The Restructuring of the International System and Its Implications for U.S. Power

Yang Jiemian

The Restructuring of the International System and Its Implications for U.S. Power

Yang Jiemian

I. The Change of U.S. Economic Strength and Its Effect on the International Economic Structure

The United States was the primary cause of the global financial crisis that began in 2008. In the face of declining U.S. economic strength, the Obama administration has over the past three years been forced to give emerging powers, such as China, more say in international discourse and decision-making. But after enduring the most difficult period of the crisis, the United States is now again stressing its rebounding economic capacity and its world leadership.

1. The unipolar position of the U.S. economy established since the 1990s depends on three capabilities.

First, the U.S.’s economic capabilities rest on the global credit expansion and virtual-economy creativity. In the 15 years between 1992 and 2006, the net purchases of U.S. stocks and other financial assets by overseas investors increased from $70 billion to $ 1.14 trillion; in 2007, the size of U.S. virtual economy was a whopping 30 times larger than its real economy. A bubble of financial assets strongly supported the sustained prosperity of the U.S. economy before the recent crisis.

Second, the U.S.’s strength is dependent on its leadership in global scientific innovation and the creativity market. Roughly 30% of American Nobel Science Prize winners were not born in the United States. Researchers working in American labs are mostly doctorate students in physics, mathematics, chemistry and engineering, of whom about two-thirds are foreigners. In the field of life sciences (biology, medicine and agriculture), foreign researchers occupy one-fourth of the total. In 2007, the GDP of the United States, the world’s largest single market, reached around $14 trillion, with consumption amounting to $9 trillion, taking up about 70% of the total.

Third, the U.S. power rests on its ability to allocate global resources. Of the top hundred multinational corporations, usually around one third are U.S.-owned. U.S. companies override their European and Japanese counterparts to a great extent in terms of their numbers of the overseas branches, turnover, and increase in added value. In 2007, U.S. multinationals, which account for only one percent of total U.S. companies, created 30% of the U.S. GDP, 25% of aggregate profit in the private sector, 37% of U.S. imports, 41% of U.S. exports, and 50% of labor productivity.

The above three capabilities have ensured the fundamental stability of the U.S. dollar in the international monetary system, and thus it has yet to be replaced by other international currencies such as the Euro. Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the quantitative easing policies adopted by the U.S. government have also benefited from the U.S. dollar’s position as the world’s core currency, thereby successfully exporting the cost of the crisis. From a fundamental point of view, these three capabilities provide not only the basis for the United States to maintain its world economic hegemony. They are also the source of the core competitiveness of the U.S. economy.

2. The U.S. power is being undermined by the financial crisis, impacting the U.S. position in the global economic configuration.

First of all, with the apparent decline in U.S.’s control over the world economy, the power discourse in terms of global economic governance has become more pluralized. This trend is reflected in the fact that the G20 has become the primary platform for coordinating global economic affairs, and the time when the G7, with the United States as its core, steered the world economy has come to an end. Pushed by the G20, the emerging market economies have substantially improved their share and say in the IMF and the World Bank.

After the adjustment, the total share of developed countries in the IMF fell from 65.4% to 57.7%, while the share of emerging market and developing countries grew from 34.6% to 42.3%. China, India, Brazil, and Russia increased their shares to 6.394%, 2.751%, 2.706%, and 2.316% respectively, making them among the top ten shareholders of the IMF, with China as the third largest total shareholder. The other six top ten shareholders are the United States (17.407%), Japan (6.464%), Germany (5.586%), France (4.227%), United Kingdom (4.227%), and Italy (3.161%).

In the World Bank, the voting rights of developing and transitional countries have increased by 3.13 percentage points to reach 47.19%. China has become the third largest shareholder and its voting rights have increased from 2.78% to 4.42%. Brazil and India respectively increased from 2.07% and 2.78% to 2.24% and 2.91%; the voting rights of Russia and South Africa have respectively decreased slightly from 2.78% and 0.85% to 2.77% and 0.76%; the voting rights of the United States and Japan fell from 16.36% and 7.85% to 15.85% and 6.84% respectively; Britain and France saw their rights dropping from 4.30% to 3.75%, while Germany saw a drop from 4.48% to 4.00%.

Secondly, impeded by its high unemployment rate and the government’s fiscal deficit, the U.S. economy has recovered only sluggishly. The prospects for economic growth are dim, undermining the United States’ position as the world economic engine. The World Economic Outlook report published by the IMF in September 2011 showed that U.S. economic activity, weakening as it is, will encounter more blows that will derive from the policy impasses in fiscal adjustment, a weak housing market, the rapidly growing household savings rate, as well as the worsening financial situation. The political differences in the U.S. are so huge that the country’s policies have become highly uncertain. A major risk is that, without a necessary long-term reform to lower the debts to a sustainable level, the hasty fiscal reduction measures will further worsen the country’s economic prospects. U.S. economic reform is confronting huge domestic pressures. The United States has internationally competitive multinationals, but its employable population is less competitive. The duality of the country’s domestic economy has increased its difficulties in economic reform. Even though Barack Obama highlighted economic equality and fairness in his State of the Union address on January 24, 2012, there are few tools available to achieve his stated goal. In terms of the prospects for a U.S. economic recovery, there are great uncertainties in stimulating exports, increasing employment, encouraging innovation, and promoting medical and educational reforms. In brief, the U.S. economy is suffering the many effects of the financial crisis: it is seeing a reduction in domestic manufacturing and increased structural unemployment caused by globalized production and technological upgrades. Meanwhile, situations in other external markets, including Europe, are worsening, with those countries scrambling for low-rate growth. In the middle and short-term, the U.S. economy will hardly solve the structural dilemma that its economy is innovative but unable manufacture the way it used to; enterprises are able to rake in profits, but unable to increase employment. In the future, the U.S. as the world economic engine will face increasing risks of lacking motivation.

Finally, the economic system and market philosophy that the United States has been proud for so long is facing unprecedented challenges. A growing number of people have insightfully pointed out that the country’s capitalist system has become so imbalanced that a structural crisis is breaking out. This will give rise to economic, political, social, and cultural disorder and turbulence. Throughout the current financial crisis, the Washington Consensus has lost its predominance, highlighting the inherent instability of the capitalist system. American-style capitalism has fallen down from its divine altar; the capital accumulation mode, namely seeking the maximization of profit, has gradually gone into deadlock. The five ways out –neo-liberalism, globalization, raising debts, fiscal deficit, and military expansion – have intensified the conflicts rather than solved them. Capitalism thus touched the ceiling to some extent. The American political mode and ideological hegemony has come to an end; the rise of emerging countries like China means not only the rise of new economic and political forces, but also an international competition in concepts and models. An undeniable fact is that Western countries are faced with evergrowing pressures to transform their systems and institutions.

II. The Adjustment of U.S. Global Strategy and Its Impact on the International Security Structure

In 2011, the United States continued to adjust its global strategy. With respect to its strategic objectives, the country attached more importance on comprehensive and integrated security. As for the strategic deployment, it reinforced its trans-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific military alliances, and when handling its strategic difficulties, it attempted to get rid of the predicament through a phased withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. These acts show that the U.S. is trying to reverse its passive position in the international security structure and reassert itself.

1. The U.S. strategic adjustment

Against a backdrop of the continued decline of its comprehensive national strength, the United States has made a series of adjustments in foreign strategies. First, it has contracted the number of soldiers on frontlines. The United States accomplished a withdrawal of forces from Iraq and formulated a timetable for withdrawing forces from Afghanistan. Meanwhile, it has assumed the gesture of “l(fā)eading behind the scenes and allies behave at the forestage,” which was well demonstrated throughout the Libya incident. It is foreseeable that in a period of time, the United States will try to avoid investing substantial military forces in non-essential regions. The second shift is one of emphasis. On the one hand, the United States is shifting its strategic focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific; but on the other hand, the subject of its strategic focus is shifting from terrorism or troubles brought by the “failed states” to the potential challenges that emerging countries, especially China, pose to its predominance. The third is a shift of its roles. The U.S.’s declining national strength forces the country to use its forces in a more “smart” way. The solution is to push its allies to the forestage and give full play to the allies’ role of the forefront of defense and intervention. As a result, the United States will probably decompose its global strategy into several regional strategies. The Untied States will seek to maintain its global leadership position by agglomerating advantages in various regions through the strengthening of its alliance system.

2. The impact of U.S. strategic adjustment on the international security environment

From an international perspective, the global institutional building or institutional reform will probably show signs of fatigue as a result of more discussions and less actions. The United States is clearly less motivated to provide public good for the world; hit by the sovereign debt crisis, European countries have collectively deepened their sense of crisis. As a result, their identity consciousness and willingness to act have been strengthened to some extent; the pursuit of emerging economies like India and Brazil for the international power status reflects a trend of multi-polarization. But meanwhile those countries have also enhanced their competition with China for the rule setting and influence in restructuring the international system.

From a regional perspective, the turbulence in the Middle East and North Africa will last for a period of time. The division of the Arab world is becoming increasingly visible, and the significance of the Middle East in U.S. foreign strategy is likely to decline. The U.S. input in the Middle East may further concentrate on several pivot regions such as the Gulf. In contrast, the United States’ focus on Asia Pacific has been elevated from strategic planning to institutional construction. In addition to further consolidate relations with its allies, the United States is also actively involved in economic integration in the Asia Pacific region. The United States has realized from its experience with European integration that security ties alone are not sufficient to ensure the U.S.’s leadership in regional affairs. Therefore, the United States will be careful enough not to be excluded from the economic integration process in the Asia Pacific region. To the United States, the approach of handling its trans-pacific ties should be different from that of trans-Atlantic ties, with an aim of ensuring that the United States will also tightly grip the region in the future. President Obama has also showed more attention to APEC than his predecessors. In mid-November 2011, President Obama attended the APEC summit meeting in Hawaii and the East Asia Summit in Bali, repeatedly stressing that “the United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay.”

From the international relations perspective, the United States needs to rally its allies, but it is restrained by material factors. In such a situation, common values will probably get more favor from the United States. The atmosphere of the general election in 2012 has also added appeal for promoting ideological factors.

III. The Obama Administration’s Mistaken Asia-Pacific Strategy

While undergoing a global strategic contraction, the United States is stepping up its initiative efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. As a Chinese scholar put it, Obama’s strategic maneuvering towards the Asia Pacific was “the first year in planning, the second year in kicking off, and the third year in establishing the framework.” Even though I do not totally agree with such a narration, the Obama administration has really accomplished its goal of shifting U.S. strategic focus to the Asia Pacific.

The United States highlights and reinforces the legitimacy of its “return to Asia” from both political and diplomatic perspectives. In a speech to the Australian parliament in Canberra, Mr. Obama explained the reason that America’s focus was shifting firmly towards Asia Pacific. He said: “Let there be no doubt. In the Asia-Pacific of the 21st century, the United States of America is all-in.” In fact, the United States has never deviated from Asia. Moreover, labeling itself as a Pacific country rather than an Asia-Pacific country, the United States intends to seek legitimacy for maintaining its interests in the Asia Pacific. At the same time, the United States has also stepped up its diplomatic activities towards Asia Pacific countries. President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta have paid intensive visits to the Asia Pacific region to consolidate relations with allies, encourage the democratization process in Myanmar, seek cooperation with Vietnam, and defame China at times. In this context, the United States takes the East Asia Summit as its main channel to transform the Asia-Pacific region, promote the TPP as the platform to integrate the regional politics and economic cooperation, and strive for the support of Southeast Asian countries with an excuse of “balancing China”.

In the security and military fields, the Obama administration has made the strategic decision to shift its focus to the Asia Pacific. The U.S. Defense Department’s National Security Strategy report, which has been repeatedly revised by Obama, stated frankly, “while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to global security, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” To legitimatize its acts, the United States has exaggerated the “China threat,” deliberately talks about the pseudo proposition of creating security in the South China Sea and arrogantly putting forward the conception of “balancing China.” As for its specific deployment and actions, the Obama administration has strengthened the military alliance and strategic partnership security system, increased its influence in regional security institutions like the ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus Meeting, the East Asia Summit, and the Shangri-La Dialogue, dominated the Asia-Pacific security ideologies, moved military forces into the Asia Pacific region, and strengthened its military deployment.

In the economic and trade fields, the Obama administration’s strategy of invigorating the U.S. economy by strengthening cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries has also taken shape. The U.S. economic strategy towards the Asia-Pacific region is seen as “killing two birds with one stone”: it will not only share the economic growth dividend by participating in Asian markets, but it will also dilute and weaken China’s influence in the region by expanding the U.S. economic presence. Just as President Barack Obama said in his State of the Union Address on January 27, 2010, “we have to seek new markets aggressively, just as our competitors are. If America sits on the sidelines while other nations sign trade deals, we will lose the chance to create jobs on our shores. But realizing those benefits also means enforcing those agreements so our trading partners play by the rules. And that’s why we’ll continue to shape a Doha trade agreement that opens global markets, and why we will strengthen our trade relations in Asia.” The Asia Pacific region is not only the world’s fastest growing region; it is also the most competitive place attracting the foreign investments. Moreover, the intraregional economic complementarity and division of labor is increasingly being strengthened. Even against the backdrop of the global financial crisis, the potential and motivation the region’s economic development remains robust. The United States’ strong advancing of the TPP in the Asia Pacific region is aimed at giving full play to its diplomatic strategy advantages and comparative economic edges in the Asia Pacific, actively promoting multilateral and bilateral cooperation with countries in the Asia Pacific in line with its domestic industrial structural adjustment, and trying to shape the regional economic division of the labor system with the United States at the core.

But the Obama administration has not learned from past experiences. First of all, it has made wrong judgments on the general international situation, as well as on the historical development trend. It failed to see or was unwilling to see the relative decline of the United States, and it insists on U.S. leadership over the world. It cannot grasp the trend of times that features peace, development and cooperation. Furthermore, it has shifted from Sino-U.S. governance to Sino-U.S. confrontation in a mere couple of years, a change that has revealed the factual groundlessness and moral deficit in the U.S.’s strategy toward China.

Second, the Obama administration has learned from the Bush administration’s mistake in its “New Empire” expansionist mentality. In early 2009, the Obama administration took office with the slogan of change that people could believe in. In changing its predecessor’s polices, the Obama administration criticized the Bush administration as having trapped U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, all while China began to dominate the Asia Pacific. As a result, Obama claimed, the U.S. had to regain leadership and dominance in the world focus area. In fact, the Bush administration was wrong in adhering to an expansionist and hegemonic (neo-conservative) theory, not just in the locations into which it chose to expand. The Obama administration is making the same mistake as the Bush administration, that is, they have decided not to contract, but to expand as their empire declines.

Third, the Obama administration failed to draw lessons from previous U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategies. After Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States started to include the Asia Pacific region as part of its strategic focus. Throughout the past 70 years, the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy can be described as having achieved mixed successes. There are success cases such as aligning with the Asia-Pacific countries and jointly defeating the Japanese invasion; supporting economic development in some countries/ regions and gaining win-win results. In particular, the Sino-U.S. reconciliation has fundamentally changed the strategic confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region, promoting regional and international peace and stability. Some of the failure cases are as follows: the United States interpreted the post-WWII situation in the Asia Pacific region as an East-West confrontation and listed China as the major country in its strategy of preventing a Cold War Domino Effect. For that reason, the United States successively fell into the Korean War and the Vietnam War, encountering major setbacks repeatedly. As a result, the United States began to decline from its climax after World War II. Despite these painful scars, the Obama administration in essence cannot escape from a Cold War mentality: it still clings to a unipolar hegemony and supremacy of military forces, sticking to the faith that the United States can regain its strategic edge in the Asia Pacific by virtue of its military strength.

And finally, the Obama administration has made wrong judgments on the major task before the Asia-Pacific countries. In the long run, the developing countries, after winning political independence, will roughly experience several phases that include political independence, economic growth, social progress, cultural development, and political innovation, and so on. These are priority issues and overlapping. In the Asia Pacific region, most countries that have won political independence after the World War II have continued to strive for economic growth and social development. They have made great contributions to global peace, development and cooperation, and have thus become important pillars in achieving the relative balance of the international power. At present and in the following decades, the central task of the Asia-Pacific region will be to pursue self-development, open development, peaceful development, cooperative development and common development, all of which require consolidating and developing various economic and security mechanisms. However, the United States purposefully opposes the mainstream trend. Senior officials in the Obama administration lavishly exaggerate the “China threat theory,” trying to sow dissension between China and other Asia-Pacific countries, continuously producing maritime rights controversies, and making every effort to promote the TPP negotiations in an attempt to dilute and replace the “10+X”regional cooperative models, etc. At the moment, the Obama administration may be well contented with its Asia-Pacific strategic deployment and implementation, but in the end the results may come against its will, and it will eat the bitter fruit of its own making.

IV. The Change of U.S. Systemic Strength and Its Impact on the International Political Structure

In 2011, when the United States and the rest of the world are desperately in need of systemic innovation, the United States fell into the systemic predicament – its governing capability, global leadership, confidence and credibility all seemed fragile. Unless it engages in complete and thorough systemic innovation, the U.S. is unlikely to walk out of the current systemic predicament.

1. The international financial crisis has exposed the severe deficiency in the U.S.’s economic governance system.

The biggest challenge for the current U.S. economic governance system lies in the fact that it cannot address prevalent problems facing the West and the world economy, such as weak growth, employment difficulties, severe debts, and unfair wealth distribution. Secondly, complacent in its own economic governance concepts, the United States has grasped tightly onto the liberal market economy and was reluctant to keep abreast of the times, resulting in theory falling behind practice. Furthermore, the U.S.’s financial governance and virtual economy, which have become the direct fuses of the current financial crisis, are in very difficult positions to undergo transformation. Finally, the contradiction in Western economic governance system – that it serves the interests of a small portion of wealthy people – was completely unveiled amidst and in the aftermath of the financial crisis. “The greedy 1% of people rule the disenfranchised 99%” is the reality in the United States today.

2. The distortion of the U.S. democratic political system

Although the U.S. democratic political system has its own rationality and effectiveness, it is facing several severe challenges now. First, the U.S. political system, based on balanced rights and interests, is facing the most subversive challenge since its founding. The traditional balance of power and the local political structure cannot adapt to the changes brought by globalization. Therefore there is a desperate need to engage in profound political reforms in various aspects, including philosophy, system, and practice. But the United States has neither the willingness nor the ability to reform at the moment. Second, as a result of the “election-driven” politics, the U.S.’s leading groups have become inward-looking, focusing on short-term interests. As the time for presidential campaign comes, President Obama undoubtedly puts ballots as his first priority, and dares not touch deep-seated contradictions. Third, the contradiction between a responsible government and an irresponsible party struggle is very prominent. U.S. party politics has become the battlefield for bipartisan wrestling. As a potent example, the repeated impasses over the debt ceiling brought devastating consequences at home and abroad.

3. The decline of U.S. self-confidence and credibility

The U.S. development model has displayed serious defects in the global financial crisis, and the U.S. self-confidence and credibility have suffered severe blows. Due to the fall of its comprehensive national strength, the continuous decline of U.S. self-confidence can be reflected as follows: an increasing sense of loss, remaining extremely sensitive to external competitive pressures, trying to shift the blame or exporting troubles to other countries rather than seeking solutions at home. The fall of U.S. international credibility is more notable. In the wake of the financial crisis, the United States decided to adopt the quantitative easing policies regardless of its international credits and responsibilities, prompting the rise of protectionist sentiments inside the United States. In light of this, the United States’ capability of providing the international society with public goods is decreasing significantly, alongside the fall of its credibility in the international society.

4. The deficiency of international systemic innovation

The United States had dominated the international systembuilding by the end of the World War II. But the bases of these systems have altogether disappeared or undergone significant changes today. Due to several reasons, however, the United States finds it very difficult to dominate a new round of international systemic innovation. First of all, the United States lacks the motivation to reform the current international system. The United States is the formulator and beneficiary of the incumbent international system, but it is the not the dominator of the current trend of the peace, development and cooperation. Therefore, it is reluctant to engage in systemic reforms aimed to build a just and reasonable new international order. Secondly, the United States lacks the appeal to innovate the international system. The United States not only lacks the strategic vision imperative for systemic innovation; it also lacks the credibility necessary for institutional innovation. Therefore, it is difficult for the United States to build consensus and reach agreements regarding the main direction of the reform of the international system. Finally, the United States lacks the capability of innovating the international system. Confined by a relative decline in its national strength, the United States lacks not only the economic strength to promote the systemic innovation, but also the support from inside and outside the country. It therefore feels powerless in proactive maneuvering and arranging the international system innovation.

V. Fully Comprehend the Change of U.S. Power and the Interactive Relations within the International System

As discussed earlier, the United States is confronted with a variety of realistic and long-term difficulties, but it has a considerable advantage in its comprehensive national strength as well as the areas of politics, military, culture, management and technology. As a result, we must make a comprehensive and objective assessment of the U.S. influence over the international system.

1. Objectively understanding the interactive relations between the change of U.S. power and the international system

On the one hand, the United States is in a period of relative rather than absolute decline. The balancing of international forces is a prolonged historical process. The United States will experience a phase of resurgence and rejuvenation. For example, the United States has a certain edge in the readjustment of the international position of U.S. dollar and setting the discourse in the international system. Regarding political and security crises, the United States has been involved in the Korea War, the Vietnam War, the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War, but it has eventually lived through the adverse impacts of these wars and preserved or even advanced the military alliance system with the United States at the core. Even in this global financial crisis, the United States took the lead to convene the G20 summit meeting. All of this shows that the United States has a fairly strong ability to lead the international system. In terms of its role within the international system, it is very difficult for the United States to make contributions, and its destructive role can never be underestimated.

On the other hand, in terms of systemic building, non-Western forces are still in their initial phase of gaining strength. There is a long way to go before they accomplish the goal of equally participating in global agenda-setting and sharing the discourse right. In the modern era, the growth of non-Western forces has been experienced through awakenings in Asia, Africa and Latin America, beginning with the successes of their national liberation movements. We should see that the enhancement of non-Western forces lies in the economic field, especially in the lowend economic sectors. With their awareness and cohesion still in their initial stages, non-Western countries lack unified ideas and ideals, as well as necessary organizational mechanisms. Therefore, from the 1970s until the mid-21st century, the vast number of developing countries will basically be in periods of struggle over the principles and terms of the new political and economic order. Even during the international financial crisis in 2008, the emerging powers had made progress merely in upgrading the G20, increasing their voting rights in the World Bank and the IMF. They still lag far behind the United States and other traditional Western powers in overall rule-making and agenda design powers.

2. Divergences and similarities between Chinese and American visions for the international system

China and the United States share some common or similar concepts in restructuring the international system. For example,“the two countries pledged to work together to strengthen the global financial system and reform the international financial architecture.” Chinese President Hu Jintao proposed during his visit to the United States in January 2011 that China and the United States pursue global cooperation as partners to fulfill common responsibilities and meet common challenges. President Obama fully agreed with President Hu’s proposal. In 2011, both countries continued cooperation in the reform of the World Bank and the IMF. However, large differences exist between the two countries in terms of the guiding principles and organizing mechanisms of the international system. The underlying reason is that the United States is clinging to its dominance and leadership in the international system, pursuing selfish interests against the will of the international community.

Furthermore, due to the domestic economic difficulties and political restraints, when handling international affairs, the United States tends to adopt soft confrontation to confine China’s space and position in the international system. For example, the United States uses ideological issues such as human rights and political freedom to create trouble for China; its fabricates the China threat theory, distorting China’s national image; it takes advantage of China’s neighboring countries, especially the claimant countries of the South China Sea, to serve its ambitions of curbing China’s peaceful rise.

In 2012, there will be a general election in the United States. The economic and social problems inside the United States will be more acute and complex, increasing the possibility of the United States exporting its domestic crisis.

Alongside preparations for the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China will also transition from a strategic formulation period to the strategic implementation period. China and the U.S.’s deep collision and integration in restructuring the international system will take place with even more extensive scope. The divergent points of the two countries will be further exposed, and the influence of domestic factors on diplomacy will be further highlighted. Therefore, if China wants to restructure the international system to maintain peace and cooperation, it must strengthen its theoretical and strategic awareness, adopt proper policies and measures, promote cooperation in the international community, and peacefully handle Sino-U.S. relations.

Yang Jiemian is President of Shanghai Institutes of International Studies.