commonality between these actions is that by voicing the public’s discontentment with the status quo and catering to their demand for political strongmen,they seek to create an image that local political figures are not only more capable and more resolute than national political elites; they also paint themselves as more patriotic than national politicians, thus laying a solid social foundation for the former to compete with the latter in national affairs. Under such circumstances, the Noda administration determined to purchase the Islands in the country’s name partly because it intends to deprive local politicians of the freedom of revolting against the central government, instead restoring order and stability in national governance.

4. Avoiding the image of troublemaker in anticipation of more American support

In the views of the Democratic Party, if Governor Ishihara was left on his own and kept causing more trouble on the Diaoyu Islands issue, not only would the Sino-Japanese relations have suffered an overall setback, but Japan’s diplomatic linchpin -namely its relations with the U.S. - would have been harmed.America’s strategic interests have determined its objectives and involvement in the Diaoyu Islands disputes. On the one hand, it has kept the issue alive as a cost-effective tool to contain China and Japan while legitimizing its heavy military presence in North-Eastern Asia. On the other hand, the U.S.is maintaining equilibrium between China and Japan in their dispute while preventing the two from engaging in direct military conflicts over the Islands. Therefore, the U.S. does not hope to see the situation go astray and it is more afraid of being drawn into warfare in the Pacific sphere. This explains why the United States adopted an ambiguous policy regarding the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands in the 1970s when China, the U.S. and Japan were in their honeymoon period. Until the mid-1990s, with the rapid rise of Chinese power, the U.S. stated explicitly that Article 5 of the“Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan”applies to the Diaoyu Islands where the Japanese government exercises administration. In short, the U.S. was encouraging Japan to take a tough position towards China on the Diaoyu Islands issue,but under the precondition of not crossing the bottom line of safeguarding American strategic goals. Therefore, the day after Japan’s“nationalization”policy was revealed, the U.S. State Department promptly responded, demanding that the Japanese government explain their action’s potential impacts on Sino-Japanese relations. In a press conference, State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell noted that“a stable and positive Japan-China relationship is conducive to the whole region.”The Japanese Democratic Party is in fact aware that changing the status quo of the Diaoyu Islands on its initiative may not be a sound policy. If the status quo were to be altered by China,the U.S. might take a position more supportive of Japan on the sovereignty of the Islands out of sympathy and concern over maintaining strategic balances. On the contrary, if Japan were the troublemaker, American discontentment would be prominent and Japan would have to pay more to obtain support and aid from the U.S. Such a result would also provoke public dissatisfaction among the Japanese people, thus undermining the social basis of Japan-U.S. relations. In such a situation,the DPJ government decided to nationalize the islands so as to strengthen the central government’s control over the“sacred area,”but they also did so to prevent anything from happening that might harm the Japan-U.S. relationship.

5. Taking advantage of the crisis situation to resolve the key issue of capturing maritime resources

When the international community became concerned and displeased with Ishihara’s eagerness to purchase the Diaoyu Islands, the Noda administration, doing what the LDP governments wanted but dared not to do, tacitly put forward the policy of“nationalization,”thus taking a crucial strategic step to enhance the Japanese government’s management of marine resources. Japan has attached great importance to the exploration of its territorial waters and marine resources since the end of World War II. For that reason, the nationalization of offshore islands has been given an important place. In 1953, according to the“Remote Islands Development Act,”the Japanese government nationalized 258 inhabited islands under the name of promoting development and revitalization.In 2008, in order to realize de facto administration of its waters,especially of islands within 200 marine miles of its territorial sea baseline, the LDP administration issued the“Basic Plan on Ocean Policy,”essentially an attempt to nationalize the remaining offshore islands. The Taro Aso administration formulated a basic policy on the preservation and management of remote islands in December 2009, deciding to“nationalize”23 offshore islands. Out of concern over its“relations with China,”Japan did not include the Diaoyu Islands as one of 23 nationalized territories. By“nationalizing”the Diaoyu Islands in the current crisis, Prime Minister Noda actually accomplished what the Aso administration desired but was unable to do.

II.Potential Consequences of the“Nationalization”Policy

The Noda administration, although in a seemingly passive manner,took advantage of the chaotic situation to tactfully implement a policy the LDP desired but dared not fulfill. However, the“nationalization”policy is a“hot potato,”good to look at but hard to swallow, for the DPJ government,and its implementation would surely bring about plenty of intertwining problems.

The“nationalization”policy indeed bears the symbolic meaning of being a turning point in Sino-Japanese relations.

First, even if the Japanese government has many domestic and diplomatic excuses to enforce the“nationalization”policy, this action has severely provoked China and the Chinese people.China will certainly stick to its consistent standpoint and make adjustments pending Japan’s future actions. From this standpoint, the“nationalization”policy indeed bears the symbolic meaning of being a turning point in Sino-Japanese relations. As known to all, the“nationalization”policy adopted by the Noda administration has led to further distrust of Japan in China,which not only curtails the maneuvering space for resolving the disputes through negotiations but also breeds trouble for the future. If the Noda government allows representatives of certain political forces to visit the Diaoyu Islands in the future, either under pressure or as an excuse to achieve its own purposes,such an act will provoke more confrontation between the two countries and potentially even lead to war. Such a situation is highly plausible firstly because there is no clearly-defined objective in the“nationalization”policy. As noted above, the policy resulted from a political process in which various forces were competing for a favorable position. Therefore, the essential meaning of the policy will be extended or adjusted with no set directions pending the development of the political situation.In other words, the“nationalization”policy itself embodies a self-negating factor, a factor against its initial intention of“maintaining stable management.”

Second, tensions over the“nationalization”policy could erupt over the issue of how to react to people like Ishihara’s island visiting requests. If the Japanese government refuses to allow Ishihara to land on the Islands for the sake of not damaging the overall Japan-China relations, the DPJ regime might be overwhelmed by condemnations of being weak diplomatically. Moreover, such a stance would be self-contradictory since the DPJ government has insisted all along that there is no territorial dispute between Japan and China. Meanwhile, internal divergence in the Democratic Party might become more conspicuous with the enforcement of the“nationalization”policy. On the one hand, cabinet members often differ enormously on the issue. For example, the Minister of Defense Satoshi Morimoto openly stated that“the government has no reason not to allow Ishihara to visit the Islands.”He has also exerted pressure on other cabinet members to issue similar statements. On the other hand, political division within the ruling DPJ could persist in the future. Some Democratic Diet members have declared their desire to split from the Party due to frictions over Prime Minister Noda’s“weak position”on the Diaoyu Islands issue, while others even sided with the opposition party - the LDP - and joined the non-partisan“League of Diet Members on Action to Protect Japan’s Sovereign Territory,”who seek to gain governmental permission to enshrine the Japanese dead on the Diaoyu Islands. It is not difficult to determine that opposition within the DPJ could turn intense with the deepening of domestic political tensions, which might ultimately undermine the DPJ’s ability to form rational and constructive foreign policies.Finally, with the instigation of people like Ishihara, the Japanese people’s dislike for China, as well as the public disapproval of the Democratic administration, will both rise. Such a radical political environment will not only harm the DPJ regime’s cohesion and its ability to rally the public, but also kidnap the government’s diplomatic orientation and bargaining positions. This will force the“nationalization”policy to reach consensus with the Ishihara position and ultimately promote the government to gradually veer right in its policies.

The implementation of Japan’s“nationalization”policy has not only increased China’s suspicion and dissatisfaction;it has also drawn the already precarious DPJ government into an international political whirlpool.

Third,“nationalization”may cause more trouble for Japan-U.S. relations. Undoubtedly,the Japanese government intends to respond to America’s strategic readjustment in the Asia-Pacific by trying its best to strengthen its control over the Diaoyu Islands. Due to financial difficulties, the U.S. is cutting $259 billion in military expense and is reducing military personnel stationed at Okinawa from 18,000 to 10,000 in the coming five years. In order to maintain the current structure of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region and ensure America’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. expects its allies and other friendly nations to fully coordinate with it and jointly cope with China’s actions and“expansion”in the surrounding seas. Japan defines the significance of its“nationalization”policy as conforming to the mutual interests of Japan and the United States. However, as the situation develops in the East Asia, the implementation of Japan’s“nationalization”policy has not only increased China’s suspicion and dissatisfaction; it has also drawn the already precarious DPJ government into an international political whirlpool. A more ironic outcome might be that the U.S. has not granted as much support for Japan on the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands as Japan expected. Washington warned Tokyo not to cause“over-deterioration”of Japan-China relations due to their disputes over the Islands, as such policies would affect regional stability. Meanwhile, the U.S. has been increasing its pressure on Japan in providing military cooperation and coordination. If the current Sino-Japanese disputes over the Diaoyu Islands get more severe, the U.S. might take the opportunity to expand its military bases in Japan as its strategic points in the name of co-defending Japan. Specifically, the U.S. could require Japan to share more responsibilities in the construction of military bases and the improvement of military facilities and equipment, which would incur a chain reaction of public discontentment in Japan. In order to contain China and North Korea, the U.S. deployed V-22 Ospreys at its military base in Iwakuni, Yamaguchi, causing Japanese citizens in Yamaguchi and Okinawa to protest strongly out of concerns over the V-22’s potential“security”problems. Against such a background, the U.S. could naturally formulate new political and legal conditions for its expansion while forcing the Japanese government to identify with its right of collective self-defense or even change the Japanese Constitution - this could help implement a U.S. strategic readjustment in the region. This means that the“nationalization”policy can be characterized by its inclination towards military adventures by fundamentally changing Japan’s post-war peaceful nation-building strategy.

III. Conclusion

The“nationalization”of the“privately owned”Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese DPJ administration is essentially an extension of its policy of using domestic laws to cope with international disputes over territorial sovereignty. Its actions are not different from Japan’s way of dealing with the ship collision incident surrounding the Diaoyu Islands two years ago. Similarly, this incident will not give Japan any legal basis to occupy the Diaoyu Islands. Unilaterally transferring the“ownership”of disputed territory is neither legitimate nor valid, nor is it the behavior of a responsible power.

Though without any international legal basis, the political significance of Japan’s“nationalization”policy should not be ignored since its main actor is the government of a sovereign state. The policy itself results from the reorganization of domestic political forces and the readjustment of power relations in Japan. However, when the policy is disguised in the name of“nationalization,”the issue will naturally rise as an interstate one, affecting international relations in a negative way.Moreover, since the“nationalization”policy originates from very utilitarian political motivation within Japan, its impacts could be fluid, leading Japan-China disputes over the Islands out of control and beyond areas of possible implementation.If the Noda administration’s definition of the“nationalization”policy is the same as the message Ishihara advertised in the“Wall Street Journal”(“Failure to support the Asian nations confronting China will result in the United States losing the entire Pacific Ocean”), the above-mentioned potential outcomes may easily become realities behind such“confronting”and“supporting.”In that case, the Diaoyu Islands disputes will become totally out of control and the international situation will go in unexpected directions.