Sino-American Nuclear Dialogue: Retrospect and Prospect

Teng Jianqun

Sino-American Nuclear Dialogue: Retrospect and Prospect

Teng Jianqun

The multi-level dialogue between China and the United States in the nuclear field has played a significant role in promoting mutual understanding and trust of the two sides in this area and in stabilizing the strategic relationship between them. The evolution of the international security situation has assigned new content to this dialogue: The United States, beginning to worry about the orientation of China’s nuclear weapons modernization after cutting a large number of its nuclear weapons and concluding the new START treaty with Russia, has been eager to conduct nuclear dialogues with China, raising such requests as China’s nuclear transparency and proposing to conduct nuclear arms reduction talks between the two countries as that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period, while China maintains that there is no substantial change in its policy on nuclear development and nuclear disarmament, its nuclear strategy and the composition of its nuclear force, and hence it is impossible for China to go further in nuclear transparency and other aspects.

I. The Evolution of Sino-American Nuclear Dialogue

Sino-American nuclear dialogue is conducted on two levels: theofficial and non-official. The non-official dialogue is further divided into the purely academic track II dialogue and the 1.5 track dialogue sponsored by the non-governmental organizations with the participation of government officials. Practice in the past shows that the U.S. side is more inclined to take the “upper-level line”, hoping to upgrade the nuclear dialogue onto the official level or even include it into the high-level strategic dialogue between the two countries while China is more cautious on the matter, believing that the nuclear dialogue between the two countries covers a wide range of topics and hence it will be more feasible to proceed from the lower to the higher level and from technical matters to policy issues. Such a disparity in the line is attributable to differences in their respective national conditions as well as objectives they wish to achieve through the dialogue.

The non-official nuclear dialogue between the two countries began in the 1980s when scholars in universities and research institutes concerned in China started to have contacts with their counterparts in the United States to probe into matters like the role of nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy and nuclear relationship between China and the United States. Not only these universities and research institutes in China held seminars on the nuclear issue and specialists in the field published monologues and papers but they also ran study classes on nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament whose participants included both scholars and government officials. Until now, it remains rare that such NGO-sponsored nuclear dialogue has evolved into an established mechanism.

Later on, official nuclear dialogue between China and the United States was included into the exchange programs of the two countries. On October 19, 2005, the then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited the headquarters and command post of the Second Artillery Force of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, who became the first ever foreign guest received by this army unit in 39 years since its inception. This visit, which was a piece of news causing a sensation, was described by the U.S. officials who accompanied Rumsfeld as“historic”, for the Americans saw what they longed to see all along. General Qin Zhiyuan, commander of the unit, told Rumsfeld that reports alleging China’s strategic missiles were targeted at certain countries were groundless and he reiterated China’s commitment of no first use of nuclear weapons. Though the visit is more symbolic in meaning, it nevertheless shows that the Chinese government is willing to have exchanges with the U.S. government on nuclear-related issues.

During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States in April 2006, President Bush took the initiative to propose to have nuclear dialogues with China. The two leaders agreed to launch official exchanges on the nuclear issue between the two countries. James E. Cartwright, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, invited General Qin Zhiyuan to visit the Command as guest. Carolyn Bartholomew, chair of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, commented that the Commission proposed to conduct strategic level military dialogues between China and the United States so as to make sure that the two sides could know the bottom line of each side.

In April 2008, the first round of official nuclear dialogue between China and the United States was held in Washington. The militaries of the two countries sent delegates to the meeting. No breakthrough results were achieved in this round of talks. Viewed as a whole, the U.S. side, eager to have nuclear dialogue with China, hopes to know more details of China’s nuclear weapons situation. There are at least three topics that the two sides are concerned with: nuclear deterrence, nuclear transparency, and nuclear disarmament.

II. The Three Topics in Sino-American Nuclear Dialogue

1. Nuclear deterrence.

Whether there is nuclear deterrence between China and the United States is always a controversial issue in the academic circle. Some scholars maintain that mutual deterrence between the two countries is a fact as both sides have nuclear weapons and pose as rivals to each other. Others hold that in the initial years since the founding of New China, China did not have nuclear weapons and the United States did not dare to wage nuclear strikes against China and hence it was not nuclear weapons that had deterred the United States from using nuclear weapons. At present, there is a huge disparity in the nuclear strength between the two countries, and the deterrence capability of China’s nuclear force is quite limited.

Divergence is also demonstrated on the respective official expositions of nuclear deterrence. China regards nuclear capability as an art and means to avoid war and maintain peace and believes that deterrence plays a significant role in insuring national security, especially in avoiding nuclear wars. China proclaims that its nuclear strategy is subordinate to and in service of the country’s nuclear policy and military strategy, and its objective is to ensure that China will not be subjected to the use or threat to use of nuclear weapons by other countries. At the beginning, China did not like the word “deterrence” as it was always associated with imperialist blackmail and aggression. The white paper China: Arms Control and Disarmament issued in 1995 pointed out: “The Chinese government has from the beginning opposed nuclear blackmail and the nuclear deterrence policy.” In 1996, China put forth a 5-point proposition at the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly and one of which is for the nuclear powers to give up their nuclear deterrence policy. In the late 1990s, China’s attitude toward nuclear deterrence saw notable change. The white paper China’s National Defence in 2002 pointed out that China’s lean and effective nuclear counterattack capability was to deter other countries from launching possible nuclear strikes against China and that any such actions would lead to retaliatory nuclear counter-attacks by China. It also said that China’s nuclear weapons were small in number, and their scale, structural composition and development were consistent with China’s military strategy of active defense. The white papers issued later on further stressed that China’s limited nuclear counter-offensive capability was to deter other countries from waging possible nuclear attacks against China and the main task of the Second Artillery Force was to deter other countries from using nuclear weapons against China and carry out nuclear counter attacks and routine missile precision strikes.

Compared with China, the United States is clear-cut but changeable in its definition of nuclear deterrence. The National Security Strategy report issued in 1991 on the eve of the end of the Cold War wrote in this way: “Deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies, and—should deterrence fail—repel or defeat military attack and end conflict in terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies.” In the eyes of the Americans, threatening the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons was a major means to ensure for America’s national security. In fact, during the Cold War, only the United States and the Soviet Union could have mutual nuclear deterrence against each other. The 2002 National Security Strategy wrote that nuclear deterrence in its traditional sense could no longer cope with those terrorists with openly declared unrestricted tactics. The 2006 National Security Strategy report maintained: “Safe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a critical role. We are strengthening deterrence by developing a New Triad composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and improved conventional capabilities); active and passive defenses, including missile defenses; and a responsive infrastructure.” The United States has extended“deterrence” into the realm of conventional arms featuring combination of nuclear and conventional forces, integration of offensive and defensive capabilities, and versatility. The United States is ready to attack its enemy at any place.

U.S. President Obama intends to build a world without nuclear weapons but the United States has not given up nuclear deterrence. In January 2010, Dr.Kissinger and three other senior political figures published an article telling people how to “maintain America’s nuclear deterrence”, saying that the United States should take two parallel paths, one was to reduce nuclear danger by maintaining deterrence and the other was to prevent proliferation through arms control and international cooperation. The National Security Strategy report issued in May 2010 pointed out that the United States would reiterate deterrence, which includes not only military means but also diplomatic actions. The new report attached importance to regional deterrence, pointing out that the United States would reinforce the posture of regional deterrence, such as stage-by-stage and flexible missile defense programs, with the aim of letting the regional adversaries know that acquisition of new offensive military capabilities would bring no benefit.

It is undeniable that China and the United States share some similarities in their understanding and application of nuclear deterrence; for instance, they both think that nuclear deterrence is the means but not the aim to achieve the purpose of avoiding war. However, there are essential differences between them: 1) The targets of U.S. deterrence are all countries hostile to it while that of China are potential nuclear weapon countries. 2) U.S. deterrence is multi-layered which includes strategic deterrence and regional deterrence (extended deterrence) and undertakes to protect its allies and friends apart from its own territory while Chinese deterrence is only for defending its own homeland. 3) China’s purpose in applying nuclear deterrence is to avoid nuclear attacks against it while the United States is ready to use nuclear weapons once it is assaulted by biological weapons. 4) The U.S. deterrence is labeled as defensive, but whether from the point of deployment or theory of combat, the nuclear weapons of the United States have a capability of preemptive attack while China’s nuclear force, which keeps a low state of alertness, is not directed against any country and will be used only in second attack. Because of the divergences in the understanding and application of nuclear deterrence, scholars and officials of the two countries often have disputes over nuclear deterrence in nuclear dialogues at various levels.

2. Nuclear transparency.

Transparency is the word with the highest frequency of occurrence in nuclear dialogues between China and the United States. The United States maintains that transparency is an important hallmark of stability in international relations. It pursues high transparency in military affairs and demands China as well as its allies to keep their military modernization transparent. The United States believes that increasing nuclear transparency is an important means to reduce lack of information and eliminate misunderstanding and that China and the United States could reduce misjudgment of information and better safeguard their respective security interests by formulating a highly transparent nuclear policy. The United States further believes that transparency is the foundation for building trust between countries, and that in the absence of transparency, no cooperation could be realized by relying on limited trust. Therefore, the United States has always been emphasizing transparency in military capabilities, numbers, budgets, modernization programs, etc., maintaining that transparency in intention may mitigate the misgivings of other countries but transparency in capability is far more important because it is capability that determines in certain degree the possible policy and action a country might adopt and take.

Different from the United States, China insists that transparency in intention is most important, maintaining that a country will not be threatened if it has no conflict of interest with another country even though the other country is much stronger. On the contrary, if two countries have conflicting security interests or the stronger side has the offensive intention, the weaker side will certainly be threatened and hence it must keep its capability ambiguous and be prepared to cope with the conflict. Many scholars in China firmly believe that the United States is open and transparent because it is a strong power and it will not harm its interests for doing so; if China had as many as nuclear warheads as the United States, it would also be transparent in the number of warheads it possesses. From another angle, the United States has been purposely displaying its capability so as to deter other countries from having direct competition and conflict with the United States. Transparency is a means to achieve deterrence and enhance security interests. However, to China, a country maintaining the lowest level of nuclear deterrence capability, making the numbers and deployment of its nuclear force transparent is equivalent to letting its rival know its best capability. China is unable to do so, neither are the other medium-sized nuclear states.

The Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010 of the United States mentioned China and Russia in the same breath and the word“transparency” occurred for 17 times, most of them relating to China. It said, “While facing the increasingly urgent threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the United States must continue to address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers – most notably Russia and China.” It added that the United States should take wider range of measures to expand cooperation and transparency to enhance strategic stability with Russia and China. It said, “Any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners.” The report stressed in particular that by enhancing transparency and mutual trust with Russia and China, the United States would be able to create conditions for building a world without nuclear weapons and lay a solid foundation for non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. It pointed out that the purpose of holding Sino-American nuclear dialogue was to“provide a venue and mechanism for each side to communicate its views about the other’s strategies, policies, and programs on nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities. The goal of such dialogue is to enhance confidence, improve transparency, and reduce mistrust.”

On the surface, it seems China’s military modernization has gone wrong; in particular its nuclear arsenal is not transparent. But behind the demand for China’s transparency lies America’s strong worries. Why the United States does not make any mention of Britain and France, two nuclear powers like China that keep their nuclear arsenals ambiguous and secret, but gives prominence to China? Putting China on a par with Russia reveals America’s anxiety: Where is China’s nuclear force heading for? Will it destroy the U.S.-Russia-dominant nuclear balance and threat America’s absolute superiority if China increases instead of reducing its nuclear arms when the United States and Russia have committed to cut their nuclear arms by big margins? Hence, from the repeated demand by the United States for China to make its nuclear force, nuclear strategy and nuclear policy transparent, one can see the widespread concern over China’s national defense modernization in the U.S. society.

China’s nuclear force is very limited, which is far less than the small number of the nuclear arms of the United States or Russia. It will not affect the so-called “strategic balance” and the superior position even if the United States and Russia further cut their nuclear arms by another half. And it will take at least 10 years for the United States and Russia to realize the new arms reduction targets they have just reached. Chinese President Hu Jintao has already expressed at the UN Security Council Summit on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in September 2009 that the rest nuclear states would participate in international nuclear disarmament at an appropriate time. It is natural and obvious that there is not much common language between China and the United States and few results have been scored by the already started nuclear dialogue between them because they are not on the same level and moreover the United States possesses superiority in conventional arms and has set up the global missile defense system.

It is a rule that countries having a small number of nuclear weapons would keep their policies ambiguous purely for ensuring the effectiveness of their policies. That China’s nuclear policy and nuclear force is most economic and efficient results from the understanding of the first generation of leaders on nuclear weapons and derives from China’s unique national defense policy, that is, China must have nuclear weapons but a small number.

In the more than 30 years since reform and opening up, China has always put economic construction as the primary task and it is impossible that China will abandon this goal to engage in arms expansion and war preparation in the foreseeable future. The objective of modernizing China’s nuclear weapons is to ensure that China will not be subjected to nuclear attack. In light of the principle of building a lean and effective nuclear force, the PLA Second Artillery Force focuses its efforts on raising the level of IT application for nuclear weapons, ensuring their safety and reliability, and enhancing the ability of defense, reaction, penetration and precision strike.

3. Nuclear disarmament.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates claimed when visiting India early 2010 that he participated in the talks with the former Soviet Union over strategic arms reduction but was unable to verify if the Soviets really reduced their strategic arms; however, the candid dialogues concerning nuclear capabilities as well as their respective views on nuclear weapons played an important role in reducing misjudgment and misunderstanding during the Cold War. He added that similar dialogues with China would be fruitful and in the interest of global security. Indeed, nuclear disbarment has been a hot topic in recent Sino-American nuclear dialogues.

Along with the re-initiation of a nuclear weapons-free world and further reduction of nuclear arms by the United States and Russia, the United States has been showing greater concern over the direction of China’s nuclear disarmament and asked China repeatedly on a number of occasions when it would follow up. Such an action reveals that the United States has a series of doubts over China’s adjustment of its nuclear policy, the direction of its nuclear force modernization, and so on.

The nuclear disarmament policy formulated by China’s first generation of leadership originated from their profound understanding of the nuclear weapons over national security and their firm belief in the Marxist outlook on war and Marxist methodology. As earlier as half a century ago, China has already put forward those ideas on nuclear disarmament now prevalent in the international community, such as the initiative of building a“world without nuclear weapons” talked about volubly by the United States and Obama’s proposal to convene the World Nuclear Security Summit and proposition on nuclear security assurance, which are exactly the same as those raised by the Chinese government much earlier.

China consistently persists in the nuclear disarmament policy of “comprehensive prohibition” and “complete elimination” of nuclear weapons. China is a developing country upholding the socialist system and China’s first generation of leadership was deeply influenced by the Marxist outlook on war when formulating the nuclear disarmament policy. Proceeding from the outlook of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, they analyzed the role of nuclear weapons in war and concluded that they were not omni-potential and ultimately decisive in winning the war. From the outset, China took the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as an obligation that should be undertaken by the international community and the aim of China in developing nuclear weapons was to eliminate nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons. Similar views could be found in various Marxist-Leninist works. What the Chinese Communists have done is to apply those views to the nuclear era and give them the characteristics of the time.

At present, profound changes have taken place in the international security situation: the United States and Russia have committed to cut by big margins their nuclear weapons, the medium-sized nuclear states have also drawn up plans to scale down the number of their nuclear weapons in service, and leaders of Britain and other nuclear countries have put nuclear disarmament as priority on their agenda in their term of office. Under such overall environment, China will have to re-phrase its nuclear disarmament policy, such as including such new ideas like the new security outlook. But in the foreseeable future, China will not give up all together the policy of “comprehensive prohibition” and “complete elimination” it has consistently persisted.

Whether China needs to take back this moral banner has recently become a major topic of many people concerned with the changes in China’s nuclear disarmament policy. At present, China is not interested in contending for limelight in this respect because it has its own strategic considerations. First, the thoroughness, fairness and morality of China’s nuclear disarmament policy are widely acknowledged in the world and the related proposals exceed far the proposition of a nuclear weapons-free world put forward by President Obama. China stands at a much higher moral ground than the United States in nuclear disarmament. Second, China’s economic capacity is limited. It is impossible for China to shift its focus of work from economic construction to the military field, for China’s nuclear weapons modernization program is primarily aimed at ensuring the safety and reliability of its existing nuclear weapons and secondly ensuring that its deterrence capability will not be weakened in face of America’s missile defense system building. Third, keeping a low profile is a guiding principle for China when mapping out its future nuclear disarmament policy. On the issue of nuclear policy, China will not act as a leader and contend with the United States for merits but will only observe calmly the possible changes and react accordingly. This is the reason why the Chinese officials and scholars are indifferent to the initiative of building a nuclear weapons-free world. What China is more interested in is not what one says but more what one does.

Compared with the time before reform and opening up, China now sets more stores by the moral value of its nuclear disarmament policy. Holding high the moral banner of nuclear disarmament is not only a posture for declaration but also an important part for establishing strategic stability with countries concerned. In particular, maintaining strategic stability with the United States is conducive to pushing forward relations between the two countries. The United States, though still keeping its focus on Russia regarding nuclear disarmament, is bound to pay more attention to China’s nuclear disarmament along with the further reduction of nuclear arms by the United States and Russia. Therefore, both China and the United States have their respective moral needs in this respect, and that is also the foundation for their cooperation.

With regard to the United States, it seems it has not taken China as its main rival as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned but focuses more on Russia because China’s and America’s nuclear forces are not on the same level. As to China, it maintains that the United States and Russia are the two countries possessing the largest numbers of nuclear weapons—accounting for over 90% of the world’s total—and in spite of a cut by nearly a half of their nuclear arsenals, the number of their nuclear weapons is still several times bigger than that of the medium-sized nuclear states. Hence, China would only follow up when these two nuclear powers have their nuclear arsenals cut to a certain size. The commitment made by President Hu Jintao at the UN Summit on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament on September 24, 2009 has reiterated China’s stand in this respect.

There will be no fundamental change in China’s nuclear disarmament policy in the foreseeable future. What may change is only the way of expression but not the basic contents of the policy. It is not because China refuses to make any progress but because the nuclear disarmament policy initiated by China’s first generation of leaders remains unsubstitutable until now and is still full of vitality.

III. Future Direction of Sino-American Nuclear Dialogue

It must be pointed out that the reasons for the above-mentioned divergences and disputes between China and the United States on the nuclear issue are multi-faceted: the two countries’ nuclear forces, at least in terms of the numbers, are not on the same level; the different nature of the two states determines that they have different purposes in developing nuclear weapons; the postures of deployment of their nuclear weapons are different; and there are lot of differences on their understanding of nuclear weapons. Most of them are structural disparities that could not be resolved through a few rounds of dialogue.

1. Positioning.China and the United States have conducted several rounds of dialogue on the nuclear issue with few substantial results, which indicates that it is a sensitive and complex issue. First of all, it is necessary to define the strategic goals of dialogue. The mechanisms of official dialogue, track II dialogue and 1.5 track dialogue formed in the past many years have played a significant role in promoting cooperation between the two countries in the nuclear disarmament field and enhancing their mutual understanding, but there is mush room for improvement. Secondly, efforts should be made to improve the integration and association of the various types of dialogue on the issue. Though having different features, the three types of dialogue have the same mission and goal, that is, maintenance of strategic stability between China and the United States and enhancement of mutual strategic trust. At present, there are only some low-level interaction, and sometimes even no association, among them. It is suggested that dialogue should start from the easier topics to gradually include the more difficult ones and efforts should be made to ensure for results for each round. And thirdly, there should be planning and higher-level coordination for the three types of dialogue and at an opportune moment the dialogue on the nuclear issue could be incorporated into the agenda of the Economic and Strategic Dialogue between the two countries.

2. Mutual trust.It is imperative for China and the United States to increase communication since they have misgivings toward each other. As mentioned before, the United States has been pressing China on its nuclear transparency, fearing the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal would undermine the deterrence and combat capability of its nuclear force. The United States often comes to the conclusion that “l(fā)ack of transparency means threat”. As a weaker side, China always fears that it is a“conspiracy” of the United States in pressing for China’s nuclear transparency which is aimed at founding out the true capacity of China nuclear arsenal, and hence it is impossible for China to make its nuclear arsenal transparent. The essential reason for the emergence of America’s “threat theory” and China’s“conspiracy theory” lies in weak mutual trust between the two sides. Mutual trust must be built on interaction between the two sides; it will not do if the United States demands transparency from China while keeping secret its own missile defense systems and nuclear arms modernization programs.

3. Equality.Nuclear dialogue is not a business purely for the nuclear physicists, officials in charge of security matters, and scholars but involves people of different sectors as well as various areas. The big disparity in the nuclear capabilities between the two countries with the United States holding obvious advantage in both technology and numbers of nuclear weapons determines the two countries need to position themselves appropriately in dialogues on the nuclear issue. The United States should get off its high horse and exchange views and information with China on the same footing instead of throwing its weight around and even pressuring on China to make a choice. That is not what is meant by dialogue and surely will not encourage China to make a positive response. On the technical level, the United States should also take the lead to move forward on such matters as visa issuance, information exchange and lab visits, so that China would feel the goodwill of the United States and relieve its fears as far as possible.

4. Gradualism.Communication will not necessarily dissolve all misgivings, or even it will dissolve none of them. The United States wishes to know the detailed composition, combat thinking, resources input and equipment level of China’s strategic forces, and so does China. And China also wants the U.S. side to explain why it seeks to weaponize the outer space and develop the missile defense systems. All these concerns make the dialogue extremely complex, which calls for patience and wisdom. Because of the fact that the nuclear field is one of the most sensitive areas of a country and because of the complexity and difficulties involved in communication and dialogue on the issue, it is impossible for the two countries to solve all problems in the nuclear field overnight. The two sides should draw up a credible roadmap and start their work from giving a right position to the various types of dialogue, maintaining mutual trust and treating each other on equal footing, with a view to achieving step-by-step results in the foreseeable future.

Teng Jianqun is Senior Research Fellow at China Institute of International Studies.