英文摘要

Abstract

3 Research on the Construction of Basic Theoretical Framework for National Security Studies

LI Wenliang

[Abstract] Constructing a basic theoretical framework for national security studies is part and parcel of disciplinary building. Without sufficient support of the basic theoretical framework for national security studies, the disciplinary construction is like building a knowledge edifice without a solid foundation. The basic theory of national security studies can only be made through a deep understanding of the connotation of national security issues. The theory-building process should follow the principle of problem-orientation and the framework of “issue-process-result”. Such contents as national security issues, national security perceptions, national security systems,national security capabilities, national security behaviors and national security limits should form a logical whole. The basic theory of national security studies takes national security issues as its logical starting point and main line. They themselves constitute the “process” of preventing and addressing national security issues as well as the premise of and guarantee for the “result” of achieving national security. In the“process”, national security issues will be prevented and addressed through the combination and application of such essential factors as national security perceptions,national security systems, national security capabilities and national security behaviors.National security limits, as a result of the realization of national security goals, mean that national security is a kind of relative security rather than an absolute one. The pursuit of absolute security will inevitably lead to a “security dilemma” and might be stuck in an infinite loop of insecurity. Pursuing common security is the core meaning of national security limits. There is no instant way for national security studies to construct a theoretical paradigm within the “issue-process-result” framework. Joint efforts should be continuously made by both the government and the academia to form a synergy in order to deepen the basic theoretical research of national security.

[Keywords] national security issues, national security processes, national security results, basic theoretical framework

[Author] LI Wenliang, Professor, University of International Relations (Beijing,100091).

30 From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: The Evolution and Return of U.S.Regional Security Strategy

FAN Jishe

[Abstract] The Biden administration attached far more importance to the Indo-Pacific region than any other U.S. administration since the end of the Cold War.Many policy measures and initiatives have been adopted and implemented in this regard, including but not limited to the following moves: The United States has increased its military presence and deployment of strategic assets; the hub-and-spokes alliance system has been further reinforced; new multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as AUKUS and QUAD have been established; newinitiatives such as Build Back Better World, Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, and Partners in the Blue Pacific have been launched with countries within and beyond this region;U.S. cooperation with other countries has been deepened and expanded to all fields including politics, economics, technology, and security, aiming to build a network excluding China’s participation and reducing China’s influence. Starting from the Biden administration, the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy has completely transformed into the Indo-Pacific strategy featuring a complete geographical coverage of the region,clearer policy objectives and more diversified policy instruments, with the relationship between the United States and its allies shifting from a vertical, hierarchical one to a more flattened one. The Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy will significantly affect the direction of American domestic and foreign policies, the political and economic development of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and the strategic competition between China and the United States. After three decades of economic globalization, coordination and cooperation among major powers on regional and global issues, as well as various attempts to promote regional integration, the Asia-Pacific region is facing the risk of transforming from a region of economic cooperation to the geopolitical arena for major powers’ strategic competition. This paper intends to examine the components and influencing factors in the U.S.Asia-Pacific security strategy over a long historical period, analyze its adjustments and changes in different time periods, and explore the actions and reactions between the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy and Sino-U.S. relations.

[Keywords] Asia-Pacific security strategy, Indo-Pacific strategy, Biden administration, Sino-U.S. relations

[Author] FAN Jishe, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Institute for International Strategic Studies at Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C. (National Academy of Governance) (Beijing, 100091).

53 Adjustments to U.S. Conventional Deterrence Strategy toward China

ZUO Xiying

[Abstract] The U.S. strategic community believes that China’s military modernization over the past two decades has greatly eroded the absolute military predominance of the United States in the West Pacific and therefore undermined the credibility of U.S. conventional deterrence against China. With the rise of China’s conventional deterrence capability, the U.S. strategic community has been advocating making fundamental changes to the conceptions and strategies of conventional deterrence against China by putting forward the concept of “integrated deterrence” and conducting deterrence by denial that aims to make China believe that no goals could be achieved in its military operations. Faced with strategic competition among major powers, the United States is trying to reinforce the deterrence effectiveness against China by strengthening its defense science and technology, enhancing its capability of deterrence by denial and consolidating its alliance system in the Asia-Pacific. Changes in the conventional deterrence capabilities of the U.S. and China have profoundly affected the strategic competition between the two countries as well as the world and regional security order. Such changes not only prompt the United States to consider and plan as a whole its nuclear and conventional forces, but also push China to rethink the relationship between its nuclear and conventional forces, which gives the United States an excuse to adjust its arms control policy, thus exerting a long-term impact on the global arms control regime.

[Keywords] Sino-US relations, deterrence by denial, conventional forces, strategiccompetition, Taiwan Question

[Author] ZUO Xiying, Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (Beijing, 100872).

81 An Analysis of the U.S. Strategy of Deterrence-by-Denial against China

CHEN Xi and GE Tengfei

[Abstract] The thoughts of deterrence by denial could date back a very long time. As a military strategy, deterrence by denial is well known for its broad, real time and challengeable nature. Deterrence by denial is more operational than punitive deterrence, which gives it more advantages in the age of information warfare. The U.S. strategic community believes that the strategy of deterrence-by-denial against China is an optimal option when the gap between the two countries is narrowing.The U.S. strategy of deterrence-by-denial against China was developed and flourished during the Trump administration, mainly featured by strengthening the flexibility of the U.S. military system and developing a new theater missile defense system. The Biden administration has applied the strategy of deterrence-by-denial against China under the framework of “integrated deterrence” and developed defense-in-depth capabilities. The U.S. understanding and application of the strategy of deterrence-by-denial have gone beyond the traditional defense-oriented model of deterrence-by-denial. This strategy aims to pull together U.S allies to stop China’s fast military operations in the Western Pacific region and help the U.S. gain regional military dominance. Although the practice of the U.S. strategy of deterrence-by-denial against China has been constrained by many internal and external factors, its negative impact on both sides is deepening and thus poses a grave challenge to regional security. China should proactively cultivate a favorable environment conducive to increasing its military strength and develop new technical equipment so as to grapple with the military coercion caused by the U.S. strategy of deterrence-by-denial against China as well as reduce various real or potential strategic risks.

[keywords] deterrence by denial, military strategy, China-US security relations,strategic stability

[Authors] CHEN Xi, Ph.D. Student, College of International Studies, National University of Defense Technology; GE Tengfei, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor,College of International Studies, National University of Defense Technology(Nanjing, 210039).

107 Space Arms Control from the Perspective of International Security：Origin, Evolution and Trend

XU Nengwu, LONG Kun and MENG Xin

[Abstract] Promoting space arms control is vital to the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind, as well as the development of the space industry of all countries. The emergence of Soviet space power in 1957 raised the specter of a “missile gap” on the part of the United States, and the two sides soon jumped into a space arms race. During the nuclear confrontation, it dawned on the United States and the Soviet Union that achieving space arms control was in line with not only their own strategic interests, but also the expectations of the international community. Therefore, in the late 1960s, a series of achievements in the first phase of space arms control were made. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a serious imbalance of power emerged in the space field, and space arms control suffered a regression from the weak Nashequilibrium in the 1970s and 1980s. In the second phase around the end of the Cold War,the space arms control progress was relatively slow due to the obstruction and withdrawal of the United States. Since 2011, space arms control has entered the third phase of development featuring fierce competition among major powers, clear-cut camps and cross-fertilization of issues. Faced with the grim reality of space militarization, all countries around the world need to actively explore and participate in the formulation of effective proposals and strategies to promote space arms control on the basis of summarizing the lessons learned from historical events and following the intrinsic mechanisms and laws of space arms control.

[Keywords] weaponization of space, arms race in space, space arms control,historical practices, development trends

[Authors] XU Nengwu, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor, College of Basic Military and Political Education, National University of Defense Technology(NUDT); LONG Kun, Ph.D. Student, College of Basic Military and Political Education, NUDT; MENG Xin, MA Student, College of Basic Military and Political Education, NUDT (Changsha, 410073).

130 The “Bottom-up” Norm-setting and the Formulation of International Cybersecurity Norms

WANG Lei

[Abstract] The use of information and communications technology poses a great threat to international peace and national security, but the formulation of international norms for cybersecurity is still in progress. While states are striving to explore ways of reaching a normative consensus, they are often subject to political and power gaming. Against this backdrop, Internet corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have started to actively engage in the norm-setting process in a “bottom-up” manner and have proposed a variety of normative initiatives that are different from the existing achievements. Can this practice break the deadlock and accelerate the formulation of international cybersecurity norms? Internet corporations and NGOs expect strict regulations on states’ behaviors in cyberspace and want to play a more important role in cybersecurity governance. Their normative initiatives driven by these expectations have indeed reinforced existing international norms in many respects. However, the state actors that dominate the norm-setting process employ a strategy of both cooperation and struggle, with Internet corporations and NGOs having limited power and influence in the norm-setting process. The United Nations Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) and a small number of states have showed limited openness to non-state actors and thus made it possible for some selected normative initiatives to be brought onto the inter-governmental agenda. But disagreements and games among states still prevent these normative initiatives from becoming widely recognized international norms. Nevertheless, with the changing way of power gaming among states, an increasing number of states tend to draw support from Internet corporations and NGOs to serve their political goals, which, along with a more balanced public-private partnership in cyberspace governance, will provide good opportunities for Internet corporations and NGOs to strive for greater norm-setting influence.

[Keywords] cybersecurity, international norms, bottom-up, multi-stakeholders,United Nations Open-ended Working Group (OEWG)

[Author] WANG Lei, Post-Doctoral Researcher at Fudan Development Institute,Fudan University (Shanghai, 200433).

（本期英文編輯：張國帥 高靜）