Chinese Attitudes towards the 1995—1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis

舒?zhèn)コ?/p>

（華中師范大學馬克思主義學院）

【Abstract】A visit to the United States by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui in June 1995 triggered the crisis. To response， from August 1995 until March 1996 the Peoples Liberation Army （PLA） conducted a series of war games and missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan. Some think tanks believe that China's military actions， belonging to radical reaction， intimidated the security of the region. But in my perspective， China was not preparing for war in 1995-1996.This crisis was just a case of Chinese coercive diplomacy， the result of a civil-military consensus.

【Key Words】1995—1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis Coercive Diplomacy

Peoples Liberation Army Military Leaders

Understanding the significance of the 1995—1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis

After two decades， the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis could well be considered a turning point in post-Cold War international relations. For the first time since the 1950s， the armed forces of the United States and China confronted each other in hostility.

In terms of Chinese realpolitik， this case seems to worth studying for two main reasons. First， the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis is the most plausible location for China to become embroiled in an armed conflict. After all， this crisis brought out a bad influence. As most western experts described， the world was warned of a looming China threat spearheaded by hawkish soldiers. More significantly， Chinese researchers were inclined to the point that the Taiwan issue is the one dispute most likely to drag China to the brink of war in the foreseeable future. It is profound to understand why China chose this strategic actions showing force. Is China preparing for war in 1995-1996？ Is the military leading the charge？ Second， the crisis may simply intensify the debate regarding contending policy options. It is how these debates are ultimately resolved that will determine the course of great-power relations， the fate of Taiwan， and regional stability. How should Chinas saber rattling be interpreted？ What roles do Chinese military leaders play？

Understanding the attitudes of military leaders and PLA soldiers

I contend the crisis is a case of coercive diplomacy. An important distinction must be made between the terms “bellicose” and “hawkish”： the first refers to temperament while the latter refers to the mental readiness to resort to war. A bellicose leader is warlike in mindset-that is， predisposed to resort to war in most situations. In contrast， a hawkish leader is one who is prepared to use military means short of war， namely， saber rattling， brinkmanship， and threats of war to achieve a policy goal-in short， to practice coercive diplomacy. Of two terms， “bellicose” is misleading， because it gives the erroneous impression that PLA leaders were spoiling for a fight in the crisis or were warlike by temperament. “Hawkish” is the most accurate to use to describe the deeds of Chinese soldiers.

How should Chinas saber rattling be interpreted？ What roles do Chinese military leaders play？ There are two main nuanced and sophisticated interpretations in academic circles. First， China's response reflected a more aggressive， dangerous turn of policy by Beijing toward Taipei--a serious escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait that raised the specter of real war. The second interpretation is more figurative. It is that the response was an elaborately orchestrated and scripted Chinese opera-also the result of a consensus decision by civilian and military leaders. In the minds of Chinese military leaders， there was little danger of actual military conflict breaking out.

What are the main assumptions implied by each interpretation？ The first interpretation is that the military is the driving force behind China's hostile behavior feeds into the stereotype of soldier as warmonger. The second interpretation-crisis as opera-is a cultural explanation that fits with the orthodox view of China's strategic tradition. This interpretation is consistent with studies that emphasize that Chinese strategy and tactics since ancient times have consisted largely of seeking to win without fighting and of outwitting the opponent by ruse and stratagem instead of combat.

Anyhow， each interpretation appears to have a significant element of truth that the crisis does reflect a more hardline approach. The missile tests and war games were undertaken in deadly earnest， but from the beginning the exercises were meant to be strictly limited to a show of force with absolutely no plans to escalate to actual war. Research on other cases of coercive diplomacy suggests a Huntingtonesque “Chinese military mind” in which soldiers possess a conservative， pessimistic outlook and exhibit a clear reluctance to use force. （Samuel P. Huntington， 1957） Betts keeps this point that soldiers tend to be no more eager， and often much less eager， than statesmen to resort to military action. （Richard K. Betts， 1991） While it does seem that the PLA was at the forefront of pushing a hardline approach on Taiwan in mid-1995， by October， a high-level consensus among civilian and military leaders had emerged that a tougher approach was needed. For instance， President Jiang Zemin， Premier Li Peng， and National People's Congress （NPC） Chairman Qiao Shi all separately issued very stern statements on Taiwan on mid-October 1995.

I appreciate that PLA figures are in part venting their frustrations and in part expressing their patriotism. Two factors help explain the hawkishness of military leaders： coercive diplomacy tends to be problematic for soldiers； the Taiwan issue evokes intensely emotional nationalism among soldiers.

Understanding civil-military relations

Coercive diplomacy is difficult enough for statesmen to practice without factoring in civil-military relations. In coercive diplomacy： “force is used in an exemplary， demonstrative manner， in discrete and controlled increments to induce the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict.”（Alexander George， 1971）It is complicated further by the fact that diplomats and soldiers see coercive diplomacy from very different perspectives. （Thomas A. Fabyanic， 1981） While both prefer a solution short of war， statesmen favor subtle signals and gradual increases in the pressure applied to an opponent in order to deter or compel them. Soldiers， in contrast， prefer to send a strong， direct， and unambiguous message promptly-a rapid， massive show of force to bring the opponent swiftly to his senses.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs （MFA） responses to Taiwanese actions and what was perceived as direct U.S. interference were in the PLA's view weak and indecisive. The MFA's escalation of sanctions in the summer of 1995 seemed pathetic and ineffective： the cancellation of ministry-level visits between China and the United States， the recall of Beijings ambassador from Washington each got no response. The White House had suddenly reversed itself in late May 1995 and issued Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui a visa. In Beijing's view， Lee's visit marked a significant change in U.S. policy. PLA leaders were particularly dissatisfied with the existing criteria for using force against Taiwan： a formal declaration of independence by Taipei and direct support or intervention by an outside power. So it is easy to understand China later issues the document， stating that China would reserve the right to use force not only in the event of a formal declaration of independence or foreign military intervention， but also if Taipei authorities “refuse” to engage in negotiations with Beijing leading to unification. From the PLA's perspective， it was time to show more stick and less carrot.

Understanding intensely emotional nationalism among soldiers

From where I can see in the history， that national unification is a deeply cherished dream by virtually all mainland Chinese is widely recognized. Taiwan， of course， is the ultimate prize for Beijing. After the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and the return of Macao in 1999， only Taiwan remains just beyond Beijing's reach.

Any analysts could not overlook that soldiers in any country tend to be extremely patriotic. Not only is the PLA's attitude toward Taiwan colored by intense nationalism， but it is also affected by the deep-seated belief that the military bears a special responsibility for achieving unification. There were factors motivating harsh rhetoric from soldiers. Military men were playing the role of hawks because it was in part expected of them and in part it was much to their advantage to do so. The virulent and aggressive public statements are plays to public opinions. The cause of reunification with Taiwan is strongly supported by ordinary Chinese people， and most would back a military attack on Taiwan if it were rationalized as preventing Taiwan from separating from China.

Conclusion

The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis stands as a largely successful instance of coercive diplomacy by Beijing because China achieved most of its goals without resorting to actual warfare： getting Taipei and Washington to take China's warnings seriously and resulting in a more chastened and less boisterous Taiwanese independence movement， without war breaking out. As Thomas J. Christensen demonstrated out， China's general success in the 1995-1996 crisis contrasts with a rather dismal record of failure in other cases of coercive diplomacy. Korea （1950）， India （1962）， and Vietnam （1979） are obvious examples of failure， because in each instance war broke out. （Thomas J. Christensen， 1992）

Leaders， while hawkish， were not bellicose as some have made them out to be. Their behavior is explained partly by soldiers' response to coercive diplomacy and partly by the intense nationalist feelings aroused by Taiwan.

References：

[1]Alexander George， “The Development of Doctrine and Strate-gy”， （Boston： 1971）

[2]Richard K. Betts， Soldiers， Statesmen， and Cold War Crises，（New York： Columbia University Press， 1991）

[3]Samuel P. Huntington， The Soldier and the State： The Theoryand Politics of Civil-Military Relations （Cambridge， MA：Belknap Press， 1957）， chap.3

[4]Thomas A. Fabyanic， “The Grammar and Logic of Conflict”，（1981）

[5]Thomas J. Christensen， “Threats， Assurances， and the LastChance for Peace”， （1992）