文/戴維·P.戈德曼 譯/楊樹鋒
By David P. Goldman
自1942年英國(guó)駐新加坡部隊(duì)向山下奉文投降以來(lái),西方對(duì)亞洲強(qiáng)國(guó)的觀點(diǎn)從未轉(zhuǎn)變?nèi)绱酥臁?015年中國(guó)股市泡沫破裂時(shí),西方主流觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為,一場(chǎng)堪比2008年美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)或2013年南歐準(zhǔn)經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰的債務(wù)危機(jī),將使中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮風(fēng)光不再。
[2]鑒于2017年中國(guó)股市以美元計(jì)流通股大盤上漲了43%(以基于摩根士丹利資本國(guó)際公司的交易所交易基金為基準(zhǔn)),西方觀點(diǎn)正在破產(chǎn)。橋水——世界最大的對(duì)沖基金——正為中國(guó)的投資渠道籌資。美國(guó)銀行預(yù)測(cè)亞洲股市將在此輪牛市中翻番。2017年9月12日彭博社頭條標(biāo)題為:“對(duì)沖基金過(guò)去熱衷做空中國(guó),現(xiàn)在則不復(fù)從前”。
[3]但隨著美元于2014和2015年間對(duì)其他貨幣急劇升值,中國(guó)的利率也有上浮以維持人民幣對(duì)美元的高匯率。其后果是,2015年人民幣實(shí)際利率升至6%的高點(diǎn),而高企的實(shí)際利率抑制了工業(yè)價(jià)格并擠壓企業(yè)利潤(rùn),迫使企業(yè)大幅舉債償息。
[4] 2015年8月,人民幣對(duì)美元貶值,這是一個(gè)讓中國(guó)借款人用本幣替代償還美元債務(wù)的信號(hào)。他們拋售約1萬(wàn)億美元的本幣用來(lái)購(gòu)入美元償債,同時(shí)中國(guó)人民銀行則向他們售出美元,回收人民幣。
[5]中國(guó)官方外匯儲(chǔ)備下降了1萬(wàn)億美元,而企業(yè)美元債也下降同樣金額,因此——正如國(guó)際清算銀行(以及筆者)在2016年所指出——中國(guó)的凈債權(quán)狀況幾乎沒(méi)什么變化。實(shí)際上中國(guó)凈資本外流微乎其微,抑或根本沒(méi)有發(fā)生,然而西方投資界和經(jīng)濟(jì)專家將此次資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表調(diào)整誤讀為資本外逃。
[6]截至2017年初,中國(guó)的生產(chǎn)價(jià)格上升,實(shí)際利率下降,外儲(chǔ)亦穩(wěn)定下來(lái);企業(yè)利潤(rùn)飆漲,企業(yè)杠桿縮短,大盤欣欣向榮。
[7]投資者對(duì)中國(guó)股市的看法轉(zhuǎn)變只能算剛開始,然而美國(guó)企業(yè)界對(duì)中國(guó)長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)一直看多。同時(shí),中國(guó)公司在全球電子產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)份額從2012年的30%增長(zhǎng)到2016年的近60%,而到2017年底,這個(gè)比例將增至87%。中國(guó)是世界上最大的電子元器件市場(chǎng),任何美國(guó)企業(yè)都無(wú)法承受不在此大舉布局的代價(jià)。
[8]特朗普總統(tǒng)曾否決收購(gòu)萊迪思半導(dǎo)體的項(xiàng)目,因而登上頭條。這本不該發(fā)生。萊迪思是二線公司,而且生產(chǎn)線已經(jīng)移師亞洲。但是作為進(jìn)入中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的條件,美國(guó)頂尖技術(shù)公司向中國(guó)出售傳家寶早已行之有年。
[9]正如《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》2017年8月4日所報(bào)道:
為進(jìn)入中國(guó)市場(chǎng),美國(guó)公司不得不轉(zhuǎn)讓技術(shù),設(shè)立合資公司,降低價(jià)格并且栽培本土玩家。這些舉措構(gòu)筑了中國(guó)宏偉藍(lán)圖的基石,即讓中國(guó)公司掌控核心技術(shù)領(lǐng)域,比如人工智能和半導(dǎo)體……隱憂在于,這些與中國(guó)合作的美國(guó)公司可能在作繭自縛,并把關(guān)鍵技術(shù)拱手相讓。
AMD和惠普正與中國(guó)公司合作開發(fā)服務(wù)器芯片,為自家產(chǎn)品制造對(duì)手。英特爾則正與中國(guó)合作制造高端移動(dòng)芯片,與高通競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。IBM已同意轉(zhuǎn)讓能讓中國(guó)挺進(jìn)暴利的銀行大型機(jī)業(yè)務(wù)的寶貴技術(shù)。
[10]數(shù)字時(shí)代的每項(xiàng)重要發(fā)明都來(lái)自美國(guó),從集成電路到半導(dǎo)體激光、太陽(yáng)能電池、平板顯示器、傳感器和發(fā)光二極管。除了集成電路,目前全球電子工業(yè)元器件的全部產(chǎn)出幾乎都來(lái)自亞洲,而且中國(guó)正展開一項(xiàng)追趕計(jì)劃,力圖成為世界半導(dǎo)體生產(chǎn)大國(guó)。
[11]干預(yù)美國(guó)公司向中國(guó)的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓將危及中短期營(yíng)收。在中國(guó)的崛起中,美國(guó)公司正活得有滋有味,公司首席執(zhí)行官們擔(dān)憂的是未來(lái)五年的股價(jià),而不是十年后美國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)地位。
[12]總體而言,西方分析家對(duì)中國(guó)萬(wàn)億級(jí)的“一帶一路”倡議以前頗不以為然。不過(guò),就在去年,新鋪設(shè)的鐵路線已經(jīng)連接了中國(guó)和伊朗、土耳其,由此直達(dá)西歐,極大降低了歐亞大陸運(yùn)輸?shù)臅r(shí)間和成本。目前有兩條聯(lián)通伊朗的鐵路線在運(yùn)營(yíng)。
[13] 9月6日,首列駛向德黑蘭的火車從中國(guó)西北部寧夏回族自治區(qū)首府銀川出發(fā),歷經(jīng)15日抵達(dá)伊朗首都,僅用海運(yùn)時(shí)間的一半。10月,連接中國(guó)和土耳其及南高加索的巴庫(kù)—第比利斯—卡爾斯鐵路線投入運(yùn)營(yíng)。中國(guó)已是土耳其最大的進(jìn)口來(lái)源地。
[14]因此,一度為人忽略的西部變成了中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)最具活力的地區(qū)。根據(jù)米爾肯研究院近期研究,中國(guó)發(fā)展最快的城市是成都,一個(gè)位于四川省、人口1230萬(wàn)的大都會(huì)。能夠在地圖上找到成都的西方人寥寥無(wú)幾,而這恰好證明“一帶一路”倡議開局順利。
[15]鐵路線搭建西亞通往北京的紐帶。中國(guó)公司可以借此將元器件打包裝進(jìn)集裝箱發(fā)往土耳其的生產(chǎn)線,由當(dāng)?shù)氐统杀緞诹M裝,再進(jìn)而出口到歐洲和非洲。來(lái)自中國(guó)的數(shù)字革命與“一帶一路”倡議交相輝映。伴隨著移動(dòng)寬帶在境內(nèi)無(wú)遠(yuǎn)弗屆的觸角,中國(guó)是首個(gè)從現(xiàn)金支付過(guò)渡到數(shù)字支付的新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體。
[16]像阿里巴巴和騰訊這樣的公司將農(nóng)村地區(qū)帶入全球經(jīng)濟(jì)市場(chǎng)。憑借馬云的螞蟻金服這樣的平臺(tái),曾經(jīng)靠口糧田自給自足或在菜場(chǎng)站攤的中國(guó)人正蛻變成手持資本市場(chǎng)門票的企業(yè)家,通過(guò)阿里巴巴行銷全球。
[17]有了中國(guó)的示范和技術(shù),土耳其計(jì)劃在2023年成為無(wú)現(xiàn)金社會(huì)。中國(guó)現(xiàn)在制造了全球90%的智能手機(jī)。在新興市場(chǎng),中國(guó)的低成本手機(jī)生產(chǎn)商正形成稱雄之勢(shì)。谷歌新近與中國(guó)手機(jī)制造商小米組建合資企業(yè),在印度市場(chǎng)營(yíng)銷中端、高性能智能機(jī)。
[18]中國(guó)也在重塑周邊經(jīng)濟(jì)。其戰(zhàn)略影響顯見(jiàn)而又深遠(yuǎn)。土耳其現(xiàn)在是向東朝中國(guó)看齊,而非向西朝歐洲看齊。長(zhǎng)期仰仗中國(guó)規(guī)避西方禁運(yùn)的伊朗,其油氣開采愈發(fā)倚賴中資。
[19]美國(guó)在西亞的影響力正在快速消解。土耳其的北約成員國(guó)身份現(xiàn)在徒有其名。它剛從俄羅斯訂購(gòu)了S-400防空系統(tǒng),視北約抗議如無(wú)物。由于敘利亞庫(kù)爾德武裝的勝利將促進(jìn)其在伊朗和土耳其境內(nèi)的獨(dú)立運(yùn)動(dòng),土耳其還聯(lián)手伊朗進(jìn)行鎮(zhèn)壓。
[20]突然之間,從中國(guó)南海到博斯普魯斯海峽,美國(guó)每有行動(dòng)都會(huì)感受到中國(guó)的影響。這和山下奉文在馬來(lái)西亞叢林中的進(jìn)擊又不等同。但無(wú)論如何,美國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層的軟弱、自滿和無(wú)能,已然超越了當(dāng)年駐守新加坡英軍傳說(shuō)中的愚蠢。 □
Economic boom continues with electronics industry domination and infrastructure growth through trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative.伴隨著電子產(chǎn)業(yè)稱雄和萬(wàn)億級(jí)“一帶一路”倡議下基建增長(zhǎng),(中國(guó))經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)繁榮。
Not since the British garrison at Singapore surrendered to Tomoyuki Yamashita in 1942 has Western opinion of an Asian power changed so fast.When China’s 2015 stock market bubble popped, prevailing Western opinion held that China’s economic boom would flame out in a debt crisis comparable to America’s subprime disaster of 2008 or the near collapse of Europe’s southern tier in 2013.
[2] Now that China’s tradeable stock market has risen by 43% during 2017 in US dollar terms (with the MSCI-based ETF as a benchmark), Western opinion is melting up. Bridgewater, the world’s largest hedge fund, is raising money for a China investment vehicle. Bank of America now predicts Asian stocks will double in the present bull run. “Hedge Funds Used to Love Shorting China.Now, Not So Much,” declared a Bloomberg headline Sept. 12.
[3] But as the US dollar rose sharply against all other currencies during 2014 and 2015, the Chinese interest rates also rose in order to maintain the RMB’s high exchange rate with the dollar. This brought real interest rates to a peak of 6% in 2015, and high real interest rates suppressed industrial prices and squeezed corporate profits, forcing enterprises to borrow heavily to pay debt service.
[4] In August 2015 the RMB dropped against the dollar, a signal to China’s borrowers to pay back dollar debts and replace them with local-currency loans.They sold roughly $1 trillion of local currency to buy dollars with which to pay back their dollar loans, and the PBOC sold them dollars for local currency.
[5] China’s of ficial reserves fell by $1 trillion and corporate dollar debt fell by$1 trillion, so that China’s net creditor position was little changed, as Bank for International Settlements economists pointed out in 2016 (as did this writer).There was little or no net capital outflow, but the Western investment community and economics profession mis-took this balance-sheet adjustment for capital flight.
[6] By early 2017, producer prices were rising, real interest rates were falling and Chinese reserves stabilized.Corporate profits surged, corporate leverage declined and stock prices boomed.
[7] Investor opinion about the Chinese stock market has only begun to change, but corporate America has been bullish on China all along. Chinese companies’ share of global electronics production, meanwhile, rose from 30%in 2012 to nearly 60% in 2016, and this share will rise to 87% by the end of the present year. China is the world’s largest market for electronic components and no American company can afford not to have a major presence there.
[8] President’s Trump veto of a purchase of Lattice Semiconductor drew headlines, but shouldn’t have. Lattice is a second-tier firm whose production facilities have already moved to Asia.But America’s top of the line tech companies have been selling their family jewels to China for years, as a condition of entry into the Chinese market.
[9] As the New York Times reported Aug. 4, 2017:
To gain access to the Chinese market,American companies are being forced to transfer technology, create joint ventures, lower prices and aid homegrown players. Those efforts form the backbone of China’s ambitious plan to ensure that China’s companies dominate core areas of technology like artificial intelligence and semiconductors… The worry is that by teaming up with China, American companies could be sowing the seeds of their own destruction, as well as handing over critical technology.
Advanced Micro Devices and Hewlett Packard Enterprise are working with Chinese companies to develop server chips, creating rivals to their own product. Intel is working with the Chinese to build high-end mobile chips, in competition with Qualcomm. IBM has agreed to transfer valuable technology that could enable China to break into the lucrative mainframe banking business.
[10] America produced every important invention in the digital age, from integrated circuits to semiconductor lasers, solar cells, flat panel displays, sensors and light-emitting diodes. Except for integrate circuits, Asia now produces virtually all the world’s output of these building-blocks of the electronics industry, and China has a crash program underway to become the world’s major producer of semiconductors.
[11] Interfering with US companies’tech transfer to China would hurt revenues in the short- and medium-term.US companies are making a good living on the rise of China, and CEO’s worry about their stock price during the next five years, not about America’s competitive position in 10 years.
[12] Western analysts in general dismissed China’s trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During the past year, though, new rail lines have lined China to Iran, Turkey and from there to Western Europe, drastically reducing the time and cost of shipping across the Eurasian continent. Two rail links to Iran are now in operation.
[13] On September 6, the first train to Teheran departed from Yinchuan,capital of northwest China’s Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, with a 15-day journey time to Iran’s capital, half as long as sea transport. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway linking China with Turkey and the South Caucasus begins operations in October. China already is Turkey’s largest source of imports.
[14] As a result, once-neglected areas of Western China have become the most dynamic zones in the China’s economy.According to a recent study by the Milken Institute, the fastest-growing city in China is Chengdu, a metropolis of 12.3 million people in Sichuan province. Few Westerners can find Chengdu on a map, but it exemplifies the initial success of BRI.
[15] Rail links bind Western Asia to Beijing. Chinese companies will be able to pack components into containers for assembly by low-cost Turkish labor, and further export to Europe and Africa. The digital revolution coming from China is as important as BRI. China is the first emerging economy to shift from cash to digital payments, as mobile broadband reaches the outlying parts of the Chinese economy.
[16] Companies like Alibaba and Tencent draw rural areas into a global economic marketplace. Chinese who once tilled subsistence plots or manned market stalls are turning into entrepreneurs with access to capital markets through such platforms as Jack Ma’s Ant Financial, and global sales through Alibaba.
[17] Turkey plans to become a cashless society by 2023, using the Chinese example and Chinese technology. China now makes 90% of the world’s smartphones. Its low-cost handset producers stand to dominate emerging markets.Google has just established a joint venture with China’s handset manufacturer Xiaomi to market mid-range, highperformance smartphones in India.
[18] China is transforming the economics on its periphery. This has obvious and deep strategic implications.Turkey now looks East to China rather than West to the European Community for its economic future. Iran, long dependent on Chinese trade to circumvent the Western embargo, is increasingly dependent on Chinese investment for oil and gas extraction.
[19] American influence in Western Asia is eroding quickly. Turkey is now a NATO member in name only; it has bought Russia’s S-400 air defense system over NATO protests, and it has allied with Iran to suppress Kurdish forces in Syria whose success threatens to strengthen Kurdish independence movements in Iran as well as Turkey.
[20] Suddenly, from the South China Sea to the Bosporus, the United States cannot move without brushing up against Chinese in fluence. It’s not quite the same as Yamashita’s march across the Malaysian jungle. But if anything,the fecklessness, complacency and incompetence of America’s leaders exceeds the fabled stupidity of the British at Singapore. ■