Might the Pandemic Pave the Way for a Universal Basic Income?疫情可能為實(shí)行全民基本收入制鋪路？

柴晚鎖 武立紅/譯

When Andrew Yang1 began his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination， his proposal for a “Freedom Dividend”—monthly cash payments of $1，000 to be paid to all Americans—distinguished him among a crowded field as an outsider and an unorthodox2 thinker. Nearly two years later， as Mr Yang leads the race for mayor of New York City， his plan to provide cash to half a million New Yorkers feels far less radical， and not just because it is much more modest than his idea for a national Universal Basic Income （UBI）.

Though UBI still meets with skepticism in many quarters， the experience of the pandemic， and the accompanying explosion in social spending， have changed the tone of discussions about radical reforms to welfare states. Cash transfers—like those deployed by many governments during the pandemic—have come to look like an efficient， effective way to meet any number of social needs. Few schemes during the pandemic offered recurring payments to all. Yet， though the age of the UBI has not dawned3， the ordeal4 of COVID-19 could have brought it closer.

Arguments for universal-income payments have flourished for centuries. Thomas Paine5 argued that the Earth is common property， and everyone who makes use of its land and resources owes society a “ground rent”， which should fund the payment of a “natural inheritance” to all adults. Plans for universal payments， and the subtly different idea of a guaranteed minimum income， were a recurring feature of welfare debates in the 20th century. Yet by the end of the century concerns about freeloading and persistently high rates of joblessness across much of Europe led to reforms that made benefits stingier6 or more contingent7 on work.

Worries about inequality and the belief—especially among tech types—that robots and artificial intelligence might soon make many workers redundant led to renewed interest in basic incomes in the 2010s. Then came COVID-19. Restrictions on activity placed huge swathes8 of society in a position of dire9， urgent economic need. Governments responded with a fire hose10 of cash. From mid-March to mid-June more than 1.1bn people received cash payments， much of which was approved with little political opposition. Cash transfers accounted for about a third of all pandemic-related social-protection policies， according to the World Bank. Americas Congress passed a COVID-relief act in March 2020 containing a provision to send no-strings-attached11 cheques of up to $1，200 to most adults by near-unanimous margins （another round of cheques followed at the end of the year）.

Residents in Japan about $950; most Singaporean adults roughly $425. Some governments experimented with payments that could be used only locally， through vouchers （as in Malta） or pre-loaded debit cards （as in parts of South Korea）. But most simply sent cash.

Pandemic assistance itself will not evolve into sustained basic-income programmes. But the worlds experience with COVID-19 could still make their eventual adoption more likely. Polling suggests that young people in both America and Europe support UBI. Both Democrats and some Republicans have expressed support for an expanded child tax credit12 in America， which would provide cash with no strings attached to families on low incomes.

Finland， for example， conducted a trial in 2017–18 in which 2，000 randomly selected unemployed Finns were paid a modest income each month， roughly equivalent in size to unemployment benefits， which was guaranteed for the term of the trial.

Among the biggest worries relating to UBI is the possibility that it might discourage recipients from seeking paid work. Yet participants who received unconditional payments actually worked more than those on the dole13. Reported well-being was substantially higher among the experimental group; recipients reported lower levels of depression and stress， a higher degree of confidence in their abilities， and more social trust than did those in the control group14.

Transfer wise

Behaviour could shift as more members of society receive generous income payments： perhaps because of a “social multiplier effect” which reflects the fact that some activities become more enjoyable as more people engage in them. That is， UBI recipients in， say， the Finnish experiment might have been more inclined to seek work because being in work is more attractive （and not being in work less so） when most people are employed—a dynamic that could potentially change were income payments to become universal.

Much of the aid provided to households over the past year has been financed with new government borrowing， up to and including Mr Bidens proposals. As accommodating15 as markets have been of government borrowing over the past year， it seems unlikely that UBI dreams can be made real without the question of financing eventually being asked and answered.

Reality cheque

Some politicians are beginning to grapple16 with the issue. Mr Lee reckons that a small UBI in South Korea could be paid for by adjusting the existing budget， but he allows that increasing the generosity of payments would require additional money. Taxes on land， carbon emissions and digital services are his preferred funding mechanisms. Mr Yang， for his part， argues that a combination of curbing spending inefficiencies and philanthropic17 donations can pay for his proposed cash transfers （which would cover only the poorest New Yorkers）.

But where the great welfare-state expansions of the mid-20th century were enabled by a spirit of solidarity and self-sacrifice， forged18 in depression and war， which made tax-financing of new benefits politically possible， the new enthusiasm for cash transfers owes more to a broad-based relaxation in concern about government borrowing. As the pandemic ends， that relaxed attitude may change as well， among some segments of the political spectrum19 at least. Only then will we learn how far along the path to a UBI the pandemic has actually moved society.

當(dāng)初楊安澤加入民主黨總統(tǒng)提名競(jìng)選時(shí)，曾提出一項(xiàng)“自由紅利”主張，倡議每月向每位美國民眾發(fā)放1000美元現(xiàn)金，從而以一個(gè)圈外人和不拘陳規(guī)的思想者在眾多競(jìng)選人中脫穎而出。時(shí)隔近兩年，楊先生參與紐約市市長競(jìng)選并領(lǐng)先于其他對(duì)手，此番他提出的向大約50萬紐約市民支付現(xiàn)金的計(jì)劃似乎遠(yuǎn)不及先前那么激進(jìn)，而其原因絕不僅僅是該計(jì)劃規(guī)模遠(yuǎn)小于在全國推行全民基本收入制（UBI）的計(jì)劃。

盡管UBI在全球很多地方依然面臨質(zhì)疑，但疫情暴發(fā)和隨之而來的社會(huì)支出井噴式增長讓人們討論福利國家銳意變革時(shí)的語氣已悄然發(fā)生改變。很多國家政府在疫情期間實(shí)施的現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)移支付儼然已成一種高效實(shí)用、立竿見影的方式，可以滿足諸多社會(huì)需求。疫情期間出臺(tái)的各種制度之中，鮮有能面向所有人實(shí)現(xiàn)多輪發(fā)錢的。然而，UBI時(shí)代的曙光雖然尚未到來，但新冠肺炎帶來的嚴(yán)峻考驗(yàn)或許讓它離我們更近了一步。

推行普惠收入制度的主張已經(jīng)盛行了好幾個(gè)世紀(jì)。托馬斯·潘恩認(rèn)為，地球是公共資產(chǎn)，每個(gè)使用其土地和資源的人都有義務(wù)向社會(huì)支付一份“地租”，而這筆租金理應(yīng)成為所有成年人享有的“自然遺產(chǎn)”收入的源泉。在20世紀(jì)圍繞福利問題展開的種種辯論之中，普惠支付方案以及與之略有不同的最低收入保障制度都是反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的焦點(diǎn)話題。然而，到世紀(jì)末，出于對(duì)“吃白食”問題的擔(dān)憂，加之歐洲大部分地區(qū)失業(yè)率居高不下，很多國家不得不推行變革，逐漸收緊福利，強(qiáng)化了福利與工作狀況之間的關(guān)聯(lián)。

2010年代，擔(dān)憂不平等問題，加上人們（尤其是技術(shù)派人士）堅(jiān)信機(jī)器人及人工智能不久或許就會(huì)讓很多工人成為多余，這再一次激起了人們對(duì)基本收入制度的興趣。隨后便暴發(fā)了新冠肺炎疫情。對(duì)活動(dòng)的限制致使全社會(huì)很大一部分人陷入了經(jīng)濟(jì)拮據(jù)、緊張窘迫的境地。為應(yīng)對(duì)這一局面，各國政府紛紛發(fā)放現(xiàn)金紓困，3月中至6月中，超過11億人收到了政府發(fā)放的現(xiàn)金補(bǔ)助，其中大部分方案在獲批過程中幾乎沒有受到任何政治阻力。據(jù)世界銀行統(tǒng)計(jì)，在所有與新冠疫情相關(guān)的社會(huì)保障政策之中，現(xiàn)金調(diào)撥占比達(dá)1/3左右。2020年3月，美國國會(huì)近乎全票通過了一項(xiàng)新冠肺炎紓困法案，其中一個(gè)條款規(guī)定，向絕大多數(shù)成年人提供最高不超過1200美元的現(xiàn)金，且不附帶任何條件（年底又發(fā)放了一輪）。

日本給國民發(fā)放約950美元，新加坡絕大多數(shù)成年人可拿到約425美元。有些政府則嘗試發(fā)放了僅限當(dāng)?shù)厥褂玫难a(bǔ)助，比如（馬耳他實(shí)行的）代金券、（韓國某些地方實(shí)行的）預(yù)充值借記卡等。但大多數(shù)國家都是直接發(fā)放現(xiàn)金。

疫情紓困補(bǔ)貼本身不會(huì)演變成為持續(xù)性的基本收入保障制度，但全世界遭遇新冠疫情仍可能提高其最終得以采納的可能性。民調(diào)結(jié)果顯示，美國和歐洲的年輕人普遍支持UBI。民主黨人和一些共和黨人士都已表態(tài)，支持美國出臺(tái)擴(kuò)容版的兒童稅收抵免方案，向低收入家庭提供不附帶任何條件的現(xiàn)金補(bǔ)貼。

例如，芬蘭曾于2017至2018年間推行一項(xiàng)試驗(yàn)，向隨機(jī)抽選的2000名無業(yè)國民每月發(fā)放一筆適量的補(bǔ)貼，金額與失業(yè)補(bǔ)貼金大致相當(dāng)，試驗(yàn)項(xiàng)目結(jié)束停止支付。

UBI引發(fā)的所有最大擔(dān)憂中，有一個(gè)是它可能助長惰性，導(dǎo)致領(lǐng)取人不再積極尋找有償就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。但結(jié)果表明，相較依賴失業(yè)救濟(jì)金維持生活者而言，領(lǐng)到無條件補(bǔ)助金的參與者實(shí)際上參與勞動(dòng)的積極性更高。受試組成員報(bào)稱的幸福感顯著較強(qiáng);相較對(duì)照組來看，他們報(bào)稱抑郁和焦慮的程度更低，對(duì)自身能力的信心更足，對(duì)社會(huì)的信任度也更高。

理想：轉(zhuǎn)移支付是上策

隨著社會(huì)成員中領(lǐng)取豐厚補(bǔ)貼的人數(shù)上升，人們的行為方式可能隨之發(fā)生變化：這或許與“社會(huì)乘數(shù)效應(yīng)”有關(guān)——該效應(yīng)所反映的基本事實(shí)是，隨著參與其中的人數(shù)增多，某些活動(dòng)也會(huì)相應(yīng)變得更加富于樂趣。拿芬蘭那項(xiàng)試驗(yàn)為例，領(lǐng)取到全民基本收入的參與者之所以找工作更積極，或許是因?yàn)樵诖蠖鄶?shù)人都處于就業(yè)狀態(tài)的情況下，有活兒可干才更具吸引力（而無工可作則相對(duì)乏味）——假如發(fā)放補(bǔ)貼成為一種普惠性制度，這一狀況可能發(fā)生改變。

截至拜登總統(tǒng)提出的最新提案（包括該提案在內(nèi)），過去一年提供給每戶家庭的補(bǔ)助大部分來自政府新的借債。盡管過去一年市場(chǎng)對(duì)政府舉債行為總體保持相對(duì)包容的態(tài)度，但融資問題終究要面對(duì)并解決，否則UBI的夢(mèng)想就不太可能實(shí)現(xiàn)。

現(xiàn)實(shí)：資金從何而來

某些政治家已開始探索解決這一問題的途徑。據(jù)京畿道李在明知事分析，在韓國推行小規(guī)模UBI所需的經(jīng)費(fèi)可以通過調(diào)整現(xiàn)有預(yù)算體制來籌集，不過他也承認(rèn)，如果想讓補(bǔ)貼更為優(yōu)厚，就必須有額外的資金來源。加征土地稅、碳排放稅、數(shù)字服務(wù)稅等都是他所傾向的籌資途徑。就楊安澤先生來說，他主張遏制低效支出和借助慈善捐助雙管齊下，這樣就可以滿足他提議的現(xiàn)金調(diào)撥方案的經(jīng)費(fèi)需求（該方案僅覆蓋紐約市民中最貧困的群體）。

然而，20世紀(jì)中期福利國家各項(xiàng)重大的擴(kuò)張計(jì)劃之所以能夠?qū)嵤?，得益于?jīng)過經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條和戰(zhàn)爭的雙重洗禮后民眾表現(xiàn)出的團(tuán)結(jié)一心和自我犧牲的精神，進(jìn)而使得通過加稅為新的福利政策籌措資金在政治上行得通。相比之下，目前對(duì)現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)移支付的熱情則更多歸因于公眾普遍減少了對(duì)政府舉債的關(guān)切。隨著疫情趨近結(jié)束，這一相對(duì)寬容的態(tài)度或許也將發(fā)生改變，至少，各政治派別中某些群體的態(tài)度會(huì)發(fā)生變化。只有到了那時(shí)，我們才會(huì)知道，在實(shí)現(xiàn)UBI的征途中，新冠疫情對(duì)社會(huì)的推動(dòng)作用究竟幾何。

（譯者單位：北京林業(yè)大學(xué)外語學(xué)院）