China’s Maritime Strategy:Retrospect and Prospect

Liu Feng & Liu Ruonan

Ever since the ancient times, the destiny of human beings has been closely connected to the oceans. As people know more and further develop the sea, the oceans play an increasingly important part in human civilization. The significance of maritime strategy was first shown in its irreplaceable role in waterway transportation. Powerful countries demonstrated their national strength and conducted trade with other countries through sea voyages. In modern times, especially since the birth of Western capitalism, the oceans have become a gateway for imperial powers to establish colonies and carve up the world. Major powers fought very hard for the big ports in all continents and strategically important maritime zones and vital transportation lines around the world. Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States became, one after the other, the world’s leading powers by controlling the sea.

Domination of the oceans is a manifestation and one of the most important elements of national strength. The history of great powers’rising since the 15th century has proved that whoever that controls the oceans is most likely to ascend in international arena. However, the time of great powers carving up the oceans has long been behind us. In the 21st century, what should China do to develop the oceans and protect her maritime rights and interests? China, as a rising country, is faced with many severe maritime security issues with neighboring countries with regards to maritime rights and interests. Therefore, it is very important to learn about China’s maritime strategy.

There are different views in the academic circle on what maritime strategy China should adopt. Some scholars argue that China’s maritime strategy should be centered on the expansion of maritime power. According to this view, the maritime power determines whether China could rise successfully, and therefore China must develop its maritime power so as to share the maritime interests with other powers, especially with the United States. However, another view holds that it is obviously mistaken to put too much emphasis on maritime power and its development, because it is restricted by geopolitics and needs the backing of strong national strength. Besides, it has a potential danger of triggering conflict with the United States, a hegemonic power, thus plunging China into security predicament. In spite of the discussions of scholars based on their respective positions, it is important for us to make clear how the Chinese government views the oceans, develops its maritime strategy, maintains its maritime rights and interests,and adjusts its maritime strategy in the face of very complex maritime environment and maritime security issues.

I. A Retrospect of China’s Maritime Strategy

The development of China’s modern history demonstrates that China’s maritime strategy can be generally divided into two stages with the founding of the People’s Republic of China as the watershed. The first stage covered a time span of more than a century, starting from the Opium War. During this period,China had undergone the transition from a traditional feudal society to a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society, which was the basic feature of Chinese society at that time. Therefore, China’s maritime strategy in that stage was closely related to the general historical context.

Since the mid-Ming Dynasty, the central government had imposed a ban on maritime trade that“neither an inch of board is allowed to be put into the sea nor a single sail be allowed to arrive at the port”. Except for a few sea routes and ports that were reserved for vassal states to pay tributes, the rest harbors and commercial ports were all closed. Anyone who violated the ban shall be charged with collaborationist crime. Since the central government strictly adhered to a maritime strategy of secluding China from the outside world, no specialized governmental agencies were set up to manage maritime affairs in the Ming and Qing dynasties. Instead, the Ministry of Rites was in charge of dealing diplomatic affairs with foreign countries. Therefore,China had nearly done nothing in preserving maritime rights and interests after the middle of the Ming Dynasty, let alone designing a specific maritime strategy.

The Opium War ended China’s seclusion. Signing the Treaty of Nanjing, the Qing government was forced to open up five ports for commercial use which were Guangzhou, Fuzhou,Xiamen, Ningbo and Shanghai, generating the need to set up customs barriers and collect taxes accordingly. The British side requested that they were in charge of“managing businessmen coming to and from those ports”with the taxes being collected to pay the war indemnity. As the request was accepted by the Qing government, the first customs agency“Jianghai North Customs”was set up in the Bund of Shanghai in 1846, followed by the second one in Guangzhou in 1858.

At that time, China was forced to give up the century-long seclusion policy, starting to manage maritime transportation and trade. However, since the management right was controlled by the Western powers, it was in the service of Western countries, guaranteeing the smooth passage of their warships and merchant vessels in China’s ports and low tariffs for their cargoes. China, with no independent national standing, was not capable of developing maritime rights and interests or making maritime strategy. Even if there were any, they were formulated involuntarily at low levels.

Ever since the founding of New China in 1949, the Chinese nation has established a completely independent sovereignty,providing conditions for the gradual development of maritime strategy from scratch. A remarkable feature of such development was that China restored its right to independently developing the oceans and firmly safeguarded the offshore security, which was in accordance with the then domestic and international situations as well as the overall strategy of the nation.

Shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China,the Korean War broke out, posing security threats to China from the Korean Peninsular. Left with no other choices, China had to shift its strategic attention and pool resources on the Korean War, losing the opportunity of“chasing and annihilating the fleeing enemies with remaining troops”. Under such a situation, China was not able to recover the islands of Taiwan,which was crucial to lay a foundation for a relatively complete coastal defense. Even worse, China’s security situation had not improved following the end of the Korean War. In the ocean,China was still confronted with naval blockade. With the help of the United States, Taiwan defended the Taiwan Strait and controlled the command of sea, leaving China’s coastal defense in a passive position along the offshore coastal areas.

Up until the 1960s, the situation had not experienced a fundamental change. During the Vietnam War, China’s surrounding waters were still in the firm control of the U.S.fleets, facilitating their supply for sea and air combats as well as guaranteeing the maritime transportation routes.On land, China and the Soviet Union were on the edge of war since relations between them soured, thus breaking the peace in China’s northern border. In the meantime, China’s southwestern border was challenged by India, which forced China into a defensive war to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The situation showed that though China had delimited land boundaries with Afghanistan, Burma,Vietnam and other neighboring countries from the founding of New China to the 1970s, China’s land security was still under threats from the north and southwest, which was an important reason for China’s difficulty in developing the naval forces and expanding maritime space. Besides, China’s national strength was also a constricting factor. Before the 1970s, due to the weak foundation of economic development and the damage of economic stagnation resulting from a decade of the Cultural Revolution, China’s comprehensive national strength was not strong enough to provide sufficient funds and technology for fully developing maritime resources and safeguarding the sovereignty of its territorial waters.

To sum up, during the period from the founding of New China to the early 1970s, China was confronted with the naval blockade from the Untied States as well as the territorial and sovereignty disputes with neighboring countries. Therefore,China’s maritime strategy was mainly“offshore defense”, being in a primary stage of developing the economic resources of sea.On the one hand, this strategy met the needs of China’s overall security strategy; on the other, it accorded with the national strength of New China in its early stage of development.

II. China’s Maritime Strategy in the New Period

Since the reform and opening-up, great strides have been made in the evolvement of China’s maritime strategy. Generally speaking, China’s maritime strategy over the past three decades has experienced three transformations. First, it changed from relative seclusion to opening up to the outside world; second,China began to explore the high seas after it had developed the offshore areas; third, its focus turned from economic development to security space. These transformations were closely related to China’s overall strategy.

From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, China had achieved significant strategic adjustment: stabilizing land boundaries.With more than a decade of efforts, China had realized unprecedented stability with almost all its land boundaries,achieving normalization of relations with Russia, central Asian countries, Mongolia, India, Vietnam and other countries, and eliminating military confrontation along the bordering areas.Thus, tens of thousands kilometer-long land boundaries became ties for peaceful exchanges, removing all obstacles for China to expand its maritime space in the future. Moreover,historical changes had been seen in China’s maritime strategy environment. The reason lied in that the United States withdrew from the South China Sea and Beibu Gulf at the end of the Vietnam War, and more importantly, the easing of China-U.S.relations improved China’s overall security environment.

As the United States was the major actor in imposing naval blockade on China, the improvement in China-U.S. relations undoubtedly greatly reduced the pressure on China’s offshore defense and lessened the difficulty of expanding maritime space.Except for the changes in external environment, domestic and foreign policies were also adjusted at the Third Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, as the Party leadership has unanimously recognized the significance of economic development. This recognition also pushed forward the change of view on the sea, which was not only“convenient for fishing,salt-making and shipping”, but also contained rich resources and served as the window for China’s opening up.

Against this backdrop, China has gradually developed its own maritime strategy. In terms of economy, the country’s secondgeneration collective leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping timely put forward a strategic thinking on maritime economy,the basic principle of which was focusing on opening up coastal areas, developing offshore resources and expanding open sea.From then on, China entered a stage of developing maritime economy in an all-round way. On the one hand, the development of maritime economy in this stage was characterized by opening up along the coastal areas; on the other, it was heading for the goal of developing maritime resources“in a comprehensive and sustainable way with high efficiency”. In addition, due to the development in maritime transportation and shipbuilding technology, China’s maritime economic activities were gradually extended from offshore areas and shallow seas to high seas and deep seas.

In terms of security, new maritime problems arose, as a result of the“vacuum”of the command of the sea over the South China Sea after the withdrawal of the U.S. forces. Shortly after the U.S.troops withdrew, Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries took the opportunity to encroach on many islands and reefs that belonged to China. The South China Sea Fleet and soldiers in Hainan military region repelled the Vietnamese naval fleets in January 1974, recovering the Xisha Islands and reiterating China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea. However, as China was still in the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, some of the islands of the Nansha Islands were not able to be recovered and still occupied by Vietnam.

Confronted with the problem of settling disputes on maritime rights and interests, Deng Xiaoping innovatively brought up a new thinking under the basic principle of“adhering to the sovereignty, putting aside disputes and seeking common development”. It was noteworthy that though the country’s third-generation collective leadership pursued this basic principle, the issue of sovereignty over the South China Sea and the islands has not been properly settled yet. With China’s comprehensive national strength constantly increasing and maritime economic activities ever expanding, higher demands were raised on maritime defense. Therefore, the dispute has been intensified in recent years, posing a major challenge to China’s diplomacy at present.

Since the 1990s, President Jiang Zemin had led China heading toward a cross-century goal of building China into a“maritime country”and“maritime power”. While keeping opening up the coastal areas and rationally developing maritime resources,China has gained a more profound understanding of the strategic significance as well as security significance of the sea.A major reason for the change of view lied in the Taiwan Strait crisis in the mid-1990s, which was provoked by the Taiwan independence force led by Lee Teng-hui. They attempted to test the bottom line of the mainland on the issue of Taiwan independence with the help of the United States.

This event made the central leadership realize the urgency of building up China’s naval force and strengthening the coastal defense. In another word, it was imperative to build a strong navy in face of the growing Taiwan independence force and in order to prevent division and safeguard national unity. Only in this way could the mainland maintain a military deterrence to the independence force in Taiwan, as well as resolve the Taiwan issue by aggressive amphibious warfare and medium-and long-range command of the sea and air when all peaceful means turned out to be inefficient.

III. Current Maritime Problems Confronting China

Entering the 21st century, China’s economy has experienced a rapid development, evidenced by remarkable increase in economic aggregate, comprehensive national strength and people’s living standards. In this context, China has reached an unprecedented level in understanding and developing the sea. Meanwhile, it has also been challenged by more and more maritime problems.

Some of the problems were left over by history such as the Taiwan Strait issue and sovereignty over certain islands, which have not been completely resolved and some were even getting worse. Other problems became gradually prominent with the expansion of maritime economic activities, such as security of maritime transportation routes and environmental problems in developing maritime economy. Problems of the first category were related to sovereignty while those of the second category could be regarded as non-traditional security issues. However,both categories of problems must be faced and resolved when formulating China’s maritime strategy for the new century.

The main goal of maritime strategy is to resolve sovereignty problems. As for the Taiwan Strait issue, the frozen state of cross-Strait relations was broken by extensive exchanges and cooperation between the two sides based on the“1992 Consensus”after Ma Ying-Jeou took office in 2008. Political community in Taiwan recognized the One-China principle and opposed the development of Taiwan independence forces, which pushed forward the steady progress of cross-Strait relations.The“Complete Three Links”and the signing of ECFA marked that cross-Strait peace began to be guaranteed institutionally. In spite of the easing of cross-Strait relations, the state of“neither unification nor independence”, however, was not a long-term solution and the only way for Taiwan’s future development was to return to the motherland under the principle of“one country,two systems”. This problem was not only related to the situation inside the islands of Taiwan but also to the international landscape in East Asia after the Cold War.

As post-Cold War East Asia was characterized by power transformation and China’s rise, countries like the United States and Japan were trying every possible means to limit China’s influence in the region. In recent years, the United States announced“Pivot to Asia”in a high profile and frequently conducted military exercises with Japan, followed by Japan’s enhancement of armament at the excuse of the DPRK’s missile launching. Those moves have demonstrated nothing but that the United States and its allies were urgently building up military strength and cooperation in East Asia, highlighting the significance of Taiwan Strait as a strategic region. Therefore,in responding to a possible worst case, China had to formulate an appropriate maritime strategy to resolve the Taiwan issue if military forces were needed.

Another important aspect of the sovereignty problem was dispute over the boundary of surrounding waters and the ownership of islands. So far, China has disputes over maritime demarcation and the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands with South Korea and Japan in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea.Moreover, disputes over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and the ownership of islands were even more complicated,involving countries like Malaysia and Brunei and particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. The South China Sea issue has been a pending problem ever since the 1970s. To solve the problem, China has been following the principle of“adhering to sovereignty, putting aside disputes and seeking common development”, which has not been implemented by concrete measures in the past.

As China’s maritime economic activities became increasingly frequent, we have come to realize that the expansion of maritime strategic space was needed to safeguard national security, and that rich oil and gas resources were one of the options to ease China’s energy shortage. In the past two years, conflict over the South China Sea was intensified, because the competition for fishery, oil and gas resources heated up among surrounding countries. Particularly, Vietnam and Brunei have made huge profits through illegal development of oil and gas resources in the South China Sea.

In recent days, the issue of the Philippines attempting to take the Huangyan Island as an excuse to arouse the attention of the international community on the South China Sea issue was also started by the contest for fishery resources. The Chinese government holds that the Huangyan Island has been China’s inherent territory since ancient times. The fact is that the Philippine side sent a naval vessel to hurt the Chinese fishermen on China’s territory. China calls upon the Philippines to solve the dispute through diplomatic channels so as to bring peace and tranquility back to the Huangyan Island. While stressing China’s commitment on bilateral consultation and peaceful resolution, China also unequivocally expressed opposition to internationalization of the problem and interference of countries outside the region.

The security of maritime transportation routes was another problem we could not afford to neglect. Located at the junction of the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, Asia and Oceania, and continent and islands, the South China Sea occupies a very important strategic position. For a rising China, the South China Sea is the lifeline for its maritime transportation. As we all know, currently over half of China’s crude oil is imported, 60% of which comes from the Middle East. The crude oil is transported through the Strait of Malacca and arrives at China’s coastal areas by the South China Sea route. In another word, the Strait of Malacca is located very near to China’s territorial waters, serving as an important passage between China and the Indian Ocean. If the strait were controlled by hostile forces to China in the region or outside the region, China’s maritime transportation is bound to be threatened. As there are uncertainties in the situation of the South China Sea, this transportation route is possible to be blockaded by warfare. For a long time in the future, China will still use the Strait of Malacca as a maritime transportation route.Therefore, it is high on the agenda for China to take part in and maintain the security of the strait, guaranteeing the smooth passage through it.

In addition, as we increased efforts in exploring maritime resources and expanding maritime economic activities, pollution of maritime environment and ecological protection became even more prominent. According to statistics, polluted areas in the East China Sea and South China Sea increased every year with more rubbish and frequent red tides. It was mainly caused by offshore tourism and industrial activities. Besides,the maritime ecological environment became even more fragile.Fishery resources reduced as a result of excessive fishing and maritime pollution while rare animals like Chinese white dolphins and tropical corals were on the verge of extinction.Of course, protecting maritime ecological environment requires not only timely counter-measures but also joint cooperation of the surrounding countries.

IV.Conclusion: China’s Maritime Strategy in Transition

In order to resolve the above-mentioned maritime problems, the Chinese government has done careful and meticulous study and formulated a corresponding maritime strategy. China realized that sovereignty problems were at the core of all maritime problems. Only when maritime demarcation and ownership of islands were cleared could the disputes over fishery, oil and gas resources be successfully settled, and political mutual trust among countries concerned be fully built, thus laying a foundation for extensive cooperation in economy, environmental protection and other areas.

To solve the sovereignty problems, China chose a strategic orientation of good-neighborly friendship and peaceful coexistence, followed a principle of“putting aside disputes and seeking common development”, and was wiling to negotiate with direct state parties on the South China Sea issue based on basic norms of international relations. This attitude demonstrated that the Chinese government and people wanted to resolve sovereignty disputes by peaceful means and would only appeal to force as the last resort; in the meantime, we hoped to minimize the economic losses of parties involved and realize common development.

Secondly, China held that maritime problems should be resolved inside the region without any interference of countries from outside. Disputes over sovereignty should be properly settled through negotiations by direct state parties. Moreover,China adhered to one-on-one bilateral negotiations to resolve problems so as to exclude the interference of forces outside the region. This meant that China was against discussing the disputes on the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea together with that on the South China Sea and opposed to interference of Japan, India and the United States in the South China Sea dispute or extension of the issue to the international and multilateral context.

Recently, when the Philippines attempted to take the Huangyan Island issue as an excuse and asked for assistance from the United States to continue its illegal occupation of the island,the Chinese government timely and unequivocally reiterated its position on the sovereignty of the Huangyan Island for many times. The general public strongly supported the government and hoped the government could take tough measures to deter the Philippine side. This showed that China stuck to the principle of its strategic option. On the other, the Chinese government also realized that flexible measures should be taken in dealing with sovereignty disputes. For example, China agreed to conduct multilateral consultations on insensitive issues.

At the China-ASEAN foreign ministers meeting held in Bali,Indonesia on July 21, 2011, China arrived at an agreement with ASEAN countries on the guidelines for the implementation of the follow-up actions of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). One year later, on July 20, 2012, China pledged to make joint efforts with ASEAN to safeguard regional peace and stability after the 10-member bloc issued a six-point statement on the South China Sea. It declared that“the Chinese side is willing to work together with the ASEAN members to implement the DOC comprehensively and effectively,”which fully expressed China’s sincerity in goodneighborly friendliness.

Although the Chinese government would make every effort to resolve the sovereignty problems by peaceful means, countries surrounding the South China Sea are geared up to grab more maritime interests due to the increasingly complicated situation in this region and heated competition for oil and gas resources.Therefore, security in the South China Sea area still faces a lot of challenges. Any move of increasing armament by any country,whether for offensive or defensive purposes, would be regarded as threat in this region and invoke vigilance and resistance from other countries. In this context, China must have a set of clear maritime strategies to respond to any potential conflicts and wars.

Up until now, China has pursued a maritime military strategy of coastal defense, as many other countries that followed the principle of peaceful coexistence have done. It is a strategy that prepares and guides the naval force to conduce defense along coastal areas, which falls into the category of naval strategies. The strategy has been implemented in accordance with China’s national conditions and the strategic orientation of good-neighborly friendliness and peaceful coexistence. First of all, this strategy demonstrates that China’s naval building is defensive rather than offensive; secondly, its focus is on certain regions and coastal areas instead of developing military capabilities in the high seas.

It is noteworthy that the measures taken by China to strengthen coastal naval building in recent years, which include the breakthrough and successful experiment in the research and development of deep-water manned submersible, the trial voyage of aircraft carrier platform, etc., have aroused attention from many parties. All show that China’s“coastal defense strategy”has evolved into“active offshore defensive strategy”,which covers wider maritime areas and needs stronger naval forces than before. The term“offshore areas”consists of the first island chain and its fringe, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and South China Sea. In the foreseeable future, China’s maritime strategy would be focused on active coastal defense.

Except for problems of maritime security, maritime economic problems become increasingly prominent in recent years, and hence China has formulated and followed a maritime strategy of economic development that is sustainable and cooperative.With a coastline of 18,000 kilometers and territorial waters of 4.7 million square kilometers, China has rich fishery, oil and gas resources stored beneath the vast seas and oceans. However,with increased fishing after the founding of New China, offshore fishery resources become deficient; for instance, wild large yellow croakers commonly seen in the middle and late period of last century are almost extinct by now. The cruel reality warns us that we should conduct a sustainable strategy of exploring the sea instead of exhausting its resources.

While deepening the development of maritime economy, we should not neglect the disputes over maritime economic profits,represented by the contention, protection and compensation of fishery resources. Recently, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and other countries all took the so-called“l(fā)aw enforcement”actions toward our fishermen. Except for detainment of some fishermen in disputed waters, most of the cases were about fishery resources.

Confronted with this situation, China should go beyond passive responding to the suits and seek active resolution of those events. On the one hand, disputes over fishery resources that are related to sovereignty and national security should be handled particularly as issues of maritime demarcation and islands ownership are done. The Chinese government is opposed to dealing with diplomatic issues with domestic laws in other countries. On the other hand, in order to handle economic disputes merely over maritime resources, China should continuously improve its laws and regulations, raise capabilities of law enforcement, and enhance government’s attention, making sure that there are laws to go by and the laws are observed. In this process, the primary goal is to protect the safety of life and property for fishermen and fishing households.All in all, China must attach great importance to the role of legal means in resolving maritime economic disputes.