Implications of Obama’s Re-election for U.S. Security Policy towards East Asia

By Zhu Feng

The quadrennial U.S. presidential election was held on November 6, 2012. President Barack Obama was re-elected,defeating the Republican candidate. The results of the election will undoubtedly have significant impacts on future American domestic and foreign policy. The following characteristics of the U.S. presidential election are noteworthy:

First, while the Democratic Party won the Presidency and remains the ruling party, there was not a big gap between the two parties in terms of the popular votes and the Republicans keep their majority in the House of Representatives. After the election, the American political and social polarization continues, and the Republican Party maintains strong checks and balances on the Democratic Party’s ruling position on legislative and social affairs.

During the 2012 U.S. presidential election, Obama won 333 electoral votes, nearly 50% more than Romney’s 206 votes.However, Obama won 50% of the popular votes while Romney 48%, only a gap of 2%. Romney’s defeat was due to losing seven of the eight“swing states.”But the Republican Party was able to hold on to its status in the Congress even though it lost some seats during the Congressional election. The Democratic Party retains the Senate, with a 55-45 majority over the Republican; the Republicans continue to be the majority in the House of Representatives with an advantage of 233:193 over the Democrats. Although the Republican Party saw its seats drop from 47 to 45 in the Senate and from 240 to 233 in the House, there was no change in the makeup of the Congress:a Democrat-controlled Senate and a Republican-controlled House of Representatives.

Second, the political orientation of American ethnic minority voters has turned clearly in favor of the Democratic Party and the Obama administration, while the traditional supporters of the Democratic Party - the elderly voters and white working class have decisively turned up to support the Republican Party; the traditional supporters of the Republican Party - white voters in small towns have decisively shifted to the Democratic Party.Significant changes in the demographic and ethnic profiles of the American voters have led to a monumental transformation of the American political landscape, creating a new history of American electorate politics.

The overwhelming support to Obama from the growing American ethnic groups has made the Democratic Party win.Post-election data show that 60% of the American adult white males voted for Romney. However, they do not account for the majority of American voters. Of the American voters, 13 percent are Latinos, 11.8 percent Afro-American and nearly 3 percent Asian-American. An overwhelming number of voters from the ethnic minority groups which account for 28% of the U.S.population support Obama rather than Mitt Romney. 72% of the Latinos, 90% of the African-Americans, and 65% of the Asian descent voted for Obama. Romney won a majority of the votes of white Americans, especially adult white males, but he had an absolute disadvantage among ethnic groups which already account for nearly one-third of the U.S. population. Romney unexpectedly lost seven of the eight“swing states,”including Virginia, Ohio, Wisconsin and Florida. In fact, Romney’s popular votes in these lost“swing states”were not far behind those of Obama, but in terms of the votes of the ethnic groups, Romney was clearly no match to Obama. In an era of ongoing tremendous changes in the demographic profiles in the United States,Romney, emphasizing in his campaign strategy a return to the traditional conservative philosophy and policy, lost to Obama who advocated expanding the responsibility of government,supporting the middle and lower classes, and increasing the rights of new immigrants by modifying immigration laws. In his presidential campaign, Obama stressed a balance between adhering to the traditional American value of individualism and moderately expanding the responsibility of government,thus more in line with a growing trend of diversification in the demographic and ethnic profiles of today’s voters in the United States.

Third, the Obama administration will be subject to great pressure as a result of serious economic conditions and the budget deficit during its second term. It will have to take an“inward looking”strategy during the second term as more and more American people expect the U.S. to spend more energy,money and time on dealing with the domestic economy,employment and the reduction of the budget deficit.

Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008,the U.S. has fallen into an economic and financial recession which was widely believed to be the most serious and profound one since the Great Depression in 1929-1933. The U.S.unemployment rate stood at 7.8% in September 2012, the first time that this figure went down to less than 8% since Obama took office. However, the jobless rate in the U.S. would reach 15% if“hidden unemployment”was taken into account. The budget deficit of the federal government also exerts extreme pressure on the Obama administration. Currently, an average of US$4 billion is added to the U.S. federal debt almost every day. As of late October 2012, the U.S. national debt totaled US$16.17 trillion. The“Fiscal Cliff”will automatically emerge on January 2, 2013 if Democrats and Republicans continue their bitter battles in Congress and Obama fails to convince Republicans to support the White House’s economic and fiscal policies. Then in 2013, the U.S. would automatically start to reduce the fiscal deficit by US$800 billion and to allow tax hikes that would constrain consumption and investment. The targeted deficit reduction of US$800 billion would account for 5% of the U.S. GDP. This would not only disrupt the Obama administration’s policy initiatives, but also make it hard to effectively implement a series of policies of the White House to expand employment and investment in manufacturing, support SMEs, and increase exports. That the U.S. economy is expected to grow 2% in 2012 does not mean that it will have come out of the economic doldrums. Although President Obama won reelection, the administration may enter its“l(fā)ame duck”period earlier than expected. Upon re-election, President Obama phoned Republican House leader Boehner on November 7 to send a clear signal that he would like to strengthen cooperation with the Republican Party and the two parties should move quickly out of the shadow of the campaigns and join hands to overcome the“Fiscal Cliff.”

In this context, the Obama administration will not change the existing tone of American diplomacy during its second term and there will be far more continuity than possible changes in its foreign policy. In planning and implementing its foreign policy, the Obama administration will make efforts to keep its policy of the first term which features four important characteristics: First, actively promoting multilateral dialogues and negotiation processes on global issues, reclaiming the banner of multilateralism on global issues. Second, engaging in“pivot to the Asia Pacific”and strengthening American dominant position on political, economic and security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region in the face of a rising China and the increasing dependence of the U.S. on its trade and economic ties with the Asia-Pacific market. The center of gravity of the global strategy of the U.S. has substantially shifted from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. Third, asking its allies to act on“the front stage”instead of acting as a policy maker and leader itself on a series of regional and security hot issues. In so doing, the U.S.relies on its huge strategic forces and massive global system of military alliances. Fourth, reversing the strategic choices of the Bush administration which had viewed anti-terrorism as a top priority. The Obama administration sought to exit from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, promote the process of democratization in the Middle East, and further reconcile with the Islamic world.On Iran, the Obama administration’s Middle East strategy no longer focused on direct military intervention by the United States as a“sheriff.”Instead, the Obama administration seeks to make the United States more like a“promoter”of the trend of self-transformation in Middle East affairs.

Based on the above analysis, the following possible trends might be discerned in the Obama administration’s Asia-Pacific policy during its second term:

Firstly, the top priority of the American strategy towards the Asia-Pacific will be continued strengthening of American alliances and enhanced coordination with its allies concerning its diplomatic, economic and security policy. With support and political assurances from its allies, the U.S. will seek to expand its strategic and military presence in the Asia-Pacific, and ensure the comprehensive and effective“operation”of U.S.-led military alliance system in regard to regional security hotspots,economic and trade issues as well as non-traditional security issues in the Asia Pacific.

Secondly, in terms of strategic responsibility in the Asia-Pacific, the United States will shift its role from direct“strategic intervention”to“strategic balancing”and define its basic strategic objective as the maintenance of regional stability and peace order in the Asia-Pacific region that meets the U.S.standards. While maintaining its security obligations to the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. will continue with its“allies-actfirst”strategy on many regional hot-spot issues. If an American ally is threatened or subjected to coercive diplomacy, the United States will stand with its allies and partners as a diplomatic and strategic gesture and seek to deter and suppress situations that the U.S. and its allies do not want to see. To this end,the United States will“re-define”the Asia-Pacific regional order through active regional diplomacy. To achieve this strategic goal,America’s large numbers of forward deployed forces and rapid projection of military power in the Asia-Pacific region remain its most advantageous means in the short-term. Therefore,the U.S. will continue to expand systems of multilateral and bilateral defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, increase the frequency and scope of joint military exercises, and may adjust the scale and intensity of military activities based on the dynamics of regional hotspots. Through this series of moves,the core goal of the U.S. is to maintain the stability of the Asia-Pacific region according to American standards while actively exploring the commercial values of the Asia-Pacific market for the development of the U.S. economy.

Thirdly, the United States will continue to maintain an active dialogue with China, make efforts to influence China’s policy and also engage in cooperation with China. At the same time,the United States will set up a number of“power barriers”for the rise of China by strengthening American alliances, expanding defense partnership and enhancing forward strategic and military presence so as to deter and constrain China’s possible behavior not to the liking of the United States. Nevertheless, the Obama administration’s Asia-Pacific strategy will further turn negative when it comes to China’s position in American strategy.During the third televised debate of the presidential candidates on October 25, Obama said that China is an“adversary”, and perhaps“a potential partner”. The negative portrayal of China in American strategy not only reflects heightened concerns of the U.S. over China’s development of power and pursuit of interests but also means that America’s“China strategy”has become increasingly dynamic and uncertain. However, during Obama’s second term, Sino-U.S. economic, financial and social interdependence will continue to deepen, and, in the absence of a big-power consensus and an effective communication and dialogue between the two countries, the structural competition of the two powers in the regional security architecture will continue to grow. In the next four years, Sino-U.S. relations may become more complex and arduous, and the prospects for a mutually beneficial bilateral relationship featuring win-win cooperation may not be optimistic.