全球治理趨向扁平

秦亞青

After the end of the Cold War， global governance has become an important element of world politics. Essentially， a vertical governance model was established under the hegemonic world order： and international institutions were set up on top of the international system to manage world affairs and cope with global issues in a top-down manner. In recent years， as the hegemonic order gradually declines， the vertical global governance model has been increasingly unsuitable and insufficient， leading to an accumulation of governance deficits. The global outbreak of COVID-19 is a typical example of governance failure. Due to a lack of governance in a serious public health security crisis， when effective governance is earnestly needed， the coronavirus is still wreaking havoc globally to this day.

Globalization moves forward and will not be fundamentally reversed by anti-globalization sentiments or movements. However， the decline of the hegemonic order will lead to an era of a pluralistic world. As the accumulation of governance deficits is superimposed by governance failure， the dynamics and patterns of global governance are also witnessing important changes， among which global governance is moving from a vertical model under the hegemonic order to a flat model. In other words， while governance continues to function at the global level， regional， sub-regional and small multilateral forms will become new driving forces and create new formats of governance. The power gravity of governance in various issue areas will also shift downward. Different states and non-state actors will undertake or jointly undertake the leading role of governance in these issue areas to address different transnational challenges. In short， global governance is becoming flat.

The Hegemonic Order and Vertical Global Governance

Under a hegemonic order， a powerful country dominates world affairs and gives play to the governance function of the international system and the international community. The hegemon maintains the order and operation of the system by virtue of its super material and conceptual power. According to John Ikenberry’s interpretation， the hegemonic order should have at least three characteristics： 1） the hierarchical international system dominated by the power of the hegemonic state; 2） the international rules， norms and governance mechanisms based on the concept of the hegemonic state; and 3） the hegemonic state provides the international community with public goods necessary to maintain the order. In the opinion of some American scholars， the 20th century was the century of American hegemonic order， when a world order was established with the support of American national strength， the banner of liberalist concepts and the mechanism of international institutions. The American hegemonic order is also dubbed “Pax Americana” or the “America-led liberal hegemonic order.”

In a strict sense， American hegemony was accomplished only after the end of the Cold War. It was in this period that the global hegemonic order， or the so-called “unipolar moment，” was established. The power of the United States was limited both after World War I and throughout the Cold War. After World War I， despite the awareness of President Woodrow Wilson and some political elite to go global， at that time the US could not obtain the legitimate power to dominate the world both at home and abroad， and there was no way of talking about governance of the whole world. After World War II， the US expanded globally by virtue of its strength， but its influence was still confined to the Western Hemisphere. The areas controlled by the Soviet Union were out of American reach in terms of both practical strength and dominant ideas. Therefore， the US at that time could only realize “hemispheric governance.” After the Cold War ended， the US became the sole superpower and liberalism became the “meta-narrative” of the world order. It was at this time that the American hegemonic order became the world order.

Although the American hegemonic order emerged after the conclusion of the Cold War， American elite had been pondering global order after World War I. When the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898， the US had already become the most powerful nation in terms of material strength. Its victory over a European power in the war marked the possibility of the US as a nation embarking on the world stage and the willingness of US political elite to go out of the Americas. At the end of World War I， American elite， represented by President Wilson， proposed the establishment of a world organization， namely the League of Nations， claiming that international organizations and institutions should replace the balance of power and serve to maintain world peace and establish a lasting order. However， since the US was then dominated by isolationist thoughts at that time， and the League of Nations， on major international issues involving power and rights， resorted to utopian idealism in response to the realist mainstream in the international system and the power politics in inter-state relations， the organization was rendered dysfunctional on governance， which led to its eventual dissolution.

The power of the US became even stronger during World War II， when President Franklin Roosevelt and other American political elite still considered governance issues from a global perspective. They proposed the establishment of the United Nations， and reached compromise with the Soviet Union on some important issues in exchange for the latter’s support for creating the UN. In the construction of its concepts and principles， the UN inherited President Wilson’s ideas of the League of Nations on the one hand， and on the other hand also learned a lot from the failure of the League of Nations. With a focus on the issues of power and rights of major countries， the Security Council was finally established as the UN’s core body. At the same time， the UN General Assembly， the UN Economic and Social Council， the International Court of Justice， the UN Secretariat， as well as specialized institutions including the International Monetary Fund （IMF）， the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade （GATT） were set up to manage world affairs.

Regardless of the effects in concrete implementation， the international order considered by American political elite was global in nature from the beginning， and the governance under this order has been largely vertical. The vertical model is characterized by top-down management， with the governance system at the global level constituting the basis of governance in any issue area. The governance system mentioned here contains at least three aspects， namely the governance concept， institutional power and material strength of the hegemonic power. Governance concept is the core of the governance model， according to which all concrete institutions and organizational forms are designed. Institutional power is the direct ability of hegemonic governance， which refers to the hegemon’s ability to lead decision-making under institutional conditions， by framing problems， setting agendas and steering implementation. Material strength is the basis for ensuring hegemonic order and the support for the functioning of the first two elements. The above three aspects constitute the indispensable elements of the vertical governance model. The absence of any will directly affect the stability and effectiveness of the hegemonic order.

Take the world economic governance as an example. The world economic governance after World War II was a typical example of vertical governance. First， liberalism， which was the mainstream economic school in the United States， became the leading concept of world economic governance. Second， the dominant institutions and organizational forms of the world economy reflected the institutional power of the hegemonic state. The establishment of three major international economic organizations， namely the IMF， the World Bank and the GATT-turned World Trade Organization （WTO）， marked the launch of vertical governance in the world economy. The US dominance in framing issues， setting agendas and implementing decisions could be reflected in the voting rights in these international organizations. Finally， after WWII， the US-led economic order did not achieve global coverage. The Soviet Union did not join the US-led world economic system， and set up the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance， a parallel economic organization， to confront the United States. However， the boundary where the US influence ended delineated the sphere for this system and it laid the foundation for the post-Cold War global economic system. With the termination of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union， the US-Soviet confrontation vanished， and the US enjoyed a long lead in terms of comprehensive power in the international system. Therefore， the end of the Cold War was also hailed as the “unipolar moment” for the US， when the world order became Pax Americana. The “unipolar moment” was also interpreted by some as a more durable “unipolar era.” William Wohlforth， an American realist scholar， argued that the world has entered into a stable unipolar order. In general， these views were based on the superiority of US power. Supported by the US， the liberal economic concept expanded globally， consolidating the core institutional forms and norms of world economic governance.

Vertical governance has three distinct characteristics. First， the system of imperial power that leads the world constitutes the basic structure of vertical governance. Peter Katzenstein believes that the world order after World War II is marked by American imperium， and US leadership is a consistent theme in the American design of the world order. It does not mean that the US has adopted the same concept of order and the same style of governance as those of the Roman Empire or the British Empire in the past. For example， Britain relied on colonial occupation to give play to its imperial power and implement governance. In the regions under the governance of “the empire on which the sun never sets，” everything was mostly established according to Britain’s own governance model including institutional mechanisms and legal systems. The US relies more on non-territorial imperial power in its governance and implements hegemonic governance by establishing international institutions. Whether it is the so-called “Pax Britannica，” or “Pax Americana，” or the much earlier “Pax Romana，” there is an awareness of imperial power， the core of which is the governance concept and institutional form of dominating the world. In the US case， it is what American political elite claim as “America leading the world.” The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union were regarded as “the end of history，” symbolizing the final victory of the democratic political system and liberal economic system represented by the United States， and also laying a legitimate foundation for the US to lead the world. All emerging countries， especially the major ones， are expected to be incorporated into the US-led world order and comply with the norms and rules therein， and hegemonic governance based on imperial power is thus fulfilled.

Second， a top-down operational approach forms the basic functioning mechanism of vertical governance. As the core of governance， international institutions refer to the institutional arrangements in the international system. Top-level institutions generate rules of conduct， which maintain stability of the order， and it is the responsibility and obligation of the actors in the system to abide by the rules in their interactions. Once there are disputes among the actors， they need to be submitted to the institutional mechanisms at the system level for adjudication. For example， in world trade governance， the WTO formulates various rules according to liberalist ideas and laws governing the market economy， which are followed and implemented by WTO members in their trade exchanges. In the event of a dispute， it shall also be submitted to the WTO for settlement in accordance with its rules. The empirical research of Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore on the IMF shows that rules are the cornerstone of international organizations， and the power of international organizations comes from the activities of formulating rules， disseminating norms and promoting international actors to abide by the rules and norms. Therefore， the core of the international system is the rules derived from the predominant knowledge. Looking from the current system of world economic governance and its organizational form， the rules of relevant international organizations are mostly based on liberal and neo-liberal economic ideas. The most fundamental responsibility and obligation for members is to implement the rules and follow the norms of these international organizations.

Third， exclusiveness is the inherent logic of vertical governance. Any other model of governance is generally regarded as contrary to vertical governance， even undermining governance at the global level. Therefore， it will not be encouraged and supported by the norms of hegemonic power and hegemonic order. As a hegemonic power， the United States builds vertical relationships between core regional states and the US， between regions and subregions， and between the US and different regions. For this reason， the US has always been highly selective in dealing with regional integration and cooperative governance. During the Cold War， the US support for European regional integration was mainly out of the political and security needs to jointly address the Soviet threat. The US has always discouraged and did not support the Asian regional cooperative process and integration efforts. Quite a long time after the end of the Cold War， the US did not support the regional cooperation process of ASEAN and believed that such regionalism would undermine hegemonic vertical governance. It was not until China， Russia， India and Japan successively joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia that the US announced its accession to the Treaty and participated in the regional process in order to avoid being excluded from East Asia. The hegemonic power generally does not encourage or support other so-called mini-multilateral governance models or bilateral coordinated governance. Governance practices and processes led by non-hegemonic powers， such as the BRICS mechanism and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank， are also difficult to have the hegemonic power’s backing， and even risk being excluded and suppressed. It not only reflects the United States’ exclusion of other forms of institutional arrangements， but also illustrates the power concept and exclusive consciousness in vertical governance under the hegemonic order.

In brief， hegemonic power and the willingness to implement power contributes to the formation of hegemonic order， which makes vertical governance possible. In turn， vertical governance will give full play to the power of the hegemonic state and support its leadership. From the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War， the United States implemented vertical governance under its hemispheric hegemony. In the past 30 years after the end of the Cold War， with the extension of American hegemony to the world， the vertical governance model has also been expanded and implemented on a global scale. It is not only the so-called “unipolar moment，” but also the stage of hegemonic governance when “l(fā)iberal institutionalism dominates the world，” or what Robert Keohane said the era when liberal institutionalism dominates the world order.

Decline of Hegemony and Emergence of a Pluralistic World

The decline of American hegemonic order has been the consensus of many scholars， with Amitav Acharya even declaring that the US-led hegemonic order has ended. A series of events， such as the inward transformation of the US itself， the surge of neo-conservative sentiments， and the emergence of other powers outside the West， are all factors leading to the end of the American hegemonic order. However， the most important is the devastating blow to the American hegemonic order and the multilateral system that supports the order by US unilateralism and hegemonic arrogance. Peter Katzenstein and Jonathan Kirshner argued that while neoliberalism as an idea will still exist， American hegemony as a world order has come to an end. Brantly Womack indicated that the hegemonic era has passed， and the post-hegemonic era features a multi-nodal world， where different state and non-state actors can become “nodes” and “points” in the global network. In a word， with the relative decline of the United States’ comprehensive national strength， the universal meaning of neoliberal values as the meta-narrative of the world order has been challenged， so it has lost the ability to govern world affairs and provide sufficient public goods to the world. In this sense， the US-led world order has come to an end.

These views are reasonable. Womack argued that American hegemony has shown explicit signs of decline since 2008. Acharya argued that the year 2014 was the end of the US hegemonic order. However， their judgments on the timing of US decline are both premature， since there is no landmark event that clearly shows the end of American hegemony. Previously， President George W. Bush took a series of unilateral actions， especially launching the Iraq War without the authorization of the United Nations and despite the opposition of most countries. The move was opposed by many American elite and US allies， and the US was criticized for its pragmatic attitude and double standards on multilateralism. However， the United States was still powerful on the whole， and President Obama’s high-profile support for multilateralism at least offset the negative opinion of Bush’s unilateralist acts， which helped restore the legitimacy of American hegemony to some degree. Generally speaking， after the end of the Cold War， American hegemony entered its heyday due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union， its main opponent. American strength was superior to that of any other major power， and neoliberalism became the dominant discourse of world order. The US-dominated international system constituted the overarching operating mechanism of the hegemonic order at the system level.

The 2008 global financial crisis would be the last demonstration of leadership for the American hegemonic order. The subprime mortgage crisis originating in the US spread rapidly， leading to the financial crisis in Western countries and the world and posing grave challenges to the world economy. In order to deal with this global problem， at the initiative of the US， the Group of Twenty （G20）， which was originally a ministerial-level mechanism， was upgraded to the summit level in 2009， when the US held the first G20 summit in Pittsburgh. Since then， the G20 has become an important mechanism for global economic governance. The shift from G7 to G20 marked a transformation from Western governance to beyond Western governance. For the first time， the G20 has incorporated emerging economies into the center of world economic governance， and almost all major powers have demonstrated supportive attitudes and cooperative actions in response to the global financial crisis. Since then， the US has never successfully organized such a collective action with the participation and support of all major powers in the world.

In a sense， the financial crisis of 2008 marked the beginning of the exit of US hegemony. Compared with other major powers， the comprehensive national strength of the United States has shown a downward trend. The US-dominated international system at the global level has exposed remarkable inefficiency in dealing with transnational threats and challenges brought by globalization， resulting in mounting global governance deficits and the continuous dysfunction of global governance. In important governance fields such as climate change， the gap between rich and poor and public health， no problem has been actively addressed and effectively solved， with many challenges even turning more intense. This is also the case in anti-terrorism， an area which the US is most concerned about. At the same time， liberalism and neo-liberalism， as the supporting concept of American hegemonic order， has also been under attack from different thoughts and ideological trends. Neo-conservatism， realism and populism all show a strong momentum of development and directly target liberal and neo-liberal ideas. Different development models and governance methods， such as China’s modernization path and rapid economic development， and ASEAN’s more flexible and inclusive soft system and soft governance， also show a diversified trend in global thoughts and practices. Therefore， the three elements required for hegemonic order， namely power， system and concept， are facing unprecedented challenges since the end of the Cold War. Under the administration of President Donald Trump， the US adopted a series of domestic and foreign policies that contain neo-conservative， strong realist， extreme populist and unilateralist elements， which made the American hegemonic order and the power factor supporting the order start to dissolve from within.

The view that the world is entering a post-hegemonic pluralistic era is mainly based on the core content of the world order. The sudden outbreak of COVID-19 and its rapid spread around the world is a landmark event of the exit of US hegemony. When the world encountered unprecedented threats to global public health security， and the international community earnestly needed governance， there appeared the dual absence of the willingness and ability to lead. When international institutions were most needed to play a coordinating role， they showed powerlessness and inefficiency. At a time when the world should work together and fight against the pandemic， there was an anti-intellectual logical paradox of collective action which resulted in serious non-cooperation. In this crisis， none of the necessary conditions of hegemonic order， namely leadership， institutional efficiency and cooperative action， has emerged， let alone playing an effective role. Hegemonic exit means that the hegemonic state has no ability to lead world affairs in an integrated way， has no willingness to provide public goods urgently needed by the world， and is unlikely to support the legitimacy of hegemonic dominance.

The COVID-19 pandemic marks the conclusion of the US hegemonic order， and also the termination of hegemony as a world order. The world order can no longer rely on a hegemonic power or some super strong countries. The era of any great power monopolizing world affairs has come to an end， and the prospect of several great powers dominating world affairs is highly unlikely to materialize. In the foreseeable future， the US will remain the most powerful country in terms of comprehensive strength， and it is difficult for other countries， including the existing major powers， to fully keep pace with it.

It should be noted that equating the decline of the US hegemonic order with the decline of the US as a country is a logical fallacy. Although American national strength and American hegemonic order are two related terms， they are absolutely not the same concept， nor do they constitute a causal relationship. The decline of US hegemony means that the US has been unable to fully support a hegemonic order and control the operation of the international system on its own. It cannot effectively influence the behavior of other regions and countries， neither can it shape the world’s cultural orientation and value system. However， the exit of American hegemony is not the end of the US as the world’s sole superpower， but the end of the US-led world order. While the exit of American hegemony means the end of world hegemonic order， it does not mean that major countries no longer have power and responsibility in international affairs. Power and responsibility of major countries still exists， and is obviously greater than that of other countries， but it is difficult for great powers to monopolize the process of world politics and dominate global affairs， as the legitimacy of such domination has been widely questioned， and the ability of these countries to provide public goods is seriously insufficient. For a long time to come， no country can independently establish and maintain a world order， and hegemony as an order has lost its legitimacy and rationality. American hegemonic order has declined， and hegemony as a world order has also retreated.

The exit of hegemony means that we are truly entering a pluralistic world. An essential feature of a pluralistic world is the decentralization and devolution of world power. In the hegemonic order， the world material power is highly hierarchical， with the hegemonic state as the superpower and the only country that can comprehensively grip world affairs and provide public goods. In contrast， the power distribution in a pluralistic world is not centralized， but rather decentralized. The hegemonic hierarchy gradually dissolves， and a multi-polar power structure takes shape. From the perspective of material strength， although the US is still the country with the strongest comprehensive power and will remain so in the foreseeable future， China and the European Union are becoming another two world power centers， forming a relatively stable China-US-EU configuration. Other important international actors， such as Russia， India， Japan and ASEAN， also play a major role in their respective geopolitical environment as well as in regional and world affairs. Meanwhile， although the state is still the leading actor in world politics， the role of other international actors is increasing. Globalization enables non-state actors such as international organizations， multi-national corporations and transnational social networks to play an important role in world affairs. In areas with a prominent global nature such as climate change， public health and ecological environment， forces in the international community， such as non-governmental organizations and non-state actors， now show stronger discourse power and ability to influence the actions of the international community in framing issues and setting agendas than ever before.

The form of an international system in a pluralistic world will also show explicit diversity. In fact， a stereoscopic and multi-dimensional international system will become an important symbol of a pluralistic world. In the American hegemonic order， international institutional arrangements focus on the global level， and the US is also mainly concerned about the institutional arrangements at this level， which demonstrates a top-down approach in institutional establishment and institutional management. The original design of the international system by American political elite after World War I， and the inheritance and improvement of the design after World War II， all reflected the consciousness and practice of top-level design， as well as the worldview， concept of order and thinking orientation of the hegemon. After the end of the Cold War， the global institutional arrangements dominated by top-level design of the international system began to be implemented worldwide. In the post-hegemonic world after the decentralization of power， institutional arrangements will develop at multiple levels and in multiple fields， while there will be more cooperation and competition， consultation and debate， compromise and struggle in the global top-level design. It is difficult to take the hegemon’s power as the basic reasoning， and it is difficult for any single country to have an absolute advantage in institutional power. Institutional arrangements at other levels will also be more proactive and flexible， and appropriate actions will be taken in a more distinctive way according to specific conditions.

Another compelling feature of the pluralistic world is the pluralistic appearance and presentation of ideological trends. In the hegemonic order， the ideology of the hegemonic state often plays a leading role. After the end of the Cold War， as American hegemony expanded to the whole world， liberal constitutionalism was taken as the basic ideological and practical guidance of the international community， and many institutional designs were also based on this concept. Under the so-called liberal international order， liberalism served as the conceptual support and the basis of relevant institutional designs. In today’s world， the multi-dimensional shift and diversification of ideas has become an apparent trend， with an unprecedented variety of mainstream ideologies and concepts. For important issues such as governance models， development paths， institutions and mechanisms， the trend of pluralism is increasingly discernable. While the United States’ view of liberal international order will continue to exist and play a role， China has been exploring development paths and governance methods that are in line with its national conditions， and its achievements have been widely recognized. The economic and social development path of the EU， which is closer to a “third way” of regional integration， is also quite different from that of the US. In addition， the ideas of developing countries are also more diversified. Instead of completely following some model or imitating a certain path， they tend to adopt a more rational form of compromise and localization. Even from the perspective of the highly relevant knowledge of international relations theory， non-Western theories of international relations have begun to rise， and put forward interpretations of basic international relations concepts that are different from the Western mainstream theory. Some scholars have raised the question： What would the world order look like if the international relations theory were not created in the West， but in Chinese， Indian or Islamic cultures？ Problems of this kind per se are a challenge to the discourse hegemony in international relations theory.

Some attitudes hold that the end of American hegemony means disorder and global chaos， the spread of strong anarchy， and even the outbreak of a systematic war. The hegemonic stability theory， an important theory of structural realism， holds that the international system will be stable only if there is a single hegemonic state or leading state in the world that comprehensively manages international affairs and exercises unified governance. This view of structural determinism is biased to a considerable extent. The exit of hegemony may lead to complex situations and even some chaos， such as the power reconstruction of the international system， the intensification of competition among countries， and the prevalence of extreme nationalism， but it does not mean the inevitable disorder of the world and the inevitable retrogression of international relations. A pluralistic world means a pluralistic diversity of initiative. As long as the initiative of state actors develops in the direction of progress and evolution， pluralistic diversity will make the world more dynamic， enlightening and innovative ideas more active， the process of regional cooperation and inter-regional cooperation more powerful， and the democratization of international relations will further develop. The development and progress of the world will not and cannot depend on any “goodwill hegemony，” but on the active cooperation and creative initiative of the international community and international actors. It is the reality for now， and it is also the trend of human social evolution.

Pluralistic World and the Flattening of Global Governance

Global governance under the hegemonic order is presented as a vertical system， while global governance in the pluralistic world will tend to be flat. The shift from vertical to flat is a transformation from one governance model to another. In this process， there will be ups and downs， and even turbulence. However， as a development trend， flat governance will be an important form of global governance in the post-hegemonic era.

The decline of hegemonic order does not mean the end of globalization. Although anti-globalization and reverse globalization sentiments and movements are currently commonplace， globalization as a worldwide trend is also an objective existence in the current stage of global development. The world economy is highly interdependent， but the connotation of the interdependence is different from the economic interdependence of great powers before World War I. At that time， the degree of interdependence was very high， but it was more an interdependence between separate units or separate subjects. In the absence of a world economic system， countries existed as separate subjects and economic relations were among these independent subjects. After the end of the Cold War， globalization transformed the world economy into a global system， and actors in the international system became subjects in co-existence and mutual inclusion. Under such conditions， the existence of independent and separate subjects has become highly impossible in an ontological sense. At the same time， the economic system is relatively open， inclusive and resilient， and will not collapse due to the impact of unilateralism， populism and anti-globalization waves. Moreover， globalization has connected members of the international community， and it is difficult for any country fully decouple from globalization. In addition， the unprecedented convergence at the societal level not only enhances mutual understanding among countries， but also strengthens the awareness of mutual learning. Even under the extreme situation where COVID-19 impedes physical mobility of personnel， modern technology has enabled people to continuously communicate online. The problems brought by globalization are common issues facing all mankind， and the challenges are common threats to the whole world. The global village is not only a conceptual metaphor， but a concrete scene today. The community with a shared future for mankind is not just a symbol of ideal， but it is also the objective reality of the world.

Globalization has not only elevated the overall welfare of the world， but also brought global problems. The report “A More Secured World： Our Shared Responsibility，” presented by the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel in 2004， pointed out that in the era of globalization， mankind is facing major global challenges， including economic crisis， climate change， nuclear weapon proliferation， and terrorism. Global problems are first of all transnational challenges that threaten all mankind， taking no heed of borders， races， faiths and political boundaries. Global problems are also pressing ones， immediately endangering human lives once they break out， as the COVID-19 pandemic and terrorism have shown. In addition， global problems closely relate domestic affairs with international affairs. While responsible actions of nation states will mitigate the threats， irresponsible moves will exacerbate dangers. More importantly， global challenges relevant to common security require the concerted cooperation of members in the international community to respond effectively. No country， no matter how strong it is， can address global challenges alone.

Globalization in the post-hegemonic era will present a situation different from that in the previous three decades， and the mode of global governance will also change significantly with the decline of hegemony. The era of globalization has not passed， and the basic trend of globalization still continues. The important change is in the way that globalization is managed， that is， from the vertical model of global governance under the hegemonic order to the flat governance in the pluralistic world. Flat governance mainly refers to the emergence of a diversified and composite governance network in the post-hegemonic world， transforming the global governance landscape from being vertical to being flat. It is more a bottom-up governance and a governance model based on local practices. The composite governance network has three typical characteristics of being multi-level， multi-domain and multi-actor.

First， it is multi-level governance， which means that governance practices are carried out simultaneously at global， cross-regional， regional， sub-regional levels and in small multilateral forms. Especially when governance at the global level is stagnant， governance activities at these different levels will be more active. Governance at the regional level is a prominent example. Regional organizations such as the EU and ASEAN and their regional cooperative processes have demonstrated great significance in terms of governance. Their respective governance concepts and practices have shown strong adaptability and vitality. The EU as a whole has adopted a governance approach that puts the rule of law first， following the concepts and designs of rules-based governance or contract governance from the beginning， and signing a series of treaties to regulate the actions of its members and improve expectations of members’ actions. Such an approach reduces transaction costs， enhances information symmetry， overcomes the problems of collective action， and achieves the goal of cooperative governance. ASEAN， in comparison， has drawn on the wisdom of oriental culture and adopted the path of relational governance， using a more flexible and resilient soft system to promote harmony among member states， enhance common identity， gather collective consensus and realize the vision of regional governance. Although the governance practices of the EU and ASEAN are very different， they both serve the fundamental purpose of governance and promote cooperation for governance. In the meantime， there are major differences between the EU and ASEAN’s governance methods and the vertical governance under a hegemonic order. Although there are relatively strong members in both regions， such as Germany and France in the EU and Indonesia in ASEAN， their governance approaches are generally non-hegemonic， which highlight democratic consultation and are much flatter than hegemonic governance in terms of power structure and operation.

Second， it is multi-domain governance. In the era of globalization， there are many issue areas， each of which involves transnational challenges and global issues. At present， the prominent areas include public health， climate change， wealth gap， economic development， world trade， terrorism， and nuclear non-proliferation. Under vertical governance， problems in these areas， instead of being well resolved， have been accumulating for long and growing more intense. In the field of world trade， the negotiation process with the WTO as the core has encountered great difficulties. The Doha Round， which began in 2001， is still far from completion， and is even considered to have failed. Relying entirely on the international system at the global level for trade governance has disappointed the international community. For this reason， some regions have taken cooperative actions at the regional level， and many small multilateral groupings have emerged among countries. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic， the vertical governance model has again let the international community down. As the hegemonic state， the United States has been almost completely absent. The World Health Organization （WHO） as a specialized organization in this field has encountered great difficulties in coordinating and facilitating cooperation. Governance in the field of public health security is basically borne by the state alone. In some important issue areas， leaders are not necessarily great powers. Small countries and even non-state actors can shoulder the status of leaders and play a leadership role. With the in-depth development of globalization， problems in new frontiers such as the outer space， polar regions， the deep sea and the digital space will continue to emerge. Whoever has sufficient governance and coordination capabilities may become the leader in the governance of these issue areas.

Finally， it is multi-actor governance. The nation state is still the leading actor in global governance， but it is no longer the monopoly actor or the only actor. In addition to nation states， other international actors， including international organizations， regional organizations， non-governmental organizations and individuals， will become nodes in the complex network system of global governance， participate actively and play an important role. Take governance in public health security as an example. Five of the top ten donors to the WHO from 2018 to 2019 were individuals or international organizations， including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation， the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs， Rotary International， and the US National Philanthropic Trust. Among them， the Gates Foundation donated US$450 million， ranking third， only after the United States and the United Kingdom. Multi-actor governance has become an important feature of today’s global governance， which not only makes up for the serious shortcomings and inefficiency of vertical governance， but also promotes a global governance model that is more flat.

The flattening trend of global governance has emerged. Amid the still serious COVID-19 pandemic， a most important governance achievement of the international community is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement （RCEP）. It is an ASEAN-led regional economic cooperation process， with ten ASEAN members joined by China， Japan， South Korea， Australia and New Zealand. It is a manifestation of consensus in regional and cross-regional economic cooperation and economic governance， and also a typical case of governance without hegemoic leadership or a vertical system.

The flattening process of global governance will make multilateralism more competitive. Competitive multilateralism can manifest itself as inter-institutional competition， that is， the relationships among multilateral systems are competitive when a variety of multilateral institutional arrangements coexist. For example， in the field of international trade， there may be competition among different regional multilateral trade arrangements， and between regional and global trade arrangements. Serious inter-institutional competition will lead to institutional fragmentation and thus produce notable negative effects， and turn a multilateral system that originally promoted cooperation into a cause leading to conflicts. Competitive multilateralism can also appear in the form of great-power competition， reflecting geostrategic competition among major powers. For example， great powers will compete for dominance and influence in the multilateral system in order to strengthen their strategic competitiveness. In the transition from vertical governance to flat governance， both the inter-institutional competition and the great-power competition for dominance and influence over multilateral institutions will become more visible. In the RCEP for example， relations featuring both competition and cooperation will remain throughout the agreement’s implementation with the competitive side possibly appearing more manifest and intense.

As global governance becomes flat， the international community needs to pay much attention to and try to avoid exclusive multilateral arrangements. In the vertical governance system， the exclusive awareness and actions of the hegemonic state will consciously or unconsciously forestall exclusive multilateral actions. With the hegemon’s willingness and ability to command global governance， all countries in the world， especially those important ones， are incorporated into the governance system as far as possible to realize the dominance of imperial power and institutional consistency. However， in the post-hegemonic era， the hegemonic state has neither enough capacity nor legitimacy to implement unified vertical governance. In that case， exclusive multilateral arrangements will appear as a form of flat governance， especially in areas where the original hegemonic power can exert influence. During the Cold War， the multilateral governance system designed by the United States was exclusive to the Soviet Union， and the Soviet Union adopted the same approach， resulting in a split and confrontational world with a bipolar power structure and dual governance institutions. Today， although the recurrence of such a scnario is a small possibility， it is difficult to rule it out completely. The international community should try its best to prevent the formation and development of a world order of antagonistic hemispheric governance. Whether the world order in the post-hegemonic era moves towards inclusive multilateralism or retreats to exclusive multilateral arrangements is a fundamental issue related to whether the world moves towards a community with a shared future or a divisive and confrontational one.

Conclusion

The flattening of global governance means a governance without hegemony. Regional and sub-regional multilateral governance will witness more dynamic development， and governance practices in various issue areas will become more effective. However， the flattening of global governance does not mean the dissolution of governance at the global level. Under the condition of power decentralization and devolution， governance at the global level will constitute an important part of the global composite governance network， showing more consultation， negotiation， cooperation and competition. Neither does the flattening of global governance mean the disappearance of great-power capabilities and responsibilities. Great powers are still important nodes in the complex network of global governance， and their capabilities and responsibilities are indispensable elements in the process of governance.

In the evolution from vertical to flat global governance， competitive factors will be more prominent. There will emerge apparent inter-institutional competition， and great-power competition over institutions. This type of competition generally belongs to the category of soft competition， which will not necessarily lead to outright division of the international community. Sometimes it will become a buffer zone for bargaining， and even exert positive effects on the multilateral institutions. However， the world risks being torn apart once the inter-institutional competition and the great-power competition move towards the extreme form of exclusive multilateralism or even strong ideological alliances.

In the future， numerous changes will take place as global governance turns flat. A stereoscopic and complex situation will emerge in which governance at global， regional and sub-regional levels interact， various governance areas are interrelated， and a variety of governance actors affect each other. It is not only rather different from vertical governance， but will also gradually become the new normal of global governance. Building new perceptions of global governance and coping with global challenges through a complex network system is bound to become an important part of global governance capacity building in the new era.