RCEP成員國多次呼吁印度回歸，如此執(zhí)著為哪般？

黃昀昀

在2019年11月印度宣布退出《區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》（RCEP）談判之后，15個(gè)成員國于2020年11月正式簽署RCEP，完成了8年“長跑”。不過在2020年12月7日，新加坡總理李顯龍?jiān)谝粓龌顒?dòng)中表示，希望印度未來重新考慮加入RCEP。

2021年，新加坡將接過東盟—印度對話協(xié)調(diào)國一棒。李顯龍稱，新加坡期待深化雙方關(guān)系，就廣泛課題進(jìn)行探討。除了新加坡，馬來西亞、日本、澳大利亞等RCEP成員國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都曾向印度表示類似的期待。而這背后有著怎樣的考量呢？

印度“退群”意在保護(hù)本國農(nóng)業(yè)與制造業(yè)

在復(fù)旦大學(xué)南亞研究中心主任張家棟看來，國內(nèi)利益集團(tuán)的抵制是導(dǎo)致印度“退群”的重要原因之一。若加入RCEP，印度勢必在國內(nèi)進(jìn)行改革。那就難以避免地觸及少數(shù)大家族企業(yè)利益，因此他們并不歡迎RCEP?！斑@樣一來，印度經(jīng)濟(jì)的供給端缺少競爭，效率不高;經(jīng)濟(jì)的消費(fèi)端缺少規(guī)模，效益不足。這一經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)既困擾著印度經(jīng)濟(jì)，也使得印度難以進(jìn)行深層次的改革開放。”張家棟說。

中國商務(wù)部研究院國際市場研究所副所長白明分析，印度此舉的根本原因是要保護(hù)其國內(nèi)數(shù)億人口所從事的農(nóng)業(yè)和制造業(yè)。整體來看，印度的產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)仍較為落后。世界銀行數(shù)據(jù)顯示，2019年，印度制造業(yè)占GDP的比重不到15%，在全球處于偏低水平?！霸赗CEP的協(xié)議下，各個(gè)成員國之間關(guān)稅降低，將進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大印度持續(xù)存在了幾十年的貿(mào)易逆差，導(dǎo)致印度商品更難出口，國民經(jīng)濟(jì)或許陷入停滯。”

對于印度政府的抉擇，印媒《商業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)報(bào)》評論道：“印度承擔(dān)不起如此做的后果?！?/p>

經(jīng)濟(jì)利益驅(qū)動(dòng)?xùn)|盟期待印度“回心轉(zhuǎn)意”

盡管印度的中途退出，令RCEP成員國曾經(jīng)做出的妥協(xié)付之一炬，但根據(jù)《區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟(jì)伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人聯(lián)合聲明》，RCEP仍對印度保持開放。目前，印度還可以觀察員身份參加RCEP會(huì)議以及和RCEP簽署方舉行經(jīng)濟(jì)合作活動(dòng)。

為何成員國，尤其是東盟仍堅(jiān)持不懈地喊話印度回歸RCEP？說到底還是離不開“利益”二字。

眾所周知，目前印度是亞洲成長速度最快的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體之一。在此過程中，消費(fèi)市場得到升級，大眾對中高端產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的需求出現(xiàn)了缺口，而印度的產(chǎn)業(yè)仍較為低端。

反觀東盟，由于承接了眾多來自中日韓等國的產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移，其大部分制造業(yè)已邁入中端階段。2015年，東盟宣告完成產(chǎn)業(yè)升級。2019年，東盟10國GDP總量為3.14萬億美元，同比增長8.2%。

因此，在很長一段時(shí)間內(nèi)，印度和東盟有條件在產(chǎn)業(yè)上實(shí)現(xiàn)互補(bǔ)。另外，雖然印度“爽約”RCEP，但其對發(fā)展與東盟的經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系仍持有較大的興趣。11月12日，印度外交部高級官員達(dá)斯（Riva Ganguly Das）表態(tài)，印度下一步將重點(diǎn)發(fā)展與東南亞的貿(mào)易關(guān)系。

當(dāng)我們將視線鎖定在新加坡時(shí)，不難發(fā)現(xiàn)它是東盟中與印度商業(yè)、文化交流最密切的國家。2018年，印度總理莫迪在新加坡舉行的香格里拉對話會(huì)上曾表示，“新加坡是我們走向東盟的跳板。幾個(gè)世紀(jì)以來，它一直是印度通往東方的門戶”。

根據(jù)印度政府公布的最新數(shù)據(jù)，2020～2021財(cái)年的上半個(gè)財(cái)年（4～9月），新加坡流入印度的外國直接投資達(dá)83億美元，排名第一，遠(yuǎn)超第二名美國的71.2億美元。2019～2020財(cái)年，新加坡為印度最大的外國直接投資來源地，占印度外國直接投資總額的30%。

在上海國際問題研究院亞太研究中心副研究員周士新看來，新加坡是地區(qū)重要的貿(mào)易自由港，相比其他東盟國家，印度的加入對其幾乎沒有負(fù)面影響，還可以加強(qiáng)新加坡在RCEP以及東盟中的地位，平衡各國的貿(mào)易比重。因此，新加坡在挽回印度方面顯得尤為積極。

加不加入，是個(gè)問題

在業(yè)界，中印合作曾被認(rèn)為是RCEP談判獲得突破的關(guān)鍵。因?yàn)橹袊c印度皆為亞太地區(qū)最大的市場，但貿(mào)易逆差又是橫亙在雙方間無法忽視的問題。

按照原有計(jì)劃，若印度沒有“爽約”，那么中印兩國將首次打通多道貿(mào)易、投資壁壘。“這從開拓地區(qū)生產(chǎn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)、便利地區(qū)貿(mào)易來看意義重大。”中國社會(huì)科學(xué)院亞太經(jīng)合組織與東亞合作研究中心秘書長沈銘輝說，另外，這于對抗逆全球化和貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義而言，也具有一定的象征性意義。

在對外貿(mào)易方面，印度失去的機(jī)會(huì)不止RCEP。2019年6月5日，美國政府正式取消給予印度的普惠制待遇。這一舉措將導(dǎo)致美國和印度的貿(mào)易關(guān)系變得更加緊張。據(jù)美方透露，美印之后也不會(huì)很快達(dá)成一份主要貿(mào)易協(xié)議。

那么，若印度未來選擇回歸RCEP，尚有機(jī)會(huì)抓住亞洲市場，尤其是中國市場。雖然印度國內(nèi)不少人對中印貿(mào)易逆差表示擔(dān)憂，但也出現(xiàn)了另一種聲音：來自中國的資本也可視為對貿(mào)易逆差的彌補(bǔ)。

對于印度與RCEP的未來走向問題，上海國際問題研究院中國與南亞合作研究中心秘書長劉宗義從印度自身發(fā)展角度進(jìn)行分析，他表示，如果印度的制造業(yè)有所突破，就有可能深化與東南亞國家的貿(mào)易，反之如果自身商品缺乏競爭力的話，就只會(huì)變成一廂情愿。

·來源：新華網(wǎng)、第一財(cái)經(jīng)等

Unleash the Potential of RCEP Cooperation

By Kentaro Iwamoto

About two weeks after China signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership trade megadeal with 14 other Asia-Pacific economies， Premier Li Keqiang stressed the need to walk the talk.

“As a member of the RCEP， our country should actively promote the implementation of the agreement with our own actions， safeguard free trade and expand new space for win-win cooperation，” Li said at a State Council executive meeting in Beijing on Dec. 1， 2020.

The RCEP grouping of China， Japan， South Korea， Australia， New Zealand and the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations constitutes around 30% of global GDP and population. One estimate， published by the U.S.-based Peterson Institute for International Economics before the Nov. 15 signing， projected the deal could add US$ 500 billion to world exports in 2030.

The big three East Asian countries — connected by a free trade agreement for the first time — stand to gain the most， according to the study. Chinas exports are projected to rise by US$ 248 billion thanks to RCEP， with Japan seeing an extra US$ 128 billion and South Korea US$ 63 billion. Trade among them should account for a significant portion of the increase.

Another study by the Japan Institute of International Affairs indicated that South Korea may see the biggest economic contribution， with RCEP adding 6.5% to real GDP while Japan gains 5% and China 4.6%.

Sachs agreed that “China， Japan， and South Korea together form a technological powerhouse， and by joining together in RCEP， that technological dynamism of the three countries can be greatly enhanced.” But he also emphasized that ASEAN countries and the whole region should benefit from “peaceful cooperation， more foreign investment， and faster upgrading of digital and green technologies.”

All this hinges on ratification. But an Economist Intelligence Unit report predicted the required six ASEAN countries and three non-ASEAN states will approve the deal by the third quarter of 2021. For now， signatories are weighing how to get the most out of the accord.

In December， the South Korean government hosted a meeting with steel， automobile， machinery and textile industry associations — four sectors expected to reap the sweetest rewards. RCEP countries accounted for 53.2% of South Koreas steel exports in 2020， up from 46.8% in 2019. The steelmaking association expects a 4.3 million ton increase in ASEAN demand for the material in 2021， to 77.3 million tons.

South Korean automakers hope RCEP will help them eat into Japanese rivals 74% share of a Southeast Asian market with 650 million people and 3.5 million annual car sales.

Japanese carmakers， of course， want more ASEAN sales themselves. And Japans industrial equipment makers will enjoy tariff-free access to China on 86% of products， up from 8%， while South Korea will remove tariffs on 92%， up from 19%.

As for ASEAN states already taking advantage of existing FTAs， reduced non-tariff barriers will lead to lower import costs and greater competitiveness， according to Kensuke Yanagida at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. He said Malaysia， the Philippines， Singapore and Thailand can expect more electronics exports， for example.

Beyond tariffs， “RCEP harmonizes rules-of-origin provisions and establishes a single set of regional content rules， effectively creating a single market for intermediate goods that will promote the creation of supply chains across the region，” sid the EIU report. The think tank added that an integrated customs regime could drive foreign investment into smaller ASEAN markets where regulatory uncertainty is an impediment， such as Myanmar， Laos and Cambodia.

This acceleration of Asian trade and investment would follow a sharp global deceleration. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic， the World Trade Organization forecast in October that global merchandise trade volume would shrink 9.2% in 2020. The International Monetary Fund projected a 4.4% decline in world GDP for the year.

Other recent developments suggest China — one of the few economies set to post growth for 2020 — is determined to grab the reins of the global economy and gallop out of the COVID crisis.

Just before New Years， Beijing sealed an investment pact with the European Union. Days after the RCEP signing， Chinese President Xi Jinping also expressed interest in joining another trade megadeal， the 11-member Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership.

But some see complications ahead.

Raj Bhala， a distinguished professor at the University of Kansas specializing in trade law， noted that RCEP is less ambitious than the CPTPP and other major deals when it comes to “breadth of coverage” of goods and services， foreign direct investment and intellectual property.

Alex Capri， research fellow at the Asia-based Hinrich Foundation， made a similar point. Capri said RCEP is a welcome vision of multilateralism but warned the members “have disparate capacity to enforce ‘deep trade standards.”

“In general， the agreement allows individual countries to opt out and cherry pick key provisions. At best， its a tiered agreement，” said Capri， also a visiting senior fellow at Singapores NUS Business School. “Indonesia， for example， has asked for a two-year delay to implement trade facilitation provisions. Even as RCEP champions E-commerce， investment and dispute settlement， individual countries in the region are doubling down on data localization laws.” “Will the agreements provisions ultimately be broadly and uniformly enacted and enforced？ I doubt it.”

Limited ambition and uncertain implementation are not the only factors that could stop RCEP from tipping the global balance. Both Bhala and Capri pointed to Joe Bidens victory over Trump in the U.S. presidential election， and his desire to reassert American leadership.

Biden has not said whether he would consider joining RCEP or reversing Trumps decision to withdraw from what became the CPTPP. But in a Dec. 28 speech， the president vowed to “regain the trust and confidence of the world.”

Bhala predicted that Bidens first couple of years might not bring a major free trade move， “but thereafter youll probably see some stronger efforts.”

· Source： Nikkei Asia

· Original Title： RCEP： China to Gain as Trade Pact Ripples Across Post-COVID-19 World