Russia and the Afghanistan Issue

Zhao Huasheng

Russia and the Afghanistan Issue

Zhao Huasheng

In 2009，the United States announced that it would begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in 2011. In 2010, the Kabul Process was initiated and the Afghan government would gradually take over all the security and governance functions, which is expected to be completed by 2014. Afghanistan has accordingly entered into a turning point, and its prospects are full of uncertainties. The changes in the situation will bring about the shift of role—with the role of some countries declining and that of others increasing. In this process, Russia that has traditional influence on Afghanistan is worth particular attention. The situation has pushed Russia once more to the front stage and Russia has the intention to stage a comeback. It may be said for sure that whatever result will appear in Afghanistan, the role of Russia will be more prominent.

I. The Historical Origin of Russian-Afghan Relations

On the Afghanistan issue, Russia has played a special role and its influence over the country has been constant and uninterrupted. Since Russia conquered Central Asia in the 19thcentury, Afghanistan became one of Russia’s neighbors as well as a target and corridor of its continued southward march. In the greater part of the 19thcentury, Russia and Great Britain were engaged in prolonged rivalry for the control of Central Asia,with Afghanistan being one of the major battlefields. In 1919 when Afghanistan gained independence from British colonialist protection, Russia was the first nation to recognize its independenc and established diplomatic ties with it. Then Russia signed a treaty of friendship with the country.

Starting from the mid-1950s, the relations between Russia (the Soviet Union) and Afghanistan became ever closer. The Soviet Union provided big quantities of economic and military aid to Afghanistan, helping the country train experts and military forces and build projects, and gradually bringing the country into its sphere of influence. In 1979, the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, overthrowing the anti-Soviet regime that had taken power by a coup, and occupying the country. In the entire period from the 1950s to the 1980s, the Soviet Union (Russia) had exerted the greatest impact on Afghanistan—it was the latter’s biggest trading partner, largest aid-giving nation and closest friend. The Soviet occupation, however, was constantly resisted and Afghanistan became its “bleeding wound”. In 1989, the Soviet Union was compelled to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. Two years later, the Soviet Union broke up and newly-independent Central Asian countries lay between Russia and Afghanistan, so Russia and Afghanistan no longer bordered each other. Meanwhile, Russia sank into an all-round crisis and was busy enough with its own affairs. The Afghan regime which the Soviet Union propped up collapsed and Russia’s impact on Afghanistan substantially declined.

In 1992, after the overthrow of the Najibullah regime, Russia declared its recognition of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. In the same year, Russia suspended temporarily the operations of its embassy in Afghanistan because of the tense situation of the civil war in the country. In 1996, the Taliban seized power. Russia refused to recognize the Taliban regime and held a stance of open opposition to the Taliban. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Afghanistan under Taliban control had become “a center of international terrorism” and “a forward base which exports bellicose extremism and separatism”, holding that the Taliban was “the shock brigade of the global destructive forces and a threat to the international system of peace and security”. Russia still recognized the government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in exile, maintained contact with and provided assistance to it. At the same time, Russia supported the sanctions of the United Nations against the Taliban and took an active part in the resolution of the Afghanistan issue.

Russia resumed the work of its embassy in Afghanistan after the downfall of the Taliban regime. Despite the fact that Russia played a secondary role in Afghanistan, both Russia and Afghanistan had the intention to develop close relations. In February 2002, not long after the establishment of the interim Afghan government, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited Afghanistan. In the same year, the Afghan defense minister, foreign minister and government president all visited Russia. In February 2002, Mohammad Fahim, first vice president and minister of defense, paid a visit to Russia. He was the first minister of the interim Afghan government to visit Russia and was met by President Vladimir Putin. Russia agreed to offer Afghanistan logistic and technological assistance and help the latter build a professional armed force. In March 2002, Hamid Karzai, president of the interim Afghan government, visited Russia. The two countries issued a joint statement, indicating they would develop political, economic, scientific and technological and cultural relations on an extensive and long-term basis. They reached 17 agreements and Russia made the commitment to participate in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In November 2002, Abdullah Abdullah, Afghan foreign minister, made a visit to Russia again.

However, the good momentum of Russian-Afghan relations did not last long and later the bilateral ties developed not fast but remained basically stable, and Russia maintained its constant focus on and support for Afghanistan.

In recent years, though Russian and Afghan presidents met quite a number of times, there were few mutual official visits, and the venues were not in their own countries. In eight years after 2002, Karzai did not visit Russia until January 2011. In 2008, Karzai extended an invitation to Dmitry Medvedev to visit Afghanistan and the latter accepted the invitation, but the visit was not made. The two foreign ministers have kept their mutual visits. The Afghan foreign minister visited Russia in 2006, 2008 and 2010 while his Russian counterpart paid visits to Afghanistan in 2007 and 2009. Moreover, the Russian foreign minister went to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010 to take part in the inauguration ceremony of Karzai and the international conference on Afghanistan in Kabul. In other areas, comparatively more contacts were maintained between security, narcotics control and economic departments of the two countries.

Russia-Afghanistan economic cooperation and trade were not on a large scale and their volume of bilateral trade lingered for a long time under US$80 million. In 2007, the two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of Economic Cooperation and Trade, but the memorandum was not appropriately implemented. Due to the debt Afghanistan owed the Soviet Union, Russian investment in Afghanistan was restrained by its domestic law. In 2008 the debt problem was resolved and Russia-Afghanistan trade went up by 2.8 times, amounting to US$190 million. Of the sum, Russia’s exports stood at US$175 million. Russian exports to Afghanistan comprised mainly fuel, metals, timber, building materials and foodstuff. Afghan exports to Russia included fresh and dried fruit. During Karzai’s visit to Russia in January 2011, the two countries signed an agreement on economic cooperation and trade. They mutually offered the most-favored-nation status and planned to establish inter-governmental committee on trade and economic cooperation. By and large, however, Russia’s economic presence in Afghanistan was somewhat weak, which can be attributed to the security situation of the country, not strong competitiveness of Russian enterprises, as well as the impact of Russia’s relations with the United States and Europe.

2003-2008 Russia-Afghanistan Trade Volume (million US dollars)

Russia has taken part in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Oil and gas, electricity, industry, communications and infrastructure are areas in which Russia has a special interest. Afghanistan is rich in oil, natural gas and mineral resources endowment and the Soviet Union had explored in the country and found some oil, natural gas and copper reserves. During the Soviet Union period, Afghanistan once exported natural gas to the Soviet Union. Now Russia hopes to reenter into the oil, natural gas and mineral sectors of Afghanistan. In the 1950s-1980s period, the Soviet Union helped Afghanistan build 142 projects, including power plants, airports, oil and gas facilities, highways, factories and schools. For example, three of the four Afghan airports were built with the assistance of Russia. The priority consideration of Russia is to undertake the modernizing upgrading of these projects. At present, Russia’s biggest project in Afghanistan is the upgrading of the Naghlu Hydroelectric Power Plant. The power plant was built in 1966 with Soviet assistance. Its upgrading should be completed in the latter half of 2010 and its funding amounted to US$32.5 million. After completion of the project, it would ensure 50% of electricity supply of Kabul. In addition, Russia has undertaken the construction of some small hydroelectric plants and some other not large-scale projects. Russia intends to participate in some new projects, including putting up new hydroelectric power plants and the restoration of the Salang Pass of the Hindu Kush Mountain.

It should be pointed out that Russia attaches great importance to educational cooperation which is Russia’s important“assets” in Afghanistan. During the Soviet Union period, a great number of Afghan youths received education in the Soviet Union and the latter built numerous education facilities in the country to promote Soviet-style education. For instance, the Polytechnic University of Kabul was built with Soviet assistance. Each year a few hundred students who speak Russian graduate from this university. Among the Afghan political and upper social circles, quite a few of them speak Russian. Nowadays Russia hopes to reenter the Afghan education field and help the country develop education and promote Russian educational system in the middle schools and universities. Meanwhile, Russia accepts more Afghan students to study in Russia.

With regard to humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, from 2002 to 2008 Russia provided more than US$30 million in aid. In 2009 Russia began a new aid program worth US$11 million. Afghanistan owed the Soviet Union US$11 billion of debt of which Russia exempted US$10 billion in 2007. Originally Russia intended to cancel this debt with a condition: if Afghanistan gave up the claim for compensation for the Soviet occupation, Russia would exempt the remaining debt. In 2010, however, Russia cancelled all of the remaining debt. The Russian authorities held that Russia’s aid to Afghanistan stood at more than US$12 billion, which covered the exempted debt.

Security and narcotics control are two important areas of Russia-Afghanistan cooperation. The two countries have maintained relatively close contacts in these fields. It should be pointed out that part of Russia-Afghanistan security cooperation is conducted within the Russia-NATO framework. Russia provides to Afghanistan military technological assistance, including airport equipment, aircraft maintenance, telecommunications equipment, light weaponry and military training. Russia plans to provide Afghanistan with helicopters and training of pilots. From 2002 to 2008 Russia provided US$200 million in aid for the development of the Afghan armed forces. In Afghanistan, Russia has set up a representative office of the federal narcotics control agency. In 2009, the two countries signed an agreement on narcotics control. Afghanistan was invited to take part, as an observer, in the “Operation Channel”military exercise aimed at combating drugs by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). And a CSTO-Afghanistan narcotics-control working group was established. Within the Russia-NATO framework, a training base for narcotics control police was established in Russia which trained personnel for Afghanistan and other countries.

II. Russia’s Interests in Afghanistan and Its Afghan Policy

Russia views Afghanistan largely from the perspective of security, including Russia’s domestic security and the security of the Central Asian region. Russia still sees Central Asia as its“sphere of influence” and this region is contiguous with southern Russia. The Caucus region of Russia, Central Asia and Afghanistan are located in the same security belt and their security is bundled together and can hardly be separated from each other. Russia is worried that Afghanistan will export instability to the neighboring areas and that religious extremism in Afghanistan will spread to Russia. There are about 20 million Muslim residents in Russia, accounting for 15% of Russian population. Relations with Muslims are a major social issue in Russia. Ethnic relations in the country are complex and tend to be worsening, particularly ties with Muslim minorities in the Caucus region. The large-scale unrest which occurred in downtown Moscow in 2010 was a dangerous signal. Under these circumstances, the spread of religious extremism is most dangerous.

Narcotics remain an important social and security problem in Russia and the country has elevated narcotics control to national strategy. In June 2010, the Russian president signed Narcotics Control Strategy of Russia Prior to 2020. President Medvedev indicated that “we consider drug taking as a grave problem threatening our national development and people’s health.”

The principal source of narcotics of Russia is Afghanistan. The Russian authorities estimate that in northern Afghanistan alone there are about 500 narcotics hideouts oriented to Russia. A study holds that about 25% of Afghan drugs enter Russia, or four tons of opium per day, the majority of which has been sold in Russia. There are about 2.5 million drug addicts in Russia, ranking the first in the world. Each year about 30,000 people die of drugs in the country. Russia attaches extreme importance to the narcotics problem in Afghanistan, seeing it as a more dangerous threat than terrorism.

Russia has geopolitical interests in Afghanistan. From this perspective, the military presence of the United States in Afghanistan and Central Asia is a key issue. Although Russia supports the United States in combating al Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. military presence particularly in Central Asia has been Russia’s anxiety. Moreover, Russia is concerned about its position in Afghanistan and cannot accept its exclusion from this region that is strategically important. In handling of the Afghanistan issue, Russia not only wants to participate, but also expects to occupy an important place.

Since 2009, Russia’s Afghanistan policy has apparently tended to be more proactive for which there are two major reasons. Domestically, with the passage of time, Russia’s“wound” in Afghanistan has gradually healed. For the elite and ordinary people, the miserable experiences of the Afghanistan war have begun to fade. Moreover, a phenomenon has appeared to positively understand that part of history. In other words, that part of history is changing from “negative assets” to“positive assets”. Russia began to emphasize the historical friendship between Russia and Afghanistan, praise the large-scale construction Russia had undertaken in Afghanistan and publicize the progress the latter had made with Russian assistance. The year 2009 marked the 20thanniversary of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the 90thanniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Russia held commemorative events and hosted the first Russia-Afghanistan forum in Moscow which Afghan Vice President Karim Khalili led a big delegation to attend. Analysts have found that the situation now is quite different from the past. Though Russia does not deny its invasion of Afghanistan,“the humiliation from the 1980s to the 1990s has partly been erased, collective memory restored, the ideological conflict blurred and memory of the might of the Soviet Union more cherished.” The other reason for Russia’s positive Afghanistan policy is at the international level, which is mainly related to the situation in Afghanistan. In March 2009, the United States put forward a new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy which means to recognize that it can not annihilate the Taliban and it is prepared to gradually withdraw troops from the country. Russia was not sure of what would come out of the situation in Afghanistan after 2014. This is a stern challenge to Russia and the situation has forced Russia to take positive actions.

Analyses note that on the Afghanistan issue Russia is no longer content of playing a minor role and it is ready to play a role as an independent actor. In a sense, it may be said that Russia is making preparations for the U.S. withdrawal of troops. These preparations are many-faceted. One, win the support of the society for Russia’s return to Afghanistan, both psychologically and in terms of policy. Two, boost its relations with Afghanistan and directly influence the development of Afghanistan. Karzai’s visit to Russia is the latest expression of enhanced bilateral relations and it is the first official visit of an Afghan president to Russia. President Medvedev said that “after 2014 Afghanistan will depend upon its own force in ensuring national security and independence. In this respect, Russia is ready to offer substantial assistance”. The Russian ambassador to Afghanistan noted that “with the exception of military presence, Russia is ready to participate in all forms of assistance to Afghanistan.” Russian president’s first visit to Afghanistan will possibly come true in a couple of years. Three, Russia steps up its military presence and the capacity to react in Central Asia in order to respond to any eventuality in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Within the CSTO framework, the first collective rapid reaction force (CRRF) was set up in 2009 whose main area of operations is Central Asia. At the same time, numerous signals indicate that Russia is striving to enhance its military presence in Central Asia, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Sources say that Russia might build a second military base in Kyrgyzstan. And four, Russia actively helps the United States implement the new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

Russia has a clear-cut stand on Afghanistan’s future political status: independence and neutrality. In other words, Afghanistan should not be subordinate to any other country, nor be controlled by any foreign country, nor pursue a foreign policy which swings in favor of a certain country. This principle was established shortly after the new Afghan regime was established. The Russia-Afghanistan joint statement issued in March 2002 declared that in future Afghanistan should be “a peaceful, united, neutral, prosperous nation which maintains good-neighborly relations with surrounding nations”. At present Russia still adheres to such a stand. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stressed at the international conference on Afghanistan held in Kabul in July 2010 that“after the efforts of the international community for stability come to an end, the restoration of the neutral status of Afghanistan will be one of the pivotal factors in shaping a harmonious and cooperative atmosphere in the region”. Proceeding from this stand, Russia supports the Kabul Process, perceiving it as a correct path to real independence of Afghanistan.

Russia rests it policy on the present regime and its long-term existence, even though it concerns about the prospect of the current regime in Afghanistan. In other words, Russia supports the preservation of the current political and constitutional system of Afghanistan and upholds the present regime as the long-term political structure of the nation. However, there is an analysis in the Russian academic circles that Russia may have three possible strategies in its Afghanistan policy. One, a strategy of non-involvement, i.e. doing nothing, making no efforts with folded arms and waiting for change. Two, a strategy of practical politics. According to this strategy, in view of Russia’s lack of capacity to influence the whole Afghanistan, it should focus on developing ties with northern provinces. Northern Afghanistan is where Russia’s principal interests lie, and Russia should build this region into a security buffer zone and put it under Russian influence. If a crisis erupts in Afghanistan in future and the country is divided into southern and northern parts, Russia may accept the result. And three, a strategy of building a unified and independent Afghanistan. Analyses are of the view that at present all the three strategies have a certain impact on Russia’s Afghanistan policy. Some-times, the conflicts in Russia’s policy stem from this.

Russia has a profound aversion to the Taliban. Instead of regarding it as political representative of the Pashtun ethnicity, Russia adopts an irreconcilable stand toward it. Russia opposes the return of the Taliban to Afghan political arena and stands for immediately rooting it out. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime, Russia’s principle for political reconstruction of Afghanistan is that “the Taliban fell into discredit for supporting international terrorism so it should not have any place in Afghan regime structure. Without eliminating this anti-people and criminal force, terrorism in Afghanistan cannot be expected to be thoroughly rooted out.” Russia firmly opposes the policies of the United States and the Afghan government that attempt to reconcile with the Taliban. The new U.S. Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy proposes negotiations with moderate Taliban members and such a policy does not receive Russia’s understanding. Russia’s view is that the Taliban will be Taliban and Russia will not distinguish “good” Taliban from“bad” Taliban. The Russian permanent representative to the United Nations explicitly stated that talks with the Taliban ran counter to the UN Security Council resolution on sanctions against the Taliban and Russia opposed such behavior. Likewise, Russia opposed the Afghan government’s attempt to offer amnesty and enlistment to Taliban leaders, asserting that the Taliban leaders were criminals engaging in terrorist activities and should never be pardoned. Russia noted that it understood the importance of national reconciliation in Afghanistan, but “the unchangeable condition for the Taliban’s joining this process is to give up violence, thoroughly cut off all the ties with al Qaeda and recognize the constitution and laws of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”. However, on certain issues Russia’s stand appeared a little more flexible. It indicated that it would accept that some terrorists be deleted from the list of those under sanctions of the United Nations, but this could only be done on a case-by-case basis and the list itself could never be annulled.

Russia stands for regional and international cooperation on the Afghanistan issue and has been an active participant in such cooperation. In promoting international cooperation, Russia has an explicit theme which is narcotics control. Russia has tried hard to push ahead with the concept, that is, narcotics are a threat not only to Russia, but also to Europe and the United States and should be seen as a global threat. Drug trafficking is more destructive than terrorism. Russia stresses that drug trafficking and terrorism are closely linked: terrorist organizations engage in drug trafficking, while the profit from drugs is their important funding source. Russia advocates linking up combating terrorism with narcotics control with the emphasis laid on both. Russia thinks that the United States and Europe attach importance to combating terrorism to the neglect of narcotics control and it is not satisfied with it. Russia openly indicates that NATO has a huge force in Afghanistan, but it has not taken effective measures to eliminate drugs. Russia makes efforts to convince them that narcotics in Afghanistan are a problem not only for Russia, but also for them. Russia believes that narcotics control should be put in the same important position as combating terrorism and that an international cooperation mechanism for joint narcotics control should be formed.

For Russia, the efforts to develop its strategic presence in Afghanistan and increase its clout with the Afghanistan issue have made it an influential dialogue partner of the United States and NATO. Russia maintains bilateral dialogue with the United States and NATO on the Afghanistan issue. But in dialogues with them, Russia attaches importance to relying upon multilateral frameworks, in other words, Russia’s tactic is conducting bilateral dialogue within multilateral frameworks. This is because Russia’s resources and capacity are not adequate after all and it finds itself weak in front of the United States and NATO, and Russia needs to enhance its weight by means of multilateral frameworks.

The multilateral frameworks that Russia depends upon heavily are the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The two organizations are different from each other. The former is a military and security organization which is composed of Russia and six former Soviet republics, including four Central Asian nations. Dominated by Russia, the CSTO has the function and capacity to take military action. In 2009, the organization formed a collective rapid reaction force whose main functions are combating aggression and terrorism, cracking down on transnational crime, narcotics control and eliminating the aftermaths of emergencies. In the rapid reaction force, the Russian force has the biggest number of troops. But the organization is inadequate in political representation and is constrained in participating in international politics.

The SCO is a political and security organization. It has an extensive political representation, particularly, the unique resources on the Afghanistan issue. Its members and observers include five of the six neighbors of Afghanistan as well as major countries such as Russia, India and Kazakhstan. Therefore, the SCO is more politically applicable and Russia is happy to use it in international politics more frequently. Russia actively publicizes the important role of the SCO on the Afghanistan issue and often talks about the issue in the capacity of a SCO representative. For instance, Russia did so at the Moscow international conference, the Hague conference and Kabul conference on the Afghanistan issue. At the initiative of Russia, the SCO convened the first international conference on the Afghanistan issue in Moscow. The European Union, NATO, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Japan and many other countries attended this conference.

In addition, Russia has set up a new framework, i.e. the four-party mechanism composed of Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan. The presidents of these four countries met for the first time in July 2009 in Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan. They met for a second time in the southern Russian city of Sochi in August 2010, and a third will be held in 2011. The foreign ministers of the four countries also held a meeting in September 2010, and in October 2010 an economic ministers’ meeting was convened. In December 2010, leading narcotics control officials met and signed an agreement, deciding to create a narcotics control mechanism of four Central Asian nations.

One feature of the four-nation mechanism is that it is highly functional and entering directly into specific cooperation without being restrained by political red tape. Its current main topics are the Afghanistan issue, narcotics control, energy and construction of communications projects. Russia has not offered explanation on out of what consideration it created such a mechanism. Some Russian analysts believe that this is Russia’s “grand game” and an indication of efforts to enhance its strategic position in this region. Through the four-nation mechanism, Russia may have more substantial influence on the future development of Afghanistan and increase its means to impact the greater Central Asian region. Analyses also hold that Russia has tried to get involved in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline plan. The framework agreement on this pipeline was signed in December 2010. When the pipeline is built, it will bring an end to Russia’s control on Turkmenistan’s natural gas exports.

The four-nation mechanism is more convenient compared with the CSTO and the SCO. Confined by the structure, the CSTO can hardly go beyond the former Soviet region. Its internal coordination is quite complex and it does not have an economic function. Though the SCO is widely politically representative and has an economic function, its ability to act is relatively weak. The four-nation mechanism is different: its structure is simple, strongly pragmatic with the participating countries carefully selected. With regard to the Afghanistan issue, Afghanistan is the nation concerned and the resolution of the problem cannot be achieved without the participation of the nation. Pakistan is the nation with the biggest impact on the Taliban and is of critical importance in resolving the Afghanistan issue. Moreover, Russia-Pakistan relations are improving and the Pakistani president will visit Russia in 2011. Tajikistan is the main corridor through which Afghan drugs enter Russia. Hence, the country occupies a special position on the issue of narcotics control. Though there are just a few members, the four-nation mechanism goes beyond Central Asia, deep into Afghanistan and enters South Asia. In political geography, it is creative thinking that can be compared to the“Greater Central Asia Plan” of the United States; in mechanism operations, Russia has found the four-nation mechanism handier.

No conflicts exist between the four-nation mechanism and the SCO in terms of goals and the functions of the former are narrower than the latter. Even so, the relationship between the two remains a problem. If the four-nation mechanism can develop smoothly, its functions may expand in scale. Russia has indicated that other member countries of the SCO may be invited to join the mechanism. If countries like India and Kazakhstan join the mechanism, how to give play the role of the SCO will become a delicate problem. Russia seems to take this point into consideration and calls the four-nation mechanism an unofficial mechanism, putting it within the framework of the SCO, to avoid being read as starting afresh on its own. And it stated that this is a contribution of the SCO to the resolution of the Afghanistan issue. But in essence the four-nation mechanism and the SCO are two parallel mechanisms rather than the former being subordinate to the latter. It may develop into an important mechanism of Russia in managing the greater Central Asian region.

Russia does not decline to get involved in the Afghanistan issue militarily. It helps the Afghan government train troops and provides military aid and weapons. In fact it has all along maintained indirect military involvement. However, Russia has not directly sent troops into Afghanistan and does not intend to keep military presence in the country. The Russian authorities denied categorically each time when media released the reports that Russia was prepared to send troops.

III. Russia-U.S. Relationship on the Afghanistan Issue

Relations with the United States are an important aspect of Russia’s Afghanistan policy. On the Afghanistan issue, there are two basic points in Russia’s policy towards the United States—fighting terrorism and geopolitics. Russia is ready to cooperate with the United States in combating terrorism; but geopolitically, Russia does not wish to see the United States grow strong in the region, in particular, it cannot tolerate U.S. control of Central Asia. Russia has all along wandered between these two points, which has made Russia’s U.S. policy contradictory and unstable.

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the United States supported the Afghan resistance forces. The two superpowers were engaged in a ten-year confrontation in the country. After the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, it became the most formidable enemy of Russia. And the United States also opposed the Taliban regime, the two countries turned from opponents to cooperators.

Russia-U.S. cooperation in Afghanistan started prior to the“9/11” incident in 2001, rather than after the incident as is generally considered. In 2000, Russia and the United States set up a joint working group on Afghanistan. Prior to the September 11 attacks, the group met three times in a little more than one year. After the September 11 incident, the working group had an emergency session attended by Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Ivanovich Trubnikov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. After the session the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a circular, declaring that Russia would help the United States fight terrorism and support the establishment of an international anti-terrorism united front. Later President Putin issued a shocking five-point statement, agreeing to the entrance of U.S. armed forces into Central Asia and Russia-U.S. cooperation reached its peak.

After the overthrow of the Taliban regime, however, the United States showed no signs of pulling out troops from Central Asia, which increased Russia’s displeasure and misgivings, so the geopolitical consideration was gaining weight in Russia’s United States policy. From 2003, the United States instigated a “color revolution” in the region of the former Soviet Union, attempting to introduce political remolding of Central Asia and Russia-U.S. relations began to take a turn for the worse. In 2005, pushed by Russia the SCO advocated that the United States should present a schedule for withdrawal of troops from Central Asia. This meant that Russia started pursuing a policy aimed at squeezing out the U.S. armed forces from Central Asia. In 2009, Russia-U.S. relations were“re-started” and the cooperation between the two countries regarding Afghanistan was an important part. The presidents of the two countries issued a joint statement on Afghanistan, reiterating that they would continue cooperation on the Afghanistan issue.

According to the summing up of Russian scholars, the Russian elite have three major propositions on the United States. The first one is to hope that the United States will be bogged down in Afghanistan, which may prevent the Taliban from coming back and will consume U.S. strength. This proposition does not advocate substantial assistance to the United States, nor does it stand for staunch support for the Karzai regime. The second one is to hope for close cooperation with the United States and exchange assistance to the United States in a difficult situation for the U.S. concessions in the region of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The third one is to hope that the United States will annihilate the Taliban, which will eliminate the biggest threat to Russia. But at the present stage, Russia’s basic official policy is to cooperate with the United States. This cooperation may bring about benefit to Russia: One, preventing the Taliban from coming back; two, the Afghan government will smoothly take over power; three, the U.S. armed forces will withdraw in an orderly manner; and four, this will promote the development of Russia-U.S. ties.

Currently Russia’s main assistance to the United States is offered in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). Since the beginning of the Afghan war in 2001, the logistic supplies of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan have been largely ensured through the port of Karachi of Pakistan. This line of communications is convenient and inexpensive, but not safe because it is frequently attacked. Out of the consideration of reducing risks and increasing transport capacity, the United States need to open up a new route of transport and the northern route, which runs through Russia and Central Asia to enter northern Afghanistan, is the priority option. As early as the summer of 2008, the United States started to consider the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). In September 2008, the Central Command of the U.S. armed forces approved the plan for the northern ground transport route. To weaken its military hue, the name was changed into the Northern Distribution Network later.

At the Bucharest session of the Russia-NATO Council in April 2008, Russia and NATO reached agreement, permitting NATO members to ship non-military supplies to Afghanistan through Russian territories. In March 2009, the first U.S. shipment of supplies was transported to Afghanistan across Russian border. In July 2009, at the Russia-U.S. summit in Moscow another agreement was reached to permit the United States to use Russian air corridor. According to this agreement, each year the United States might fly 4,500 military sorties via Russia to Afghanistan and the commercial flights were not limited. In November 2010, Russia and NATO once more agreed at the Lisbon meeting that the shipments across Russia were turned from one-way to dual-way transport, i.e. supplies may also be shipped out of Afghanistan. Russian private airline companies participated directly in the transport of supplies to Afghanistan. The United States spoke highly of Russia’s contributions to the NDN. The former U.S. Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke said that till June 2010 NATO members had shipped more than 10,000 containers of goods through the Russian railway system, carried out around 300 flights through Russian airspace and transported more than 35,000 personnel. He thought that Russia’s support of Afghanistan was “crucial and extensive”.

Besides the NDN, the United States obtained important supplies from Russia. It was revealed that Russia had supplied aircraft fuel to the U.S. Manas base on a long-term basis. Moreover the United States bought from Russia helicopters to be used in the Afghan war. Talks are ongoing for the purchase of another 21 helicopters by the United States.

Russia does not welcome the United States keeping long-term military presence in Afghanistan and insists that the Afghan government should be independent in the end. However, Russia does not hope to see the United States pull out its troops in haste. Russia is worried that the United States and NATO will wash their hands of the matter, which will surely lead to a chaotic situation. In that case it will have to directly face a turbulent situation in Afghanistan. This will be extremely unfavorable and difficult situation for Russia: its surrounding environment will worsen and the situation in Central Asia will be more complicated. Therefore, among various goals, keeping the situation in Afghanistan stable is Russia’s priority option. Russia hopes to keep the United States and NATO there and make them continue to bear heavy burden of Afghan problems. Out of this consideration, politically Russia supports continued stationing of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, believing that “under present circumstances, the International Security Assistance Force is a force checking terrorist threat. Its continued presence conforms to the interests of Afghanistan and the region and is conducive to international security.” In December 2009, Barack Obama unveiled a new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy and decided to send another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan. Russia agreed to the goal advanced in the new U.S. Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy and expressed understanding for increased military forces in Afghanistan. This new strategy has accorded with Russia’s visions — preventing the situation in Afghanistan from deteriorating, and withdrawing U.S. troops progressively.

For Russia, Central Asia is a region more sensitive than Afghanistan. In this region Russia has untiringly tried to squeeze out U.S. military presence. After the closedown of Khanabad base in November 2005, the United States had only the Manas base left in Central Asia. Russia also intended to have the Manas base closed down. At the end of 2008, Russia promised to offer Kyrgyzstan US$2 billion of loans. Not long after that, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced in Moscow that a decision had been taken to close down the Manas base. Commentators generally believed that the two matters were inherently linked — the closedown of the base is the condition for the loans. But later Bakiyev changed his mind and stroke a deal with the United States, allowing the U.S. to continue the use of the Manas base. In the end, this led to the abandonment of Bakiyev by Russia, and foreshadowed the overthrow of Bakiyev in 2010. It can be seen here Russia boldly opposes the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, and rejects linking the U.S. military presence with the situation in Afghanistan. It should be pointed out that rather than a part of the NDN, the Manas base is a military base whose main function is to transship military personnel and fuel.

However, Russia is willing to cooperate with NATO in Central Asia. It has invited NATO to join the narcotics control exercise of the CSTO, hoping that a cooperation mechanism may be shaped between NATO and the CSTO. This practice was meant to make NATO recognize the dominant position of Russia in Central Asia and incorporate NATO’s activities in the region into the NATO-Russia bilateral framework. NATO, however, is not enthusiastic about this idea.

As for the prospect of Russia-U.S. relations, it depends upon the situation in Afghanistan to some extent. If the situation in Afghanistan worsens and remains tumultuous, it will prompt Russia and the United States to further their cooperation; if the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, it will undermine Russia-U.S. cooperation. In the present period, the United States greatly needs the support of Russia if it wants to extricate itself from Afghanistan. The NDN cannot function smoothly without Russia. But after the greater part of U.S. troops pulls out of Afghanistan, the NDN will become less important and the United States will have less expectation of Russia. Their cooperation in Afghanistan will be cut back in both space and specific matters.

Zhao Huasheng is Professor at Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies, Fudan University.