對(duì)中西方在涉藏問題上認(rèn)知偏差的幾點(diǎn)認(rèn)識(shí)

■ 吳楚

對(duì)中西方在涉藏問題上認(rèn)知偏差的幾點(diǎn)認(rèn)識(shí)

■ 吳楚

一、中西方在涉藏問題上認(rèn)知偏差的表現(xiàn)

重點(diǎn)是三個(gè)方面：

第一，關(guān)于主權(quán)問題。西藏是中國一部分，涉及中國的核心利益。同時(shí)也早已為國際社會(huì)所承認(rèn)，過去態(tài)度比較模糊的有兩個(gè)，一是印度，一是英國，特別是英國，一直宣稱中國對(duì)西藏只擁有宗主權(quán)，直到2008年10月，英國外交大臣米利班德發(fā)表聲明，明確承認(rèn)西藏是中華人民共和國一部分，英國過去的政策是“時(shí)代錯(cuò)誤”。然而，西方學(xué)術(shù)、民間、媒體的態(tài)度卻又是另一番景象，大多是在附和達(dá)賴集團(tuán)的主張，宣揚(yáng)“西藏是一個(gè)獨(dú)立國家，1950年后被中共政權(quán)占領(lǐng)” 。

第二，關(guān)于人權(quán)問題。西方國家政府近年來的一個(gè)基本表態(tài)是，“明確承認(rèn)西藏是中國的一部分，同時(shí)也關(guān)注西藏的人權(quán)狀況。”中國人的認(rèn)識(shí)是，1959年西藏民主改革之前，長期實(shí)行政教合一的封建農(nóng)奴制度，占人口95%的藏民由于是農(nóng)奴，連基本的生產(chǎn)資料和人身自由都沒有。通過民主改革，百萬農(nóng)奴真正成為自己命運(yùn)的主宰，成為國家的主人。然而，西方政界和公眾長期在西藏人權(quán)問題上與中國糾纏，并有兩個(gè)突出的觀念，一是西藏在過去由達(dá)賴?yán)锝y(tǒng)治時(shí)期，是一個(gè)宗教信仰虔誠、社會(huì)和諧安寧的香格里拉；另一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)是中共政權(quán)控制西藏后人權(quán)狀況惡化，特別是本民族語言、文化、宗教信仰受到壓制，至今如此。

第三，關(guān)于達(dá)賴?yán)飭栴}。1995年以后中國政府明確指出，達(dá)賴是圖謀“西藏獨(dú)立”的分裂主義政治集團(tuán)的總頭子，國際反華勢力的忠實(shí)工具，在西藏制造社會(huì)動(dòng)亂的總根源，阻撓建立藏傳佛教正常秩序的最大障礙，并認(rèn)為達(dá)賴早已無權(quán)代表西藏和西藏人民。然而西方人則普遍認(rèn)為，達(dá)賴?yán)锸谴缺?、非暴力、有智慧的，也是世界性的宗教領(lǐng)袖，中國政府只有和這位全體藏族人信仰的、藏人利益的代表進(jìn)行談判，才能從根本上解決“西藏問題”。

二、強(qiáng)烈認(rèn)知差異的思想文化背景

中西方在涉藏問題上為什么存在如此強(qiáng)烈對(duì)立的認(rèn)知差異。最重要、最核心的原因是以美國為首的西方把涉藏問題作為對(duì)中國進(jìn)行丑化、牽制的一張牌。其次，是由于達(dá)賴集團(tuán)幾十年來對(duì)境外藏胞的仇恨教育和對(duì)世界的欺騙宣傳。以上兩條是比較明確和公認(rèn)的。此文則著重探討一下對(duì)這種認(rèn)知差異背后的思想文化背景的思考。筆者認(rèn)為，西方思想文化中幾個(gè)重要方面對(duì)其在涉藏問題上的認(rèn)知影響較大：

第一，西方民族國家理論。西方特別是歐洲國家歷史上各城邦、封建領(lǐng)地之間的分權(quán)、自治是一種常態(tài)。資產(chǎn)階級(jí)革命后，成立單一民族國家是常態(tài)，對(duì)于多民族國家則多采取自治和民族自決的辦法，認(rèn)為一個(gè)國家拆分成幾個(gè)國家是正?，F(xiàn)象，西藏意愿與中國在一起或是選擇分離，是其民族的權(quán)利，也是正?，F(xiàn)象。而中國人看來，中國的歷史是由多民族共同創(chuàng)造的，是多元一體格局，并且形成了強(qiáng)烈的大一統(tǒng)理念，近代又遭受列強(qiáng)入侵，對(duì)于國家統(tǒng)一、民族團(tuán)結(jié)看得比任何事情都重，絕不會(huì)容忍西藏的分離。

第二，宗主權(quán)理論。在西方學(xué)術(shù)和公眾眼中，中國歷史上是一個(gè)帝國體系，特別是元、清兩代更是典型的帝國，與奧斯曼帝國、沙皇俄國等類似，是建立在軍事統(tǒng)治和民族壓迫基礎(chǔ)上的，因而他們更愿意把中國想象成是滿洲、蒙古、西藏、東土耳其斯坦和漢人中原的拼湊體，中國歷史上對(duì)西藏最多只擁有宗主權(quán)，到了近代，這種帝國的瓦解是社會(huì)發(fā)展的必然，而二戰(zhàn)后中國對(duì)西藏?fù)碛兄鳈?quán)的主張得到國際社會(huì)公認(rèn)，也是由于雅爾塔體系對(duì)戰(zhàn)后國際政治格局的利益安排以及后來中共強(qiáng)權(quán)入侵的結(jié)果。在這種認(rèn)識(shí)下，達(dá)賴?yán)锾岢鐾ㄟ^與中國政府談判以實(shí)現(xiàn)西藏“高度自治”，在西方一些人眼里不僅符合對(duì)這種宗主權(quán)的歷史回憶，而且簡直就是慈悲的達(dá)賴?yán)餅榱藴p輕西藏人民所受痛苦所采取的巨大讓步和智慧之舉。

第三，“東方主義”傳統(tǒng)。所謂“東方主義”，簡單地說就是西方人一方面將其他文明看作是觀察、研究的對(duì)象，另一方面卻又按照自身的邏輯重構(gòu)其他文明的形象。東方主義在涉藏問題上最突出的表現(xiàn)就是把過去的西藏想象為一個(gè)和平、自由、沒有階級(jí)、不分貴賤、非物質(zhì)的人間凈土。根據(jù)國內(nèi)有關(guān)專家的研究，達(dá)賴?yán)镆苍趪夂苜u力地、巧妙地“自我東方化”，不但將西方人對(duì)西藏的精心設(shè)計(jì)照單全收，而且還自我設(shè)計(jì)、乃至竄改西藏的傳統(tǒng)，以迎合西方人對(duì)西藏的想象和熱望。不管西方人對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)的西藏有多少的了解，西藏都是他們心中的最愛，“西藏問題”牽涉了當(dāng)今世界上幾乎所有最重要的“話語”，如人權(quán)、博愛、和平、環(huán)保、非暴力、文化傳統(tǒng)的延續(xù)、男女平等、宗教自由、民族、文化自決等等。對(duì)于西方人來說，“西藏問題”是一個(gè)立場問題，事關(guān)政治正確與不正確，對(duì)于西藏的立場和態(tài)度表明你是否是一個(gè)先進(jìn)和開明的現(xiàn)代人。在這種情況下，不管是我們大張旗鼓地宣傳西藏現(xiàn)代化建設(shè)取得的巨大成就，還是言辭激烈地批判達(dá)賴及其追隨者分裂中國的狼子野心，都因?yàn)楹臀鞣街髁鞯摹拔鞑卦捳Z”背道而馳而多半是對(duì)牛彈琴，得不到西方受眾的理解和支持。

三、兩點(diǎn)啟示

1．對(duì)涉藏問題的長期性、復(fù)雜性要有充分的估計(jì)。由于有這種思想文化背景的差異，使得西方政客對(duì)西藏的政治算計(jì)有了文化、道義和輿論上的基礎(chǔ)，使得西方公眾、媒體、政界對(duì)于涉藏問題的偏見根深蒂固，這種偏見不會(huì)輕易隨著中國實(shí)力的上升和與西方關(guān)系改善而迅速消失。當(dāng)前西方對(duì)中國快速發(fā)展的防范遏制心理在上升，他們不僅害怕中國經(jīng)濟(jì)、軍事實(shí)力的強(qiáng)大，更害怕中國模式的成功，而中國模式也包括中國人的天下觀，解決民族、宗教問題的智慧和辦法，從這個(gè)意義上講，西方一些人是不愿意讓中國治理西藏的模式在世界上獲得好名聲的。有關(guān)專家早就指出，以西方的民族主義理論看待中國對(duì)西藏的主權(quán)具有潛在的不確定性，主權(quán)的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵要素是國際政治承認(rèn)，但在當(dāng)代國際社會(huì)環(huán)境格局下，主權(quán)承認(rèn)的政治從來不是穩(wěn)定不變的政治，西方國家起先也按照國際法承認(rèn)南斯拉夫的主權(quán)，但隨著形勢的變化，他們很快打破國際法規(guī)則，理直氣壯地對(duì)南斯拉夫進(jìn)行肢解。從這個(gè)意義上講，我們對(duì)所謂國際上承認(rèn)西藏是中國一部分、不與“西藏流亡政府”發(fā)生官方聯(lián)系的表態(tài)也不必太在意、太當(dāng)真。承認(rèn)不承認(rèn)又能怎樣，西藏照樣是中國一部分，照樣在不斷發(fā)展。就是承認(rèn)了，也沒見西方減少對(duì)達(dá)賴集團(tuán)的支持，更不能排除一旦形勢變化西方轉(zhuǎn)眼放棄在涉藏問題上的所謂承諾，對(duì)此絕不能有任何幻想。

2．應(yīng)全方位加強(qiáng)學(xué)術(shù)和思想文化的交流。當(dāng)前國際學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)于“東方主義”等在研究中國和涉藏問題上的局限性、虛偽性已經(jīng)有了一定的反思和批判，我們也應(yīng)以更開放、更自信的姿態(tài)加大國際交流，以擴(kuò)大這種聲音，進(jìn)而影響國際輿論和西方公眾、媒體。特別是要加強(qiáng)國際藏學(xué)的交流，在藏學(xué)界起到平衡和引導(dǎo)作用，扭轉(zhuǎn)國際社會(huì)對(duì)西藏歷史、文化和現(xiàn)實(shí)進(jìn)行香格里拉和殖民心態(tài)的誤讀。同時(shí)在涉藏學(xué)術(shù)交流中引入更多的學(xué)科和領(lǐng)域，比如國際法、文化比較研究，引入西方的漢學(xué)家等等，增進(jìn)國際社會(huì)對(duì)中國歷史上多元一體格局、大一統(tǒng)理念、民族區(qū)域自治制度的理解和認(rèn)同，通過對(duì)中國整體認(rèn)知的改進(jìn)來縮小在涉藏問題上的認(rèn)知偏差。

I. The manifestation of cognitive bias in the way Chinese and W esterners view the Tibe t issue

Cognitive bias is manifested mainly in three areas :

1. The sovereignty issue. Tibet is a part of China and involves China’s core interests. The international community long ago acknowledged this. In the past only India and Great Britain were vague on this matter. Great Britain in particular for a long time maintained that China merely exercised suzerainty over Tibet. It was only in October 2008 that British Foreign Secretary David Miliband issued a statement clearly acknowledging that Tibet is a part of the People’s Republic of China and that Great Britain’s past policy was a “mistake of the times.”However, the academic, popular and media attitude is quite different. For the most part, it accords with the Dalai Lama’s position that “Tibet is an independent country that was occupied by the Chinese Communist regime after 1950.”

2. The human rights issue. In recent years the basic position of Western governments has been to “openly admit that Tibet is a part of China while at the same time showing concern for the human rights situation in Tibet.” The Chinese people’s understanding of the situation is that for a long time before the democratic reforms in Tibet in 1959, Tibet practiced a feudal serf system in which politics and religion were intertwined.At that time, 95% of the people were serfs who had no means of production or personal freedom. After the democratic reforms, millions of serfs genuinely took control of their lives and became masters of the country.However, Western politicians and the Western public have for a long time badgered China about human rights in Tibet and have held two prominent misconceptions:first, that under the rule of the Dalai Lama Tibet was a Shangri La of devout religious believers who lived in a harmonious and peaceful society; and second, that after the communist Chinese regime took control of Tibet,the human rights situation there worsened and the native language, culture and religious belief were suppressed and still are.

3. The Dalai Lama issue. Since 1995, the Chinese government has clearly pointed out that the Dalai Lama is the head of a separatist political clique plotting“Tibetan independence,” the obedient tool of foreign anti-Chinese forces, the source of social unrest in Tibet, and the greatest obstacle blocking the orderly development of Tibetan traditional Buddhism, and he has long since lost the right to represent Tibet and the Tibetan people.However, Westerners generally believe that the Dalai Lama is benevolent, nonviolent and wise, and a world religious leader, and that if only China negotiates with this person who all Tibetans trust and who represents the interests of the Tibetan people, the “Tibet issue” can be fundamentally solved.

II. The intellectual and cultural background of these sharp cognitive differences

Why are there such sharp cognitive differences in Chinese and Western views on the Tibet issue? The most important and central reason is that the West with the United States in the lead use the Tibet issue as a means to vilify and contain China. In addition, for several decades the Dalai Lama clique has carried out hate education among the Tibetan diaspora and spread deceitful propaganda throughout the world. There is broad consensus on these two points. Here I will focus on an exploration of the intellectual and cultural background of these cognitive differences. I personally believe that there are several important intellectual and cultural aspects of Western thinking that have a large impact on how Westerners view the Tibet issue.

1. Western nation-state theory. For a long period in Western history, especially European history, it was normal for government to be decentralized and for city states and feudal territories to be self-ruling.After the bourgeois revolution, nation-states arose, and countries that included more than one nation typically adopted some measures for self-rule and national selfdetermination. It is considered normal for a country to be split up into a number of smaller countries, so many Westerners think that Tibetans have the right to choose whether they want to remain part of China or to split from it. However, in the minds of the Chinese people, China was created by the common efforts of many nationalities and China has a pattern of diversity within unity. In addition the Chinese have a powerful conception of great uni fi cation, and the invasion of China in its modern history by Western countries led them to value state and national unity above all else. They absolutely will not let Tibet go.

2. Suzerainty theory. In the eyes of Western scholars and ordinary people, China has been an imperial country throughout its history, and it was a typical empire particularly in the Yuan and Qing dynasties, similar to the Ottoman Empire and Czarist Russia, that is, an empire built on military might and the suppression of native populations. Hence, these Westerners are willing to view China as a patchwork made up of Manchuria,Mongolia, Tibet, East Turkistan and the Chinese central plains. So they think that throughout history China only exercised suzerainty over Tibet, and the dissolution of empires in modern times is an inevitable consequence of social development. Moreover, after World War II,China’s sovereignty over Tibet was widely recognized in the international community because it was set forth in the Yelta system for the post-war international political world order, and its reality is the result of the occupation of the Chinese Communist regime. With this view of things, many Westerners not only view the Dalai Lama’s proposal to negotiate with the Chinese government to achieve “a high degree of autonomy” for Tibet as being in accord with their historical recollections of suzerainty,but also a major concession and a wise move that would enable the benevolent Dalai Lama to diminish the suffering of the Tibetan people.

3. The Orientalism tradition. Orientalism in essence is an attitude of Westerners to consider a different culture as the object of observation and research, and in addition to use their own logic to reconstruct the other culture.The most prominent manifestation of Orientalism in the Tibet issue is imagine that the old Tibet was peaceful and free, without class distinctions, without rich and poor, and a non-materialistic land of purity. According to research by Chinese scholars the Dalai Lama is working hard and cleverly to “orientalize” himself so that Westerners unquestioningly accept this idealization of Tibet, and he is also tampering with Tibetan traditions to cater to their preconceptions and hopes. No matter how little they actually know about the real situation in Tibet, Tibet is the greatest love in their hearts, and Tibet involves all the most important topics in the world today,such as human rights, universal brotherhood, peace,environmental protection, nonviolence, preserving cultural traditions, the equality between men and women, religious freedom, ethnicity and cultural self-determination. In the minds of many Westerners the Tibet issue is a position issue, and your position on it shows whether you are politically correct or not and whether you are a progressive and enlightened person. In this kind of situation, it doesn’t matter how much we trumpet the great achievements that have been made in Tibet’s modernization and development or strongly criticize the wild ambition of the Dalai Lama and his followers to split China, nothing we say to the Western audience will be understood or supported anymore than talking to a wall because it runs contrary to the fl ow of Western discourse on Tibet.

III. Two Revelations

1. We need to fully appreciate the duration and complexity of the Tibet issue. These differences in intellectual and cultural background provide the cultural,moral and public opinion foundations upon which Western politicians make their political calculations and are the source of deep-rooted biases the Western public, media and politicians have on the Tibet issue. These biases will not quickly disappear as China’s national strength increases and its relations with the West improve. At present, Western countries are becoming more determined to prevent and curb China’s rise. They are not only afraid that China’s economic and military power will grow, but are also afraid of the Chinese model of success. This model includes the Chinese people’s conception of the world and its wisdom and methods for solving ethnic and religious problems. From this perspective, some Westerners are unwilling for China’s method of ruling Tibet to fi nd favor in the world. Experts pointed out long ago that viewing China’s sovereignty over Tibet from the perspective of Western theory of nationalism has latent uncertainty. An integral factor of sovereignty is international political recognition, but in the present international environment,the politics of recognizing sovereignty is never stable and unchanging. Western countries originally recognized the sovereignty of Yugoslavia on the basis of international law,but as the situation changed, they quickly broke the rules of international law and dismembered it without any qualms.In light of this, we should not put much stock in the fact that other countries recognize that Tibet is a part of China and that they have not established of fi cial relations with the“Tibetan government in exile” .Whether they recognize it or not, Tibet is a part of China and will constantly develop.Even though they recognize Tibet is part of China, Western countries have not diminished their support for the Dalai Lama’s clique. We cannot exclude the possibility that if the situation changes Western countries might renounce their so-called promises concerning the Tibet issue in the blink of an eye. On this matter, we absolutely cannot harbor any illusions.

2. We should comprehensively increase academic,intellectual and cultural exchanges. At present, there is already some reflection and criticism in the international academic world of the limitations and falseness of the Orientalist approach to research on China and the Tibet issue. We should take a more open and con fi dent attitude in increasing international exchanges and expanding this kind of voice, and further in fl uence international public opinion and the Western public and media. We especially should increase international exchanges in Tibetan studies, play the role of providing balance and guidance to the world of Tibetan studies to reverse the international community’s misreading of Tibetan history, cultural and current affairs as in the case when they see it as Shangri La or view it with a colonialist state of mind. We should also extend academic exchanges on Tibet to more disciplines and areas, such as international law and comparative culture research, get Western Chinese scholars interested in topics concerning Tibet, and get foreign historians to understand and recognize manifestations of diversity and unity, great uni fi cation and the system of autonomous ethnic regions in Chinese history. In this way we can decrease cognitive bias on the Tibet issue by increasing overall understanding of China.

COGNITIVE BIAS IN THE WAY CHINESE AND WESTERNERS VIEW THE TIBET ISSUE

■ Wu Chu

(孫顯輝 譯)