China-US Strategic Competition under the Biden Administration

Wu Xinbo

With his four-year term of office as President of the United States， Donald Trump has caused unprecedented damage to China-US relations. Now， as Joe Biden takes power at the White House， there are widespread concerns about the following issues： How is Bidens China policy different from Trumps？ How will the United States carry out strategic competition with China and how will China respond？ And how will China-US relations evolve in the next four years？

The Biden administration is confronted with a domestic and international situation which is far different from four years ago， and it will， to a great extent， determine its policy agenda and priorities. On the China issue， Biden is expected to continue with key elements of Trumps strategic competition policy while making some major adjustments. This will provide not only challenges but also opportunities for bilateral relations. At the same time， with its growing strength and improved maneuvering skills， China will play an increasingly greater role in shaping the relationship. In the next four years， there will exist important opportunities for the easing of China-US tension and improvement of the bilateral relationship. Under the present evolving trend of China-US relations， such policy adjustment may be only tactical， but will also be very crucial.

The Environment for Bidens China Policy Formulation

After taking office， Biden has now to tackle many extremely thorny domestic issues， among which putting COVID-19 under control， recovering the American economy， and improving racial relations are his top priorities. Given the rampant spread of COVID-19 in the US， it will take half a year or more to fully contain the coronavirus， and economic recovery depends largely on the trajectory of the pandemic. As for racial tension， it remains a systemic malady in the US and no significant improvement is expected in the short run. As a result， Biden will focus on domestic challenges and he will remain politically weak， at least for now， since he is unlikely to make significant progress on these issues.

As far as the China policy is concerned， the first thing Biden has to deal with is the negative legacy left over from Trump. The Trump administration defined China as Americas most important strategic competitor and advocated a tough policy to meet Chinas challenges. This has become a consensus in the American policy-making circle. But Trumps bottomless strategic competition and reckless strategic confrontation with China have dealt an unprecedented blow to China-US relations. How to clean up this mess is Bidens biggest problem in dealing with China.

Externally， important changes have taken place in the past four years. In 2016， Chinas economic size was about 60 percent of that of the US. By 2020， it had jumped to over 70 percent.1 The gap in the balance of power between China and the US is narrowing. China has achieved the goal of poverty alleviation as scheduled. This is not only a tremendous accomplishment of China， but also a significant contribution to poverty reduction and social development of mankind. China has withstood the trade frictions and technological blockades initiated by the Trump administration， quickly and effectively controlled the COVID-19 epidemic at home， and taken the lead in restoring robust economic growth. This shows the vitality and resilience of Chinas political system， and greatly boosts the confidence and pride of the Chinese people. In the face of changes in the external environment and the needs of the new development stage， China has made timely adjustment to its development strategy， vigorously promoted independent innovations in key technologies， established a “dual circulation” development pattern， opened wider to the outside world， pushed for the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership， and concluded negotiations on the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. Under such new historical conditions， China is actively implementing the new strategic layout， showing promising development momentum and prospects.

During the same period， the external environment of the US has severely deteriorated under the impact of Trumps policies. Driven by the concept of “America First，” the Trump administration took a cavalier attitude toward international institutions and mechanisms and withdrew from them whenever they did not satisfy Washingtons demands， setting a record of US withdrawal from international organizations. Trump launched trade wars against allies， exited the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear issue， initiated sanctions against the “Nord Stream 2” natural gas pipeline projects jointly built by Germany and Russia， unilaterally pulled out its troops from Germany， and exerted pressure on Japan and the ROK on defense burden-sharing. A series of actions like these have damaged the interests of， and caused serious discontent among， Washingtons allies， resulting in unprecedented division between the US and its allies. Trump launched allround strategic competition with China and resorted to extreme measures in suppressing China. His political attacks on China resembled a return to the Cold War era， and caused unprecedented intensity of diplomatic confrontation between the two countries. The bullying actions taken by the Trump administration have led to severe turbulence in majorcountry relations， undermined major-power cooperation that is essential to addressing global challenges， threatened the security of global industrial， value and supply chains， and trampled on international rules and order. With“America First，” the Trump administration did whatever it could to pursue its interests in disregard of any countrys bottom line. With its antagonism， destructiveness and danger fully revealed， the US has turned from the founder and defender of the existing international order into its biggest destroyer， and its reputation and credibility in the international community has suffered a heavy blow.

The priority of the domestic agenda， the constraints of Trumps political legacy， the changing pattern of China-US interaction， and the declining US status and influence in the world will all gravely restrain the designing and implementation of Bidens China policy. In the next four years， it will be difficult for the US to completely shake itself free from the Trump shadow in its China policy， and any improvement of US relations with China will be gradual， limited and even difficult.

The New Trend in US Strategic Competition with China

Biden once said during his election campaign that Americas “biggest competitor is China.”2 After taking office， he declared that China was Americas “most serious competitor” and that the United States would “push back on Chinas attack on human rights， intellectual property， and global governance.”3 Secretary of State Antony Blinken defined the relationship with China as “the biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century，” asserting that “China is the only country with the economic， diplomatic， military and technological power to seriously challenge a stable and open international system.”4 White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki also said that “we are in a serious competition with China” and that “strategic competition with China is a defining feature of the 21st century.”5

Therefore， competition will be a core concept in the Biden administrations thinking on China， the organizing principle of its China policy， and the keynote in its handling of the relationship with China. At the same time， the Biden administration may redefine the role of competition in its China strategy and the main connotations of US competition with China， making certain changes in terms of its approach.

The Biden administrations competition with China will focus on the following aspects：

Competition for technological superiority. Technology is seen as“the center of US-China competition.”6 In order to maintain Americas leading position in technological innovation， the Biden administration will compete with China in artificial intelligence， quantum computing， biotechnology， clean energy and other key emerging technologies.7 As for the pattern of competition， it will block China from acquiring advanced， emerging and critical basic technologies， and prevent China from narrowing the technological gap with the US. Meanwhile， it will increase investment in research and development to ensure Americas technological superiority. Unlike the Trump administrations extensive technological decoupling in the name of national security， Bidens government is likely to adopt an approach of “small yard， high fence，” reduce the scope of technological blockade and strengthen the protection of key technologies.8 To compete with China in technology， the Biden administration will put more emphasis on multilateral approaches. In addition to working together with its allies to tighten technological regulation against China， the US will make joint efforts with core allies to develop communications equipment and promote a semiconductor supply chain that is not dependent on China.9 In addition， the Biden administration will maintain the United States leading position in artificial intelligence， quantum computing， semiconductors， 5G and other fields by increasing spending on research and development and on purchasing American goods and services.

Competition for rules-making power. Biden claims he believes in“fair trade.” To prevent international economic rules from hurting American interests， he suggested new international rules be established in areas such as digital technology and biotechnology， and international trade rules be revised on subsidies and government procurement.10 After taking office， Biden said the US would engage in “extreme competition” with China with a focus on international rules.11 To be specific， the US will carry out rulessetting competition with China particularly with regard to state-owned enterprises， labor standards， environmental standards， intellectual property protection， “forced technology transfer” and other areas. To prevent China from dominating digital economic technologies and industries， Bidens government will also work to set up multilateral digital infrastructure standards and rules that would significantly limit the international market available for Chinese companies engaging in the digital economy， on the pretext of protecting data privacy and preventing “authoritarian government”from using digital technology to spy on their citizens.

Competition over values. Secretary Blinken prioritizes “renewing democracy” in US foreign policy， vowing to support democracy around the world， with a particular emphasis on defending US values in relations with China.12 By highlighting value in its rivalry with China， the Biden administration is not only following the Democratic Partys ideological preference； it also has practical policy considerations such as mobilizing domestic public support and attracting global allies. Different from Trumps blatant attacks on Chinas political system and the Communist Party， the Biden administration will resort to an issue-oriented approach to pressure China on issues related to Hong Kong， Xinjiang and Tibet， and link them up with issues of concern for China as a bargaining chip. At the same time， the Biden administration will work energetically to mobilize American allies by convening a “Summit for Democracy” to build up an anti-China coalition.

Competition in the security arena. In terms of security competition with China， the Biden administration inherits the major elements of Obamas Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy and Trumps Indo-Pacific strategy， focusing on security competition in the West Pacific， attaching great importance to the South China Sea and stepping up Americas involvement on the Taiwan question. In terms of approach， the US will increase its military presence in relevant regions， enhance its offensive and defensive capabilities in the West Pacific， increase military and intelligence cooperation with the Taiwan authorities， and give assistance to some Southeast Asian countries in their maritime force build-up. The Biden administration will continue to use the “Quad cooperation” among the US， Japan， Australia and India as the main platform，13 while stepping up efforts to win over some Southeast Asian countries. In addition， cyberspace is also an important area for US security competition with China， and the US will strengthen its advantages in terms of capabilities and rules.

Competition in the financial field. Trump launched a financial war against China， restricted the listing of Chinese companies in the US and the access of US funds to the Chinese stock market， and imposed financial sanctions on some Chinese citizens and entities. In addition to a possible extension of the above-mentioned approach， the Biden administration is expected to block the internationalization of the Chinese currency. At a time when the US dollar depreciates， the Chinese economy keeps growing and the appreciation of the renminbi seems promising， renminbi internationalization will gain more momentum， which Washington takes as a challenge to the dollars dominance. Thus， curbing the process will be a pivotal potential option for Biden to compete financially with China. Specific measures may include： blocking the increase of Chinese voting power and quota in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund， preventing some countries from incorporating the renminbi as their reserve currencies， and holding back these countries from entering into bilateral currency swap agreements with China.

Compared with the previous administration， the Biden administration will be different in its approaches to competition with China. While the Trump administration focused on suppressing and weakening China， the Biden administration will stress enhancing the United States own competitiveness and seek to win the competition through the revitalization of the American economy， namely through increasing investment in scientific research， launching industrial policies and improving infrastructure. Although Trump also tried to confront China together with allies and other countries， the strong unilateralist nature of his policies and his actions to cripple alliances made it impossible to form an anti-China coalition. The Biden administration will pay more attention to coordination with allies， and win their cooperation and support in areas such as economic and trade rules， technological regulation， investment restrictions， values and security. In addition， Biden will actively use multilateral mechanisms such as the World Trade Organization and the Group of 20 to advance competition with China over rules-making and revision as well as agenda-setting. Trumps competition with China was reckless， regardless of the cost， and often inflicted huge losses to the US itself while hurting others. A large part of his heavy tariffs on China were borne by US consumers and manufacturers. In contrast to that， the Biden administration will focus on cost control and stress “smart competition” to reduce head-on collision and avoid a lose-lose situation. While Trumps strategic competition with China deteriorated to strategic confrontation that almost excluded any cooperation， Biden has made it clear that he wants to cooperate with China on issues of converging interests， such as climate change， nuclear non-proliferation and global public health security.14

Undoubtedly， the Biden administrations strategic competition with China will be constrained by a number of factors. First is the evolution of Americas political， economic and social situation at home. It remains highly uncertain whether the domestic political and social conflicts will be alleviated， whether the pandemic will be effectively controlled in a short time of about half a year， and whether the American economy will gradually recover and a new crisis be avoided. All this will greatly affect the resources and energy expended in diplomacy by the Biden administration. The second is the influence of interest groups. Poised as a non-establishment candidate， Trump did his utmost to exclude the influence of Wall Street， Silicon Valley， manufacturing， retail and other related interest groups on China issues. The Biden administration， typically belonging to the establishment， is inextricably linked to the various interest groups in the US， which will in turn seek to exert influence on Bidens China policy.15 And the third is the role of Americas allies. Biden attaches great importance to coordination with allies in responding to China. This not only means that the US will seek support and cooperation from its allies in handling relations with China， but also means that Americas allies will have the chance to influence Washingtons China policy. The Biden administration has made a particular point of coordinating its stance on China with its European allies， declaring that “together we must prepare for a long-term strategic competition with China.”16 However， the interests of Brussels in relations with China are not exactly the same as those of Washington， and the two have divergent views of China，17 which means that it is impossible for Europe to follow Washingtons lead on China， and Washington at times must take the European position into account. Most of American allies in the Asia-Pacific region have close economic ties with China， and it will be a hard job to force them to remain in lock-step with Washington on China-related issues.

Chinas Response

China has a clear understanding of the United States China policy and the direction of China-US relations under the Biden administration. The long-lasting and protracted strategic competition between China and the US is a product of the evolving international landscape as well as respective development and changes taking place in both countries. The Biden administration will continue strategic competition with China and spare no effort to slow down Chinas growth in overall national strength and global influence in order to maintain American dominance in the world. However， Bidens China policy will manifest different features than Trumps. This will not only pose new challenges to the development of the bilateral relations， but also bring about opportunities for cooperation. Properly seizing these opportunities will help improve China-US relations. In this process， any initiative taken by China is crucial. As Chinas strength grows and its international position rises， its domestic development strategy and foreign policy strategy have been correspondingly adjusted. With more self-confidence and richer experience and skills in strategic maneuvering with the US， China will be in a better position to effectively cope with strategic competition launched by the US， and shape a more competitive bilateral relationship.

It is expected that， in the coming years， the Biden administration will keep on pressuring China on issues related to Hong Kong， Xinjiang and Tibet and table new measures， while mobilizing more allies for active involvement in these issues. China will stand up steadfastly to American pressure on issues concerning its sovereignty， territorial integrity as well as its political security. The contest between the two countries on these issues is bound to be acute and intense， and some of Americas allies will also get involved to varying degrees. At the same time， the US may try to put China-US competition into an ideological context and lay out a “Cold War trap” for China. China should maintain a high degree of vigilance in order to avoid this competition being portrayed as one over political systems and ideology. In fact， the essence of China-US competition is a contest provoked by the US to maintain its hegemony and to contain Chinas development. It epitomizes Washingtons efforts to maintain a unipolar world and resist the global trend of multi-polarization. The actions taken by China are intended to safeguard its legitimate rights of development， advance multi-polarization， safeguard multilateralism and promote global governance.

Economics and trade， science and technology， and finance will remain major battlegrounds of China-US competition. The Biden administration seeks to benefit from Chinas rapid economic growth while attempting to deter its increasing might. This has resulted in a bilateral relationship that features both cooperation and competition. China should step up reform and opening-up， further open its market and improve its business environment so as to provide more opportunities for US access to the Chinese market and win support from the American business community for bilateral economic and trade ties. At the same time， China should vigorously promote independent technological innovation， reduce its dependence on US technology， lower its vulnerability in key technological fields， and better safeguard the security of its own supply and industrial chains. In addition， through institutional trade and investment arrangements， China can deepen economic and trade cooperation with East Asian and European countries， effectively diversify its export and investment destinations， and avoid as much as possible the risks entailed by US trade and investment protectionism. In the face of promising economic development prospects and a steady appreciation of the renminbi， China should actively promote its currency internationalization strategy， expand the renminbi cross-border payment system， reduce dependence on the US dollar and mitigate external financial risks. In the fight against the tariffs and technological blockade imposed by the Trump administration， China has already accumulated a lot of useful experience， and effectively fought back American provocations through tariffs， export control， sanctions and other means. All the approaches are also applicable to the China-US economic and trade competition during the Biden era.

The Biden administration will step up pressure on China regarding the South China Sea and Taiwan. On the South China Sea issue， China will continue to stand up to US pressure and firmly safeguard Chinas sovereignty， maritime rights and security interests. At the same time， China will continuously promote talks with ASEAN countries on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea， properly handle maritime disputes with relevant countries through bilateral negotiations and consultations， and ensure overall stability in the South China Sea. As for the Taiwan question， under new circumstances， China should actively enhance its ability to shape the security environment and steadily improve its management of the situation across the Taiwan Strait. With increasing intensity and frequency of interactions between Chinese and American militaries in the West Pacific， the risk of maritime and air contingencies is also on the rise. Therefore， the two militaries should make good use of their communication channels to promote confidence-building measures， and improve mechanism building and practice for risk control， crisis prevention and management.

The Biden administration accepts the concept of globalization and global governance， promises to return to multilateralism， and wishes to play a leading role in international affairs. This provides important opportunities for China-US cooperation. It is necessary and possible for the two countries to cooperate on such regional hotspot issues as climate change， global public health， reform of the international economic and financial governance system， the Iranian nuclear issue and the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. At the same time， the Biden administration will spend more efforts to use multilateral mechanisms in its competition with China. It may further advance those multilateral economic and trade cooperation arrangements that exclude China， embed major-power competition in global governance mechanisms， suppress and restrict China through rulesmaking and agenda-setting， and block Chinas participation in bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives. In view of this， China should prepare itself for dealing with the US within the frameworks of the United Nations， the International Monetary Fund， the World Bank， the World Trade Organization and the Group of 20， and guard against US meddling in East Asian cooperation， Eurasian cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative. To sum up， the competition between China and the US in multilateral arenas will intensify， and Washington will show an increasingly utilitarian attitude toward multilateral mechanisms. This will seriously erode the space and effectiveness of bilateral cooperation in multilateral fields.

Under the new situation， China finds it more and more necessary to get rid of conventional thinking and experience， and reconsider the ChinaUS relationship. In handling competition with the US， China will take its internal imperatives as the starting point， focus on bilateral issues while winning support at the multilateral level. As a manifestation of majorcountry competition in the 21st century， “the competition between China and the United States， in essence， is a struggle between economic strength and social governance capacity，”18 which means the outcome of this competition lies in the two countries respective internal development and governance. As it moves into a new development stage， China will build a new development pattern based on smooth circulation of the national economy， gain new development momentum through scientific and technological innovation， stimulate new development vitality through deepening reform， create new advantages in international cooperation and competition through high-level opening-up， and achieve new breakthroughs in social development by joint construction， shared governance and mutual benefits. All this will ensure further growth of Chinas national strength and improvement of its governance. It is also the basis on which China should handle its relations with the US in the new era. At the same time， with the development of economic globalization， regionalization and political multipolarization， as well as the strengthening of its comprehensive national might and governance capacity， China will be able to play a bigger role in international political and economic affairs， and thus take the lead and help shape China-US relations at the international level.

On February 11， 2021， in his phone call with President Biden， Chinese President Xi Jinping advocated that the two countries focus on cooperation while managing their differences. He suggested that various dialogue mechanisms be reopened， in-depth communication between the two foreign ministries be conducted， and engagement be carried out between economic， financial， law enforcement， military authorities of the two sides. President Xi also urged the US side to respect Chinas core interests on the Taiwan question and issues relating to Hong Kong， Xinjiang， and act prudently.19 These constructive proposals， practical suggestions and earnest advice by China are of great significance for a restart of China-US relations and the proper handling of major and sensitive issues between the two countries.

Future Trend of China-US Relations

To a great extent， the direction of China-US relations during the Biden administration depends on American actions on two issues： how Washington deals with the Trump legacy， and how it resets the China agenda.

During the four years in office， Trump launched strategic competition and confrontation with China， and caused unprecedented damage to the bilateral relations. How to deal with this mess is a big challenge for the Biden administration. In general， there are three options for Biden： first， to accept Trumps legacy and make it part of the new administrations China policy； second， to abolish it and replace it with a brand-new policy； and third， to carry on tactically Trumps China policy by using it as a bargaining chip when dealing with China， making adjustments only after gaining expected concessions. In practice， the Biden administration is likely to combine the three approaches. A policy review will be made before specific policy choices are decided.20 In the current domestic political and social environment， it is difficult for Biden to conduct major surgery to or make a clear break from Trumps China policy. Partial and gradual adjustments are a more likely approach.

While formulating its own China policy， the Biden administration needs to listen to different voices within his team， accommodate diverse demands from the Democratic Party， and more importantly， face pressure from the Republican Party. Within the Biden team， some advocate getting tough with China and competing with China more effectively， while others stand for a combination of competition and pragmatic cooperation. Among Democrats and Republicans on the Capitol Hill， with a dominant voice to play tough and impose great pressure， a bipartisan consensus on China has become a prominent feature in current American politics. In general， Bidens China policy is shaped by four major forces. The first group， highlighting the factor of values， holds ideological bias against China and puts pressures on China in the name of democracy， human rights and freedom. The second group， analyzing the international situation from a strategic perspective， is concerned about a China with growing power and expanding world influence， and finds it urgent to jump into military and geopolitical competition with China. The third group， which stresses business interests， wants more access to the Chinese market and wants to expand economic and trade ties between the two countries. And the fourth group， which stands for global governance， advocates cooperation with China in addressing transnational challenges， advancing global governance， and maintaining the existing international system. The policy influence of these four forces is not fixed or distinct， but dynamic and interwoven. Bidens China policy will depend largely on the evolving domestic and international situation as well as on the maneuvering of these forces.

Two problems have to be tackled when resetting Americas China policy： rebuilding mechanisms for China-US interaction and defining the agenda of relations with China. In the later years of the Trump administration， all major mechanisms for bilateral exchanges were suspended， and the two sides lacked channels for substantial communication， which is extremely detrimental to the handling of bilateral issues. For the Biden administration， the pressing task is to rebuild and start quickly dialogue and consultation mechanisms with China in diplomatic， economic and security fields， so that the mechanisms can play the role of supporting and managing bilateral relations. At the same time， priority areas and key topics in bilateral relations should be identified so as to promote the stability， improvement and development of bilateral relations through the handling of these issues. Of course， both the rebuilding of interaction mechanisms and the formulation of the agenda for bilateral relations require effective communication and consultation between the two countries. The phone call between President Biden and President Xi Jinping on February 11 was an important first step.

There are several possibilities for China-US relations in the next four years.

A bilateral relationship featuring a combination of competition and cooperation. In such a scenario， competition is salient， but cooperation is also an important aspect. Before Trump came to power， China-US relations had always seen competition and cooperation interwoven. Sometimes competition overtook cooperation， and sometimes cooperation gained an upper hand. However， since Trump clearly identified China as the principal strategic competitor， competition has become the overarching theme of the bilateral relationship. The Biden administration will continue this policy thinking， but unlike his predecessor， Biden and his team recognize the importance of working with China.21 If the two countries can restart cooperation in bilateral and multilateral areas and keep on making progress， it will have a positive effect in promoting the willingness of both sides to cooperate and expand the areas of cooperation. With cooperation playing a larger role in bilateral relations， competition will to some extent be balanced.

A bilateral relationship dominated by competition. When competition becomes the keynote， and with less desire for cooperation， the two countries are more prone to competitive thinking. In this kind of relationship， it is crucial for the two sides to ensure that their competition is primarily benign and controllable， and that both sides compete according to roughly identical rules while effective management mechanisms are established. Competition， though intense and routine， does not necessarily lead to confrontational conflicts or subvert bilateral relations. However， cooperation does not play an important part in bilateral interactions， and it is hard to regulate competition through cooperation.

A bilateral relationship where competition leads to conflicts. The risk of confrontation， armed conflicts and even a new Cold War will increase if competition becomes malign and gets out of control. With such a relationship， the main purpose of competition is not to strengthen oneself， but to weaken or defeat the other party. A competition with inefficient rules and slack control mechanisms would result in repeated breaches of the bottom line of their respective policies as well as their bilateral relations. The interaction between the two sides would be caught up in a vicious circle， and confrontation and conflicts would become more and more frequent. This is a typical pattern in bilateral relations in the later period of the Trump era.

During the Biden era， China and the US should avoid the last scenario， strive to establish a relationship featuring a combination of competition and cooperation， and ensure that benign competition plays the leading role. “No conflict， no confrontation” has been Chinas consistent position in handling China-US relations. President Xi Jinping emphasized this position in his congratulations to Biden on Bidens election as US president and in his first call after Biden took office.22 Biden also emphasized that China and the US “need to not have a conflict” and “cannot and must not return to the reflexive opposition and rigid blocs of the Cold War.”23 Biden knows China well and has a broad world vision and rich governing experience. His team is mostly from the establishment and has a strong sense of policy propriety， which is in sharp contrast with Trump and his team. Therefore， the Biden administration offers an opportunity to moderate and adjust the relationship with China. However， whether the opportunity will be seized depends on whether the two countries can build basic trust with regard to each others strategic intentions， effectively conduct practical cooperation， and manage a growing number of intractable differences. This will be a test to the ability， particularly of the United States， to adjust policies， overcome domestic political distractions and manage strategic anxieties and impulses.

More broadly speaking， the international landscape and the domestic situation in both countries are still undergoing profound changes， which will bring China-US relations into a period of drastic transformation. For both China and the United States， it is hardly possible， in the next four years， to establish a stable framework for bilateral relations. It will only constitute a stage in the process of establishing a new framework for the bilateral relations， but this stage is a crucial one. Although it is difficult to reverse the trend of competition， all efforts in the next four years will be pivotal in the effort to curb vicious competition and strategic confrontation， make competition more benign， and increase cooperation to the face of this competition. If successful， it will lay a good foundation for future China-US relations. Otherwise， the future bilateral relations are bound to undergo more severe tests.

In the long run， a new and stable framework for China-US bilateral relations depends， to a large extent， on Americas objective and rational perceptions of a rising China and the evolving world power configuration， and on the US designing a China policy that is wise， reasonable and feasible. The US policy elite sees that problems in US-China relations are caused by a rising China that constantly poses challenges to US dominance and to the established international order.24 From Chinas point of view， the problems in China-US relations are caused by the fact that Washington cannot accept the rise of emerging countries， nor adapt to drastic changes in the world political and economic landscape， but attempts to meet the new reality with old mindset and strategies.25 Whether the US will be able to make necessary adjustments ultimately depends on further development and changes in the balance of power between China and the US， on the indepth evolution of the international landscape， and more importantly， on the shaping of US concepts and behavior by bilateral interaction. How the Biden administration writes this chapter of history will be closely watched by the international community.

1 According to data of the World Bank， in 2016， Chinas GDP was US$11.23 trillion， about 60 percent of that of the US， which was $18.71 trillion. In 2020， the Chinese economy grew by 2.3 percent. Based on the annual average exchange rate of the renminbi to the US dollar， Chinas economic size had grown to $14.73 trillion. In the same year， the US economy was estimated to decline by 3.3 percent， with a GDP of $20.95 trillion， making Chinas economy about 70.3 percent the size of the US economy.

2 “Joe Biden Makes the Case for Why He Should Be President，” CBS News， October 25， 2020， https：// www.cbsnews.com/news/joe-biden-democratic-presidential-candidate-kamala-harris-60-mintues-interviewnorah-odonnell-2020-10-25.

3 “Remarks by President Biden on Americas Place in the World，” The White House， February 4， 2021 https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-onamericas-place-in-the-world/

4 Antony J. Blinken， “A Foreign Policy for the American People，” US Department of State， March 3， 2021， https：//www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people.

5 “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki，” January 25， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/press-briefings/2021/01/25/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-january-25-2021.

6 “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki，” January 25， 2021.

7 “At a Time of Tests， Security Advisors Discuss Threats to U.S. and Global Security，” United States Institute of Peace， February 3， 2021， https：//www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/time-tests-securityadvisors-discuss-threats-us-and-global-security.

8 The tactics of “small yard， high fence” was proposed in 2018 by Lorand Laskai and Samm Sacks from the think tank New America. That is to selectively define the technologies that are crucial to US national security， and take more effective measures to protect these technologies. See Lorand Laskai and Samm Sacks， “The Right Way to Protect to American Innovation，” Foreign Affairs， October 23， 2018， https：//www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-23/right-way-protect-americas-innovation-advantage.

9 It is reported that the Biden administration has started dialogues with US allies and partners， proposing an alliance to restrict China in semiconductors， artificial intelligence， technical standards， quantum computing， biotechnology， 5G communication， monitoring technology and other fields.

10 Joseph R. Biden， Jr.， “Why America Must Lead Again： Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy after Trump，”Foreign Affairs， March/April 2020， https：//www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/whyamerica-must-lead-again.

11 “Biden Says U.S. Wont Lift Sanctions until Iran Halts Uranium Enrichment，” CBS News， February 7， 2021， https：//www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-interview-iran-sanctions-nuclear-agreement.

12 Antony J. Blinken， “A Foreign Policy for the American People.”

13 On February 18， 2021， the first Quad dialogue since Biden took office was held online among foreign ministers of the four countries. Only less than a month later， the first Quad summit was virtually held on March 12.

14 “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden， Jr. Call with President Xi Jinping of China，” February 10， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/10/readout-of-presidentjoseph-r-biden-jr-call-with-president-xi-jinping-of-china.

15 The US Chamber of Commerce issued a research report “Understanding U.S.–China Decoupling”on February 17， which assessed the huge economic losses that would bring to the US in the fields of investment， trade， cultural exchanges， aviation and medical equipment， and stressed that it is not advisable for a full decoupling between China and the U.S. The report， which was issued on the occasion of the Biden Administrations comprehensive evaluation of its China policy， is undoubtedly to exert impacts on Bidens policy orientation towards China. “Understanding U.S.-China Decoupling： Macro Trends and Industry Impacts，” China Center， US Chamber of Commerce， February 21， 2021， https：//www.uschamber.com/sites/ default/files/024001_us_china_decoupling_report_fin.pdf.

16 “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference，” The White House， February 19， 2021， https：//www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-bypresident-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference.

17 An example is the signing of China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment despite American pressure at the end of 2020. In addition， according to a poll conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations， a European think tank， in January 2021， to 15，000 people in 11 European countries， 60 percent of the respondents believe that their government should remain neutral in China-US confrontation and RussiaUS confrontation. When Biden called on Europe to work together with the US to prepare for long-term strategic competition with China， German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that China is needed to solve global problems， and Europe and the US have different opinions on China.

18 Wu Xinbo， “China-US Strategic Competition，” World Economics and Politics， No.6， 2020， p.129

19 “Xi Speaks with Biden on Phone，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China， February 11， 2021， https：// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1853684.shtml.

20 According to the statement by the White House spokesperson， the policy review has started soon after Biden took office. See “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki，” January 25， 2021.

21 At a press availability on January 27， 2021， Secretary of State Blinken said that “（China-US） relationship has some adversarial aspects to it. It has competitive ones. And it also still has cooperative ones.” See “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability，” US Department of State， January 27， 2021， https：//www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability.

22 “Xi Congratulates Biden on Election as U.S. President，” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China， November 25， 2020， https：//www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1835557.shtml； “Xi Speaks with Biden on Phone，” February 11， 2021.

23 “Biden Says U.S. Wont Lift Sanctions until Iran Halts Uranium Enrichment”； “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference，” February 19， 2021.

24 In the US National Security Strategy released in December 2017， the Trump administration claimed that China challenges the strength， interests and influence of the United States and tries to change the international order according to its interest preferences. The Biden administration also claimed that China challenges the prosperity， security and democratic values of the United States and the stable and open international system. See The White House， National Security Strategy of the United States of America， December 2017， pp.2 & 27； “Remarks by President Biden on Americas Place in the World，” February 4， 2021； Antony J. Blinken， “A Foreign Policy for the American People.”

25 Wu Xinbo， “The China Challenge： Competitor or Order Transformer？” The Washington Quarterly， Fall 2020， pp.99-114.