Academic Differences between the Guanzhong School and the Yangming School in the Middle Ming Dynasty

Chang Xin

Abstract： The revivalistic literary movement during the Hongzhi reign of the Ming dynasty aimed for literary renovation and at the same time triggered self-reflection and self-criticism within Confucianism. Sharing a common literary pursuit and political ideal， Guanzhong scholars Li Mengyang， Kang Hai， and Wang Jiusi， together with Wang Yangming， participated in that revivalistic literary movement. Later， however， Wang Yangming shifted his focus to reforming Confucianism and proposed the doctrine of intuitive knowledge， which broke the dominance of the Cheng–Zhu school of principle in Confucianism. In the face of the radical change Wang Yangming brought to Confucianism， the Guanzhong scholars distanced themselves from Wang with their responses to Wangs theories of intuitive knowledge， investigating things， knowledge and action， and gongfu， indicating that the Guanzhong school was following Zhu Xi in its pursuit of Neo-Confucianism.

Keywords： Guanzhong school， Yangming school， academic differences， middle Ming dynasty

The Hongzhi period （1488–1505） in the Ming dynasty （1368–1644） witnessed a revivalistic literary movement， and after it there occurred a political struggle against Liu Jin 劉瑾 （1451–1510）， a powerful eunuch who was favored by the then emperor. In this movement and struggle， the renowned early Seven Scholars， namely， Kang Hai 康海 （1475–1541）， Li Mengyang 李夢(mèng)陽 （1473–1529）， Wang Jiusi 王九思 （1468–1551）， He Jingming 何景明 （1483–1521）， Xu Zhenqing 徐禎卿 （1479–1511）， Bian Gong 邊貢 （1476–1532）， and Wang Tingxiang 王廷相 （1474–1544）， as well as some other influential scholars such as Lü Nan 呂柟 （1479–1542， style name Jingye 涇野） and Wang Yangming 王陽明 （1472–1528， a.k.a. Wang Shouren 王守仁） formed a group with shared values. Their scholarly interactions promoted the development of scholarship in the Ming dynasty. Of the early Seven Scholars， Li Mengyang， Kang Hai， and Wang Jiusi were scholars of Guanxue 關(guān)學(xué) （the Guanzhong school）. They had personal contacts with Wang Yangming himself and， in addition， in their careers as officials， they associated with some disciples of Wang Yangming， and through exchanges of ideas and debates over academic questions， both sides got to know each others opinions well， which indicated their academic differences.

The main reasons why the Guanzhong scholars opposed Wang Yangming and his followers， in regard to the major aspects of Wangs philosophy， are manifold. First， the Guanzhong scholars were firm followers of Zhu Xi 朱熹 （1130–1200）. Second， many Guanzhong scholars understanding of Wang Yangmings philosophy was based on secondhand materials and consequently deviated from what it meant originally to say. Third， when Wang was alive， differences in understanding his doctrine already occurred among his disciples. After he passed away， his disciples split into many sub-schools， and later some disciples of his gave up self-cultivation and got lost in seeking sudden enlightenment， whose empty and shallow academic style was unacceptable to the Guanzhong Confucians who cherished honesty and sincerity in their scholarly pursuit， thus causing their misunderstanding and rejection of Wangs teachings.

Difference on the Doctrine of Intuitive Knowledge

[Refer to page 85 for Chinese. Similarly hereinafter]

The root of Wang Yangmings philosophy is the doctrine of intuitive knowledge （liangzhi 良知）， comprising two aspects： （1） the original substance of intuitive knowledge and （2） the effort （gongfu 工夫） to extend intuitive knowledge （zhi liangzhi 致良知）. It can be known from Wang Yangmings clarification of his concept of intuitive knowledge that， in conceiving his doctrine of intuitive knowledge， he drew on the relevant theories of Confucianism， Buddhism， and Daoism and integrated them into his theory. His approach to developing a new doctrine introduced a new realm of theorization within Confucianism， but at the same time provoked strong criticism against his doctrine among his contemporary and later Confucians， who blamed its closeness to the doctrine of the Chan Sect of Buddhism. His concept of intuitive knowledge became the object which bore the brunt of their censure and attack. In the debates of Guanzhong scholars with Wang and his followers， the question of intuitive knowledge was frequently a hot topic. Though admitting that “Wangs doctrine is based on Menciuss theory on intuitive knowledge， and when Wang proposed it to instruct people， its warning was not insignificant，” Lü Nans difference from Wang is considerable over the question of intuitive knowledge.

As regards Lüs comment on Wangs doctrine of intuitive knowledge， little is mentioned in the records available. Nonetheless， in the preface to “Presented to Shi in Yuxi” [贈(zèng)玉溪石氏] are a few important sentences which make it clear that he called it into question.

Compared with me who has been accused and exiled once again， Wang Yangming has climbed higher and higher up the official ladder， his path has become wider and wider， and the people who spread and advocate his doctrine are more and more. . . . His doctrine is quite different from the opinion I expounded initially to the official historian. . . . These days I am eager to see Wang so as to resolve my doubt. . . . But up to this time I have not had any chance to consult him.

It is a pity that after pacifying a rebellion in the Sien Prefecture and Tianzhou Prefecture， Wang Yangming died of an illness and Lü could never see him and discuss with him any longer the doctrine from which he had felt “quite different.” The reason for Lüs complaint about Wangs intuitive knowledge is mainly that， to him， Wangs doctrine of intuitive knowledge ignored the individual difference in natural endowment. He mentioned this problem with Wangs doctrine in both his “Record of Yangzhi Pavilion” [仰止亭記] and his “Discourse from East Abode in Jiufeng Peak” [鷲峰東所語]， in either of which the recorded conversations of Lü were with some of Wangs disciples who firmly believed in their masters doctrine.

When the Sage （i.e.， Confucius） taught his students， he would change his method of teaching with different students. For example， when Yan Yuan 顏淵 （521–481 BCE） asked him what was meant by ren 仁 （humanity）， Confucius told him that it meant “restraining oneself and returning to propriety.” To answer the same question asked by Zhonnggong 仲弓 （b. 522 BCE）， Confucius told him to respect others and avoid resentment. To Fan Chi 樊遲 （d. 515 BCE） who asked the same question， Confucius replied by saying： “It is， in retirement， to be sedately reverent; in the management of business， to be earnestly attentive; in association with others， to be strictly sincere.” This shows that he taught his students according to their different natural endowments and the different levels of their advancements in learning， avoiding applying the same rigid standard. By contrast， when contemporary Confucians taught others， they tended to neglect their different natural endowments and actual advancements， and impose on them the same requirements. Are they not biased？

On the individual difference in natural endowment， Lü was of the opinion that Wangs doctrine of intuitive knowledge might take effect on those with natural endowment above the middle， but was completely to no avail to those below the middle. The issues of human natural endowment and the acceptability of Wang Yangmings doctrine Lü mentioned in his “Record of Yangzhi Pavilion” may have to do with the elucidation Wang made of his Four-Sentence Teachingsi on an occasion when his two disciples Wang Ji 王畿 （1498–1583） and Qian Dehong 錢德洪 （1496–1574） debated it， an incident which was referred to as “Elucidation on Heavenly Fountain Bridge.” Wang Yangming said to them，

My doctrine always embraces these two instructions： The four no-distinctionsii are an instruction for those endowed with the top-level root， while the four distinctions are an instruction for those with the middle-level and the lower-level root. To those with the upper root， the original substance is the same as gongfu， which pertains to the pursuit of sudden enlightenment. To those with middle and lower root， they have to make an effort to do good and remove evil so as to return to their original substance.

Considering the above three opinions of Lü， it is obvious that， to him， hidden in Wangs doctrine of intuitive knowledge was something worrying： Those people endowed with a lower root could by no means understand truly his doctrine， and this failure would prompt misunderstanding and misreading on their part， which would cause a series of problems to crop up. Actually， the many malpractices which occurred among Wangs followers after he passed away were the very problems he was worried about. It can be known from this that Wangs doctrine of intuitive knowledge was troubled by some theoretical drawbacks and defects， and Lü， as an onlooker， was clearly aware of them.

In his discussions of cognition by the mind （xin 心） and nature （xing 性）， Ma Li 馬理 （1474–1555， pen name Xitian 溪田）， through differentiating several types of “knowledge” （zhi 知）， clarified the subjects gongfu of self-cultivation in different phases and also distinguished between the intuitive knowledge emanating from the innocent minds of children and the hidden subtle knowledge one could only get access to by keeping watchful while alone and making an effort to cultivate oneself. At the same time， the knowledge that is extended through investigation of things （gewu 格物） is obviously tinted with the epistemology in the tradition of Cheng Yi 程頤 （1033–1107） and Zhu Xi， that is， the great knowledge is extended by seeking for a sudden apprehension of the total substance through long-term accumulation by persistently investigating things and exhausting principle to the utmost. The former two types of knowledge pertain to moral cognition， while the knowledge extended through investigation of things falls into the category of rational experiential cognition. Thereby， in his criticism， Ma said， “Their teacher had claimed， ‘this knowledge is the same as that knowledge， and they spoke of it as gaining understanding half way and compared it to awakening from a dream. They sounded like followers of Chan Buddhism indeed.” Though he did not mention whom he drove at， clearly what he said pointed at the empty talk about the doctrine of morality， nature， and destiny prevalent among the later Yangming scholars.

Hu Zuanzong 胡纘宗 （1480–1560） once had a deep discussion with Wang Yangming at Liantan Posthouse （in todays Tongcheng of Anhui） over the question of investigating things and extending knowledge to the utmost， but they did not touch upon the concept of intuitive knowledge. In his Wishing for Learning [愿學(xué)編]， Hu did not endorse Wangs doctrine of intuitive knowledge， and believing that Wangs doctrine of intuitive knowledge was different from Menciuss doctrine of intuitive knowledge， he expressed his doubt about Wangs extending intuitive knowledge.

In the Great Learning， it is zhi zhi 致知 （extending knowledge）， while now they use zhi liangzhi. Could it be that there are two different zhi 知？ As there exists only one li 理 （principle）， so there exists only one knowledge which should be extended. When they say “the intuitive knowledge seems unnecessary to be extended，” this means that innocent children can extend their knowledge naturally by themselves. But when they say “they extend it so as to make themselves never lose their intuitive knowledge，” does this not mean “they extend it so as to make themselves never lose their original mind”？ Is this not confusing？ Is it necessary to mention “intuitive knowledge”？ Their so called intuitive knowledge is nothing but knowledge itself.

Hu shared the opinion of Lü that knowledge pertained to Heavenly principle （天理）， and it possessed the attribute of being intuitive， so the term “intuitive knowledge” was tautological. Since， according to him， intuitive knowledge was possessed by humankind a priori， it did not need a posteriori effort to extend it， and in this sense， in the expression “extending intuitive knowledge” there is a logical contradiction. Hu here ignored Wang Yangmings idea that the a priori “intuitive” did not necessarily lead to the a posteriori “intuitive，” and the veiling of the “intuitive” caused by the profane in human life was the very reason why the a priori “intuitive” was lost. It is because of this ignorance that Hu also distanced himself from Wang in regard to his understanding of the investigation of things.

Difference on the Concept of Investigating Things [87]

Wang Yangming， in his early years， tried to understand Zhu Xis concept of investigating things， but felt perplexed by it. On the basis of his study of the ancient text of the Great Learning， Wang suspected that Zhus Interpretation of the Great Learning [大學(xué)章句] fell short of revealing the original intention of the Confucian classic. In 1508， Wang attained a thorough understanding of Confucian philosophy at Longchang and this unraveled his perplexity over the concept of investigating things. He said， “I understand the doctrine of the sage that tells me my nature is self-sufficient， and I was wrong to look for principles in things and affairs.” According to his understanding， the “investigating” means rectifying and the “things” refers to affairs. Thus， his explanation of the concept is rectifying the will， that is， setting right what is not right in the mind so that the mind can return to the rightness possessed by the original substance.

However， after Wang proposed his explanation of investigating things， it was called into question by a number of Neo-Confucians belonging to the school of principle. For example， Lü Nan， who inherited Zhu Xis theory of investigating things and extending knowledge， reiterated that investigating things was nothing but probing the principle to the utmost. Here， “principle” does not refer to objective knowledge in the usual sense， nor to the transcendental Heavenly principle， but rather the principle underlying daily activities and behaviors. Therefore， he was opposed to Wang and his followers who understood investigating things as rectifying the mind. Furthermore， he criticized Luo Jinxi 羅近溪 （1515–1588） who proposed that “intuitive knowledge was ready-made，” for his theory further misled the later Yangming scholars who were lost in the bad practice of seeking for sudden enlightenment but slighting gongfu and practice. According to Lü， “The Way advocated by the Confucian sages was very simple， plain， and easy， which only needed one to practice it in his daily activities and behaviors， and whatever theory preached anything occult， elusive， and too high to be reachable was heretical.”

A detailed record of the discussion on the question of investigating things between Hu Zuanzong and Wang Yangming can be found in Hus Wishing for Learning. Their conversation indicates that they had some common ground over that question， but it does not follow that Hu agreed completely with Wangs opinion of investigating things. According to Hu， Wang was wrong when he understood “things” as will， for they were two separate concepts which were not related to each other at all. Wang explained “things” as “things in the will，” and took them as the object of investigating. To him， since this object entered into a substantial relationship with the subject in the latters cognition and practice， it acquired meaning for humankind. In Hus sense， the “things” refers to the things in the physical world， which involves both the known part and the unknown part， and in the unknown part， there is no meaning to speak of. In this regard， their difference is mainly concerned with their different understandings of the denotation and connotation of “things.”

As Wang explained， the “investigating” and “things” mean respectively rectifying and affairs， and he defined the “affairs” as what the will dwells in. In his sense， investigating things means rectifying what is not right in the mind. Thus， he replaced the cognitive function played by investigating things in Zhu Xis sense with the simple and rapid function of setting right the immoral consciousness. In light of Wangs logic， the things are where the will dwells and the arousing and functioning of the mind concern it. This means that extending knowledge occurs before investigating things. As the function of the will， rectifying plays at the same time the roles of extending knowledge， making the will sincere， and rectifying the mind， thus making it unnecessary for one to pursue learning by following the “three items and eight steps” （三綱八目） as Confucianism advocated. For this reason， Hu criticized Wangs explanation of investigating things for its neglecting probing external things and turning the pursuit of learning completely into an internal psychological activity， and he blamed its destructive and subversive deviation from the traditional interpretation of investigating things transmitted in the Confucian classics.

Difference on the Relationship between Knowledge and Action [88]

In 1509， the second year after Wang Yangming had his thorough realization of the Confucian philosophy at Longchang， he put forward his theory of knowledge and action in unity （知行合一）. In that year， Lü Nan served as an official in the capital. One year later， he submitted a memorial to the throne against Liu Jin， the powerful eunuch， and to avoid political persecution， he resigned on the pretext of illness and then returned to his hometown. Thenceforth， he made clear his opinion on Wang Yangmings theory of knowledge and action while discussing academic issues with Zhan Ruoshui 湛若水 （1466–1560）.

Zhan was the official in charge of the highest imperial civil examination Lü Nan took and passed. In his pursuit of learning， Lü benefited much from Zhan， and actually， he conceived his theory of “knowledge being prior to action” under Zhans influence. In his opinion， Zhans theory of “advancing knowledge and action side by side” could be adopted to remedy Wangs theory of “knowledge and action in unity.” However， Lü misunderstood Wang slightly here， for Wang never treated knowledge and action as two separate things， but highlighted their unity. As Wang said， “Knowledge is the direction for action and action is the gongfu of knowledge. Knowledge is the beginning of action， and action the completion of knowledge.” Of knowledge and action， Wang attached more importance to action. “There have never been people who know but do not act， for those who are supposed to know but do not act simply do not yet know.” In essence， Zhans “advancing knowledge and action side by side” was another expression of Wangs “knowledge and action in unity.” Therefore， Lüs agreement with Zhans theory of advancing knowledge and action side by side can be seen as his indirect agreement with Wangs theory of knowledge and action in unity.

Lü Nans understanding of Wang Yangmings theory of knowledge and action in unity is not based on his direct reading of Wangs works but on some indirect sources， that is， some hearsay information and even misreading of Wangs theory held by later Yangming scholars. Wangs basic idea was to stress gongfu and action， emphasizing the manifestation of the original substance through gongfu， but sometimes indeed Wang expounded the original substance of intuitive knowledge as something too elusive and mysterious. In particular， his affirmation of Wang Jis theory of four no-distinctions led directly to the left-wing Yangming scholars pursuing a direct enlightenment which transcended the original substance， neglecting the requirement for accumulating effects by making simple and superficial efforts persistently. Thus， those scholars were lost in the bad practice of pursuing what was empty， mysterious， visionary， and far away， treating it as their final destination. By contrast， Lüs study of humanity （仁學(xué)） is characterized by his saying little of the original substance and his emphasizing gongfu and practice whenever and wherever. Therefore， from his own standpoint， he warned other scholars against too much talk about the elusive original substance of intuitive knowledge. His contribution lay in reminding them of the possible negative consequences caused by the doctrine of intuitive knowledge and rectifying its deviation. Later， in the transition from the Ming dynasty to the Qing dynasty （1644–1911）， when some scholars of the Guanzhong school criticized the empty and shallow academic style taken up by the later Yangming scholars， their scholarship was under direct influence from Lü， who cherished and displayed the sincere and earnest spirit of the Guanzhong school in its pursuit of learning.

Hu Zuanzong， in his Wishing for Learning， refuted point by point Wang Yangmings exposition of his theory of knowledge and action. From Hus arguments， it is obvious that Hu was very familiar with Wangs exposition on the question of knowledge and action， as well as Wangs letters where he discussed that question with other scholars. In Hus opinion， knowledge and action should not be integrated as one but rather be seen as two interrelated processes. As for the simile “[one] hates what smells bad or loves what looks beautiful，” which Wang employed when he explained his view of knowledge and action， Hu only attributed the “hate” and “l(fā)ove” to the category of knowledge， and to put that knowledge into the practice of action one had to make some effort. If one had that knowledge but failed to act （that is， he did not go beyond the step of knowing）， it meant that he did not complete the entire process of knowing and acting. In this regard， Hu noted that， to complete the entire process of knowing and acting， their subject had to enter into a substantial practical relationship with the object of his knowledge and action. “When one has not drawn near to what looks beautiful and has not kept far away from what smells bad， then it should not be said that he has acted，” said Hu. Wang Yangmings disciple Xu Ai 徐愛 （1487–1518） raised questions over his proposition that knowledge and action were a unity. When explaining his theory to Xu， Wang cited coldness， hunger， loyalty， and filial piety as examples. In this regard， Hu stood on the side of Xu and affirmed that knowledge and action were clearly two separate things. For if lacking the necessary conditions， despite having knowledge of coldness and hunger and despite having knowledge of loyalty and filial piety， one could never put the knowledge into action， then this could not be said to be his action. As Wang said，

The reason why I proposed my theory of knowledge and action in unity is that recent scholars have tended to separate them as two different things， that is， pursuing knowledge before putting it into action. However， deplorably， they would only end up with no action at all for all their life. Thus， I have had to use it to rectify their deviation and correct their bad practices.

Denying Wang Yangmings theory of knowledge and action in unity， Hu asked， “To know what one should know and do what one should do—is there anything that the ancients did against their will？ Anything that they had to rectify and correct？”

In a word， on the relationship of knowledge and action， the main difference between the Guanzhong Confucians and Wang Yangming lies in whether they should be seen as a unity or treated as two separate processes. Despite the theoretical defect with Wangs theory of knowledge and action as a unity， it was somewhat reasonable in that it displayed his anxiety about contemporary scholars， who separated them as two separate things and who eventually failed to turn to action. With their criticism targeting Wangs theory， the Guanzhong scholars， including Lü Nan and Hu Zuanzong， intended to highlight the importance of action， under the precondition of attaching importance to knowledge. In this regard， the Yangming school and the Guanzhong school shared some common ground in their theories. However， when Wang， under the premise of his theory of knowledge and action as a unity， claimed that “the moment an idea stirs， action occurs，” its theoretical insufficiency was obvious， and it became an object of denunciation from his opponents.

Difference on the Theory of Gongfu [90]

In the recorded discussions of Wang Yangming with other scholars and in his letters， there are abundant materials concerning the question of tranquility （jing 靜）. As recorded in the “Chronicle of Wang Shourens Life” [年譜]， in 1510， Wang “and his disciples sat in tranquility in a Buddhist temple， and he guided them to seek for personal understanding of the substance of nature， and they felt as if there was something accessible.” Though his gongfu of tranquility has a somewhat mysterious nature， he made it clear that，

It must be known that if one strives for the gongfu of tranquility but does not make any effort to restrain himself or herself， then when anything occurs， one will be at a loss. One must train and polish himself or herself in the actual affairs of life. Only in this way can the one stand firm and keep unperturbed whether in tranquility or in activity.

This is somewhat different from the Daoist or Buddhist gongfu in pursuit of tranquility. However， due to the later followers of Wang who made indiscriminate use of his concept of the gongfu of tranquility， many Confucian scholars questioned and criticized Wangs doctrine for its too strong tincture of Chan Buddhism.

For Lü Nan， Wangs gongfu theory laid too much emphasis on sitting in tranquility， which might lead to the danger of neglecting the learning of concrete knowledge.

Wang Yangming had experienced things and affairs of every kind， and in his old age， he took to sitting in tranquility and whenever his disciples came and asked questions of him， he would tell them to do as he did. How easy his Way was！ But this is not the Way of Confucius， who was fond of antiquity and earnest in seeking it there， forgot his food in his eager pursuit of knowledge， and was the whole night without sleeping， and who never slackened in asking questions of others about propriety， officialdom， and such things. When the Sage was so diligent and painstaking， how much more should other men be？ A scholar should exert himself in pursuit of learning day and night， and even by acting thus， he may fail to gain true knowledge， and even after gaining it， he may forget it.

The main target of Lü Nans criticism cited above was those later Yangming scholars who talked much about sudden enlightenment but ignored self-cultivation. Actually， many other disciples of Wangs had already started to criticize them. As recorded by Qian Dehong， in Chuyang （in modern Chuzhou， Anhui Province） where Wang Yangming once advocated his doctrine and assisted people by teaching them the practice of sitting in tranquility， “there arose more and more scholars preaching empty views for the sake of offbeat novelty，” and Qian blamed them for their “merely sitting in tranquility but making no effort to examine and restrain themselves.” Huang Wan 黃綰 （1477–1551） also denounced those Yangming scholars for their “indulgence and lack of self-restraint.” Of his disciples， Qian and Huang were two who Wang thought highly of and their ideas to some extent represented Wangs own opinion on those topics.

Yang Jue 楊爵 （1493–1549） and Qian Dehong were both imprisoned for years， and for three years during their imprisonments they kept in contact and discussed academic issues. Yang accepted Qians suggestion for the gongfu of tranquility， which can be demonstrated by the records Yang made.

At the beginning of the night， I would sit in tranquility and make some examination of my words and deeds in the daytime. Having read Sima Guangs 司馬光 （1019–1086） discussion on the essentials of exerting the mind to the utmost and conducting oneself， I began by not talking nonsense. . . . With mental tranquility， I am able to know the springs of things， while if the mind is caught by disturbance， then it counts the perilous as safety and the calamitous as profit.

But from the letters Qian wrote to Yang to discuss academic questions， it can be known that Yang called into question Wang Yangmings opinion that “the mind stirs when acted on by things.” In a letter， Qian also said， “Our teacher has left us for a long time， and I have no way to know whether what I heard about his teachings is what he really meant to say. Thus， today I can do nothing but confirm them by using my mind.” As regards the question concerned here， Yang Jue seemed inconsistent， but considering his circumstances in prison， we can understand the possibility and necessity of his gongfu by sitting in tranquility. Meanwhile， when Yang Jue， a Guanzhong scholar， distanced himself from Wang Yangming and adhered to the Guanzhong schools tradition of practicing personally the Confucian code of conduct， this conforms to the characteristic of the school.

Of those Confucian scholars who were Wangs contemporaries， Ma Li was the harshest critic of Wangs doctrine. His “Letter Submitted to Master Luo Zhengan” [上羅整庵先生書] is the most important document for studying his thought and his academic difference from Wang Yangming. In the letter， Ma saw Wang and his disciples definitely as “followers of Chan Buddhism.” When it comes to how to understand the concept of keeping watchful while alone stated in the Doctrine of the Mean， Ma argued： “One should examine himself whenever there is any subtle spring of anything in his mind so as to prevent it from becoming vile and selfish and should keep cautious and apprehensive when in supreme tranquility so as to preserve the substantial principle.” The concept of hidden and subtle knowledge accessible only by keeping watchful while alone highlights the effort for moral practice of exerting nature to the utmost， practicing in person， preserving the mind， and examining oneself， and this what is meant by the approach of honoring moral nature， which naturally should not be neglected in light of the Confucian theory of gongfu. As for following the path of inquiry and study， pointing at the inclination among many later Yangming scholars to preach the pursuit of sudden enlightenment while ignoring self-cultivation， Ma was critical， saying，

Nowadays， a rampant far-fetched argument claims that the sudden attainment of sagehood can be made and reading books may as well be dropped. They are self-indulgent， presumptuous， usurping， and pretentious even more than Yang Zhu 楊朱 （ca. 395–335） and Mo Di 墨翟 （468–376）！ This vile stream actually started from Wang Yangming who was the first to advocate it.

Though what Ma said against this inclination among the later followers of Wang Yangming was troubled by his misunderstanding to some extent of Wang himself and his scholarship， his criticism was not groundless.

Conclusion [91]

On the whole， in the middle Ming dynasty， the Guanzhong scholars were tolerant in their attitude toward Wang Yangming and his teachings. This tolerance was due to， on one hand， the academic open-mindedness of the Guangzhong school， and on the other， the Guanzhong scholars friendly contacts with Wang Yangming. By introducing his philosophy of the mind， Wang opened a new horizon for Ming Neo-Confucianism， making a contribution to correcting the fragmentary Zhu Xi studies of his time. Though most Guanzhong scholars followed Zhu Xi in their pursuit of Neo-Confucianism， they also made some criticisms and rectifications of Zhus doctrine. In this regard， they shared some common ground with Wang. However， Wangs theories of intuitive knowledge， extending knowledge， knowledge and action as one， and gongfu were troubled by some theoretical defects and drawbacks， and particularly， many later followers of Wang had a distorted understanding of his academic opinions. All these brought about an overall criticism within the middle Ming dynasty Confucians against Wang himself and his teachings. This was the historical background in which the Guanzhong scholars criticism against Wang was situated.

Bibliography of Cited Translations

Chan， Wing-tsit， trans. and comp. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton， NJ： Princeton University Press， 1963.

Henke， Frederick Goodrich， trans. The Philosophy of Wang Yangming. London and Chicago： The Open Court Publishing Co.， 1916.

Legge， James， trans. Analects. http：//ctext.org/analects， accessed May 12， 2020.

Translated by Wang Xiaonong