International Anti-Piracy Action and Cooperation in Global Governance

Chen Zhirui & Wu Wencheng

International Anti-Piracy Action and Cooperation in Global Governance

Chen Zhirui & Wu Wencheng

Since the release of the report Our Global Neighborhood by the Commission on Global Governance, the concept of “governance”has taken root in the hearts of the people in the world and“governance without government” has become the principal tendency of global governance. Moreover, “governance” has replaced “governing” in concept, the role of power is slowly diluted and the role of various “authorities” in the international community is drawing ever more attention. International power structure has been weakened, the process of the international community has been the main focus of study on governance and academic circles have attached extensive importance to non-traditional security themes such as economy, environment, population and public health. In contrast to the single security study in the Cold War era, a new path has been brazed in global governance and numerous international phenomena, neglected and concealed before, have been “discovered” so that research on security has been broadened and deepened.

Global governance and non-traditional security problems are closely associated with each other. However, partly because of this, apparent drawbacks appeared in the past global governance. The role of power structure was lowered and importance was attached to the process of the international community to the neglect of the role of the actors. The fundamental role of cooperation between countries, particularly big countries, was all the more underestimated, leading finally to fragmentation. In other words, for global governance, it was frequently “much cry and little wool”. Due to ambiguity and deficiency in terms of concept, interest, mechanism and regime, global governance landed itself in an embarrassing situation with little effect and no consensus. Here a crucial issue remains on specific agenda of global governance: what are the main actors, how do different actors participate in it and coordinate and cooperate with one another to enhance the certainty, transparency and effect of global governance, making it live up to its name, i.e. how do various actors unfold cooperation in global governance. In view of the point, this paper, taking international anti-piracy action as an example, will endeavor to sort out the mutual relations between global governance and non-traditional security problems, identify the fundamental role of cooperation between the big countries on the global governance agenda so as to clarify the different roles and common value of big countries, international organizations and non-governmental organizations in global governance.

I. “Trans-sovereignty” Security Threats and Global Governance Agenda

The surge of global governance is closely linked with the lowering of threat of systemic war and the emerging of a series of transnational threats. In the 90s of the 20th century, along with the end of the Cold War and accelerated development of globalization, tremendous changes took place in security threats, with the traditional security threats beginning to decline and non-traditional security threats rising by a big margin.

First, after the end of the Cold War, the traditional threat of war between the big powers decreased greatly and it is nearly impossible for a large-scale war to break out among the big powers. Barry Buzan believes that in the 21st century there are“neither major ideological disputes, nor serious confrontational conflicts” between the major powers. In expounding the new security situation, Robert O’Neill likewise holds that after the Cold War and in the foreseeable future it is basically impossible for systemic war to break out among big countries. “We are leaving far behind the era of global war.” Other scholars believe that the end of the Cold War makes the danger of world wars disappear which are replaced by regional and local conflicts. There are scholars who even assert that after the end of the Cold War, big countries detest wars between them and such wars are “obsolete”. Scholars of different schools offer divergent explanations for this. Realist scholars such as William C. Wohlforth, from the perspective of international pattern, analyzes the reasons why it is very difficult for fierce wars to erupt among the big countries after the end of the Cold War, believing that the United States’ unipolar hegemony ensures stability and peace of the international system so that other secondary countries dare not unleash wars rashly. Some scholars in China also hold similar views. Fu Mengzi, a research fellow with China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) maintains that “in an international situation where the United States wields extremely strong force, traditional strategic confrontation between big countries has become unimaginable.” And the advocates of the end of nuclear weapons are of the view that the gigantic destructive force of nuclear weapons renders victory impossible in a war among big countries. The devastating role of nuclear weapons for the concept of territorial security lies in that nuclear weapons pierces traditional state protection so it renders a victory in a war quite unfounded. Normative evolutionists stress that with the rise of the international norms of respecting territory and sovereignty, the mortality rates of states have gone down objectively, survival and security of states are ensured and it is no longer necessary for big countries to worry about outside threats to their survival.

Second, despite the fall in traditional security threats, numerous trans-sovereignty security threats keep emerging. Nontraditional security problems such as environment, diseases and terrorism transcended the boundaries of sovereign states, eroded the legitimate authority of states, and gave birth to the so-called “failed nations”. The evolving globalization has accelerated and magnified the importance and impact of these non-traditional security threats. In the era of globalization, therefore, security of big countries is not equal to international security, and the stability of relations among big countries cannot ensure that of the international community. The efficiency of traditional strategic instruments among big countries such as military alliance, deterrence and balance have been on the decline and these instruments can hardly cope with the challenge of the non-traditional security threats. The traditional definition of security bears upon the use of military force, and security is directly associated with “threat and use of military force”. Under the new circumstances, however, the importance of military security goes down, trans-sovereignty security threats are upgraded to security problems without the need to influence the use of military forces of the states, as non-traditional security threats are sufficiently serious themselves. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, in a dialogue with his critic Marc A. Levy, explicitly explains the reasons why people are concerned with the non-traditional security threats such as the environmental problem. He points out that the threats to the environment are never challenges to the United States alone and that the environmental problems in many regions are impacting adversely the core values of millions in developing countries, triggering regional conflicts and instability. In research on security of water resources, some scholars do not study the impact of water resources on the use of military force, but stress the scarcity of water resources and their uneven distribution in various regions, which makes the water resources problem a new security threat. Numerous scholars who study the relationship between diseases and security also emphasize that it is essential to be free from the set pattern of national security and concerned with the basic need of humans. They are of the view that transnational epidemic diseases not only pose security threats through eroding the economy and military power of a state, but also lead to domestic disturbances and international instability. Scholars who advocate “security of humans” pay more attention to the dignity and requirements of survival of humans and see them as the main content of security.

It is easily shown here that the problems related to global governance such as the global environment, public health, financial crisis, even population and gender equality may also be perceived as a series of non-traditional security problems. In fact, the reason why global governance and non-traditional security problems overlap each other to a great extent is that the rise of both depends on two factors: On the one hand, it is the objective reflection of the situation that after the Cold War traditional security threats decline whereas non-traditional security threats rise. On the other, it is also the result of reflections of the big countries in the world on the security situation and based on their policy adjustments. After the end of the Cold War, the danger of war between big countries decreases, security of the system is guaranteed and the traditional military security threats, based on national territory, gradually weakens whereas other security problems, hidden in U.S.-Soviet bipolar confrontation, stand out salient. Hence, transnational nontraditional security threats become the focus of attention, opening a window of opportunity for global governance. Different from non-traditional security study that develops theory within the framework of security research, global governance sets forth brand new solutions and theoretical structure for a series of trans-sovereignty threats, emphasizes the participation of international pluralistic actors, dilutes the role of power structure, and sets big store by the flowing authorities in the international community. However, just because of this, global governance is faced with numerous important theoretical and practical issues that require clarification and resolution. They are related to the foundation of global governance, the status and role of big powers and other actors in global governance agenda and the establishment and way of cooperation in global governance.

II. Cooperation among Big Powers and Foundation for Global Governance

The efforts in global governance are aimed at reducing the role of power structure, attaching importance to the international community process and neglecting the role played by actors, particularly state actors. In particular, the fundamental role of cooperation among the big powers was seriously underestimated. For sure, a certain big power or bloc of big powers is not in the position to solve single-handedly a series of transnational problems. The transnational and non-state nature of security threats and uncertainty and fluidness of the source of security threats have made it more and more difficult for a major power to unilaterally seek its own security, the effect of solving security problems through military force is further lowered and traditional major-power political pattern declines day by day. Conversely, however, we should not underestimate too much the role of cooperation among big countries in global governance. In the present international community, “big-power politics remains a crucial factor in the international relations agenda.” The resolution of a series of transnational security problems cannot be separated from big countries. To a certain degree, cooperation among the major powers still constitutes an important basis for achievements in global governance.

Then why do the big countries participate actively in the global governance process? It is said that the areas targeted in global governance and non-traditional security studies quite overlap each other. Most themes in global governance are transnational security issues. In this area, the situation is different from that during the Cold War when big powers remained confronted with one another. They all have immediate interest in seeking to solve such problems as well as a strong desire to do so. Therefore, in the global governance process of transnational security problems, cooperation among the major countries may be clearly found. Specifically, big-power participation in global governance bears upon mainly two factors: First, after the end of the Cold War, the major countries are all faced with transnational security threats, so active participation in global governance targeted at these problems complies with their interest; second, in joining the global governance process, these countries set bigger store by absolute gains rather than relative gains and they may cooperate with each other.

1. Big countries are universally faced with transnational security threats.

In the world today, new security threats like ecological crisis, terrorism, transnational organized crime, nuclear trafficking, international epidemic diseases and piracy are ever more grave and the countries are universally confronted with various nontraditional security threats, making big countries more inclined to take part in the global governance process as it is in their interest to do so.

Firstly, transnational security problems are mostly global in nature. Among them, global warming, scarcity and pollution of water resources, spread of transnational epidemic diseases and network terrorism are threats confronting the entire international community with no major powers exempted from them. As the interests of big countries are more extensive, complex and global, they are more prone to some particular transnational security threats and vulnerable to damage and heavy losses. The September 11 incident offers an eloquent example. For another example, ecological security is apparently global in nature and countries, big and small, are all under its impact. “Nature will not respect political boundaries”. From the threats to human life and health originating from imbalance and degeneration of the biological circle to the conflicts and instability brought about by the scarcity of resources, environmental problems frequently penetrate the borders of sovereign states and likewise are intimately associated with the big countries. Therefore, the origins and resolution of ecological security transcend boundaries of nation-states and are by far beyond the capacity of big countries.

Secondly, the nature of transnational security problems shows that no major power is able to cope single-handedly with them successfully. The United States is the strongest country in the world, but it can hardly deal with the new security threats it faces. The zigzags and difficulties in the U.S. anti-terrorism wars after the September 11 incident fully prove this point. After the George W. Bush administration suffered setbacks in pursuing unilateralism counting on its power, the Obama administration had to come back to multilateralism, emphasizing international cooperation and respecting the arrangements of the international regime. Moreover, with the rise of nontraditional security problems, security threats begin to change from symmetric to asymmetric ones. It is ever more difficult to trace the source of threats and even major countries cannot succeed in it. Therefore, international cooperation among big countries is the natural option. Take network security threats for example. On the one hand, the cost and binding conditions for producing threats are low since they do not require largescale social mobilization and resource accumulation, but their damage can match destruction of wars. On the other, because of the open nature of the network platform, the high-speed flow of information and mutual crossing of network nodes, no matter whether the network security threats were posed by hackers or viruses, it is hard to probe the original source of threat. As a result, no single country “boasts the ability and authority to tackle network security threats all by itself”.

Thirdly, numerous transnational security problems tend to spread. It is possible that resource scarcity and biological crisis in some regions and particular countries do not affect the entire international community directly and do not exert direct security pressure upon major countries. On many occasions, however, these security threats may speedily spread in the international community and threaten the security of big countries and world stability. In addition to elements of religion and political ideology, the Palestinian-Israeli dispute is linked with the scramble for precious water resources. Moreover, water resources are scarce in the Middle East region and 15 neighboring countries grapple for water resources of the Euphrates. Syria, Iraq and Turkey were all once drawn into conflicts over water resources. The military conflicts and political disturbances in the Middle East sharpen regional tensions, trigger humanitarian disasters and harm international security; on the other, they endanger the international oil supply, and therefore the economic security of the big countries, which are heavily dependent on oil resources of the region, cannot be safeguarded.

2. Big countries attach more importance to absolute gains in the transnational security field.

In is usually held that in an international community under anarchy, cooperation, in particular cooperation between big countries, is comparatively difficult. Some realists stress that states are generally more inclined to unfold cooperation in nonmilitary fields and, despite common interest existing among them, difficulties in collective action and consideration about relative gains will impede cooperation between big countries. But neo-liberalism emphasizes the possibility of unfolding security cooperation among big countries under anarchist circumstances: If international cooperation involves three or more sides, the difficulty concerning relative gains will be eased. If the relative gains acquired by a state in cooperation are not converted into power advantage, the difficulty in cooperation may also be alleviated. In other words, if cooperation among big powers involves more than three sides and the relative gains in the cooperation cannot be easily transformed into advantage over other countries, then cooperation among big powers is possible. On this point, Robert O. Keohane’s views are representative. He believes that states laying emphasis on relative gains will not hinder cooperation among them. When cooperation involves two actors, the issue of relative gains will crop up, yet “on most issues, states have the potential to cooperate. From trade liberalization to climate change, it is not easy to calculate the relative gains in multilateral negotiations and there is little danger of decisive power transfer. Therefore, relative gains only underline the difficulties for cooperation in sharp bilateral competition but overall these gains will not weaken the general prospect for cooperation.”

In a nutshell, there are two major conditions for security cooperation among the big powers. One is that the cooperation involves many sides, and two is that the relative gains in the cooperation can hardly be converted to power advantage. As far as traditional military security area such as territorial security is concerned, security always has a geographical sense, i.e. in most cases, it involves two actors and security mainly refers to ensuring international or regional balance of power. Under these circumstances, gains in the cooperation are easy to be transformed to military advantage to shaken the balanced patterns at various levels. In the transnational security field, however, viewed from these two angles, it is easier for big powers to unfold international cooperation. One, the tendency of transnational security threats to spread makes big powers universally face various non-traditional security problems. And cooperation involves far more than three sides and even the participation of the entire international community is required for their resolution. For instance, global climate change has not only brought about serious difficulties for the survival of some small island nations, in a long-term point of view, it has also constituted sustained security challenges for big countries. Therefore, the resolution of the problem warrants joint efforts of the international community. Two, the non-military nature of transnational security threats has made it difficult to transform the relative gains in the cooperation into power advantage. Various non-traditional security threats are defined as “nonmilitary” security threats. Their source is uncertain, they are often posed by non-state actors and their resolution requires longer time. These characteristics have made it hard for big countries to convert relative gains in security cooperation into military and political power advantage. For example, in essence the international eruption of epidemic diseases is an issue of public health and “human security” and the resolution of the problem will not automatically be changed into state power advantage. Therefore, in the cross-border prevalence of SARS and bird flu, big countries and international organizations swiftly conducted cooperation.

III. Global Governance Cooperation in International Anti-Piracy Action

The global governance process lays the emphasis on the playing of an active role by non-state and super-state actors in resolving transnational problems. This clear view is no doubt valuable. But as far as specific fields of problems are concerned, the respective roles of state, NGOs and international organizations are to be analyzed earnestly. In the past global governance study, the issue of “who is the governing” was not considered, the importance of the process was over-emphasized to the neglect of the initiative of the agent, particularly the fundamental role of the cooperation among big powers in resolving the problems of global governance. In regard to the status and role of states, NGOs and international organizations in global governance, the international campaign of combating Somali pirates offers a good case. We may find from it that states, particularly big powers, play a fundamental role in global governance and NGOs and international organizations likewise make important contributions and are actually vanguard forces in global governance.

Since the end of the Cold War, piracy has been ever more rampant. The Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca near Malaysia are two regions with most frequent pirate attacks. And Somali pirates are the focus of attention of the international community. The constant occurrence of pirate incidents has posed a grim hidden danger for various countries, in particular big countries highly dependent on overseas trade and energy supplies such as the United States, China, Britain, France and Japan. Big powers have made known their position one after another and took actual measures to fight piracy. In the international cooperation to suppress piracy, a multilateral security governance mechanism is being shaped in the international community. In it there are security cooperation between big countries and the playing of important roles by specialized international organizations and international NGOs as well as “anti-piracy collective actions undertaken within the framework of intergovernmental departments and cooperation between maritime insurance companies and shipmasters and non-governmental organizations like International Maritime Bureau.”

First, the big countries cooperated positively in the United Nations Security Council, successively adopted many resolutions to lay an international legal foundation for combating piracy. In accordance with the international laws like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the definition of piracy should be in conformity with three standards: one, piracy occurs on the high seas or in an area beyond the jurisdiction of the coastal sovereign states; two, the attacker and the victim must be non-state actors; three, the aim of the pirates must be non-political and private. Although international law confers on the countries the universal jurisdiction to combat piracy, the international laws on piracy are difficult to implement. There are two scenarios in which piracy cannot be effectively suppressed: one, piracy takes place on the high seas but the criminals then flee to a territorial sea of a sovereign state; two, piracy was committed on a territorial sea and then the pirates flee to the high seas. Somali piracy occurs apparently on the territorial sea of a sovereign state, but due to the long-term political disturbances of the country, the government is unable to tackle it. And because it concerns the sovereignty of a country, the international community could not effectively combat piracy in Somali territorial waters, leaving the problem worsening continually. Therefore, authorization of the Security Council, cooperation between big powers in the Security Council and joint action in the framework of the United Nations are essential for fighting piracy. For this purpose and at the request of the Somali government, since 2008 the Security Council successively passed five special resolutions 1861, 1838, 1846, 1851 and 1950, authorizing foreign military forces to enter the Gulf of Aden with the agreement of the Somali government to fight piracy. Resolution 1851 of the United Nations Security Council explicitly “calls upon states, regional and international organizations that have the capacity to do so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia … by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft.” Consequently, the United States, NATO, European Union, Russia, India and China have dispatched naval ships to the waters off the Somali coast one after another to conduct escort operations and combat piracy. For a time, warships of big countries gathered in the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, in compliance with Resolution 1851 of the Security Council, in January 2009 more than 60 states including big countries and international organizations set up the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia within the framework of the United Nations. The contact group, joined on a voluntary basis by countries, has four working groups which exchange information regularly, discuss tactics and coordinate military, political and other means to resolve the Somali piracy problem. Each year the contact group meets three times at the United Nations and convenes numerous meetings of its subsidiary working groups. For instance, from November 6 to 7, 2009, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense presided over a conference in regard to international coordination and cooperation in escort missions in the Gulf of Aden. Representatives of countries and international organizations such as Russia, Japan, India, EU and NATO attended the conference and “discussed cooperation in escort operations in divided areas of the Gulf of Aden to shape the best way for international cooperation in escort missions in the region.”

In addition to cooperation within the framework of the United Nations, big countries have dispatched their own warships to fight Somali piracy. At the end of 2008, with Britain, France and Germany as the mainstay, the EU launched one-year Operation Atalanta targeted specially at Somali piracy. The campaign was executed by naval forces of France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands and Spain to stop, avert, intervene with and finally put an end to pirate attacks and armed robbery. On the part of EU member states, their naval forces also took action. In 2008, the frigate of the British Royal Navy the Cumberland freed a merchant ship intercepted by pirates off the coast of Somalia and killed two pirates. In January 2009, French anti-submarine frigate the Jean de Vienne captured 19 pirates in a rescue operation. In April 2009, French frigate the Nivose caught 11 pirates during its patrol off the coast of Kenya. On April 10, the French navy used force to rescue a French sailing yacht which had been hijacked, killed two pirates and arrested three. NATO under the leadership of the United States launched numerous suppression operations against piracy at sea. In October and December 2008, four warships of the second group of the NATO standing flotilla were sent to the waters off the Somali coast for combating piracy. In March 2009, seven warships of the first group of the NATO standing flotilla from the United States, Canada, Spain, Netherlands, Germany and Portugal fought pi-racy once more in the waters off the coast of Somalia. In April 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made known the U.S. four-point consideration on suppressing Somali piracy, in-cluding U.S. assistance to the Somali government in enhancing the law enforcement capability of its police, convening as soon as possible an international conference to better coordinate the reaction of various countries, sending envoys to the Somali transitional government and urging its leaders to crack down on the bases of pirates on land, and consulting shipping and insurance companies to arm merchant vessels to beef up their defense capability. The U.S. navy launched its own action separately. In April 2009, for example, a U.S. commando of Seals, in rescuing Captain Richard Phillips hijacked by pirates, killed three pirates and arrested one. China began to dispatch maritime military forces to the Somali waters of the Gulf of Aden at the end of 2008. In the following two years, China has sent eight flotillas on escort missions and escorted a total of more than 3,000 merchant vessels, including 1,400 foreign ones, and chased away numerous pirate vessels which tried to attack. In January 2009, Russia sent its large Admiral Binogradov anti-submarine ship to the Gulf of Aden for escort missions and succeeded in thwarting numerous pirate attacks. In March, Russia dispatched another flotilla of its Pacific Fleet to the Gulf of Aden.

But “the core task of the fleets of various countries is to escort their own merchant vessels and then it is to fight Somali piracy. Such practice of ‘hoeing one’s own potatoes’, entire-journey escorting and repeated patrols make a lot of waste of resources and leave many windows of opportunities for Somali pirates”. Further, due to the differences in the strategic intention between big powers and their scramble for leadership as well as the unclear division of sea areas for escorting and lack of coordination mechanism, the escort missions still leave quite some leeway for pirate attacks. According to the statistics of the International Maritime Bureau, until March 16, 2011, in 2011 the whole world reported 119 pirate attacks, of which 83 attacks occurred in the Somali waters. Overall, cooperation between big powers to suppress piracy made great achievements, but their actions are to be further coordinated.

Second, specialized international organizations played an important role of coordination and management in the security governance network of combating piracy. The big powers are aware of the limits of fighting piracy through force. This is reflected in the text of the UN Security Council Resolution 1950: “stressing the need for a comprehensive response to tackle piracy and its underlying cause by the international community”. Therefore, it is essential to have specialized international organizations play the role of coordination in bigcountry cooperation to combat piracy in order to avoid disorder and confusion in the fight against piracy by various countries. And the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has played such a role. The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations with 162 member states. It is mainly in charge of maritime navigation security and engaged in maritime legislation. In fighting piracy, it plays mainly the role of supervision, releasing information and formulating maritime security laws and relevant standard. It has published numerous reports on piracy problem, urging the international community to combat Somali piracy. The series of the UN Security Council resolutions assimilated the content of the IMO’s research reports. The IMO enacted maritime navigation security laws and reduced piracy threats through enhancing maritime navigation security. In 2002, the IMO formulated the unified and detailed Guidelines on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships and revised it in 2009. On July 1, 2004, the IMO began implementing the amendments to the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, adding content about maritime security, which includes mandatory installation of automatic alarming system on ships, assigning security guards and implementing port security plan. All these measures have greatly stepped up the security of ships and ports while increasing the difficulties of piracy and robbery. In 2009, the IMO held a conference in Djibouti and adopted the norms of conduct for the joint cooperation to combat piracy by the coastal countries of the Western Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. The signatories agreed to unfold allround cooperation in fighting piracy and armed robbery in compliance with international law, share and communicate information among them, intercept suspect ships, rescue the ships and crews that suffer from pirate attacks and robbery.

Third, international NGOs played an independent role in fighting piracy. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) under the International Chamber of Commerce, as an important component of maritime security governance, has played a vanguard role, fulfilling actually the governance functions of a public affairs organization of the international shipping industry. In 1992, the IMB established the Piracy Reporting Center, which works 24 hours a day, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and the ships subjected to pirate attacks may immediately get into touch with the center. After pooling the information, the center sends through satellite daily reports on dynamic piracy developments to all ships at sea free of charge and every week renews information on pirate hijacking and robbery on its Website. On the official Website of the IMB, one may check the real-time map of pirate incidents and obtain quarterly or annual reports on pirate incidents through e-mails. Now the IMB is the authoritative provider and issuer of information on international piracy. Moreover, the IMB defined “piracy”and its definition has gradually gained universal recognition. The traditional identification of piracy is mainly based on the definition of the International Maritime Organization composed of sovereign states — piracy must occur on the high seas or in an area beyond the jurisdiction of sovereign states; pirate attacks must be between two ships; most importantly, a pirate attack must be out of private purpose. Breaking away from such restricted definition, the definition of the IMB holds that it is not necessary to distinguish between piracy on the high seas and that on the territorial seas of sovereign states, and piracy must not necessarily occur between two ships, so attacks launched from rafts or a dock on ships are likewise considered piracy. Moreover, pirate attacks are not confined to those for private purposes and can include those for political purposes. As the definition of the International Maritime Organization is too narrow, more and more states and scholars accept the definition and nomenclature of the IMB for “piracy”. Sure, every coin has two sides. Though the IMB “provides technical support for international anti-piracy action through issuing piracy warnings and setting up information exchange and contact channels”, it does not boast the capacity to suppress piracy. When ships are attacked by pirates, they are required to report to the Piracy Reporting Center through the Global Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS) and the center needs to make contact with warships nearby so that the latter will proceed to the site for escorting. As contact-making takes time, it is frequently the case that the ship is already hijacked or robbed before the arrival of the warship. It may be seen that the security governance of the piracy problem cannot be divorced from multilateral cooperation between big powers. The multilateral anti-piracy joint-action initiative, CTF151, launched by the United States and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia are both faced with the predicament in collective action among the big countries. Hence, piracy-suppression still warrants deeper cooperation between big countries and the coordination and support of pluralistic actors such as inter-national organizations and NGOs.

IV. Conclusion

After the end of the Cold War, the rise of global governance bears the imprint of the times. By and large, “governance” is of important theoretical significance and may break up the narrowness in international relations dominated in the past by power and open up a path for a new international order and agenda. However, substituting “governance” for “governing”cannot resolve the two thorny problems of effectiveness and legitimacy. On the other hand, with the accelerated evolution of globalization, global challenges facing mankind are ever more serious. “The ecological and environmental problems of common concern of the world (global warming, biodiversity crisis and damage in the ecological system, scarcity of water), problems in sustainable development of mankind (eradication of poverty, conflict prevention, control of epidemic diseases in the world) and global rules for competition (nuclear non-proliferation, disposal of toxic waste, protection of intellectual property rights, rules of heredity study, trade, financial and taxation rules)” have all become urgent major themes. The preliminary sorting of and probing into global governance in this paper indicate that cooperation between big countries still remains fundamental in seeking the resolution of the series of global challenges. Meanwhile, in view of the features of global problems and their resolution, cooperation between big countries is far from enough and that active participation of non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations and citizens of the world—different actors who have the willingness and capability to play their roles jointly—is warranted. Only in this way, can global governance make solid achievements.

Cheng Zhirui is Senior Editor of Foreign Affairs Review sponsored by China Foreign Affairs University; Wu Wencheng is Editor of Foreign Affairs Review.